Judgment :- This CRP has been filed by the petitioner herein against the dismissal of the interim application in M.P.No:56 of 2003 in RCOP. No.1890 of 2001 before the learned XV Judge, Court of Small Causes (Rent Controller), Chennai, questioning the jurisdiction of the authority to entertain a fair rent petition filed by the respondent herein under Section 4 of the Rent Control Act. 2. According to the petitioner the so called lease deed was a transaction sui generis in a nature amounting to all incidence arising out of a conveyance. On a cumulative reading of the various clauses in the so called lease deed it will be clear that the transaction though styled as a lease deed confers all rights of absolute ownership and is a transfer of all interest in immovable property in favour of the petitioner bank and that the said petition filed under Section 4 of the Rent Control Act should be dismissed. Earlier on the application filed by the Bank to try the issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue was dismissed by the Rent Controller holding that the said issue can be decided along with other issues. Thereupon the petitioner herein filed CRP.No:586 of 2003 and this court by order dated 212. 2005 disposed of the said CRP directing that the Rent Controller should decide the question of jurisdiction as preliminary issue. Consequently, the Rent Controller by the impugned order dismissed the said application holding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship. Aggrieved of the same, the present CRP is filed by the petitioner. 3. Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner contended that the learned Rent Controller without rendering any finding as to whether the dispute of title by the petitioner was bona fide or not which only decides the issue of jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, cannot go into the merits of the matter and dismiss the application. Even though Section 4 of the Rent Control Act does not contain a proviso as one finds under the second proviso to Section 10(1), the Supreme Court held that there are clear indications in the Act and Rules that the Rent Controller does not have the jurisdiction to decide the questions of law. 4. Even though Section 4 of the Rent Control Act does not contain a proviso as one finds under the second proviso to Section 10(1), the Supreme Court held that there are clear indications in the Act and Rules that the Rent Controller does not have the jurisdiction to decide the questions of law. 4. According to the learned Senior Counsel, as the issue in the present case revolves around the nature of a document, it is essential to take into account the principles with regard to construction of documents as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in AIR 1966 SC 1178 ; (1971) 1 SCC 562 and (1977) 1 SCC 17 wherein the Honble Supreme Court held that the true effect of a transaction may be determined from the terms of agreement considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of transaction and in each case, the court has, unless prohibited by statute, power to go behind the documents and to determine the nature of the transaction, whatever may be the form of the document". According to the learned senior counsel, the mere description of the deed will not be decisive of the essence of the transaction as the same isolated from the terms and provisions, may be misleading or a misnomer. When there exists mixed elements in an instrument disclosing several features, the court has to find out the predominant intentions of the parties executing the documents viewed from the essential aspect of the reality of transaction. It is his further contention that on a cumulative reading of the various clauses of the so called lease deed in question it is clear that the said transaction in question styled as a lease deed, parties being described as landlord and tenant and rent being mentioned will not make the document to be a lease deed since a reading of various other clauses clearly point to the predominant intention of the parties that the deed in question was absolute sale of the property in question by the respondents to the petitioner and as such in any event the dispute of title by the petitioner under the deed, of the respondent is bona fide and as such the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller gets clearly ousted. 5. 5. According to the learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, the important clauses which clearly show that the document was only a sale and not a lease are as follows:- .(a) Deposit amount of Rs.3,90,98,302/=; .(b) The deposit shall bear interest at 10% per annum payable on or after 5th December but before 31st December of every year; .(c) The plinth area has been taken into account to arrive at the value and not the carpet area; .(d) An equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds has been created; .(e) Rates and taxes including property tax to be borne by the Bank; .(f) Bank can encumber or alienate howsoever the whole or part of the property in question on such terms and conditions it deems fit; put up additional floors, make alterations and use the premises with all rights that of owners; .(g) If the lessor fails to pay interest, lessee need not pay rent and it would not amount to default; (it would be relevant to note that the rent and interest on deposit are almost the same and the rent paid in advance in the first year is returned as interest on deposit at the end of the year. The first amount given by the bank is circulated back and forth.) .(h) Though there is provision for selling lessors right in the property, the same has neither any use nor effect in favour of the lessor. If both the paras in the clause is read together no reasonable person will venture to purchase the so called rights of the lessor which according to the document will come into effect only after 198 years. Therefore, this clause on the whole, only protects the rights of the Bank as owners; .(i) the lessor shall not encumber the property and shall not put up any further construction. Therefore, this clause on the whole, only protects the rights of the Bank as owners; .(i) the lessor shall not encumber the property and shall not put up any further construction. The lessor shall not obstruct Bank from putting up any construction it deems fit; (j) The lessor shall not be entitled to determine the lease or re enter upon the leased property during the term of the lease except for any default on the part of the Bank; .(k) In case of land acquisition the compensation goes to the Bank to the value of the property and the improvements made thereon and the lessor has no right for the same; .(l) The bank is entitled to an option of renewal for further 99 years on the same terms and conditions. 6. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, de hors the above clauses, the conduct of the parties only leads to the irresistible conclusion that the document in question is only a sale. According to him, the several payments made upto 1991 in a sum of Rs.3 crores depending upon the construction will only refer to the construction as a sale and not otherwise. It is also contended that there cannot be any estoppel against the contract besides the fact that Section 91 of the Evidence Act forbids the taking into account of any oral evidence or the conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of document which if taken would go against the predominant intention of the deed in question as has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in 1996 (4) SCC 491. Moreover, the estoppel operates in the field of acts and not in the realm of rights. 7. As regards the proceedings before the Income-tax Authorities, it is contended by the learned senior counsel that the proceedings being subsequent conduct of the parties, cannot take away or whittle down the terms of the deed in question and make the surrounding circumstances a the time of transaction something different, if the deed by itself has to be construed as a sale. Further Section 91 of the Evidence Act will preclude any subsequent oral evidence against the terms of a written contract, the proceedings before the Income Tax Authorities will be wholly extraneous and irrelevant to be considered in this CRP, apart from the fact that the Bank has capitalised the deposit of Rs.3.9 and odd crores of and the same has been reflected and treated as asset of the bank. .8. It is also contended by the learned senior counsel that Article 35 of the Stamp Act is of no help to the respondent since Clause vii of the said Article only speaks of 75% of the market value an the document does not reveal any such calculation. In any event the said clause was introduced only in the year 2000 and therefore will not apply to this transaction. 9. On the other hand, Mr.K.Ramasamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent contended that the only requirement for the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to entertain an application under Section 4 is that there should be the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to the proceedings. Section 2(6) of the Act defines that a landlord includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself an d others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant. Likewise, the description of a tenant under Section 2(8) includes any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse or a son or daughter or the legal representative of the deceased tenant. The fair rent is fixed by the Rent Controller in accordance with the principles set out in Section 4 of the Act. .10. According to the learned senior counsel, unlike the provisions of the Rent Control Act where consequent proceedings are also taken, as far as Section 4 is concerned, the job of the Rent Controller is over with the fixation of fair rent and the landlord must approach a civil court for collection of either fair rent or for arrears of rent. According to the learned senior counsel, unlike the provisions of the Rent Control Act where consequent proceedings are also taken, as far as Section 4 is concerned, the job of the Rent Controller is over with the fixation of fair rent and the landlord must approach a civil court for collection of either fair rent or for arrears of rent. Hence the provisions of section 4 and that of Section 10 cannot be equated with each other. As per the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 10 where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims the right of permanent tenancy, the controller shall decide wither the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records such a finding, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for the eviction of the tenant in a civil court. In other words, if there is a bona fide denial of the title, the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to entertain a petition for eviction is ousted. But there is no such provision in Section 4. As already stated, the only requirement to be satisfied before applying Section 4 is that there should be the existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant. This principle has been emphasised even in the decision relied on by the petitioner, reported in 1990 (4) SCC 286 . In the said decision the Honble Supreme Court also clarified that on a proper construction of the Rent Control Act, the question on which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded is only the determination as to the fair rent of the premises. The Supreme Court further held that it will not be open to the Civil Court to re-determine the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord because that is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and therefore impliedly excluded from the purview of the civil court. It is therefore clear from the above judgment that the only authority entitled to decide the fair rent of a building is the Rent Controller and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is categorically excluded. The respondent is therefore left with no other option than to approach the Rent Controller for the fixation of the fair rent, once the relationship of landlord and tenant is established. 11. The respondent is therefore left with no other option than to approach the Rent Controller for the fixation of the fair rent, once the relationship of landlord and tenant is established. 11. In this case, the contemporary document to decide the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is the lease deed dated 28th June 1991, executed between the parties to the present proceedings. Throughout the deed, the mutual relationship of the parties has been clearly established as lessee and lessor and the document is also called the "Deed of Lease" in various places. As per clause "C" of the deed, the rent payable is fixed at Rs,39,27,995.95 per year which shall be paid in advance on or before 5th January every year. Clause "D" of the deed speaks about the refundable deposit which was paid by the lessee to the lessor. The deposit shall be refunded on the termination of the lease against surrender of possession of leased property and as security for the repayment of the deposit amount, the lessor has created an equitable mortgage by the deposit of title deeds relating to the property. According to this clause the lessee shall deliver back the title deeds on repayment of complete deposit amount. As per clause "I" the lessee shall be entitled to a first option of purchasing the lessors interest in the leased property in the event of the lessor intending to sell the same. As per clause "K" if the lessee refused to avail the option the lessor shall be at liberty to dispose of the property to any other third person. .12. Though the lessee has been given, the right to put up such additional construction at their own cost, it has been specifically mentioned in the lease deed that the lessee has to demolish such additional construction without disturbing the exiting structure before handing over the possession of the property to the lessor. It is also mentioned in the Lease Deed that the lease can be determined or forfeited in the event of default on the part of the lessee. There is a specific clause in the Lease Deed that in the event of the building being declared as unfit for occupation, the lease is construed as determined and consequently the lessor shall refund the deposit amount after adjusting any dues. There is a specific clause in the Lease Deed that in the event of the building being declared as unfit for occupation, the lease is construed as determined and consequently the lessor shall refund the deposit amount after adjusting any dues. There is also a provision for renewing the lease at the completion of the initial period of 99 years. All these provisions will clearly prove that the document in question is only a lease deed and cannot be construed as a sale deed by any stretch of imagination. 13. Inasmuch as the proceedings are summary in nature, no issues are framed in a Rent Control Proceedings and no definite findings with respect to each issue is given like a regular civil proceedings. The Rent Controller is only expected to frame the point for determination and to answer it accordingly. Therefore, in the impugned order, the learned Rent Controller discussed the documentary evidence and other circumstances of the case with respect to the provisions of the Rent Control Act and came to the conclusion that the RCOP is well within the ambit of law and is maintainable. It is also found by the learned Judge that the petition questioning the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller has no merits and is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, it cannot be said that a specific finding was not given by the Rent Controller. 14. Even as per Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, when the terms of the contract are reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract except the document itself. According to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, when the terms of such contract are proved according to Section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted for the purpose of contradicting, varying or subtracting from the terms of the said contract. Therefore, no evidence can be accepted contradicting the nomenclature or the terms of the Lease Deed entered into between the petitioner and respondent on 26. 1991. Even the exceptions found in provisions 1 to 6 of Section 92 will not apply to the facts of the present case. Therefore, no evidence can be accepted contradicting the nomenclature or the terms of the Lease Deed entered into between the petitioner and respondent on 26. 1991. Even the exceptions found in provisions 1 to 6 of Section 92 will not apply to the facts of the present case. As per Section 93 of the Indian Evidence Act, even when the language used in a document is ambiguous or defective, evidence may not be given of facts which should show its meaning or supply of its defects. In short, the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act would clearly prove that the document could only be termed as a Lease Deed and not otherwise. .15. Apart from the clauses found in the lease deed, there are several letters including one written during March 2007 by the petitioner to the respondent asking to pay the interest on deposit and indicating that the rent will be paid only on receipt of the said interest. Thus the petitioner is estopped from denying the title of the respondent as the owner and landlord of the petition premises. Further, there are proceedings of the Income-tax Department which will clearly show that the relationship between the parties has been that of landlord and tenant only. At the time of commencement of the lease, a joint application was given to the appropriate authority seeking permission to enter into the lease deed. Thereafter certificates under Section 197 of the Income Tax Act relating to deduction of tax were issued to the Bank every year wherein it is stated by the income Tax Department authorities that the bank to pay the rent to the respondent. Every year the bank after deducting the Income Tax at source, files Form NO.16A to the Income Tax Department wherein the nature of payment was clearly mentioned as rent. The assessment order for the year 1990-1991 with respect to the respondent also clearly indicates that the transaction between the petitioner and the respondent was only a lease on the basis of the examination of the bank staff as witness. Above all, under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, when a person has, by declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed to deny the truth. Above all, under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, when a person has, by declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed to deny the truth. Therefore, the burden to prove that there is no such relationship is heavily on the petitioner, which the petitioner has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubts. 16. It is pertinent to point out that the petitioner-Bank itself conceded in the Assessment Order for the year 1990-91, wherein the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax has recorded as follows:- "1. The next direction of the Tribunal is to ascertain the correct position in the matter of application of Sec.2(47)(vi) read with Section 45(1) for the property at Spencer Tower-II, Chennai, leased out to Canara Bank, Chennai for 99 years. Accordingly, summons under Section 131 were issued to the Manager, Canara Bank, Chennai on 110. 2003 and served on 11. 2003. In response thereto their representatives were present and filed details called for with evidence on which dates assessees side was represented by their authorised representatives. In their letter dated 211. 2003 they clarified that: .(A) they made refundable security deposit of Rs.3,90,98.332 with assessee which carried interest at 17.5% (which was reduced to 10% vide Canara Bank letter dated 21. 2004 and Lease Agreement dated 26. 1991) .(B) they paid rent of Rs.39,27,995-95 per annum to the assessee .(C) interest charged was credited to their income and lease rent debited to expenditure account for the years ended 33. 1990, 33. 1991 and 33. 1992 and there was no book adjustment but actual payments on either side. 6. 2. They have explained in detail the nature of the above transactions, how did they fix rent and interest and the reasons therefor etc., the lease being for a longer period at fixed rent without escalation, they charged interest at a lesser rate on he money advanced by it. During the course of further hearing, Canara Bank filed proof showing the amount outstanding under the the head Sundry Assets towards lease deposit paid to assessee and copies of correspondence between them and assessee to confirm that interest on lease deposit has actually been paid by assessee and lease rent actually paid by bank to the assessee and that there as no adjustment of book entries. These submissions were verified from the evidences field and found to be correct....." 6. 3. The assessees representatives were made aware of the above details who in their letter dated 21. 2004 reiterated the above submissions of the Canara Bank i.e., lessor-lessee relationship only; that Canara Bank did not claim any ownership over the property, neither they capitalised the amount paid in their books nor they claim depreciation on that etc.," Therefore, the petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate. The petitioner being a Nationalised Bank cannot say that to avoid stamp duty the lease agreement was entered into. It is pertinent to note that stamp duty is paid on 75% of the market value for the lease of 99 years. 17. In the present case, the stamp duty between a sale deed, even assuming so, and lease for 99 years is only marginal and therefore the contention that instead of sale deed, the lease deed was entered into to save some money as stamp duty is not sustainable. Further, a Nationalised Bank cannot involve such kind of cheating the Government for evasion of stamp duty. 18. All that the Rent Controller has to do is to satisfy himself that the person seeking eviction or fixation of fair rent is a landlord, who has, prima facie, the right to receive the rents of the property in question. In order to decide the whether the denial of the landlords title by the tenant is bona fide, the Rent Controller may have to go in to the tenants contentions on the issue but he is not to decide the question finally, as such exercise is vested only with the Civil Courts. In this case, on a consideration of the documentary evidence the learned Rent Controller prima facie found and has rightly arrived at the conclusion that there exists a landlord tenant relationship between the parties and consequently dismissed the application questioning the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in entertaining the application filed under Section 4 of Rent Control Act. Considering the rival submissions of the respective counsels and perusing the typed set of papers and on a conjoint reading of the clauses found in the document dated 26. 1991, I am also of the considered view that it is only a Lease Deed and cannot be termed as a sale deed. Considering the rival submissions of the respective counsels and perusing the typed set of papers and on a conjoint reading of the clauses found in the document dated 26. 1991, I am also of the considered view that it is only a Lease Deed and cannot be termed as a sale deed. Apart from that, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, the income tax proceedings of the respective parties with respect to the petition premises would show that they have been acting as landlord and tenant. When most of the clauses found in the document are in unambiguous terms to show that it is only a lease deed, and the subsequent conduct of the parties are substantiating the same thing, there is no necessity to go into the surrounding circumstances which prevailed at the time of entering in the said transaction. In the above circumstances, this CRP fails and the same is dismissed. 19. Consequently, connected CMP is also dismissed. No costs.