JUDGMENT:- 1. This Suo Motu Contempt Petition has arisen on account of the non-compliance by the Respondent no.2 of the directions issued by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition nos. 5146 of 2006 and 5376 of 2006 which have been disposed of by judgment and order dated 9/10th August, 2006. The directions issued were in the context of the interpretation of rules that the Division Bench had arrived at in respect of the holding of the meeting to elect the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. In the context of the said interpretation, the Division Bench had issued the following directions:- " We direct that Secretary-Respondent no.4, in consultation with Respondent no.5, shall convene a meeting for elections of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, in accordance with Rules, 2005. The date of meeting shall be not before 23.8.2005 and in any case, meeting should be conducted before 31.8.2006 and not later than 31.8.2006." . It is needless to say that polling should follow after fifteen minutes time gap for withdrawal, as per Rules. . In view of the said directions it was incumbent for the Respondent no.4 i.e. the Respondent no.2 herein who was the then Mayor to have conducted the meeting and to transact the business on 31.8.2006 in the manner directed by this Court. Instead of conducting the meeting and transacting the business, the Respondent no.2 adjourned the meeting sine die thereby prima facie violating the orders passed by this court. The Respondent no.2 despite service of notice in the said Writ Petition no. 6385 of 2006 chose not to appear in the said Petition and in the light of the said fact this Court was constrained to issue a notice of suo motu contempt to the Respondent no.2 for showing wilful dis-obedience to the said judgment and order of this Court passed in the said two Writ Petitions nos. 5146 of 2006 and 5376 of 2006 dated 9/10th August, 2006. 2. After the issuance of notice for Suo Motu Contempt the Respondent no.2 i.e. Bhagwan Pralhad Fulsunder who was enjoined in terms of the directions to carry out the mandate of the said order dated 9/10th August, 2006 has now filed an Affidavit in reply in the above Suo Motu Contempt Petition. 2. After the issuance of notice for Suo Motu Contempt the Respondent no.2 i.e. Bhagwan Pralhad Fulsunder who was enjoined in terms of the directions to carry out the mandate of the said order dated 9/10th August, 2006 has now filed an Affidavit in reply in the above Suo Motu Contempt Petition. The Respondent no.2 has in the said affidavit in reply has stated the reasons, as to why he had to adjourn the said meeting sine die for electing the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The relevant excerpts from the said affidavit are reproduced hereinunder:- 3. Accordingly, by issuing notices meeting was convened for election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor. Said meeting was scheduled on 31 August 2006. Members of Indian National Congress and Nationalist Congress Party, by their representation dated 30th August, 2006, addressed to Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, directly and impliedly, expressed no confidence in deponent as well as functioning of deponent came to be doubted. Self-explanatory copy of representation submitted by members of Indian National Congress and Nationalist Congress Party, addressed to Commissioner of Ahmednagar Municipal Corporation, dated 30th August, 2006 is annexed with Petition and marked as Exh. "A" for kind perusal and ready reference of this Hon’ble Court." 4. Even then, to corner the deponent-out going Mayor-members of Indian National Congress and Nationalist Congress Party preferred to submit representation dated 30th August, 2006, thereby expressing dis-faith/No-Confidence. As meeting was scheduled on 31st August, 2006, I was unable to approach this Hon’ble Court even to express my feelings and/or to apply for modification of Judgment and Order dated 9/10th August, 2006, thereby getting relieved from responsibility to preside over the meeting." 5. Even excluding the un-parliamentary and abusive language, the entire tenor was to show dis-faith and to utilize the opportunity of meeting dated 31st August, 2006 to turndown image of deponent. Most insulting aspect was that these members were not having faith in deponent, therefore, I was shocked and mostly worried about meeting dated 31st August, 2006. I was not in a position to avoid the responsibility as I was under directions of the Hon’ble Court at the same time many members express their dis-faith and/or no-confidence in deponent. With all sincerity, deponent feels that in democratic process to preside the meeting, for conducting elections of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, even though a responsible job, its foundation is always a faith of members of House. With all sincerity, deponent feels that in democratic process to preside the meeting, for conducting elections of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, even though a responsible job, its foundation is always a faith of members of House. Once members express directly or indirectly that they don’t have faith, the presiding officer should vacate the chair respecting the feelings expressed by members." 6. Therefore, there left the only way for me to attain the meeting, preside over it and adjourn the same by expressing my feelings before the House, which a Supreme authority in Corporation, wherein I was enjoying post of respect i.e. Mayor. Therefore, while complying the directions of this Hon’ble Court I had followed respectable democratic principles and respected the feelings of members of the House, expressed by way of representation dated 30th August, 2006 at the same time followed and tried to comply directions of this Hon’ble Court, to the extent possible, as a common man, in given circumstances. 8. Even though I had taken every possible care to comply the directions of this Hon’ble Court in above referred two Writ Petitions as regards to elections of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, still I feel that there is some non-compliance on my part, more particularly to the extent of completion of election process of Mayoral elections on 31st August, 2006, which I could not complete because of no-confidence expressed by a group of members of House, therefore, I tender sincere and unconditional apology." . The sum and substance of what has been stated in the said paragraphs is that in view of the representation dated 30.8.2006 received from the members of the Indian National Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party, expressing dis-faith/no-confidence in the Respondent no.2 and in view of the pandemonium that had taken place at the time of the said meeting held on 31.8.2006, that the Respondent no.2 was helpless and was left with no alternative but to adjourn the meeting sine die. In the context of the directions of this Court contained in the said order dated 9/10th August, 2006 and in the context of the reply given by the Respondent no.2 it would have to be considered whether there has been a deliberate breach and violation of the directions contained in the said order by the Respondent no.2, in the manner in which he adjourned the said meeting. 3. 3. Since this is a Suo Motu Contempt Petition, it would be relevant to narrate the context in which the said directions were issued. The elections of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor was a contentious issue as is usually the case with the said posts. On the tenure of the earlier incumbents coming to an end in the year 2005, a meeting was held to elect the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor of the Ahmednagar Municipal Corporation. The said meeting was held on 30.6.2006 which commenced at 11.00 am. on the said day, it was presided over by the Respondent no.2, one Deep Narayan Chavan was elected as the Mayor. Thereafter it appears that another meeting was held at 4.00 pm. wherein one Sandeep Kotkar was elected as a Mayor. Both Deep Narayan Chavan and Sandeep Kotkar filed Writ Petitions in this Court for a declaration that the meeting held for electing the other person as Mayor be quashed and set aside meaning thereby that either of them be declared as Mayor. The legality and validity of the two meetings had therefore come up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in the said two Writ Petitions considering the rules governing the holding of meeting for election to the post of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor, this Court came to a conclusion that the elections of both Deep Narayan Chavan and Sandeep Kotkar, in the two meetings held on 30.6.2006 were un-sustainable and therefore directed the outgoing Mayor i.e. Respondent no. 2 to hold a fresh meeting on 31.8.2006 and issued the directions, the breach of which has given cause for the above Suo Motu Contempt Petition. 4. Prior to the issuance of the said directions observations made by the Division Bench in the said judgment in my view, are relevant in the context of the above Suo Motu Contempt Petition, which read as under:- ". Aspirants to democratic position of power, must honour democratic process. Those defeated or anticipating the defeat, must face the situation gracefully like King Porus and those aspiring to climb the ladder of power-position, must do so, by a route made available by law and no other means. Countermanding of election by now, is not a rarity and this one is a case which needs adoption of such a course. Those defeated or anticipating the defeat, must face the situation gracefully like King Porus and those aspiring to climb the ladder of power-position, must do so, by a route made available by law and no other means. Countermanding of election by now, is not a rarity and this one is a case which needs adoption of such a course. Having found that declarations of both the Petitioners as elected Mayors are vitiated by illegality, there is no option for them except going through the exercise again and this time, without indulging in any, other or new, irregularity or illegality. This may appear to be a situation like child being sent home for not having done his homework, but this is just because, as you so, so you reap." 5. I have heard Shri Y.S. Jahagirdar the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent no.2 pursuant to the Show cause notice issued to the Respondent no.2. The learned Senior Counsel drew my attention to the directions for the breach of which Contempt has been alleged. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that in sofar as the first two directions namely that the Respondent no.2 herein shall convene a meeting for elections of Mayor and Deputy Mayor is concerned, the said directions have been complied with as there is no dispute that the meeting was convened. So also the directions that the said meeting should be conducted before 31.8.2006 and not later than 31.8.2006 inasmuch as the said meeting was in fact held on 31.8.2006 and it is only the third part of the direction that polling should follow after fifteen minuets gap for withdrawal as per rules which the learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted has not been complied. The learned Senior counsel submitted that there was no wilful dis-obdience of the said directions but the said directions could not be complied with considering the situation that had arisen on the account of the representation dated 30.8.2006 and the situation prevailing in the house. The learned Senior counsel drew my attention to the representation dated 30.8.2006 made by the Members of the Indian National Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party to the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation. The learned Senior counsel drew my attention to the representation dated 30.8.2006 made by the Members of the Indian National Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party to the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that in view of the lack of faith and no confidence expressed by the said members in the Respondent no.2 as a Presiding Officer and in view of the pandemonium that took place in the house on the said date that the Respondent no. 2 exercised his discretion and adjourned the said meeting sine die. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the bonafides of the Respondent no.2 can be seen from the fact that immediately thereafter on 1.9.2006, he addressed a letter to the Commissioner to take up the issue with this Court and seek clarification which were followed by subsequent reminders dated 2.9.2006 and 3.9.2006. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that there was no wilful dis-obdience of the said order, and that it was merely a technical breach and therefore a lenient view should be taken of the matter. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that this Court is the best judge to assess whether the majesty of the law was undermined in the instant case. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in support of his submission that unless there is a wilful, deliberate and intentional flouting of the order passed by this Court, this Court would not exercise its’ jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 2862 in the matter of Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Government Employees in Public Enterprises and another v. Arvind Verma and others. The Apex Court in the facts of the said case held that since there was a genuine doubt about the interpretation of the order passed, it could not be said that there was a wilful and deliberate breach of the order of which contempt has been alleged. The Apex Court in the facts of the said case held that since there was a genuine doubt about the interpretation of the order passed, it could not be said that there was a wilful and deliberate breach of the order of which contempt has been alleged. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1999 SC 880 in the matter of Indian Airport Employees Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee and another, wherein it has been held that where the act alleged was bonafide and was based on an interpretation of orders of the Court and notification etc., it could not be said to amount to wilful dis-obdience of the orders of the Supreme Court. The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1999) 7 SCC page 569 in the matter of KapilDeo Prasad Sah and others v. State of Bihar and others. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment is material for the purpose of the present Contempt Petition and is reproduced hereinunder:- " 9. For holding the respondents to have committed contempt, civil contempt at that, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience of the judgment or order of the court. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear violation of the court’s order. Since notice of contempt and punishment for contempt is of far-reaching consequence, these powers should be invoked only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court’s order has been made out. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are to be properly understood and complied with. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience particularly when the attention of the person is drawn to the court’s orders and its implications. Disobedience of the court’s order strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice." . The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Appeal (Cri.) no. 321 of 2001 in the matter of Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, Bench Gwalior dated 31.5.2007. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice." . The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Appeal (Cri.) no. 321 of 2001 in the matter of Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, Bench Gwalior dated 31.5.2007. Paragraph 18 of the said judgment has been relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel which is reproduced hereinunder:- "18. This Court has repeatedly cautioned that the power to punish for contempt is not intended to be invoked or exercised routinely or mechanically, but with circumspection and restraint. Courts should not readily infer an intention to scandalize courts or lowering the authority of court unless such intention is clearly established. Nor should they exercise power to punish for contempt where mere question of propriety is involved. In Rizwan-ul-Hasan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh ( 1953 SCR 581 ), this Court reiterated the well-settled principle that jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice. Of late, a perception that is slowly gaining ground among public is that sometimes, some Judges are showing over sensitiveness with a tendency to treat even technical violations or unintended acts of contempt. It is possible that it is done to uphold that majesty of courts, and to command respect. But Judges, like everyone else, will have to earn respect. They cannot demand respect by demonstration of ’power’. Nearly two centuries ago, Justice John Marshall, the Chief Justice of American Supreme Court warned that the power of Judiciary lies, not in deciding cases, nor in imposing sentences, nor in punishing for contempt, but in the trust, confidence and faith of the common man. The purpose of the power to punish for criminal contempt is to ensure that the faith and confidence of the public in administration of justice is not eroded. Such power, vested in the High Courts, carries with it great responsibility. Care should be taken to ensure that there is no room for complaints of ostentatious exercise of power. The purpose of the power to punish for criminal contempt is to ensure that the faith and confidence of the public in administration of justice is not eroded. Such power, vested in the High Courts, carries with it great responsibility. Care should be taken to ensure that there is no room for complaints of ostentatious exercise of power. Three acts, which are often cited as examples of exercise of such power are : (i) punishing persons for unintended acts or technical violations, by treating them as contempt of court; (ii) frequent summoning of Government officers to court (to sermonize or to take them to task for perceived violations); and (iii) making avoidable adverse comments and observations against persons who are not parties. It should be remembered that exercise of such power, results in eroding the confidence of the public, rather than creating trust and faith in the judiciary. Be that as it may." 6. The learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that the Respondent no.2 has tendered his unconditional apology and even if this Court comes to conclusion that the Respondent no.2 has committed a contempt of the order dated 9/10th August, 2006 this Court would exercise it’s discretion and instead of imprisonment should impose a fine. In support of his said submission, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2001 CRI. L.J. 3927 in the matter of District and Sessions Judge, Aurangabad v. Deelip Balaram Bedekar and anr. Paragraph 9 and 10 of the said judgment are material and are reproduced hereinunder:- " 9. Learned counsel for both the contemners strenuously urged that in view of the contriteness and repentance expressed by the Contemners in their affidavits, the ends of justice would be satisfied if the un-conditional apology tendered by the contemners is accepted and the notices issued against them are discharged. We have reflected over their submission and make no bones in observing that we are not inclined to accept it." . It should be borne in mind that the majesty of law has to be maintained and it has to be ensured that the faith of the common man in Courts is sustained. If a soft view is taken in cases such as the instant, where, per se, contumacious statements are thoughtlessly published by newspapers, the faith of the common man in the Judiciary would be eroded. If a soft view is taken in cases such as the instant, where, per se, contumacious statements are thoughtlessly published by newspapers, the faith of the common man in the Judiciary would be eroded. And that, indeed, would be distressing. It is on account of this reason that we are not prepared to accept the unconditional apology set forth by the Contemners in their affidavits. 10. The question is whether in the instant case, a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of fine or both would meet the ends of justice. It is true, as we have seen earlier, that S. 12 of the said Act gives an option to the Court to choose from any of the aforesaid three sentences. But we make no bones in observing that, normally a sentence of fine should be imposed and a sentence of imprisonment should be restricted to the "rarest of rare" cases, wherein the contumacious act is per se, so gross and reprehensible that a sentence of fine would be wholly dis-proportionate to its gravity. To put it differently, a sentence of fine should be a rule and imprisonment an exception. We are fortified in our view by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC 1536 : (1979 CRI. L.J. 960) (Smt. Pushpaben v. Narandas Badiani). Paragraph 6 of the said decision reads thus:- . "A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that (16) the legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule." What emerges from the reading of the said judgment is that normally a sentence of fine should be imposed and sentence of imprisonment should be restricted to the rarest of rare case wherein contemptuous act is per se so gross and reprehensible that sentence of punishment would be held dis-proportionate to it’s gravity. To put it differently a sentence of fine should be a rule and imprisonment a exception. 7. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent no.2 by the learned Senior Counsel Shri Jahagirdar. As mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment, the directions of which contempt has been alleged have been issued, in the background of the said two Writ Petitions being nos. 5156 of 2006 and 5376 of 2006 as stated hereinabove, Writ Petitions had arisen on account of there being two persons elected as Mayor in two different meetings held on 30.6.2006. It was to avoid the democratic process of electing the Mayor and Deputy Mayor being carried out in an un-democratic manner that the said duty was enjoined upon the Respondent no.2 by this Court by the directions contained in the order of which contempt has been alleged. A reading of the affidavit in reply filed by the Respondent no.2 makes it clear that the Respondent no.2 has not abided by the said directions in sofar as the polling and conclusion of the said meeting was concerned. In the background of the earlier elections held on 30.6.2006 it cannot be said that Respondent no.2 was totally unaware of the situation that would unfold on the said day i.e. 31.8.2006. In sofar as the elections to the post like Mayor and Deputy Mayor is concerned, the outcome of the said elections are usually known much before hand except in rare cases wherein the balance tilts at the last minute. In the instant case, though the representation was received on 30.8.2006, the Respondent no.2 possibly looking to the writing on the wall as regards the outcome of the elections to the post of Mayor and Deputy Mayor had in my view deliberately abdicated his responsibility and adjourned the meeting sine die. The Respondent no.2 could have followed the democratic process provided in the rules and tried to see that the meeting is concluded on the same day itself as directed by this Court but expecting that the result of the said meeting would be unpalatable to his party the Respondent no.2 had adjourned the meeting sine die. This can only be termed as a deliberate attempt by the Respondent no.2 to scuttle the democratic process. 8. This can only be termed as a deliberate attempt by the Respondent no.2 to scuttle the democratic process. 8. What is significant to note here is that after the Respondent no.2 had adjourned the meeting the Councillors it appears had appointed the seniormost Corporator to preside over the meeting and thereafter had proceeded to elect the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The election of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor held on the said day it appears came to be challenged in this Court and I am informed by the learned Senior Counsel that the said challenge was negatived and the Writ Petition dismissed. It is in this context also, that the allegations of deliberate breach of the order dated 9/10th August, 2006 would have to be considered. In my view, the conduct of the Respondent no.2 in adjourning the meeting sine die, and thereby flouting the mandate of this Court was wilful and deliberate in the facts and circumstances of the case. The said act would amount to Civil Contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The question that arises is as to what punishment to be imposed on the Respondent no.2. The Respondent no.2 is a sitting Corporator of the Ahmednagar Municipal Corporation and Respondent no.2 has also tendered his un-conditional apology and has fairly admitted that the third part of the directions as regards polling has not been complied by him. In the context whilst holding that the Respondent no. 2 has committed civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by committing deliberate and wilful breach of the order dated 9/10th August, 2006, instead of committing him to prison, the interest of justice would be served if the Respondent no. 2 is directed to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand) and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week. The fine shall be deposited by the Respondent no.2 within a period of four weeks from date in the Office of the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court who shall accept it on production of a certified copy of this judgment. The issuance of the certified copy is expedited. 9. The Suo Motu Contempt Petition is accordingly disposed of.