JUDGMENT Heard Sri Vijai Bhatt counsel for the appellant and Sri V.B.S. Negi counsel for the respondents. 2. Present second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 20-12-2006 passed by the District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar allowing the Civil Appeal No. 70 of 2005 M/S Kesar Enterprises Ltd. vs. Khuman Singh preferred against the judgment and decree dated 26-7-2005 in Civil Suit No. 47 of 2001. 3. Briefly stated M/S Kesar Enterprises has filed a civil suit against Khuman Singh with the allegations that the plaintiff is a registered company under the Indian Companies Act. The plaintiff has its Sugar Unit and Distillery at Baheri and its research and development centre is at Khurpakiya Farm, Kichcha, District Udham Singh Nagar. The plaintiff has constructed residential quarters for its employees during their employment. 4. The respondent was appointed as Manager in Research and Development Centre. A residential house was allotted to the defendant appellant in Khurpakiya Farm. The defendant appellant was dismissed from service on 14-12-1992 on the charges of corruption and disobedience of higher officers after completing disciplinary proceedings against him in accordance with law. However, the defendant appellant failed to vacate the residential house allotted to him by the plaintiff company. The plaintiff served a legal notice on the defendant appellant through its counsel on 14-1-1999 but despite of the notice the defendant appellant neither vacated the disputed premises nor paid any amount of rent/damages. 5. The defendant appellant has contested the suit and filed written statement. The defendant has alleged that the provisions of the Indian Companies Act are not applicable to the disputed premises. According to the defendant the provisions of U.PZA & L.R. Act are applicable to Khurpakiya Farm and under section 123 of the said Act, the defendant appellant has matured his tenancy rights. The plaintiff has no right to dispossess the defendant and his family from the premises in suit. The plaintiff initiated criminal proceedings under sections 441 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code against the defendant and his family members. The defendant filed a revision before Allahabad High Court and obtained stay order from there whi.ch is still operative. The disputed land was recorded in the name of Jeewan Lal in revenue records and as such plaintiff has no right and title over the disputed premises. 6. The defendant filed a revision before Allahabad High Court and obtained stay order from there whi.ch is still operative. The disputed land was recorded in the name of Jeewan Lal in revenue records and as such plaintiff has no right and title over the disputed premises. 6. The trial Court has examined P.W.1 Narendra Verma and P.W.2 Virendra Singh Solanki, while the defendant examined himself as P.W.1 and Prem Pal Singh as P.W.2. 7. P.W.2 Sri Virendra Singh Solanki has deposed as under: 8. On the basis of evidence on record the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 25-7-2005 has held that the plaintiff failed to prove its ownership and title of the plaintiff over the premises in dispute. Although a finding was recorded that the property belong to Khurpia Farm of the plaintiff Company and further after termination of the service of the defendant his possession is unauthorised. The trial Court in his judgment has observed as under: 9. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff has filed the appeal before the District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar, which was registered as appeal No. 70 of 2005. The District Judge has decided the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 20-122006. Feeling aggrieved the present second appeal has been filed by the defendant Khuman Singh. The appellate Court has observed as under: 10. Defendant appellant Khuman Singh has admitted in his statement that he was employee of the plaintiff company till 1992 and plaintiff company had allotted the house in dispute to him for his residence during his tenure of service in the company. The defendant Khuman Singh has not disputed the fact of his termination from the service on 14-12-1992. The plaintiff has also stated that all outstanding dues of the defendant till 14-12-1992 have been paid to him. Alegal notice was also served upon the appellant on 14-1-2000 for vacating the premises in suit. Thus it is amply proved that the plaintiff company was the owner of the house in dispute and the house was allotted to him in consideration of his employment in the plaintiff company. 11. The defendant has no where taken the plea regarding the ownership of the premises or the same having been constructed by him. 12. Thus it is amply proved that the plaintiff company was the owner of the house in dispute and the house was allotted to him in consideration of his employment in the plaintiff company. 11. The defendant has no where taken the plea regarding the ownership of the premises or the same having been constructed by him. 12. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the disputed premises is governed by the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, and as the defendant appellant has claimed adverse possession over the premises in dispute, therefore, the defendant appellant cannot be evicted from the disputed premises without filing a suit under section 209 of U.P.ZA & L.R. Act. 13. Section 209 and 210 of U.P.ZA & L.R. Act read as under: 209. Ejectment of persons occupying land without title. (1) A person taking or retaining possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and(a) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar or assami without the consent of such bhumidhar or asaami (b) Where the land does not form part of the holding of a bhumidhar or asaami without consent of the [Gaon Sabhal Shall be liable to ejectment, on the suit in cases referred to in clause (a) above, of the bhumidhar, or asaami concerned and in cases referred to in clause (b) above of the [Gaon Sabha] and shall also be liable to pay damages. (2) To every suit relating to a land referred to in clause (a) of sub section (1) the State Government shall be impleaded as a necessary party. 210. (2) To every suit relating to a land referred to in clause (a) of sub section (1) the State Government shall be impleaded as a necessary party. 210. Consequences of failure to file suit under section 209 : If a suit for 'eviction from any land under section 209 is not instituted by a bhumidhar or asaami, or a decree for eviction obtained in any suit is not executed within the period of limitation provided for institution of such suit or the execution of such decree, as the case may be, the person taking or retaining possession shall(a) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar with transferable rights become Bhumidhar of transferable rights of such {and the rights, title and interest of an asami, if any, in such land shall be extinguished; (b) Where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar with non transferable rights become a bhumidhar with non transferable rights and the right, title and interest of an asami, if any, in such land shall be extinguished. (c) Where the land forms part of the holding of an asami on behalf of the Gaon Sabha, become an asami of the holding from year to year. 14. A perusal of section 209 of the Act, makes it abundantly clear that this section applies only on the land which comes within the ambit of U.PZA & L.R. Act, but the aforesaid provision is not applicable to the present case as admittedly the defendant was let out the premises in lieu of his employment and as such the defendant entered in the house with due permission of his employer, and the same continued till his employment has came to an end. After service of the notice, the appellant has become unauthorised occupant and was liable to be evicted by filing the suit. Neither the plea of adverse possession is available to the appellant nor any right has been matured under the provisions of section 209 and 210 of U.P.ZA & L. R. Act. The argument is completely misconceived and liable to be rejected. The suit against the defendant has been filed for his eviction from a residential house, which has been allotted to him by the plaintiff company during his employment in the company. The relationship of employer and employee between the plaintiff and the defendant is admitted. 15. The argument is completely misconceived and liable to be rejected. The suit against the defendant has been filed for his eviction from a residential house, which has been allotted to him by the plaintiff company during his employment in the company. The relationship of employer and employee between the plaintiff and the defendant is admitted. 15. The plaintiff has also filed copy of the notice given to the defendant appellant which revealed that the defendant has filed a case in the Labour Court for setting aside his termination order stating therein that he continues to be employee of the Company. 16. The defendant cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time as he having accepted his dues after the termination of his service and has also exercised his right in the Labour court and now contesting the case on the basis of adverse possession, the argument is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 17. Further on the principle of estoppels the defendant is estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff as admittedly the defendant entered in the premises. (a) While he entered in the employment in lieu of his job. (b) During the continuance of his service he was allotted the accommodation. (c) His services were terminated and after that he has accepted his dues. (d) He has agitated the matter before the labour Court, treating him to be the employee and the plaintiff to be his employer. 18. The principles of estoppel apply to the facts of the present case. Section 116 of the Evidence Act provides as under: "116. Extoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.- No tenant of immovable properly or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such person had a title to such possession at the time when such license was given." 19. It is well settled that the defendant cannot deny the title of the plaintiff. In Munnawar Vs. Addl. It is well settled that the defendant cannot deny the title of the plaintiff. In Munnawar Vs. Addl. District Judge, Haridwar [2003 (2) ARC 608J after relying upon the judgment of Joginder Singh and another v. Smt. Joginder and others, JT 1996 (1) SC 467 : 1996 SCFBRC 503, it has been held as under: "12. In the case of Joginder Singh and another v. Smt. Joginder and others, JT 1996 (1) SC 467 : 1996 SCFBRC 503, the Apex Court has relied upon the provisions of Section 116 of Evidence Act and has held that no tenant of immovable property can be allowed to deny the title of the landlord. The observations are quoted below: 'This is a settled view that having regard to the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny the title of the owner of such property. In this connection, it would be relevant to make a reference to the decision of this Court in Veerraju v. Venkanna, 1966 (1) SCR 831: AIR 1966 SC 629, wherein this Court, with reference to the decision of Privy Council took the view as under: "A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's We, however, defective ft may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord." 20. In Maroti Vs. Tulsiram and another 1995 SCFBRC 1, the Apex Court has observed as under: "The findings recorded by the High Court and the trial Court were that the appellant had entered into the possession as a tenant and he is estopped to deny the title of the trust by operation of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. 21. The plaintiff has also filed the judgment of Settlement Officer, Aurangabad, which shows that the Settlement Officer has directed mutation of Kesar Enterprises in place of Keshar Sugar Mills. In place of Agent Jeewan Lal, the name of Senior General Manager was mutated. 22. In view of above, I find no substantial questions of law so as to interfere under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff will be entitled for damages from the defendant appellant @ Rs. In place of Agent Jeewan Lal, the name of Senior General Manager was mutated. 22. In view of above, I find no substantial questions of law so as to interfere under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff will be entitled for damages from the defendant appellant @ Rs. 100/- per month from the date of termination of his tenancy i.e. 14-1-1999 till actual delivery of possession. 23. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed summarily with costs.