JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - C.M. No. 12468-CII of 2005 This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning of 21 days delay in filing the present revision petition. 2. It has been averred in the application that after dismissal of the appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, the matter was placed before the General House of the Municipal Council for seeking permission to file the present revision petition. It was on 29th of April, 2005 that a resolution was passed in the General House and a decision was taken to file the revision petition in the High Court. A certified copy of the order is said to have been received on 18.1.2005, which was supplied to the Municipal Council by the Advocate on 21.5.2005 when immediately appeal was filed. Thus, it was pleaded that the delay had occurred on account of procedural formalities. No reply to the application was filed. Consequently, this Civil Misc. application is allowed and delay of 21 days in filing the civil revision is condoned. Civil Revision No. 3291 of 2005 2. The present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 18.1.2005 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, dismissing the application moved by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. 3. The plaintiff-respondent had filed a suit for mandatory injunction against the petitioners seeking a direction to the petitioners herein to execute a legally valid and duly Registered Deed of Conveyance or to issue a legally valid sale certificate in respect of the old building of school comprising area measuring 6.82 marlas, situated at Urmar Tanda. However, the learned trial Court allowed the alternative plea for recovery of Rs. 1,12,750/- with costs and interest @ 12% per annum with effect from 9.6.1995. The judgment and decree was passed on 20.1.2004. 4. The appeal against the said judgment and decree was preferred. Along with the said appeal an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved for condoning the delay of 53 days in filing the appeal. It was averred in the application that application for obtaining certified copy of judgment was made by the petitioners on 30.1.2004. The certified copy was prepared on 4.2.2004. The certified copy of the said judgment was collected by the Counsel for the petitioners on 9.2.2004. 5. It was averred in the application that application for obtaining certified copy of judgment was made by the petitioners on 30.1.2004. The certified copy was prepared on 4.2.2004. The certified copy of the said judgment was collected by the Counsel for the petitioners on 9.2.2004. 5. It was the case of the petitioners that on 24.2.2004 a resolution was passed by the Municipal Council, Hoshiarpur, taking a decision that no appeal is required to be filed. However, the said resolution was sent to the Regional Deputy Director, Local Bodies, Jalandhar, who stayed the operation of the resolution and sought the legal opinion for filing the appeal. It was thereafter that a decision was taken on 11th of March 2004 to file the appeal. Thus, it was pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal was due to procedural formalities which were required for taking the decision. 6. The learned lower Appellate Court disbelieved the assertion made in the application and, therefore, dismissed the application for condonation of delay. 7. When the matter came up for hearing, this Court was pleased to pass the following order on 20th April, 2006 :- "An old school building was put up for public auction by the petitioner- Municipal Council on 9.6.1995. The respondent participated in the said auction and was the highest bidder, who offered a sum of Rs. 4,51,000/-. As per terms and conditions of the public auction, the respondent-plaintiff deposited an amount of Rs. 1,12,750/- with the petitioner-Municipal Council vide receipt No. 35, book No. 43 dated 1995 on the same day. The aforementioned auction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff, however, was neither accepted nor rejected by the competent authority. The efforts made by the respondent to deposit the balance amount and to get the property transferred in his name, having failed, he filed a suit for mandatory injunction seeking following direction to the Municipal Authorities :- (i) to execute a legally valid and duly registered Deed of Conveyance or to issue a legally valid Sale Certificate in his favour in respect of the auctioned property. (ii) alternatively, his suit for recovery of Rs. 1,12,750/- along with interest @ 18% be decreed. The learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 20.1.2004 granted the respondent-plaintiff alternative relief to the extent that his suit for recovery of Rs. 1,12,750/- was decreed along with interest @ 12% per annum from 9.6.1995. (ii) alternatively, his suit for recovery of Rs. 1,12,750/- along with interest @ 18% be decreed. The learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 20.1.2004 granted the respondent-plaintiff alternative relief to the extent that his suit for recovery of Rs. 1,12,750/- was decreed along with interest @ 12% per annum from 9.6.1995. This is an admitted fact that on 30.1.2004, the appellant-Municipal Council applied for certified copy of judgment and decree dated 20.1.2004 which was prepared by the copying agency on 4.2.2004 and was delivered to the Executive Officer of Municipal Council on 9.2.2004. On 24.2.2004, the Municipal Council passed a resolution resolving not to file an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20.1.2004. However, the Deputy Director, Local Bodies, Government of Punjab is stated to have (sent) a communication on 11.3.2004 to the Municipal Council to challenge the above mentioned judgment and decree dated 20.1.2004. Acting upon the said letter, Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, vide his order dated 18.3.2004 stayed the operation of the Municipal Council resolution dated 24.2.2004. Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the Executive Officer of the Municipal Council on 19.4.2004, which was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay of 53 days. The first appellate Court did not find any justification for condoning the delay and consequently, it dismissed the said application as well as the accompanying appeal vide the impugned order dated 18.1.2005. Feeling aggrieved at the order, the Executing Officer as well as the Municipal Council have filed the present revision petition. The facts speak for themselves. Apparently, there appears to be absolutely no justification for the petitioners or the Deputy Director, Local Bodies, who so ever they may be to take any administrative or statutory action to withhold the amount, which the respondent-plaintiff had deposited being the highest bidder in a public auction, unless there (their ?) such action is actuated by extraneous or mala fide considerations. The only reasonable action, which the authorities could take was either to accept the bid or to reject the same and in case of rejection they were supposed to refund 25% of the bid amount which the respondent-plaintiff had deposited on the date of auction itself. The only reasonable action, which the authorities could take was either to accept the bid or to reject the same and in case of rejection they were supposed to refund 25% of the bid amount which the respondent-plaintiff had deposited on the date of auction itself. What to talk of any such reasonable action, which a public authority is obligated to perform, the respondent-plaintiff was compelled and dragged to avoidable litigation when he filed a civil suit seeking the mandatory injunction either to accept the bid in his favour or to decree the suit for recovery of the 25% of the bid amount deposited by him. Prima facie, these (there ?) appears to be no transparent reason for the Deputy Director, Local Bodies as well as Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur to stall the implementation of the Civil Court decree. Assuming that they were aggrieved at the award of interest to be paid to the respondent, yet the principal amount ought to have been immediately refunded. No such step has been taken so far. The casual approach of the authorities responsible for such like undesirable and avoidable litigation also needs to be checked with firm hands. It appears that personal responsibility of those who are instrumental in harassing the respondent and have taken the court for a ride, needs to be fixed in this case. However, further directions are issued, the Executive Officer of Municipal Council is directed to file an affidavit within two weeks from today disclosing the names of the then Deputy Director, Local Bodies, who had written the letter dated 11.3.2004 as also of the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, who passed the order dated 18.3.2004 and also to disclose their present place of posting. Adjourned to 15.5.2006." 8. In pursuance of the order passed by this Court, the affidavit was filed by Shri S.K. Aggarwal, Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Urmar Tanda and keeping in view the said affidavit, the following order was passed by this Court on 15.5.2006 :- "In deference to the order dated 20.4.2006, an affidavit has been filed by S.K. Aggarwal, Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Urmar Tanda, District Hoshiarpur, which is taken on record. In view of the information given in para Nos. 5 and 6 of the said affidavit, let notice be issued to (i) Smt. Gurpreet Kaur Sapra, PCS, presently posted as Joint Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Jalandhar, (ii) Mr. In view of the information given in para Nos. 5 and 6 of the said affidavit, let notice be issued to (i) Smt. Gurpreet Kaur Sapra, PCS, presently posted as Joint Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Jalandhar, (ii) Mr. Kirandeep Singh Bhullar, IAS, presently posted as Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar. Along with the notice, a copy of the order dated 20.4.2006 shall also be sent. Adjourned to 11.7.2006." Again on 11th of July, 2006 this Court was pleased to pass the following order :- "In deference to order dated May 15, 2006 an affidavit has been filed by Kirandeep Singh Bhullar, IAS, Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, which is taken on record. Mr. Majithia, learned counsel for Mrs. Gurpreet Kaur Sapra, however, seeks and is granted three weeks time to file reply. Adjourned to 11.8.2006. Meanwhile, the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur and the Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Urmar Tanda, District Hoshiarpur are directed to release the decretal amount along with interest as awarded by the trial Court to the respondent-plaintiff before the adjourned date, however, without prejudice to their legal rights and subject to the condition that the respondent-plaintiff shall furnish adequate security to the satisfaction of executing court qua the interest amount only. Let a copy of this order be handed over to Mr. Mann, learned counsel for the petitioner for necessary compliance." 9. In compliance with the above order of this Court, the decretal amount was deposited by the petitioner-judgment-debtors before the trial Court which was ordered to be released to the respondent-plaintiff. The order passed by this Court on 11.8.2006 reads as under :- "Learned counsel for the petitioners states that in deference to the order dated 11.7.2006, they have deposited a sum of Rs. 2,74,768/- before the learned trial Court. In this view of the matter, respondent No. 1-plaintiff is directed to withdraw the aforesaid amount and the learned trial Court shall release the same in his favour forthwith which the respondent-plaintiff shall withdraw without prejudice to his right to claim any additional amount to which, according to him, he may be entitled to in terms of the decree passed by the trial Court. Adjourned to 18.9.2006. Adjourned to 18.9.2006. Meanwhile, the petitioners are also directed to file a statement of accounts as to how the arrears in terms of the decree passed by the Civil Court have been calculated." This order shows that the decretal amount now stands paid to the decree-holder-plaintiff and question for determination in this revision petition now is as to whether the impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Judge is liable to be set aside or upheld. 10. Mr. A.P.S. Mann, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that in the present case the appeal could not be filed within limitation due to procedural formalities which were to be followed by the Municipal Council before challenging the order passed by the learned trial Court. 11. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the present case it has been brought on record that in pursuance of the resolution passed by the Municipal Council, the matter was referred to the Regional Director, Local Bodies, wherein the decision was taken to file the appeal. His contention was that the delay in filing the appeal stood duly explained. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, contended that sufficient cause is to be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. In absence of grave negligence, inaction or want of bona fide, the delay should normally be condoned. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Major Singh v. Balwant Singh and others, 2006(3) RCR(Civil) 810 (P&H). The learned counsel further placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, 1996(3) SCC 132 to contend that the States cannot be put on the same footing as an individual and, therefore, a liberal latitude is required to be followed while condoning the delay. Para 11 of the said judgment reads as under :- "Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives power to the Court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed period. The Supreme Court generally adopts a liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. Para 11 of the said judgment reads as under :- "Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives power to the Court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed period. The Supreme Court generally adopts a liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. Decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected by what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner." 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, 2005(2) Apex Criminal 75 : 2005(3) SCC 752, wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under :- ".... Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, 2005(2) Apex Criminal 75 : 2005(3) SCC 752, wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under :- ".... Expression sufficient cause should be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay - Having regard to considerable delay of procedural red tape in the decision making process of the Govt. certain amount of latitude is permissible - The State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants - Hence, it cannot be put on the same footing as an individual - Public interest suffers if appeals by the State are lost because of such default - Court to decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit - State should constitute legal cells to examine whether cases involve legal principles for decision by Court or require adjustment at governmental level - Officer concerned should be made personally responsible for the delay in filing the appeal. On facts, delay of 57 days in filing the application for grant of leave made in terms of Section 378(3) Criminal Procedure Code held, deserved condonation - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 378(3)." 14. Mr. C.B. Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 contended that the impugned order is just and fair. The contention of the learned counsel was that the appeal was in fact an attempt to misuse the process of the Court and was a mala fide exercise to harass the plaintiff- respondent. This contention was based on the observations made by this Court while passing the interim orders. 15. It was further contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that in the present case the petitioner - Municipal Council has failed to show "sufficient cause" for delay in filing the appeal and, therefore, this revision petition deserves to be dismissed. 16. On a consideration of the matter, I find that this Court in order to settle the equity has already directed the petitioner-judgment-debtors to deposit the decretal amount which has been allowed to be withdrawn by the plaintiff-respondent. 16. On a consideration of the matter, I find that this Court in order to settle the equity has already directed the petitioner-judgment-debtors to deposit the decretal amount which has been allowed to be withdrawn by the plaintiff-respondent. The very fact that the respondent-plaintiff was directed to furnish security to the satisfaction of executing Court qua the interest amount shows that the intention of this Court was to condone the delay. In order to protect the interest of the plaintiff-respondent, the decretal amount was ordered to be paid to him. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners fully cover the case in hand and, therefore, learned lower Appellate Court was not justified in dismissing the application moved by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, this revision petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the application moved by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed. The learned lower Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal on merits. 17. It may be observed that in view of the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Mani and others (supra), the learned lower Appellate Court while disposing of the appeal, should fix the liability of the officer concerned, who has been responsible for causing delay in filing the appeal and in case the appeal is held to be mala fide and any costs are imposed, the liability for the loss of the interest which the Municipal Council may have to suffer on account of delay in depositing the decretal amount should also be fastened on the officer responsible for the lapse. Petition allowed.