ORDER 1. After detailed hearing five queries were formulated by the Bench comprising TS. Thakur and S.N. Aggarwal, JJ. by Orders dated 23.2.2007 which read as under: (1) When did respondent No.1 join the LL.B. degree course and in which law college affiliated to which University. (2) Was any permission required under the standing army instructions or orders for his joining the course and if so, was any permission applied for taken by him. (3) Did he join as a regular student in the day or evening course offered by the college and in case he was a regular student whether he attended classes on a regular basis. (4) Where was he posted during the time he remained on the roll of the law college. (5) Did he complete the course in the college without taking leave or did he apply for grant of any leave for completion. 2. So far as the first query is concerned it has been disclosed by the respondents that respondent No.1 had joined the LL.B. Degree Course in Jai Narayan Degree College, Lucknow affiliated to the Lucknow University. On this question no further controversy remains. 3. In response to the second query our attention has been drawn to Annexures A to F of the Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.1 sworn on 7.8.2008 of which a copy was served on the petitioners learned Counsel on that very day. These disclose that the respondent No.1 had duly applied for permission to pursue LL.B. study for each of three years. Permission had been granted by the Brigadier. Artillery by Order dated 24.12.1979, in respect of the second year. Respondent No.1 has stated on oath that permission had been granted for First year as well as Third year LL.B. Course but those documents are not available with him. So far as the Union of India is concerned it has stated that it does not have the relevant records in its possession at present. We have no reason to believe that permission had been declined to respondent No.1 for pursuing his LL.B. Studies. 4. With regard to the third query, the College has certified that respondent No.1 had attended the LL.B. course as a regular student. The College has also stated that instruction/ teaching classes pertaining to LL.B were held from 4.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. at the relevant time. 5. 4. With regard to the third query, the College has certified that respondent No.1 had attended the LL.B. course as a regular student. The College has also stated that instruction/ teaching classes pertaining to LL.B were held from 4.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. at the relevant time. 5. Fourthly, Union of India in its Counter Affidavit has given a detailed account of respondent No. ls posting together with his leave between the year 1977 and 1982 which is reproduced as under: 6. Keeping in view the duration within which the respondent No.1 had pursued and completed his LL.B. Degree Course i.e. from December 1977 to November 1982, there is no reason to conclude that respondent No. 1 had not fulfilled the attendance criteria. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner relies on a Certificate issued by the University of Lucknow which states the year of examination of LL.B. First year to be 1978, LL.B. Second year 1979 and LL.B. Third year to be 1982. These Certificates are controverted by an original mark-sheet shown to us pertaining to respondent No.1 which is to the effect that respondent No.1 cleared the LL.B. First year in June 1979, Second year in June 1980 and Third year in December 1982. Originals have been returned to both parties. There is no justification for us to arrive at a conclusion adverse to respondent No. 1 in the present proceedings. 7. Accordingly, so far as the fourth query is concerned, it stands answered in favour of respondent No.1 by the Table from the Counter Affidavit filed by the Union of India reproduced by us above. 8. In respect of the fifth query the respondent No.1 was at the material 31 Dec. 82 time posted in Lucknow and, therefore, did not need to apply for leave to complete his LL.B. Degree Course. This is especially so since the normal time of instructions/ classes for the LL.B. Degree in the College was from 4.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. during the years when the respondent No.1 was enrolled as a student. 9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has drawn our attention to the following passage from The University of Mysore and Anr. v. CD. 9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has drawn our attention to the following passage from The University of Mysore and Anr. v. CD. Govinda Rao and Anr., [1964] 4 SCR 575: "As Halsbury has observed- , An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined. Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from making appointments to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to the inquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." 10. He has also relied on the observation in State of Haryana v.Haryana Co-Operative Transport Ltd., [1977] 2 SCR 306 where Their Lord-ships observed: "The mere circumstance that the first respondent did not in so many words ask for a writ of quo warranto cannot justify the argument that the appointment was being challenged collaterally in a proceeding taken to challenge the award. On the averments in the writ petition it is clear that the main and real attack on the award was the ineligibility of Shri Gupta to occupy the post of a Judge of a Labour Court in the discharge of whose functions the award was rendered by him." 11. So far as the delay is concerned, two questions immediately arises. Firstly, whether an action in the nature of writ of quo warranto can be entertained even after the passage of several years. On this question we find a complete answer in the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court of India in Govinda Rao. 12. However, after the passage of a large number of years the second question which arises is the quality of evidence available to prove an allegation raised before a writ Court. In substance the petitioners case is that respondent No.1, while serving in the Army could not have fulfilled the attendance criteria set down for the LL.B degree. In this regard the College as well as the University has confirmed that no objections existed to the effect that respondent No.1 was short of attendance. They have stood by and affirmed the grant of the LL.B. Degree to respondent No.1. We must, therefore, assume that in fact respondent No.1 had pursued his studies in a manner which fulfilled all criteria and was, therefore, eligible for the grant of Degree of LL.B. as well as for its enrollment. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the enrollment of respondent No.1 by the Bar Council of Delhi. 13. The Petition is without merit and is dismissed. All pending Applications also stand disposed of accordingly. We, however, decline to impose costs. Petition dismissed.