Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. This regular second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Ferozepur accepting the appeal partly and modifying the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff-appellants filed a suit on the plea that Raman son of Haku son of Vir Singh was owner of the land measuring 101 kanals 13 marlas as detailed in the plaint. The plaintiffs claimed that they being Hindus were governed by Mitakshra School of Hindu Law and were governed by Hindu Succession Act in the matters of succession. It was claimed that said Raman son of Haku died in 1972 leaving behind two sons namely Mehtab Singh and Gulab Singh and five daughters. It was claimed that since he died after 1956 all his sons and daughters were entitled to inherit the property left by him in equal shares. Mehtab Singh and Gulab Singh sons of Raman, however, got the mutation of inheritance sanctioned in their favour fraudulently and mis- stating the true facts before the Revenue Officer. The said mutations were also challenged being illegal and ineffective on the rights of the plaintiffs. Gulab Singh also died and he was succeeded by defendant No. 1 while Mehtab Singh on his death was succeeded by his heirs defendant Nos. 2 to 5. Gulabo one of the daughters of Raman also died leaving behind plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 and while Kammo left behind plaintiff No. 5, Bharian left behind plaintiff Nos. 6 & 7 as her heirs. The plaintiffs claimed 6/8 share in the land left by Raman and, therefore claimed possession of the land. 3. In the written statement filed by defendant No. 1, a plea was taken that Raman had died on 2.11.1963 and that defendants were in possession and had become owners by adverse possession. It was claimed that the disputed property was joint Hindu Property and defendant No. 1 was entitled to the succeed the share of Gulab Singh. Defendant Nos. 2 & 4 did not contest the suit as they admitted the claim of the plaintiffs. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession as prayed for ? OPP 2. Whether disputed property is joint Hindu Family property and defendants have become its owners after death of Raman being co-parceners ? On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession as prayed for ? OPP 2. Whether disputed property is joint Hindu Family property and defendants have become its owners after death of Raman being co-parceners ? OPD 3. Whether defendants have become owners of the suit property due to hostile and adverse possession ? OPD 4. Whether Raman deceased died on 2.11.1963 or in the year 1972 ? Onus parties. 5. Relief. On issue No. 1, the learned trial Court was pleased to hold that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed on the basis of inheritance. On issue No. 2, the learned trial Court observed that the jamabandi for the year 1971-72 on record showed that the property was in the name of Raman and was not shown to have been inherited from his father Haku. Keeping in view the fact that defendants had led no evidence to show that the property was joint Hindu coparcenary property, issue No. 3 was decided against the defendants and it was held that the defendants have failed to prove that they had become owners by way of adverse possession. Whereas on issue No. 4, it was held that Raman in fact died on 2.11.1963. However, it was held that the suit could not be held to be barred by limitation as the plaintiffs would be presumed to be co- sharers and, therefore, in joint possession. Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed. 4. In appeal, filed by the defendants, the learned lower appellate Court was pleased to reverse the finding on issue No. 2 by holding that the stand of the defendants in the written statement that the property in the hand of Raman was joint Hindu Family property of Raman deceased and his two sons and they formed coparcenary, was in fact admitted in para Nos. 2 and 7 of the replication. 2 and 7 of the replication. Consequently, it was held that once there was admission on the part of the plaintiffs qua the nature of the property, issue No. 2 deserved to be decided in favour of the defendant No. 1 i.e. the contesting defendant and in view of the reversal of the finding on issue No. 2, the appeal was partly accepted and it was held that while the sons would be entitled to 1/3 share in their individual capacity the 1/3 share held by Raman is coparcenary with his sons and would be inherited by all the legal heirs in equal shares. 5. The plaintiff-appellants in the present appeal have raised the following substantial question of law :- "Whether an illegal admission could be basis for passing a judgment and decree in favour of opposite party ?" 6. Mr. S.C. Khunger, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has contended that by way of admission the appellants-plaintiffs had only admitted the factum of the property being joint Hindu Family property in which all the sons and daughters claimed themselves to be coparceners with their father. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, therefore, was that the said admission was prima facie illegal as the daughters could not be said to be coparceners prior to the amendment of the Hindu Succession Act by Amendment Act of 2005 and, therefore, the contention was that this admission could not bind the plaintiff-appellants. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Molar and others v. Smt. Santo and others, 1968 PLR 510 wherein this Court was pleased to lay down as under :- "It was contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that a gratuitous admission made by a person could be withdrawn by him at any time and the same was then not binding on him. According to the counsel when admission was made by a party he was bound by it unless he could show that that admission was wrong. In the instant case, it had not been shown by the plaintiff that the said admission was erroneous in any way. According to the counsel when admission was made by a party he was bound by it unless he could show that that admission was wrong. In the instant case, it had not been shown by the plaintiff that the said admission was erroneous in any way. After the statement Exhibit DW3/A had been made by the plaintiff that it was an erroneous admission by her and the property in fact was not ancestral in nature. That she had failed to establish in the instant case and she was, consequently, bound by the admission made by her. It was also contended by the learned counsel that in the present case the admission made by Shrimati Santo was not gratuitous in nature. It is needless to decide as to whether the admission was gratuitous or not and also whether Shrimati Santo could withdraw the same at any time, because, in my opinion, it has been conclusively proved on the record that the said admission was erroneously made. The burden of issue No. 1 was placed on the defendants. They had to establish that the land in dispute was ancestral. In spite of their best efforts, they could not prove from the revenue records or otherwise that the land was ever owned by Bhuru, the common ancestor. As already referred to above, all that could be shown was that the land was held in equal shares by the two sons of Bhuru and that also not in the first settlement but in the fourth one. Admittedly, the land could not be held to be ancestral on those facts. Even if the argument of the learned counsel for the defendants was to be accepted and after the alleged admission Shrimati Santo had to be established that it was an erroneous one, in the present case the facts brought on the record by the defendants themselves prove that the admission was wrong, because the property was not owned and held by Bhuru, the common ancestor and consequently not ancestral. The statement Exhibit DW3/A made by Shrimati Santo was obviously incorrect. It is not understood how she had stated that the land was owned by Bhuru and it had devolved upon Dewtial by inheritance from him. Obviously, she had no personal knowledge about it and the revenue records produced in the case definitely show that the admission made by her was wrong on facts. It is not understood how she had stated that the land was owned by Bhuru and it had devolved upon Dewtial by inheritance from him. Obviously, she had no personal knowledge about it and the revenue records produced in the case definitely show that the admission made by her was wrong on facts. Consequently, even accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants, since the admission of Shrimati Santo had been proved to be wrong in the instant case, the same was not binding on her. Excepting the admission there was no other evidence in the case to prove the ancestral nature of the land. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the admission of Shrimati Santo was not validly withdrawn or explanted (explained ?) away by her, it could not, without any other evidence on the record, prove the ancestral nature of the land in dispute. Admission, as mentioned in Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. They may, at the most, operate as estopples. But in the present case, the said admission cannot act even as an estopple because it was never the case of the defendants that they had made any change in their position qua the suit land on account of the said admission on the plaintiff. That being so, the decision of the learned District Judge on this point was correct in law. Since the land was not ancestral qua the defendants, admittedly they had no right to it." 7. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. The Municipality, Thanesar, 1989(1) RRR 128 (P&H) : 1989 PLJ 424 to contend that admission in ignorance of legal right cannot bind the maker of such admission. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, therefore, was that once evidence by way of jamabandi for the year 1971-72 was placed on record showing that the property was not ancestral Hindu undivided family property the admission made by the plaintiffs could not bind them especially when the defendant-respondents had failed to discharge their onus of proving issue No. 2. 8. However, Mr. 8. However, Mr. Gaurav Chopra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that part of admission which was in consonance with law should have been accepted and in joint Hindu Family property the plaintiffs had no share and, therefore, the learned lower appellate Court was right in partly decreeing the suit. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the learned lower appellate Court rightly relied upon the admission made in the replication as the replication being part of the pleadings was to be taken note of and any admission made in the pleadings did not require any further proof and, therefore, it was not necessary for the defendant-respondents to have proved on record the nature of the property in dispute. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find force in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is settled law that admission has to be read as a whole and once the admission is said to have been made in ignorance of right and the same was contrary to law, the same was not binding on the plaintiff-respondents. Once the onus of providing (proving ?) issue No. 2 was placed on the defendant-respondents and they failed to discharge the same, the learned trial Court rightly held that the property was not joint Hindu Family property and the parties were rightly held entitled to inherit as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. In view of what has been stated above, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the learned trial Court is restored, with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.