Judgment S. P. KUKDA Y, J.:- Rule. Rule made retunable forthwith with he consent of parties. Learned APP waives service for the Respondents. 2. In this Writ Petition, for the writ of Habeas Corpus, the petitioner has impugned detention order dated 27th July, 2006 passed by Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad, under section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for 1 short), confirmed by the Home Department (Special) of the State Government (Respondent No.1) by order dated 7th August, 2006 under section 3 (3) of the Act. 3. Inspector of Police of Kranti Chowk Police Station (Respondent No.3) sponsored a proposal for detention of the petitioner. On consideration of this proposal, Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad (Respondent No.2), on being satisfied from the material placed before him, that the petitioner habitually indulges in activities prejudicial to the public order within the area of his operation and that the remedies available under ordinary laws have proved to be ineffective in curbing his nefarious activities, passed Detention Order dated 27th July, 2006. The order was served on the petitioner and he was detained in Central prison, Aurangabad. On the same day, information regarding his detention was communicated to his father. Copies of the grounds for his detention with Marathi translation, were supplied to the petitioner on 29th July, 2006. The petitioner was apprised of his right to make a representation to the Advisory Board and to the State Government. Report in respect of the detention of the petitioner dated 27th July, 2006 was forwarded to the Government on 31st July, 2006. The order was approved by Respondent No.1 on 3rd August, 2006 and a reference was made to the Advisory Board on the same day. The petitioner made representation through Adv. Talwar on 8th August, 2006. Remarks of the Detaining Authority were received on 14th August, 2006. The representation was routed through proper channel to the Additional Chief Secretary (Home). The Advisory Board heard the petitioner on 25th August, 2006. During the course of hearing, the petitioner submitted a written representation. After considering the representation, the Board rejected his representation and forwarded its opinion dated 31st August, 2006 to respondent no.1. The opinion of the Advisory Board was received by the Home Department of Respondent No.1 on 1st September, 2006. The Advisory Board heard the petitioner on 25th August, 2006. During the course of hearing, the petitioner submitted a written representation. After considering the representation, the Board rejected his representation and forwarded its opinion dated 31st August, 2006 to respondent no.1. The opinion of the Advisory Board was received by the Home Department of Respondent No.1 on 1st September, 2006. Report of the Advisory Board and other material placed before him, was placed before the Additional Chief Secretary (Home). The Additional Chief Secretary (Home), who is duly empowered for the purpose under the Rules of Business of Respondent No.1, made under Article 166 of the Constitution, considered the material placed before him, on 2nd September, 2006. After considering material placed before him and satisfying himself that the detention of the petitioner is necessary, the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) confirmed the order of detention of the petitioner for the period of one year, on 4th September, 2006. It is not in dispute that the time schedule for approval of the detention order as required by the provisions of the Act is adhered to by the respondents. 4. The facts leading to the detention of the petitioner reflected in the grounds of the detention are that the petitioner has formed a gang of rowdies and is indulging in commission of offences, such as, outraging modesty of women, criminal intimidation, voluntarily causing hurt, rioting with deadly weapons and committing breach of the prohibitory order promulgated under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act. The petitioner is involved in five criminal cases, namely, (i) RCC No.3054/1999 under Section 509, IPC (Kranti Chowk Police Station) in which he is acquitted: (ii) RCC No.73/2003 under sections 323, ~24, 504, 506 read with section 34, IPC (City Chowk Police Station) which is compromised; (iii) RCC No.63/2005 under sections 323, 324, 504, 506 read with section 34, IPC (City Chowk Police j Station); (iv) RCC No.20/2006, under section 325,504,506 read with section 34, IPC (Kranti j Chowk Police Station) and, (v) RCC No.156/ g 2006 under sections 143, 147, 148, 324 read j with section 149, IPC (Kranti Chowk Police e Station) which are pending. Preventive actions sand Externment proceeding were also taken d against the petitioner by Kranti chowk Police e Station, being (i) Chowk Police Station; Chapter Case No.6/2006 under section 107, Cr.P.C. in which the petitioner was released on bond of Rs.10,000/- (ii) Chapter Case No.47/2006 under section 110 of Cr.P.C. (iii) Externment order no. 1766/2006 issued by the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Zone) Aurangabad dated 6th September, 2006 under section 56(l)(a)(b) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The petitioner had had unleashed a reign of terror in the localities of Gulmandi, Tilakpath, Paithan Gate, Aurangpura, Nirala Bazar and Central Bus Stand. Registration of the offences and the preventive actions taken against the petitioner had no effect on his prejudicial activities. On account of fear, the victims neither filed compliant against the petitioner nor made any statement against him. However, two witnesses showed willingness to make a statement against him on the condition that their names would not be divulged and they would not be called upon to give evidence against the petitioner. In his statement recorded on 8th June, 2006, witness "A" stated that he knew the petitioner since last three years. The petitioner is always armed with lethal weapons. He forcibly collects protection money (Hafta) from traders having business in Aurangpura, Gulmandi, Tilakpath, Paithan Gate and Nirala Bazar areas. In the first weak of May, 2006, at about 8.00 p.m. the petitioner went to the shop of the witness, collected some cassettes of movies, took away Rs.2000/- from his cash box and told him that he will have to give protection money of Rs.1000. While leaving the shop, the petitioner threatened him with dire consequences if he approaches the Police. On account of fear of reprisal, he did not lodge complaint against the petitioner. In his statement recorded on 9th June, 2006, witness "B" disclosed that he knows the petitioner for five years. The petitioner has created a terror in Aurangabad, Gulmandi, Tilakpath. Paithan Gate, Nirala Bazar and Bus Stand areas. Residents of this area are afraid of the petitioner who extorts money from residents of this area by using lethal weapons. About fifteen days prior to recording of his statement, at about 8.00 p.m. at Veer Sawarkar square, the petitioner demanded protection money (hafta) from the witness. Paithan Gate, Nirala Bazar and Bus Stand areas. Residents of this area are afraid of the petitioner who extorts money from residents of this area by using lethal weapons. About fifteen days prior to recording of his statement, at about 8.00 p.m. at Veer Sawarkar square, the petitioner demanded protection money (hafta) from the witness. When he refused, petitioner removed Rs.1800/- from his shirt pocket at the point of knife and threatened him with dire consequences if he makes a grievance. The witness got frightened and ran away. He did not approach law enforcement machinery because of the fear. In paragraph 6, the Detaining Authority summed up the conclusion in these words : "6............... Your above described activities are disturbing even tempo of life of citizens of the said localities and areas, which can be seen from grounds 4 and 5. The preventive action under Cr.P.C. and externment proceeding under Bombay Police Act taken against you, proved to be futile to prevent you from indulging in such activities. You are not gainfully employed, and as such you are likely to continue your criminal and dangerous activities in future Inspite of Police action taken against the same from time to time. Your criminal activities are likely to disturb public order in Gulmandi, Tilakpath, Paithangate, Aurangpura, Nirala Bazar. Bus stand and adjoining area. Therefore, I am subjectively satisfied that, with a view to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to detain you under the provisions of "Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1980 (Amended 1996)." 5. It is contention of learned counsel for the petitioner Shri. B.L. Sagar-Killarikar that the petitioner is acquitted of the charges levelled against him in Criminal Case No.3054/1999. Criminal Case No.73/2003 is compromised and in other criminal cases, he is released on bail. The incidents for which he is prosecuted have no tendency to affect public order; they can at the most, be regarded as affecting law and order. Similarly, the interval of time between filing of the cases would show that the petitioner can not be categorized as a habitual offender. Therefore, the Detaining Authority is not justified in detaining the petitioner by involving section 3(1) of the Act. Similarly, the interval of time between filing of the cases would show that the petitioner can not be categorized as a habitual offender. Therefore, the Detaining Authority is not justified in detaining the petitioner by involving section 3(1) of the Act. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2130 in the matter of Deepak Suresh Ghodeshwar Vs. Shri. M. N. Singh. Referring to the in-camera statements, learned counsel contends that the allegations in these statements merely refer to the demand of money and threats given by the petitioner. These statements do not disclose that public order of a particular locality or area was disturbed by the so called prejudicial acts of the petitioner. None of these allegations are reflected in the criminal cases registered against the petitioner. Moreover, there is delay in recording these statements, thus they can not form basis for arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner is involved in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and is a dangerous person. It is further contented that the identity of witnesses who made in-camera statements is not personally verified by respondent no.2 nor he has made enquiries to satisfy himself of the truth of the allegations found in the statements. In view of this failure on the part of Respondent no.2, the order of detention suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and deserves to be set aside. For this proposition reliance is placed on the ruling of this Court in the matter of Pankaj Mehta Vs. R.H. Mendoca reported in 2000 ALL MR (Cri) 773. Learned counsel contends that the detention order is passed for the period of one year in contravention of the mandate of section 3(2) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, respondent no.3 has initiated these proceeding in view of the promise given to his relative Shri. Baheti. The material on record does not disclose that the petitioner is a dangerous person and indulges in activities which are prejudicial to the public order. The data on record does not furnish sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the respondent no.2. In the absence of necessary material justifying detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the Act, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The data on record does not furnish sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the respondent no.2. In the absence of necessary material justifying detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the Act, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The ground of non-supply of the copies of the relevant papers in Hindi which is mother tongue of the petitioner is not pressed at the time of arguments as it is contended that the petitioner has taken education in Marathi medium up to IX standard. 6. Referring to the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondents and a reply filed by Secretary of the Advisory Board, learned APP Shri. K. B. Choudhary has pointed out that the material on record is sufficient to establish that at the time of passing of the order of detention, the petitioner was engaged in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is further pointed out that there is no foundation for the allegations of mala fadies against the Sponsoring Authority. According to learned APP, the respondents have complied with all the requirements of the provisions of the Act, therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned order of detention. 7. Canvassing a theory that the acts imputed to the petitioner do not fall within the category of the acts affecting public order, learned counsel Shri. Killarikar argues that the material placed before the respondents, is not sufficient to establish that the petitioner is engaged in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is contended that the acts referred to by respondents constitute commission of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, at the highest, these acts may create law and order problems. The alleged acts can not be termed as prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as they affect an individual and not the members of the society. Pursuing this thread of the arguments, learned counsel contends that the material available to the detaining Authority falls short of showing that the petitioner habitually committed acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as the alleged acts, spread over a long period of time, can not be said to constitute a habit. Pursuing this thread of the arguments, learned counsel contends that the material available to the detaining Authority falls short of showing that the petitioner habitually committed acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as the alleged acts, spread over a long period of time, can not be said to constitute a habit. The purpose of the Act is to curb the activities of Dangerous persons which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by having recourse to the provisions of the Act, on failure of the normal remedies available under the penal laws. Section 2(b-l) of the Act defines "dangerous person" as a member or leader of a gang, who habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commissions of any of the offence punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offence punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959. Section 2(a)(iv) read with the explanation defines the phrase "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" in relation to a dangerous person. When such a person is engaged, or is making preparation for engaging, in any of his activities as a dangerous person, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order, the public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause directly or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity, among the general public or any section thereof, or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health. 8. The topic relating to the distinction between the acts affecting law and order and those prejudicial to the maintenance of public order has been a subject-matter of several decisions of the Apex Court. In Ram Manohar Lobia Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 se 740) speaking for the majority. His Lordship Justice Hidayatullah, observed, "one has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents C the largest circle within which is the next circle I, representing public order and the smallest circle c represents security of State. In Ram Manohar Lobia Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 se 740) speaking for the majority. His Lordship Justice Hidayatullah, observed, "one has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents C the largest circle within which is the next circle I, representing public order and the smallest circle c represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but v not public order just as an act may affect public n order but not security of the State." Giving an example to bring out the distinction between d these concepts, His Lordships observed in Arun Ghosh Vs. State of W.B., (1970)1 SCC 98 "(Para 3)" Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to a half a dozen chambermaids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquility there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies." In Subhash Bhandari Vs. District Magistrate, Lucknow (1987)4 see 685 (At pages 686-687) dealing with the questions whether a solitary instance can provide basis of detention it is observed. District Magistrate, Lucknow (1987)4 see 685 (At pages 686-687) dealing with the questions whether a solitary instance can provide basis of detention it is observed. "A solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs public tranquility by creating terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is alleged to have been committed. Thus it is the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the questions whether a an has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order." 9. In Phulwari Jagdambaprasad Pathak Vs. R. H. Mendoca, (2000)6 SCC 571 : [2000 ALL MR (Cri) 1503 (S.C.)], considering a case where the material before the respondents consisted of in-camera statement alone, in para 16 of the report Their Lordships observed, "Then comes the crucial question whether in-camera statements of persons/witnesses can be utilized for the purpose of arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for passing the order of detention. Our attention has not been drawn to any of the provisions of the Act which expressly or impliedly lays down the type of material which can form the basis of a detention order under section 3 of the Act. Preventive detention measure is harsh but it becomes necessary in the larger interest of society. It is in the nature of a precautionary measure taken for preservation of public order. The power is to be used with caution and circumspection. For the purpose of exercise of the power, it is not necessary to prove to the hilt that the person concerned had committed any of the offences as stated in the Act. It is sufficient if from the material available on record, the detaining authority could reasonably feel satisfied about the necesscity for detention of the person concerned in order to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is sufficient if from the material available on record, the detaining authority could reasonably feel satisfied about the necesscity for detention of the person concerned in order to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the absence of any provision specifying the type of material which mayor may not be taken into consideration by the detaining authority and keeping in view of the purpose the statute is intended to achieve, the power vested in the detaining authority should not be unduly restricted. It is neither possible nor advisable to catelogue the types of material which can form the basis of a detention order under the Act. That will depend on the facts and situation of a case. Presumably, that is why Parliament did not make any provision in the Act in that regard and left the matter to the discretion of the detaining authority. However, the facts stated in the material relied upon should be true and should have a reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the order is passed." 10. A person can be detained having recourse to the provisions of the Act only in a case where remedies available under the ordinary laws fail to bridle his nefarious activities. As the Act permits detention without trial, safeguards are provided to ensure that the provisions are not misused. Before invoking the extraordinary remedy available under the Act, the Authorities have to satisfy themselves that the detenu is, in fact indulging in activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Subjective satisfaction of the authorities concerned is a sine qua non for passing an order of detention under the provisions of the Act. As these persons create a terror in the sphere of their operation, the inhabitants are either reluctant to approach law enforcing agency or simply suffer indignity and harassment for the fear of retaliation. In such instances the detenu may not even have been prosecuted or proceeded against under the penal laws for want of evidence to justify initiation of criminal proceedings. It is therefore, not essential that the detenue should have a long standing record showing commission of cognizable offences or a history showing that he is a habitual offender. In such instances the detenu may not even have been prosecuted or proceeded against under the penal laws for want of evidence to justify initiation of criminal proceedings. It is therefore, not essential that the detenue should have a long standing record showing commission of cognizable offences or a history showing that he is a habitual offender. This concept of detention under the Act is further made clear by introduction of section 5-A which provides that the detention is permissible on anyone ground and that the order of detention shall not be invalidated on account of vagueness, non-proximity or other contingencies specified in the section. Thus, the material on which the decision is to be taken varies according to the nature and the extent of the activities of the individual concerned. What is essential is that the material available to the authorities must be sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the authorities concerned and to justify invocation of the extraordinary remedy. Once it is found that there is indeed sufficient material justifying passing of the order under the provisions of the Act, writ court would not interfere with the impugned order. 11. In the present case, the petitioner is prosecuted for commission of offences punishable under different sections of the Penal Code including sections 143, 147, 324, 325, 506,509 falling under Chapter XVI of the Penal Code. Learned counsel has pointed out that the petitioner is acquitted of the offence punishable under section 509, IPC in Criminal Case No.3054/1999 and the extermination order has been set aside in appea1. According to learned counsel having regard to this fact it can not be said that the material available to the detaining authority was sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner is concerned with the commission of acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. We are unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to this view. Conviction or acquittal of the accused depends upon the production of necessary evidence to establish his guilt beyond doubt. These principles also apply to confirmation of an order passed in externment proceeding. Usual experience regarding criminal cases filed against desperados is that the witnesses are reluctant to give evidence against them. Besides, there can be other causes for failure of these proceedings. These principles also apply to confirmation of an order passed in externment proceeding. Usual experience regarding criminal cases filed against desperados is that the witnesses are reluctant to give evidence against them. Besides, there can be other causes for failure of these proceedings. Failure of these proceedings do not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the incidents for which the accused was prosecuted had not taken place, Therefore, merely because of the failure of some of these proceedings, it can not be said that the material before the detaining authority was not sufficient to arrive at the conclusion of the necessity of initiating proceeding for the detention under the provisions of the Act. Dealing with such a situation in the matter of Harpreet Kaur (Mrs.) Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1992)2 SCC 177 the Apex Court observed in para no.25 of the report. "There is no gainsaying that in the present state of law, a criminal can be punished only when the prosecution is able to lead evidence and prove the case against an accused person beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the prosecution is unable to lead evidence to prove its case, the case fails, though that failure does not imply that no crime had been committed. Where the prosecution case fails, because witnesses are reluctant on account of fear or retaliation to come forward to depose against an accused, obviously, the crime would go unpunished and the criminal would be encouraged. In the ultimate analysis, it is the society which suffers. Respect for law has to be maintained in the interest of the society and discouragement of a criminal is one of the ways to maintain it. The objectionable activities of the detenu have, therefore, to be judged in the totality of the circumstances to find out whether those activities have any prejudicial effect on the society as a whole or not. If the society, and not only an individual, suffers on account of the questionable activities of a person, then those activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and are not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order". For invoking provision of the Act, it is not necessary that the detenu should have been convicted for the commission of an offence or externed from the locality frequented by him. For invoking provision of the Act, it is not necessary that the detenu should have been convicted for the commission of an offence or externed from the locality frequented by him. If the available material is reliable and shows that his activities affect maintenance of public order in the region where he habitually operates, the authorities would be justified in invoking provisions of the Act for the detention of such a person. 12. Apart from these two instances there is other material on record to justify action taken against the petitioner. The facts leading to the registration of Crime No. 156/2006 shows that the petitioner was forcing owner of the shop Atiq Motiwala to compromise previous dispute between them and not only assaulted Shaikh Imran but also damage show-rooms of the nearby shops creating panic which resulted in the closing of the shops by the shopkeepers of the area on 9th May, 2006. Witness "B" also refers to the incident of the same day, i.e. of 9th June, 2006 regarding the pedestrian to run for their life instead of helping the victim. Witness "A" speaks of the incident of extortion of Rs.2000 from his shop on the earlier day and demand for protection money. These incidents which took place in the recent past, show that the petitioner habitually indulged in activities which affected the society as a whole. The material before respondents was thus, sufficient to justify the conclusion that the activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance for the public order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the matter in Deepak Suresh Ghodeshwar Vs. Shri. M.N. Singh (supra) in support of his contention, that an act of threatening a witness can not be regarded as an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In that case the detention of the petitioner was founded on registration of an offence punishable under sections 435, 506(11) r/w. Section 34, IPC and three in camera statements. This Court found that the story of the incident on the basis of which offence regarding commission of arson was registered appeared to be imaginary and the facts set out in the in-camera statements were not sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This Court found that the story of the incident on the basis of which offence regarding commission of arson was registered appeared to be imaginary and the facts set out in the in-camera statements were not sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This decision is based on the appreciation of the facts of that particular case. The facts of the present case being different this decision does not sub-stantiat contention of learned counsel that the material available in the present case do not disclose activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In this view of the matter we can not sustain contention of learned counsel that the alleged activities of the petitioner affected only the individuals and merely created law and order problem and the interval between commission of alleged offences falls short of establishing a habit to commit acts disturbing public order. 13. Relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Pankaj Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 ALL MR (Cri) 773, learned counsel would submit that in the absence of personal verification of the in-camera statements by the detaining authority the impugned order deserves to be set aside. In Pankaj Mehta's case the only material available to the authorities was the in-camera statements of two witnesses. The endorsement of the Act on these statements was to the effect that the witnesses acknowledged correctness of the in-camera statements. This Court found that in the absence of registration of offence and an independent enquiry regarding the truthfulness of the said statements, these in-camera statements were not sufficient to form a basis of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The view expressed by this Court in Pankaj Mehta's case is based on the peculiar facts of that case. It is earlier pointed out by us that the material available to the detaining authority varies from case to case. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the detaining authority can be founded on the incamera statements alone. It may be advisable to have counter checks for the verification of the in-camera statements though the provisions of the Act do not mandate for such a necessity. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the detaining authority can be founded on the incamera statements alone. It may be advisable to have counter checks for the verification of the in-camera statements though the provisions of the Act do not mandate for such a necessity. However, in the absence of the specific provision in this behalf, detention order can not be invalidated merely for the absence of independent inquiry to ascertain the truth of these statements. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by another Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Magar s/o. Pan sing Pimple Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2005(12) LJ SOFT 104 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 491] to which one of us (S. B. Deshmukh, J.) is a party, that Pankaj Mehta's case was decided on the peculiar facts of that case and do not lay down a binding precedent. In the present case, we have perused the files produced by the respondents and have satisfied ourselves that the in-camera statements were in fact verified by the detaining authority. In the present case, in addition to the in-camera statements there is other material in the form of registration of offences against the petitioner showing that not only the individual concerned but the members of the society are affected by activities of the detenu. This material is sufficient to reach a conclusion regarding necessity of detaining the petitioner under the provisions of the Act. In these circumstances, we can not accept contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention has to be struck down in the absence of an independent enquiry to ascertain the truth of the in-camera statements. 14. It is next contended that the order of detention of the petitioner for a period of one year is illegal in view of the fact that under section 3 sub-section (2) of the Act, the detention can be for a period of three months at a time. This contention is based on subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Act which provides for a delegation of the power of detention to the District Magistrate and the Commissioner of Police. The period of delegation prescribed by this sub-section is limited to three months. In appropriate cases, the period of delegation can be extended by further period of three months. The period of delegation prescribed by this sub-section is limited to three months. In appropriate cases, the period of delegation can be extended by further period of three months. This section does not refer to the period for which the State Government can pass an order of detention. Section 13 provides that detention of a detenu can be for a maximum period of 12 months. The Act does not provide for prescribing a period of detention in the order of detention. Embargo placed by sub-section (2) of Section 3 is applicable only if the detention order is passed either by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of the area concerned. It is thus, optional for the State Government to mention or not to mention, period of detention in the order. If the Government chooses to mention the period in the order of detention, the only limitation on the power of the Government is that the period should not exceed 12 months. In either of these contingencies, it is open to the Government to revoke the order of detention before completion of the maximum period of twelve months if the exigencies of the case so requires. This position has been clarified by the Apex Court in the matter of T. Devaki Vs. Govt. of T. N., (1990)2 SCC 456 , which overrules contrary view taken in the earlier decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Commissioner of Police Vs. Gurubux Anandram Bhiryani, 1988 Supp. sce 568. In para 10 of the report the Court observed : "10. Provisions of the aforesaid section are inbuilt safeguards against the delays that may be caused in considering the representation. If the time frame, as prescribed in the aforesaid provisions if not adhered to, the detention order is liable to be struck down and the detenu is entitled to freedom. Once the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government, maximum period for which the detenu shall be detained can not exceed 12 months from the date of detention. The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. Once the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government, maximum period for which the detenu shall be detained can not exceed 12 months from the date of detention. The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. The expression the State Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order occurring in sub-section (2) of the Section 3 relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and it has no relevance to the period of detention. The legislature has taken care to entrust the power of detention to the State Government, as the detention without trial is a serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen, it has taken further care to avoid a blanket delegation of power, to subordinate authorities for an indefinite period by providing that the delegation in the initial instance will not exceed a period of three months and it shall be specified in the order of delegation. But if the State Government on consideration of the situation finds it necessary, it may again delegate the power of detention to the aforesaid authorities from time to time but at no time the delegation shall be for a period of more them three months. The period as mentioned in Section 3(2) of the Act. refers to the period of delegation and it has no relevance at all to the period for which a person may be detained. Since the Act does not require the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained, order of detention is not rendered invalid or illegal in the absence of such specification." In this view of the matter, we can not sustain contention of the learned counsel that the order of detention is illegal as it is passed for a period of twelve months in contravention of the mandate of section 3 sub-section 2 of the Act. 15. 15. Another challenge to the validity of the order of detention is that it is based on old incidents as the grounds of detention refer to the cases registered in the year 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2006 and the in-camera statements refer to the incidents which took place in the month of June, 2006. In essence, the contention is that the incidents referred to do not provide for a live link between the incidents and the order of detention. It is not in dispute that the time frame prescribed by the provisions of the Act for confirmation of the order of detention is adhered to. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioner and members of his gang are habitually engaged in commission of the acts which result in disturbing peace of the area frequented by them. It is for this reason that the previous registration of offences are mentioned in the grounds of detention. Proposal for the detention of the petitioner dated 27th June, 2006 is forwarded to the Government on 31st June, 2006 by Sponsoring Authority. The proximity of the prejudicial activities with the order of detention is established by quoting recent incidents which took place in the first and third week of June, 2006. In this view of this data available on record, we can not accede to the contention that there is not proximate nexus between the order of detention and the prejudicial activities of the petitioner. 16. The order of detention is sought to be challenged on the basis of mala fides. It is contended that the Sponsoring Authority is related to complainant Mahesh Satyanarayan Baheti in Crime No.20/2006. At the time of hearing we made queries about the relationship of the sponsoring Authority with the complainant in this criminal case. Apart from the similarly of the surname, no information could be given by the learned counsel. In his return filed on record, Respondent No.3 has refuted this allegation mentioning that he is not related to Shri. Mahesh Baheti. In the absence of relevant data and in view of the fact that the allegations in respect of bias are traversed by respondent no.3, we do not find substance in the allegation regarding bias. In these circumstances, challenge to the legality of the order on the ground of mala fides must also fail. 17. In the absence of relevant data and in view of the fact that the allegations in respect of bias are traversed by respondent no.3, we do not find substance in the allegation regarding bias. In these circumstances, challenge to the legality of the order on the ground of mala fides must also fail. 17. Careful scrutiny of the material placed on record shows that the petitioner was habitually engaged in the commission of activities which disturbed the peace of the localities within the sphere of his operation. It had become impossible for the inhabitants of these areas to lead a normal life in view of the prejudicial activities of the petitioner. In our considered opinion there was sufficient material before the respondent to justify invocation of the provisions of the Act for detaining the petitioner. The Respondents have complied with all the provisions of the Act. In this view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the impugned order of detention. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed.