JUDGMENT S. Ravindra Bhat, J.-The writ petitioner impugns an order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) partly allowing his appeal, under Section 169 of the (then existing) Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereafter "the Act"). 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner appears to have acquired a residential flat in the Narwana Co-operative Group Housing Society (hereafter called "the society"). The society was apparently served with a consolidated notice for assessment for house tax. The petitioner received a communication dated 24.2.1994, in respect of the assesment; he filed his response/objections to that on 8.3.1994. The Muncipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) acting through its Joint Assessor and Collector, issued a rectification order on 30.9.1997. In this, the rateable value fixed with effect from 18.7.1987was rectified and the tax payable for the period 1.12.1989 to 31.3.1996 was calculated on the basis of the new assesment. 3. The petitioner felt aggrieved; he preferred a statutory appeal to the ADJ. The grounds urged in support of the appeal were that notice was never issued to him; in the absence of individual notice, a consolidated appeal could not have been the basis of an assesment order. It was also averred that the assessment order was time barred, since the notice issued was for an earlier period, whereas the order was made only in 1997. The ASJ, after considering the submissions, concluded that the earlier consolidated notice was served on the society on 30.3.1991, which led to issuance of the order-cum-assessment dated 14.2.1994; that was rectified on 30.9.1997. This fixed the rateable value at different amounts for the period commencing from 1.12.1989 onwards. The ASJ held that the MCD should re-assess the property after giving due opportunity to the assessee. He therefore set aside the orders dated 14.2.1994 and 30.9.1997. The petitioner challenges that order. 4. It was contended by learned Counsel that the so-called order of 1994 was no order at all, as it was merely a notice of hearing. In the absence of a proper order, issued within time, the notice issued for the period commencing from 1987 could not be used to fasten liability for other periods which it did not obviously cover. It was also contended that the MCD could not have relied upon a collective, or consolidated notice, to found tax liability; it was incumbent upon it to issue notice to the asseee occupier concerned. 5. It was also contended that the MCD could not have relied upon a collective, or consolidated notice, to found tax liability; it was incumbent upon it to issue notice to the asseee occupier concerned. 5. The factual narrative and records disclose that the society was issued a collective notice in 1991. On the basis of information supplied by it subsequently about individuals, the petitioner was issued a notice/order dated 24.2.1994 requiring him to show why rateable value on cost method at Rs. 25,140/ - should not be finalized. The MCD also sought particulars about whether the flat was rented out and if so at what rate and also whether the petitioner had to say anything about the rateable value actually arrived at. No doubt the petitioner did not hear anything about the response given by him. However, the order (styled as a "rectification" order) was issued on 30.9.1997; this reduced the rateable value for different periods. 6. There is, at the first blush some merit in the contention raised by the petitioner that the notice could not have covered periods beyond which it was intended to be effective. That has been the interpretation placed by a Division Bench of this Court, in the judgment reported as M.C.D. v. Dharma Properties & Anr., 120 (2005) DLT 588 (DB). However, in this case, the consolidated notice was issued on 23.3.1991. The judgment of the Supreme Court, reported as Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Trigon Investments and Trading (Pvt) Ltd., 1996 (3) SCC 63, held that: "So far as transferee is concerned, therefore, Section 126 does not in any manner cut down his liability or exonerate him from the liability resting upon him by virtue of other provisions in Chapter VIII. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to go into the scope and purport of Section 126. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to go into the scope and purport of Section 126. It is enough to clarify that whatever its scope and purport, it does not have the effect of relieving a transferee of a land/building from the liability to pay property taxes duly assessed upon such land/building and that this liability extends even for the period prior to the transfer in his favour and such taxes can be recovered from him according to law." It was also held that the absence of notice to transfer the property, given to the MCD, did not relieve the transferee of the obligation to pay the tax, and that the provisions in Section 126 did not in any manner limit such liability. 7. In view of the above position, it is not possible to accept that the communication of 14.2.1994 was not an order, or that no valid notice for the period or periods had been issued. The consolidated notice issued to the society was sufficient for fixing liability. As regards the contention urged that the rectification order was without any authority, that too, in my opinion, cannot be gone into by the Court at this stage. In any case, the impugned order is one of remand. The petitioner has the liberty to raise all contentions, regarding the method or quantum of fixation of rateable value, subject to the above findings. 8. The petition therefore has to fail; it is dismissed. The matter is remitted to the assessing authority, for decision in accordance with law. No costs Petition dismissed.