JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Sri Nagesh Aggarwal, counsel for the revisionist and Sri Alok Singh, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Sri Dharmendra Barthwal and Mamta Joshi, counsel for the respondent. 2. By the present civil revision filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, the revisionist has prayed for setting aside the order dated 14th March, 2007 passed by the Addl. District Judge, District Dehradun. 3. Briefly stated, a suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent praying for the eviction of the defendant on the ground that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the building in dispute. 4. The plaintiff has sent the demand notice on 26th July, 2004 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which was duly served on the defendant on 28th July, 2004 stating therein that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the building in dispute. The statement made in paragraph 6 of the notice is quoted below: ß6- ;g fd iz”uxr lEifÙk dk fuekZ.k o’kZ 1985 ds mijkUr gqvk gS vkSj lEifÙk dk izFke dj ewY;kadu vDVwcj 1986 dks uxj fuxe nsgjknwu esa gqvk gSA bl izdkj lEifÙk ij mÙkj izns”k “kgjh Hkou fdjk;s ij nsus] fdjk;k rFkk fu’dklu vf/kfu;e] 1972 ¼mÙkjkapy jkT; }kjk vaxhÑr½ iz”uxr lEifÙk ij ykxw ugha gksrk gSAÞ 5. The said notice was duly replied by the defendant and the averments with regard to the facts that the building was constructed after 1985 have not been denied. Paragraph 6 to that effect is quoted below : ß6 ;g fd dfFkr lwpuk i= dh pj.k la[;k 6 esa n”kkZ;s x;s leLr rF; tkudkjh ds vHkko esa Lohdkj ugha gSaA mu rF;ksa dks lkfcr djus dk Hkkj vkids O;ogkjh ij gSA vkidk O;ogkjh mUgsa lkfcr djsAÞ 6. After the demand notice, the plaintiff has filed the suit for eviction and recovery of the rent. 7. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiff has stated that he is the landlord of the shop having two shutters forming part of property No. 47/2 Retha Mandi, Lakhi Bagh, Dehradun of which the defendant is tenant at the rate of Rs. 700/- per month and Rs. 200/- was payable towards electricity charges total Rs. 900/- per month. 8. 7. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiff has stated that he is the landlord of the shop having two shutters forming part of property No. 47/2 Retha Mandi, Lakhi Bagh, Dehradun of which the defendant is tenant at the rate of Rs. 700/- per month and Rs. 200/- was payable towards electricity charges total Rs. 900/- per month. 8. In paragraph 5 of the plaint, it has been stated that the building was constructed after 1985 and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the building in dispute. Paragraph 5 to that effect is quoted below : “5. That property in suit has been constructed after 1985, and Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (as adapted by state of Uttaranchal) is not applicable to the property in suit.” 9. The aforesaid paragraph 5 has been replied by the defendant in his written statement to the following effect : ß5- ;g fd dfFkr okn i= dh pj.k la[;k 5 esa n”kkZ;s x;s rF;ksa ds lEcU/k esa izfroknh dks tkudkjh ugha gksus ds dkj.k mDr rF; vLohdkj gSaAÞ 10. According to the plaintiff, neither the rent has been paid nor the electricity charges w.e.f. 1st March, 2001 have been paid, the details of which were given in paragraphs 3 and 4. The same are quoted below : “3. That following amount is due against the defendant : (a) Rent/Electricity charge w.e.f. : Rs. 37,680.00 01.03.2001 to 27.08.2004 at the rate of Rupees 900/- per month (b) Cost of notice : Rs. 1,800.00 Total : Rs. 39,480.00 4. That the plaintiff has been advised that he cannot recover rent for more than three years through process of law. The plaintiff is not waving his amount. As per recoverable rule following amount is due against the defendant :- (a) Rent/Electricity charge w.e.f. To 27.08.2004 at the Rate of Rupees 900/- per month : Rs. 32,400.00 (b) Cost of notice : Rs. 1,800.00 Total : Rs. 34,200.00 11. The plaintiff, therefore, has claimed the amount to the extent of Rs. 34,200/- from the defendant. As per recoverable rule following amount is due against the defendant :- (a) Rent/Electricity charge w.e.f. To 27.08.2004 at the Rate of Rupees 900/- per month : Rs. 32,400.00 (b) Cost of notice : Rs. 1,800.00 Total : Rs. 34,200.00 11. The plaintiff, therefore, has claimed the amount to the extent of Rs. 34,200/- from the defendant. The relief claimed by the plaintiff is quoted below : “It is therefore prayed that a decree for the following relief be kindly granted in favour of the plaintiff :- (a) That defendant and all the persons claiming through them be evicted from the property mentioned in schedule of the plaint and possession be resorted back to the plaintiff, and plaintiff be put in actual possession of the property. (b) That defendant be called upon the pay a sum of Rs. 34,200/- as mentioned in para 4 of the plaint along with interest at the rate of Rs. 12% per annum. (c) That mesne-profits at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day with effect from 28.07.2004 be kindly granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant till the possession is restored back to the plaintiff and plaintiff is put in actual possession of the property. (d) That any other further amended, in alternative and in additional relief, which is in favour of plaintiff be kindly granted. (e) That full cost of suit be and special cost in the circumstances of the suit, kindly granted in favour of plaintiff.” 12. The suit has proceeded after filing of the written statement and the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff was closed on 29th July, 2005 as will appear from the order issued on 29th July, 2006. The same is quoted below : ßiqdkjkA vf/koDrk o i{kdkj mifLFkr gSaA c;ku PW2 lquhy efyd dk fy[kk x;kA lk{; oknh }kjk lekIr dh x;hA lk{; izfroknh gsrq fnñ 17-8-05 fu;r gksAÞ 13. On 17.08.2005, the defendant has taken time and further 30.09.2005 was fixed and on 30.09.2005 further case was adjourned to 27.10.2005 on the request of the defendant as will appear from the order-sheet dated 17.08.2005, 30.09.2005, 27.10.2005 and 16.11.2005. On 17.08.2005, the defendant has taken time and further 30.09.2005 was fixed and on 30.09.2005 further case was adjourned to 27.10.2005 on the request of the defendant as will appear from the order-sheet dated 17.08.2005, 30.09.2005, 27.10.2005 and 16.11.2005. The same is quoted below : ß17-8-2005 i=koyh is”k gq;hA izfroknh us le; ekaxk fd muds vf/koDrk vkt U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr ugha gks ldrsA nwljs i{kdkj }kjk vkifÙk dh x;hA izkFkZuk i= 50@& #i;s gtsZ ij Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh fnukad 30-9-2005 dks is”k gksA 30-9-2005 i=koyh is”k gq;hA foi{kh us lfxu izkñ i= fn;kA oknh dh lk{; 29-7-05 dks lekIr gks pqdh gSA lfxu izkñ i= 100@& #i;s gtsZ ij Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA izfroknh dh lk{; gsrq i=koyh fnukad 27-10-2005 dks is”k gksA 27-10-2005 iqdkjkA vf/koDrkx.k mifLFkr gSaA izfroknh dh vksj ls 72x LFkxu izkFkZuk i= fnokt ij lqukA eqñ 50@& cgtsZ ij LohÑfr lk{; izfroknh gsrq fnñ 16-11-05 fu;r gksA 16-11-05 iqdkjk x;kA izfroknh us izkFkZuk i= fn;k fd vkt xokg ugha gSA bl ij vkifÙk dh xbZA izkFkZuk i= 50@& #ñ gtsZ ij LohdkjA okLrs lk{; fnñ 5-12-05 fu;r dh tkrh gSAÞ 14. The case has proceeded on various dates thereafter on 5th July, 2006, the order was passed “that despite the time was allowed from time to time, the defendant has not produced any evidence” and the Presiding Officer has fixed 14th July, 2006 for arguments and further liberty was given that “if the defendant wants to produce the evidence, he may submit before the date fixed and he may also be ready for cross-examination on the date fixed for final arguments”. The order sheet dated 5th July, 2006 is quoted below : “5/7/2006. Case called out. Plaintiff present with Id. Counsel. Defendant present himself. Adjournment again sought by the defendant. The evidence of the plaintiff has been closed on 29.07.05. Till then no evidence is produced by defendant, again adjournments by defendant opposed with endorsement that various adjournments have already been taken. In the interest of justice adjournment application is rejected. Fixed 14/7/06 for arguments. Before argument if defendant wants to produce evidence he may submit his evidence before the close of argument and shall ready to cross-examine on the date of argument before final arguments.” 15. In the interest of justice adjournment application is rejected. Fixed 14/7/06 for arguments. Before argument if defendant wants to produce evidence he may submit his evidence before the close of argument and shall ready to cross-examine on the date of argument before final arguments.” 15. Thereafter on 14th July, 2006, the defendant has again applied for adjournment and therefore, 18th July, 2006 was fixed for argument and on 18th July, 2006, the defendant was not present as will appear from the Order-sheet dated 18.07.2006. 16. Counsel for the revisionist has referred the order-sheet dated 6th March, 2007, 13th March, 2007 and 14th March, 2007 to the effect that no opportunity was given to the defendant-appellant. 17. The order-sheet dated 6th March, 2007 shows that the Presiding Officer has observed that from 5th July, 2006 continuously the defendant has taken adjournments and it appears that the defendant has not shown his anxiety either to submit the evidence except the matter was adjourned and as such the adjournment application was rejected on 6th March, 2007 and 14th March, 2007 was fixed for the judgment and ultimately on 14th March, 2007, the judgment was pronounced. 18. Counsel for the revisionist has submitted that there no arrears of were due and the rent was to the extent of Rs. 500/- per month. The finding has been recorded, which remained unrebutted. The rent has been demanded to the extent of Rs. 32,400/- at the rate of Rs. 900/- per month. The Judge Small Cause Court has passed the decree at the rate of Rs. 700 per month from 26.08.2001 to 27.08.2004. So far as the arrears of rent is concerned, the Judge Small Cause Court has rightly passed the order decreeing the suit. The plaintiff has been able to establish that the defendant has not paid the rent from 26.08.2001 – 27.08.2004. 19. Counsel for the landlord-respondent has submitted that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the building in dispute. The record shows that the first assessment has been made after 1985 i.e. from 1st October, 1985 as will appear from the contents of the notice from Nagar Nigam, Dehradun. No rebuttal evidence has been filed on behalf of the defendant despite ample opportunities given to him. The record shows that the first assessment has been made after 1985 i.e. from 1st October, 1985 as will appear from the contents of the notice from Nagar Nigam, Dehradun. No rebuttal evidence has been filed on behalf of the defendant despite ample opportunities given to him. The plaint averments have also not been rebutted by the defendant and as such, in view of the aforesaid, the finding recorded by the Judge Small Cause Court that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the building in dispute requires no interference by this Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 20. The plaint averments have also not been rebutted by the defendant and as such, in view of the aforesaid, the finding recorded by the Judge Small Cause Court that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the building in dispute requires no interference by this Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 20. Section 2(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides as under :- “(2) [Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed]: [Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest), whichever is shorter.]: [Provided further that where construction of a building is completed on or after April 26, 1985 then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of [forty years] from the date on which its construction is completed.] Explanation I. – [For the purposes of this section].- (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (non including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction of guarding the building under construction) for the first time: Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants; (b) “construction” includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished; (c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition.” Explanation II. – The expression “bank” means – (i) a banking company, as defined in the Banking Regulation Act, 1949; (ii) the State Bank of India constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955; (iii) a subsidiary bank, as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Bank) Act, 1959; (iv) a corresponding new bank constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970; (v) a financing bank or Central Bank of (as defined in the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965), not being a Land Development Bank; and (vi) any other financial institution notified by the State Government in the Gazette as a bank for the purpose of this Act; Explanation III. A building shall be deemed to be constructed substantially out of funds obtained from sources mentioned in the proviso, if the funds obtained from one or more of such sources account for more than one-half of the cost of construction.]” 21. In Raj Kumar Sharma vs. District Judge Haridwar and others 1993 (2) ARC, it has been held as under : “18. The question involved in the present case is to be determined the background of aforesaid position in law. The provisions contained in Section 2(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 clearly indicate the legislative policy of allowing exemption from the restrictive provisions of the Act to all the building for specified period to be computed from the date of the completion of their construction. Such an exemption was felt necessary in order to give incentive to appears desirous to construct new buildings. The Legislature has expressly recognized the need for encouraging the construction of new buildings by granting exemption to all such building which had not completed ten years from the completion of their construction to section 2(2) of the Act. This period of exemption was raised from ten years to twenty years by an Ordinance and to forty years as provided by the U.P. Act No. 11 of 1988. In the statement of objects and reasons of the said Act it has been clearly indicated that the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act provided that the buildings constructed on or after April 26, 1985 shall be exempted from the operation of the said Act for a period of twenty years from the date on which the construction was completed. In order to encourage the construction of new buildings in the State it had been decided to extend the period of said exemption from twenty years to forty years. It is, therefore, obvious that the provision of exemption envisaged under Section 2(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had been made specifically for the benefit of the landlords and consequently in order to secure the benefit to be provided to the landlords the explanation has to be interpreted in a manner so as to ensure that the protection and its benefit extend to the landlords. As observed by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur v. Dattatraya Dahankar and another reported in 1991 J.T. (4) 500, a mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with modern positive approach. The modern positive approach, it was indicated, is to have a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. Further in determining either the general object of the legislature or the meaning of its language in any particular passage it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be the true one. 27. It is, obvious that in the presence of the unimpeachable documentary evidence establishing that the building in question had been assessed for the first time in the year 1987 it was not at all necessary for the Courts below to hold an enquiry into the existence or otherwise of the building in dispute during the period 1974-1979. I respectfully agree with the view expressed in the case of Smt. Samundri Devi (supra), decided by this Court wherein it has been clearly observed that where irrespective of the reality, the Legislature has unmistakeably provided for assumption of the date of completion of the construction of a building in Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act, it is immaterial whether the landlords admits or avers to a date of completion of construction of the building different from the one contemplated by the fiction. Normally an admission may be binding upon the person making it except where he is able to explain it away. Normally an admission may be binding upon the person making it except where he is able to explain it away. But that principle will be wholly inapplicable to a case in which the Legislature, acting within its competence, mandates through a legal fiction assumption of a fact different from the reality.” 22. The judge Small Cause Court has decreed the suit on a sum of Rs. 700/- per month and from 28th August, 2004 on a sum of Rs. 50 per day the damages have been awarded. 23. Relying upon the explanation of Section 2(2) of the U.P. Act No.1 3 of 1972, the Apex Court in Sudha Rani Garg (Smt.) v. Sri Jagdish Kumar (Dead) and others [2004 SCFBRC 449], the Apex Court has held as under : “7. The Explanation provides for four different dates for determining the date of completion of building. The dates are : (1) When the completion of the building is reported to the local authority. (2) When the completion of the building is otherwise recorded by the local authority. (3) When the first assessment of the building comes into effect. (4) When it is actually occupied. 8. The Explanation further provides that in case for the first three categories the dates are available then the earliest of the three dates will be the date of completion of the building and in case the first three dates are not available, then the fourth date will be the date on which construction of the building shall be taken to have been completed. 9. The Explanation I is a deeming provision. The word ‘deemed’ is used a great deal in modern legislation. Sometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible” (per Lord Radcliffe in St. Aubyn (L.M.) v. A.G. (No. 2) (1951) 2 All E.R. 473 (HL).” 24. In Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 705 after relying upon various judgments to the following effect : “13. Aubyn (L.M.) v. A.G. (No. 2) (1951) 2 All E.R. 473 (HL).” 24. In Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 705 after relying upon various judgments to the following effect : “13. In Shyam Charan v. Sheoji Bhai (1977) 4 SCC 393, this Court has upheld the principle that the tenant continuing in occupation of the tenancy premises after the termination of tenancy is an unauthorized and wrongful occupant and a decree for damages or mesne profits can be passed for the period of such occupation, till the date he delivers the vacant possession to the landlord. …… After determination of the tenancy, the position of the tenant is akin to that of a trespasser and he cannot claim that the measure of damages awardable to the landlord should be kept tagged to the rate of rent payable under the provisions of the Rent Control Order. If the real value of the property is higher than the rent earned then the amount of compensation for continued use and occupation of the property by the tenant can be assessed at the higher value.” 25. Relying upon the judgment of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. V. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. JT 2004 (1) SC 410 : 2005 (1) SCC 705 2005 SCFBRC 99 in Achal Mishra Vs. Ram Shankar Singh reported in 2005 (1) ARC Page 887 it has been observed as under : “We make it clear that the respondents shall be liable to pay the rent equivalent to mesne profits with effect from the date with which they are found to have ceased to be entitled to retain possession of the premises as tenant for such period the landlord’s entitlement cannot be held pegged to the standard rent. Reference may be had to the law laid down by the Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. V. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., JT 2004 (1) SC 410 : 2005 (10) SCC 705 : 2005 SCFBRC 99.” 26. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been held that after the determination of the tenancy defendant is liable to pay damages on the market rate. Considering the request of the defendant the amount of 50/- per day is modified to this extant that from date of termination of the tenancy, defendant shall be laible to pay the arrears at the rate of Rs. Considering the request of the defendant the amount of 50/- per day is modified to this extant that from date of termination of the tenancy, defendant shall be laible to pay the arrears at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month up to the date of judgment and from the date of judgment till the delivery of possession, the defendant will be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1500/- per month. 27. Scope of interference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act has been interpreted by the Apex Court from time to time. It is not an appellate jurisdiction and therefore, the findings of fact cannot be interfered. 28. In Harshvardhan Chokkani Vs. Bhupendra N. Patel 2002 SCFBRC 344, the Apex Court has observed as under : “Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional power which in its very nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers of the Revisional Court cannot be equated with the power of the Appellate Court. In examining the legally and the proprietary of the order under challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved in such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like, it is only in such situations that interference by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be justified. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power. From the above discussion, it is clear that none of the aforementioned reasons exists in this case to justify interference by the High Court.” 29. Counsel for the revisionist has sought some time to vacate the premises in dispute. However, taking into consideration his prayer, the time is granted up to 31st July, 2007 to vacate the premises in dispute provided : (1) he furnishes undertaking on or before 30th April, 2007 to vacate the premises. (2) He pays the entire arrears of rent/damages/mesne profit as observed above on or before 30th April, 2007. (3) He pays monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 1500/- in the first week of every month until and unless the premises in dispute is vacated. (2) He pays the entire arrears of rent/damages/mesne profit as observed above on or before 30th April, 2007. (3) He pays monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 1500/- in the first week of every month until and unless the premises in dispute is vacated. On failure of the aforesaid conditions, plaintiff-respondent shall have liberty to execute the decree against the revisionist. 30. Consequently, the revision lacks merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.