J U D G M E N T Appellant is the plaintiff. The appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 19-8-1995, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, in AS No.9 of 1993, by which, the judgment and decree, dated 23-4-1993, passed by the learned District Munsif, Sangareddy in OS No.27 of 1982 was reversed and dismissed the suit. 2. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law raised in the grounds of appeal: (c) The appellate Court could not appreciate the aspect of burden of proof especially in the light of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act. (g) The appellate Court should have appreciated that the alleged sale cannot be relied upon in the light of Section 17 of the Registration Act and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. (h) The appellate Court should have appreciated that the defendant’s never denied the title of the plaintiffs and hence the adverse possession never commenced at all at any point of time, since permissive possession however long it may be will not amount to adverse possession. 3. The brief facts of the case are: 4. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration as well as for recovery of suit schedule property together with mesne profits of Rs.1,150/- till the date of the suit and also future mesne profits of Rs.50/per month. 5. It is stated that the plaintiff is the karta of the joint family consisting of three brothers and widowed mother. The father of the plaintiff died on 22-9-1980 and the plaintiff being the eldest son, has become the karta of the joint family, after the death of his father. The plaintiffs father was the owner of the house bearing No.2-4-78 and an open land, with a dilapidated house, bearing No.2-4-77, along with many other immovable properties at Sadasivpet. The said properties were left by the father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and his family members have succeeded to the properties, after the death of the plaintiff’s father. 6. It is also stated that the first defendant, who is the father of the second defendant, was a poor man and he used to purchase cloths from the father of the plaintiff, mostly on credit basis. The plaintiff and his family members have succeeded to the properties, after the death of the plaintiff’s father. 6. It is also stated that the first defendant, who is the father of the second defendant, was a poor man and he used to purchase cloths from the father of the plaintiff, mostly on credit basis. Due to long association, the first defendant almost became a family member of the plaintiff’s family and when the first defendant expressed his inability to have a residential house, the father of the plaintiff permitted the first defendant to use the house, bearing No.2-4-78 at Sadasivpet. Since the open place, bearing No.2-4-77, was adjoining the said house, the same was also permitted to be used by the first defendant and the first defendant was using the said open space. During his lifetime, the father of the plaintiff effected repairs and maintenance to the suit house which was under permissive possession of the first defendant. The suit schedule property was standing in the name of the father of the plaintiff in the municipal records, as he was the real owner. Subsequent to the death of the father of the plaintiff, the plaintiff and his brothers have become the owners. On 16-3-1980, the plaintiff and his mother asked the defendants to give possession of the house and the open land. But, the defendants denied the title of the plaintiff and his family, and claimed that the property stands in their name in the municipal records. Thereupon, the plaintiff’s mother made an application to the Municipality, as elder member of the family, and on enquiry as to flow the property was transferred in the name of the second defendant, the Municipal Commissioner, Sadasivpet, has issued a letter, dated 28-8-1981, directing the parties to seek redressal by establishing their rights before the Civil Court. Hence, the suit was filed. 7. It is further stated that the defendants do not have any right whatsoever in respect of the suit schedule property. Therefore, they are not entitled to continue in possession, as the possession is only permissive. However, the defendants played mischief in collusion with the municipal authorities and got the property transferred in their favour in the year 1978 without the knowledge of the plaintiff and his family members. Therefore, they are not entitled to continue in possession, as the possession is only permissive. However, the defendants played mischief in collusion with the municipal authorities and got the property transferred in their favour in the year 1978 without the knowledge of the plaintiff and his family members. Since no title was created by the members of the plaintiffs family by transfer, the defendants could not get the ownership transferred in their favour in the municipal records. The suit schedule property is the absolute property of the plaintiff and his family. Therefore, the plaintiff sought for declaration as well as possession, and other reliefs. The plaintiff also stated that the cause of action arose on 16-3-1980, when the defendants denied title of the plaintiffs and refused to deliver possession. 8. The defendants filed a written statement denying the allegations made against them by the plaintiffs. However, the defendants admitted that late Pandurangam, father of the plaintiff, was the original owner of the suit schedule property. But, it is denied that the plaintiff and his family members inherited the suit schedule property, as alleged by them. The defendants have stated that they have been in possession of the suit schedle property in their own right, as the suit schedule property was purchased by the first defendant for a valuable consideration in the year 1959 and possession was delivered and late Pandurangam executed a document to that effect. It is contended that after sale, a portion of the house has fallen down and therefore, the first defendant got reconstructed the said portion, after obtaining permission from the Municipality on 2-3-1963, and the plaintiff is well aware of the same. In the year 1967, the first defendant filed an application, along with the documents executed by the father of the plaintiff, before the municipal authorities for mutation of the suit house in the name of the second defendant. The Municipality, after enquiry and recording the statement of late Pandurangam, mutated the name of the second defendant on 5-12-1967 and the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property, since 1959 as absolute owners by paying the municipal tax. The defendants in their written statement stated that the document executed by late Pandurangam was misplaced and thre same shall be filed as and when traced. The defendants in their written statement stated that the document executed by late Pandurangam was misplaced and thre same shall be filed as and when traced. Even otherwise, it is contended that the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property in open assertion of their right as owners in hostility to the right of late Pandurangam, and after him, in hostility to his legal heirs i.e., the plaintiff and family members openly, from the date of purchase for more than 12 years and as such, they have perfected title even by adverse possession. It is also contended that the plaintiff has the knowledge of sale, but he filed the suit only to harass the defendants. Therefore, the defendants sought dismissal of the suit. 9. The trial Court framed appropriate issues as to whether the plaintiff continues to be the owner and entitled to possession of the property, whether the defendants are possessors of the property in their own right and whether the defendants have got title by adverse possession. 10. On behalf of the plaintiff, plaintiff himself was examined as PW.1 and got examined PWs.2 to 5, apart from marking Exs.A1 to A11 on his behalf. On the other hand, on behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 4 were examined, apart from marking Exs.B1 to B25. 11. The trial Court, after consideration of the evidence - oral and documentary; has come to the conclusion that the defendants are not able to prove that they are in possession of the suit schedule property in their own right and that their possession was only with the permission of the plaintiffs father. Hence, the question of adverse possession would not arise, and accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants carried the matter in appeal. 12. The lower appellate Court framed the following points for consideration. 1. Whether the appellants/defendants were enjoying the possession of the suit property as owners thereof asserting their title? 2. Whether the defendants’ possession over the suit premises was permissive possession? 3. If so, whether the permissive possession was converted into hostile possession since more than 12 years prior to the date of filing of the suit? 4. Whether the defendants perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession? 5. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the lower Court are sustainable in law? 13. 3. If so, whether the permissive possession was converted into hostile possession since more than 12 years prior to the date of filing of the suit? 4. Whether the defendants perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession? 5. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the lower Court are sustainable in law? 13. The lower appellate Court, after re-appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties, has come to the conclusion that the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property in their own right paying the property tax to the Municipality. It was observed that the document filed by the defendants shows that they have been paying the property tax from the date of alleged purchase and at the same time, the plaintiff though claimed that he has been paying the property tax, he could not produce any evidence showing that he has paid the property tax after 1968. The lower appellate Court also observed that the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property and the house bearing No.2-4-78 consisting of as many as 13 rooms, where the defendants are stated to have been running a weaving factory. In such circumstances, if the defendants have not purchased the suit schedule property, the father of the plaintiff would not have failed to claim the suit schedule premises or at least would have demanded rent for the premises, especially when the defendants were carrying on business, as admittedly, the property in question would definitely fetch some rent. According to the lower appellate Court, there was absolutely no convincing reason for late Pandurangam to keep quiet for not demanding any rent for the suit premises. Further, as the first defendant was running a weaving factory in the premises, he cannot be treated as a poor man, on which ground, he would have been allowed by the father of the plaintiff on sympathy, without demanding any rent. Therefore, the lower appellate Court has come to the conclusion that the suit schedule property was sold by the plaintiff’s father to the defendants. 14. Further, the documents produced by the defendants clearly shows that when the defendants made an application to the Municipality for mutation of their names, an enquiry was conducted and even the statement of the plaintiff’s father was recorded, before effecting mutation of the name of the second defendant. 14. Further, the documents produced by the defendants clearly shows that when the defendants made an application to the Municipality for mutation of their names, an enquiry was conducted and even the statement of the plaintiff’s father was recorded, before effecting mutation of the name of the second defendant. Further, since the defendants have been in possession in their own right paying the property tax with reference to the suit schedule property claiming title themselves openly and peacefully for more than 12 years prior to the date of death of Pandurangam, the plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of suit schedule property. 15. The lower appellate Court also recorded a finding that even assuming that originally the defendants entered into possession with the permission of the father of the plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendants asserted their title over the property adverse to the interest of the true owner. It is also observed that from Ex.B9, it is clear that the defendants applied for mutation and got the suit schedule property mutated in their name as long back as in the year 1965 in respect of house bearing No.2-4-78 and in the year 1967 in respect of 2-4-77. A perusal Ex.B9 also shows that the transfer order was communicated to late Pandurangam in the year 1965 in respect of the house bearing No.2-4-78. Therefore, late Pandurangam had the knowledge of assignment of title in favour of the defendants. Therefore, it was concluded by the lower appellate Court that the defendants have expressed their animus as early as in the year 1965, which is in the knowledge of the true owner. Therefore, the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession and accordingly allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Hence, the present second appeal by the appellant-plaintiff. 16. The learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the lower appellate Court has committed a grave error in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissing the suit. Hence, the present second appeal by the appellant-plaintiff. 16. The learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the lower appellate Court has committed a grave error in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissing the suit. It is contended by the learned Counsel that when the defendants are claiming to be in possession of the suit schedule property by virtue of a document of title which they could not produce and prove, and further when they are claiming to be in possession adverse to the plaintiff, the burden is on the defendants to prove that their possession is adverse and hostile to the real owner, which was not specifically pleaded in the written statement, but only stated in the evidence. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was in error in reversing the finding of the trial Court. The learned Counsel further contended that when once possession of the defendants is permissive, it continues to be permissive and cannot be treated as hostile, unless specific instances of animus was shown to the real owner. It is also contended by the learned Counsel that it was the case of the plaintiff that the defendants were permitted to be in possession of the suit schedule property by the father of the plaintiff and the evidence of other witnesses also shows that the plaintiff’s father was continuously exercising right over the suit schedule property by carrying out repairs and also paying the property tax. In the light of the said evidence, there is absolutely no scope for the defendants to show that their possession is adverse to the interest of the real owner. Therefore, the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the possession of the defendants is not permissive and therefore, the possession is adverse to the plaintiff, is clearly illegal and unsustainable. 17. The learned Counsel also contended that though the first defendant himself was examined as DW.1 and also got examined DWs.2 to 4, the evidence was found to be inconsistent and in fact, the document alleged to have been executed by the father of the plaintiff was not brought before the Court. 17. The learned Counsel also contended that though the first defendant himself was examined as DW.1 and also got examined DWs.2 to 4, the evidence was found to be inconsistent and in fact, the document alleged to have been executed by the father of the plaintiff was not brought before the Court. It is further contended that it was claimed by the defendants that when the alleged document executed by late Pandurangam in favour of the first defendant was filed before the municipal authorities, it was lost and a receipt was given by the Municipality stating missing of the said document. But, no such document allegedly given by the Municipality was brought before the Court. Therefore, the version of the defendants is clearly not supported by any evidence. The learned Counsel also contended that the plaintiff’s father paid the property tax in respect of the suit schedule property under Exs.A1 to A3 which clearly shows that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property paying the municipal tax, though the defendants were permitted to be in possession. The learned Counsel also contended that the burden is on the defendants to prove that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, under an alleged document, which is admittedly not registered document and which the defendants failed to produce as well as to prove, and also failed to prove from which date their possession was adverse to the plaintiffs. In the absence of any such evidence, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is not sustainable. 18. The learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff relied upon the following decisions - ACHAL REDDI V. RAMAKRISHNA REDDIAR AND OTHERS(1) , ANNASAHEB BAPUSAHEB PATIL AND OTHERS V. BALTIWANT ALIAS BALASAHEB BABUSAHEB PATIL (DEAD) BY LRS AND HEIRS ETC.,(2) KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKF V. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND OTHERS (3), MOTURI SEETA RAMABRAHMAM V. BOBBA RAMA MOHANA RAO AND OTHERS(4), NIRKAR DAS V. GOURHURI DAS AND OTHERS(5), ARJUNA SUBRAMANYA REDDY V. ARJUNA CHINA THANGAVELU (6) and S. SARASWATHI V. Y LAXMINARAYANA(7), in support of his contention that the possession of the defendants could not be treated as adverse to the plaintiff, since their possession is permissive. 19. 19. The learned Counsel further contended that since the defendants relied upon an unregistered document, the same would not confer any title, as title would not pass on in respect of immovable property, where the value is more than Rs.100/-, unless a registered sale deed is obtained. Since admittedly, the property in question is Rs.2,000/- as is admitted by the defendants, unregistered sale deed cannot be relied upon. The learned Counsel also contended that the defendants did not plead what they have stated in the evidence. Therefore, the evidence that was adduced which was not pleaded in the written statement cannot be accepted. Therefore, he sought for setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. 20. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants, Smt. C. Jaya Shree Sarathy, on the other hand, sought to sustain the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court on the ground that all the contentions that were advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff are only questions of fact and while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, this Court has no power to reappreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion than what was arrived at by the lower appellate Court. 21. The learned Counsel contended that it was the case of the defendants that they have purchased the suit schedule property under an unregistered document in the year 1959 and it is also not in dispute that the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property since then. Though the document is an unregistered document, which could not be relied upon to claim title, the same can be shown as a point of time from which the defendants are in possession in their own right and not with the permission of the plaintiff or his father. It is also contended by the learned Counsel that the document produced by the defendants clearly shows that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the property in their own right paying the property tax to the Municipality. The documents under Exs.B 11 to B25 clearly shows that the defendants have been paying the property tax from the date of their possession in the year 1959 or even prior thereto. The documents under Exs.B 11 to B25 clearly shows that the defendants have been paying the property tax from the date of their possession in the year 1959 or even prior thereto. The learned Counsel also referred to and relied upon Ex.B9, which is the proceedings of the Municipality on the application made by the first defendant for mutation of the name of the second defendant in the municipal records in respect of the suit schedule property, and on such application, the Municipality issued a notice to the plaintiff’s father, late Pandurangam, and also recorded his statement, as is evident from Ex.B9 and it is only after satisfying the claim of the defendants, the Municipality mutated the name of the second defendant. In fact, the said proceedings of mutation was also sent to the father of the plaintiff, as is evident from the said document under Ex.B9. As long as the documents relied upon by the defendants are not disputed by the plaintiff, it is not open to contend contrary to the same, which clearly shows that the name of the second defendant was mutated in the municipal records as early as in the year 1965 and 1967 and property tax has also been paid by the defendants. In fact, the plaintiff did not pay the property tax after 1968. In the light of the evidence available on record, the lower appellate Court recorded a finding that the defendants have been in possession in their own right adverse to the interest of the real owner. 22. The learned Counsel further contended that the lower appellate Court also had gone into the circumstances under which the defendants have been in possession and also taking into account the extent of the property and the activity that was being carried on by the defendants in the suit schedule property, a finding was recorded that the plaintiff would not have allowed the defendants to be in possession without rent, if it is permissive possession. Therefore, it recorded a finding against the plaintiff. Therefore, the said findings cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. Therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 23. Therefore, it recorded a finding against the plaintiff. Therefore, the said findings cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. Therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 23. Alternatively, the learned Counsel for the respondents-defendants contended that since the defendants have come into possession under an invalid document, their possession on date cannot be considered as permissive and if it is so, the suit filed in the year 1980 is clearly barred by limitation, since the defendants have been in .. possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property from 1959 onwards. 24. The learned Counsel for the respondents-defendants relied upon the following decisions - GOVINDARAJU V. MARIAMMAN(8) , SUGANI V. RAMES-HWAR DAS AND ANOTHER(9) , JHAGRU NONIA AND OTHERS V. MST. BIPTI AND OTHERS(10), SHANKRU AND OTHERS V. SUHARU DEVI AND OTHERS(11), STATE OF WEST BENGAL V. THE DALHOUSIE INSTITUTE SOCIETY(12) , and SMT. CHANDRAKANTABEN J. MODI AND ANOTHER V. VADILAL BAPALAL MODI AND OTHERS(13), in support of her contentions. 25. Heard the learned Counsel for both the parties and considered the material on record. 26. From the above, the issues to be considered in this second appeal are the issues which are framed as substantial questions of law in grounds of appeal at (c), (g) and (h). 27. The first substantial question of law raised in ground No.2(c) is - whether the appellate Court could not appreciate the aspect of burden of proof, especially in the light of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act? 28. On appreciation of evidence, the lower appellate Court recorded a categorical finding with reference to possession of the plaintiff and also how the possession of the defendants was shown to be adverse to the real owner. The documents filed by the defendants clearly shows that the defendants are in possession of the suit schedule property in their own right. The lower appellate Court referred to Ex.B9, which is the proceeding of mutation of property in the name of the second defendant on an application filed by the first defendant and that itself clearly shows that a notice was given to the plaintiff’s father, late Pandurangam, and his statement was also recorded. Therefore, mutation was ordered and a copy of the said mutation proceedings was also communicated to the plaintiff’s father. Therefore, mutation was ordered and a copy of the said mutation proceedings was also communicated to the plaintiff’s father. When the property was got mutated in the name of the second defendant, after enquiry and notice to the real owner, it would be difficult to accept the contention of the plaintiff that such proceedings cannot be considered as adverse to the real owner and the defendants are in not possession in their own right. The said proceedings were issued as early as in the years 1965 and 1967, and in fact, the plaintiff paid the property tax only up to 1968, last year of payment of property tax. Thereafter, the plaintiff or his father did not pay any property tax in respect of the suit schedule property. There is absolutely no explanation why the plaintiff’s father did not pay the property tax, though it is stated he has been paying the property tax with reference to other properties. 29. Further, the defendants have been continuously paying the property tax from the date of the alleged purchase i.e., 1959. In fact, the defendants have even paid the property tax for the period even prior to that, though the payment was effected in the year 1967. There is no explanation on the part of the plaintiff how the defendants were allowed to pay the property tax or why the plaintiff did not pay the property tax in respect of the suit schedule property. Therefore, taking into all these facts, the lower appellate Court recorded a finding that the possession of the defendants is adverse to the real owner and therefore, the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession. There is absolutely no infirmity in the said appreciation of evidence and finding recorded with reference to adverse possession by the lower appellate Court. 30. Coming to the second question of law raised in ground No.2(g), though the defendants have claimed that they have purchased the property from the plaintiff’s father under an unregistered sale deed and though it was pleaded before the Courts below, no relief was granted basing on the said unregistered sale deed. Therefore, the second question of law as framed would not arise out of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. 31. Therefore, the second question of law as framed would not arise out of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. 31. Similarly, coming to the last question of law raised in ground No.2(h), the claim of the plaintiff is that the defendants have never denied title of the plaintiff and hence, adverse possession never commenced at all. This is clearly devoid of merit, since it was specifically pleaded by the defendants that their possession is as owners of the property and adverse to the real owner and the same is evidenced by Ex.B9, where they have claimed and got mutation of their names in the municipal records, which clearly shows that they have asserted their title in respect of the property. Therefore, even the said substantial question of law is devoid of merit. 32. However, before concluding, it would be appropriate to refer to the decisions relied upon by the respective Counsel. 33. In Achal Reddi’s case (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the issue of adverse possession, where the party obtains possession under an executory contract, observed as under: “In the case of an agreement of sale, the party who obtains possession, acknowledges title of the vendor, even though the agreement of sale may be invalid. It is an acknowledgement and recognition of title of the vendor while excludes the theory of adverse possession. The well-settled rule of law is that if a person is in actual possession and has a right to possession under a title involving a due recognition of the owner’s title his possession will not be regarded as adverse in law, even though he claims under another title having regard to the well-recognised policy of law that possession is never considered adverse if it is referable to a lawful title. The purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible character cannot be heard to contend that his possession was adverse. In the conception of adverse possession, there is an essential and basic difference between a case in which the other party is put in possession of property by an outright transfer, both parties stipulating for a total divestiture of all the rights of the transferor in the property, and in case in which there is a mere executory agreement of transfer both parties contemplating a deed of transfer to be executed at a later point of time. In the latter case, the principle of estoppel applies estopping the transferee from contending that his possession while the contract remained executory in stage, was in his own right and adversely against the transferor. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. When the commencement and continuance of possession is legal and proper, referable to a contract, it cannot be adverse.” 34. In Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil’s case (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the issue of adverse possession as well as applicability of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, at Paras 12 and 13 held as follows: “Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes that for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title, the limitation of 12 years begins to run from the date of the defendant’s interest becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Adverse possession means a hostile assertion i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. Under Article 65, burden is on the defendants to prove affirmatively. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i, e., possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts, alleged by a person, constitute adverse possession, regard must be had to the animus of the person doing those acts which must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case. The person who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e., possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. Where possession could be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.” 35. One who holds possession on behalf of another does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.” 35. In Karnataka Board of Wakfs case (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the issue of adverse possession, at Paras 11 and 12 observed as follows: “In the eye of law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner. It is a well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. Plaintiff, filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. In P. Perisasami v. P. Periathambi, (1995) 6 SCC 523 , this Court ruled that - “whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.” The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639 = 1996 (2) ALD (SCSN) 7, that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: “As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period his title by prescription ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” 36. In Moturi Seeta Ramabrahmam’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the issue of adverse possession, held that a party obtaining possession through an agreement of sale having acknowledged the title of the true owner, which excludes the theory of adverse possession, the party is not entitled to claim title by adverse possession. 37. In Moturi Seeta Ramabrahmam’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the issue of adverse possession, held that a party obtaining possession through an agreement of sale having acknowledged the title of the true owner, which excludes the theory of adverse possession, the party is not entitled to claim title by adverse possession. 37. In Nirkar Das’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of Orissa High Court, while considering the similar issue, and considering the period of 12 years for claiming title by adverse possession acquired under an agreement of sale being permissive possession, held that the same would not coincide with the date of agreement and a person acquired possession under an agreement being permissive not entitled to plead his possession adverse to the real owner. 38. In Arjuna Subranianya Reddy’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the issue of adverse possession relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Achal Reddi v. Ranzakrishna Reddiar and others, AIR 1990 SC 553 , held that the defendant who claims to have got into possession under an oral sale having acknowledged the title of the true owner, is not entitled to plead that his possession is adverse to the real owner and accordingly, reversed the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff, who is the real owner for recovery of possession. 39. In S. Saraswathi’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, held that an unregistered sale deed does not confer title on the purchaser and the notarized sale deed relied upon by the party is inadmissible in evidence, particularly for the purpose of declaration of title. 40. 39. In S. Saraswathi’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, held that an unregistered sale deed does not confer title on the purchaser and the notarized sale deed relied upon by the party is inadmissible in evidence, particularly for the purpose of declaration of title. 40. In Govindaraju’s case (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the scope of interference by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, observed at Para 12 as follows: “Section 100 provides that the second appeal would lie to the High Court from a decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court if the High Court is satisfied that the case “involves a substantial question of law.” It further provides that the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and the High Court on being satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved in a case formulate the said question. Sub-section (5) provides that the “appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated”. It reserves the liberty with the respondent against whom the appeal was admitted ex parte and the questions of law had been framed in the absence to argue that the case did not involve the questions of law framed. Proviso to sub-section (5) states that the questions of law framed at the time of admission would not take away or abridge the power of the Court to frame any other substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier, if the Court is satisfied that the case involved such additional questions after recording reasons for doing so. It is abundantly clear from the analysis of Section 100 that if the appeal is entertained without framing the substantial questions of law, then it would be illegal and would amount to failure or abdication of the duty cast on the Court. The existence of substantial questions of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code.” 41. In Sugani’s case (supra), the Apex Court while considering the scope of Section 100 CPC, at Para 25 observed as follows: “It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact. In Sugani’s case (supra), the Apex Court while considering the scope of Section 100 CPC, at Para 25 observed as follows: “It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witness accepted by the trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal, when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible. One drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appeffare Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 42. It is further observed at Para 13 that mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. 43. In Jhagru Nonia’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge of Patna High Court, while considering the scope of Section 100 CPC, held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of the first appellate Court without formulating substantial questions of law and interference with the judgment of the first appellate Court is permissible only when it is perverse. 44. 44. In Shankru’s case (supra), where the defendant claimed to be the owner on the basis of a document purported to be a sale deed executed by the deceased plaintiff in favour of the defendant in the year 1969 prepared on a plain paper and not prepared on a required stamped paper nor it was registered, the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the defendant even otherwise became owner by adverse possession, which was reversed by the lower appellate Court, a learned Single Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court reversed the said judgment of the lower appellate Court observing that a person entering upon possession of immovable property under an invalid or void transfer, he does not acquire any lawful title to the property, but the possession becomes adverse to the true owner the moment he enters upon such possession. 45. While coming to the above conclusion, the learned Judge relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY(14) and the relevant para of which is extracted hereunder: “..........The position of the respondentCorporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent-Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly, as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent-Corporation has acquired the limited title to it and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865......” 17. The above extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse possession. In the case before us, there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the, respondent on this point and we agree with those findings.” 46. The above extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse possession. In the case before us, there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the, respondent on this point and we agree with those findings.” 46. In State of West Bengal’s case (supra), the Government granted some land in favour of the respondent-Institute not in the manner required by law. However, the evidence shows that the grantee was in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property for over 60 years. The Institute was treated as owner by the Municipal Corporation as well as by the Government. Possession of the Institute was held on basis of grant, though invalid, as adverse to the real owner and acquires title and therefore, it is entitled for compensation of money for acquisition of such land. 47. In Smt. Chandrakantaben J. Modi’s case (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the claim of adverse possession, accepted the claim of the sixth defendant therein that she came into possession of the joint family property by way of gift which was mutated in her name in the place of donor and she has been collecting the rents of the property through her agent and therefore, claimed that she is the owner of the property and not liable to be dispossessed. Though her claim was not accepted by the High Court, the Apex Court reversed the judgment of the High Court recording a finding that her possession was adverse from the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent, Defendant No.1 and thereafter, through her husband, Jayantilal and son, Defendant No.7 till 1960, when the suit was filed, and the total period being more than 12 years, the claim of the plaintiff that it is the property of the joint family and therefore, one of the family member is not entitled to claim exclusive possession, was negatived. 48. In the light of the above decisions relied upon by the respective Counsel, it is clear that where a party enters into possession under an agreement of sale and where the vendor had agreed to execute a registered sale deed at a subsequent date, the possession of the vendee continues to be that of a permissive recognizing the title of the vendor and cannot plead adverse possession. But, in a case where a person inducted into possession under an invalid document of transfer, even though title is not passed on to the person in possession, possession of that person, who was inducted, would be considered as adverse to the true and real owner. 49. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the above decisions, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s possession was permissive, since the first defendant was permitted to be in possession by the plaintiffs father, which was disputed by the first defendant claiming that he had purchased the property under an unregistered sale deed which is admittedly not placed before the Court. On the other hand, the evidence shows that the sale deed was executed on a plain paper or insufficiently stamped paper, and admittedly, not registered. Therefore, no valid title could be passed on under the said document. Apart from the said document, Ex.B9 clearly shows that the first defendant made an application to the Municipality seeking mutation of the name of the second defendant in the place of the original owner with reference to the suit schedule property. In pursuance of the said application, the Municipality conducted an enquiry as is evident from Ex.B9, recorded the statement of the father of the plaintiff and passed orders mutating the name of the second defendant. A copy of which was also communicated to the plaintiffs father, which is also evident from Ex.B9. In those circumstances, the claim of the defendants cannot but be considered as adverse to the interest of the real owner. The defendants claiming to be the owners, sought for mutation of their names in the municipal records, which was in fact effected in the years 1965 and 1967. Further, the defendants have been continuously paying the property tax, while the plaintiff was not able to show that he or his predecessor in title had paid the property tax after 1968. There is no explanation why the property tax was not paid after 1968. 50. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court cannot be considered as perverse or erroneous warranting interference. There is no explanation why the property tax was not paid after 1968. 50. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court cannot be considered as perverse or erroneous warranting interference. In the circumstances, the questions of law on which the second appeal was admitted are devoid of merit and does not call for any interference with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. 51. The second appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs. --X--