JUDGMENT D. D. SINHA, J. :- Rule returnable forthwith. Heard by consent of Mr. Anand Parchure, learned Counsel for petitioner and Mr. Mujumdar, learned A.G.P. for respondent. 2. The writ petition is directed against the impugned communication dated 26-6-2006 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special), Mumbai in exercise of power under clause (2) of subsection 2(A) of section 2 of the Bombay Home Guards Act, 1947 whereby the service of the petitioner stands terminated after expiry of period of one month from the date on which the said notice was served on the petitioner. 3. Mr. Parchure has submitted that the petitioner was appointed as District Commandant (Home Guards) for the district of Nagpur vide order dated 2-82003 issued by the respondent No. 1 for a period of 5 years. Petitioner assumed charge of the post on 7-4-2003. It is contended that a frivolous complaint was filed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under sections 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was granted interim bail by the Competent Criminal Court in the said crime. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the respondents by impugned notice/order terminated the services of the petitioner without giving any reasons whatsoever as well as without following the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the impugned notice/order being violative of principles of natural justice cannot be sustained in law. 4. Mr. Parchure has vehemently argued that in the affidavits in reply filed by the respondent in the present writ petition, the respondent has given several reasons as to why the petitioner was unfit to continue in service as District Commandant. However, the petitioner was not issued any notice or any memo in respect of those alleged complaints by the respondent. It is contended that all the allegations made in the affidavits filed by the respondent pertaining to alleged complaints, if any, are denied by the petitioner by filing counter-affidavit dated 16-10-2006. It is submitted that if the impugned order dated 26-6-2006 is issued in view of the alleged complaints or alleged misconduct, if any, committed by the petitioner while discharging his duty as a District Commandant, in that event, it was all the more necessary for the respondents to grant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before issuing the impugned order since the alleged allegations are completely denied by the petitioner. Mr. Mr. Parchure, therefore, contended that the impugned notice/order of termination being inconsistent with the rules of natural justice cannot be sustained in law. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 . 5. Mr. A. G. Mujumdar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent, has submitted that the respondent in exercise :of powers conferred by clause (2) of sub-section 2 of section 2A of the Bombay Home Guards Act, 1947 issued the impugned notice/order whereby the petitioner was informed that his services stand terminated after expiry of period of one month from the date on which the said notice/order would be served on him. It is contended that clause (2) of section 2A of the Act does not contemplate grant of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before terminating the services of the petitioner while exercising power under clause (2) of section 2A and empowers the State Government to terminate the services of any Commandant at any time after giving him one month's notice. It is submitted that it is the statutory power vested in the State Government which only requires the State Government to give one month's notice before terminating the service which has been given to the petitioner. Clause (2) does not require either issuance of show-cause notice nor grant of opportunity of hearing to such commandant before passing the order of termination and, therefore, the impugned order of termination/notice is just and proper and is sustainable in law. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council and others, reported in 2003 (9) SCC 731 . 6. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the respective Counsel. Perused the impugned notice/order of termination as well as decisions cited and relied on by the respective Counsel. 6. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the respective Counsel. Perused the impugned notice/order of termination as well as decisions cited and relied on by the respective Counsel. In the instant case, the respondent State in exercise of power conferred on it by Clause (2) of sub-section 2 of section 2A of the Bombay Home Guards Act terminated the services of the petitioner and, therefore, it will be appropriate to reproduce the provisions of the said sub-section 2 of section 2A of the Act which reads thus :- "Section 2A(1) - The term of office and other conditions of service of the Commandant General shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government by rules made under this Act: Provided that, while appointing any Commandant or the Commandant General the State Government may direct that he shall hold office for such period as the State Government may fix in his case, (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government shall have the authority to terminate the services of any Commandant or the Commandant General, at any time, after giving him one month's notice therefore." 7. In the instant case, the petitioner was appointed as District Commandant for the Nagpur district vide order dated 2-8-2003 for a period of 5 years. It is, therefore, evident that as per proviso to sub-clause (1) of section 2A, the appointment of the petitioner was made by the State Government for the period of 5 years with the result that the petitioner is legally entitled to hold the office of District Commandant, Nagpur district for a period of 5 years. 8. In the instant case, in the affidavit dated 9-10-2006 filed by the respondent it is stated that during the tenure of the petitioner, the petitioner has misused his power and discharged his duties contrary to the rules. The petitioner has made several appointments on temporary basis without following procedure laid down in relevant rules. Petitioner has· issued several orders appointing persons in Nagpur Home Guard such as Advocate Mr. Anil Thakre as legal adviser for Nagpur district whereas there is no such post available in the department. The petitioner has made several appointments on temporary basis without following procedure laid down in relevant rules. Petitioner has· issued several orders appointing persons in Nagpur Home Guard such as Advocate Mr. Anil Thakre as legal adviser for Nagpur district whereas there is no such post available in the department. Similarly, the petitioner has appointed one Manjusha Dave on the post of Staff Officer and Chief of Ladies Platoon at district level whereas such post is required to be filled in by promotion to be made by District Level Committee constituted by the Commandant General of Home Guards, State of Maharashtra. It is further stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that there were complaints against the petitioner regarding misappropriation of Government money. The preliminary enquiry into the complaint was also made through Commissioner of Police, Nagpur and the said preliminary enquiry reveals that there was a substance in the complaints made against the petitioner. It is also mentioned in the complaint that the Crime No. 46/06 for the offence punishable under sections 420 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code is also registered against the petitioner on 23-2-2006 and after completion of investigation by the prosecution, the charge-sheet has been filed in the competent Criminal Court. 9. The petitioner in his counter-affidavit denied these facts and allegations made by the respondent in the affidavit and contended that if the petitioner would have been given reasonable opportunity of hearing, the petitioner would have submitted appropriate explanation to the respondent in respect of each and every allegation and would have satisfied the authorities concerned about the falsity of the allegations. 10. In the instant case, the respondent has taken a specific stand that in view of clause (2) of sub-section (2) of section 2A of the Act, the State has absolute power to terminate the services of the Commandant or of Commandant General at any time and the provision does not require the State Government to either issue show-cause notice or give reasonable opportunity of hearing before issuing the notice/order of termination. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on observations of the Apex Court in para 32 of the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra and others vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council and others (supra) which reads thus :- 32. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on observations of the Apex Court in para 32 of the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra and others vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council and others (supra) which reads thus :- 32. The caution of associating rules of natural justice with the flavour of flexibilities would not permit the Courts applying different standards of procedural justice in different cases depending on the whims or personal philosophy of the decision maker. The basic principles remain the same; they are to be moulded in their application to suit the peculiar situations of a given case, for the variety and complexity of situations defies narration. That is flexibility. Some of the relevant factors which enter the judicial process of thinking for determining the extent of moulding the nature and scope of fair hearing and may reach to the extent of right to hearing being excluded are: (i) the nature of the subject-matter, and (ii) exceptional situations. Such exceptionality may be spelled out by (i) the need to take urgent action for safeguarding public health or safety or petitioners never objected to the notices issued under section 13(2) or section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act, 2002. It is also pertinent to note that the said employees never invoked any of the provisions of the labour enactments to assert their rights. The timing of filing of the said petition as well as the averments made and the reliefs claimed also lends support to the allegations of Shri Dhorde, the conduct of the petitioners begs the question whether it is natural for two employees to say that the assets of the Karkhana be liquidated, the answer to the same can only be in the negative as it is expected of employees that they would only be interested in securing employment and getting their dues. Be that as it may in the said circumstances we refuse to exercise our writ jurisdiction in such a case. As indicated above in view of our finding of the overriding effect of the Securitisation Act, 2002 we do not find any merit in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners in the said Writ Petition No. 6039 of 2006 and we therefore dismiss the said petition. 28. As indicated above in view of our finding of the overriding effect of the Securitisation Act, 2002 we do not find any merit in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners in the said Writ Petition No. 6039 of 2006 and we therefore dismiss the said petition. 28. As regards Writ Petition No. 6674 of 2006 we are of the view that the said union can invoke the forums provided under the labour enactments for recovery of the amounts of the defaulted wages which according to it is to the tune of Rs. 4,93,29,946/- by adopting appropriate proceedings under the said labour enactments; one of which is a proceeding under section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioners in both the Petition No. 6039 of 2006 and 6674 of 2006 can therefore file appropriate proceedings under the labour enactments to get their defaulted wages. This would be in addition to the forum provided under the Securitisation Act, 2002. Insofar as Writ petition No. 7020 of 2006 since we have dismissed the four petitions the logical corollary would be that the MSC Bank would be leasing the Karkhana as per the tender notice issued by it, if the Karkhana is so leased to the offered whose offer the MSCB finds fit, the grievance of the petitioners in the said Petition No. 7020 of 2006 would not survive as on leasing of the said Karkhana the same would start functioning and sugar cane contracted by the petitioners would be crushed. The said petition is therefore disposed of accordingly. 29. Though Shri Dhorde has questioned the maintainability of the petitions on the ground that the MSCB is neither a State or an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, we are of the view that the said issue need not be decided by us in view of the fact that all the petitioners have alternate efficacious remedies under the Securitisation Act, 2002 as well as the Labour legislations. We therefore do not express any opinion on the said issue. 30. In the result in the light of what we have held hereinabove Writ Petitions Nos. 5632 of 2006, 5633 of 2006, 6039 of 2006 and 6674 of 2006 stand dismissed and rule discharged. 31.Writ Petition No. 7020 of 2006 stands disposed of accordingly. 32. We therefore do not express any opinion on the said issue. 30. In the result in the light of what we have held hereinabove Writ Petitions Nos. 5632 of 2006, 5633 of 2006, 6039 of 2006 and 6674 of 2006 stand dismissed and rule discharged. 31.Writ Petition No. 7020 of 2006 stands disposed of accordingly. 32. At this stage prayer is made for continuation of the interim order passed by this Court on 29-8-2006. Prayer for continuation of stay rejected. Petitions dismissed.