JUDGMENT Honble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Amit Kumar Singh for the contesting respondent. 2. This petition is directed against an order dated 12.7.2006 passed by the respondent No. 4 and the consequential order dated 14.7.2006 by which the petitioner has been reverted to her Seasonal Clerk post. 3. The petitioner was appointed as a Seasonal Clerk in the Cooperative Cane Development Society Limited Khadda in Kushi Nagar. By an order dated 19.7.2005 she was given the post of a regular clerk in the regular Establishment in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500 on which basis she joined and continued to work. By the impugned orders she has been reverted back to the Seasonal Cadre and the order dated 19.7.2005 has been cancelled. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the impugned orders have been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice without giving any notice or opportunity to her. 5. The services of the seasonal as well as the permanent staff of Cane Development Societies are governed by the U.P. Cane Cooperative Service Regulations, 1975. It is provided therein that 50% post of the permanent cadre is to be filled up through direct recruitment while the remaining 50% is to be filled up by preferment from the seasonal staff. Regulation 41 provides that appointment by preferment from the seasonal staff shall be based on the position of the incumbent on the basis of their respective seniority. 6. In the counter-affidavit a copy of the seniority list of seasonal staff prepared at the regional level and which was circulated vide order dated 27.12.1997, has been filed. The name of the petitioner finds place at serial No. 455. It is stated that petitioner was illegally appointed in the regular cadre superseding 454 persons and, thus, when this anomaly was noticed, she was relegated to the seasonal cadre by the impugned order. Though much emphasis has been laid on an order dated 14.11.2005 (Annexure 7 to the petition) to contend that the petitioner was placed at serial No. 3 in the seniority list and, therefore, was rightly appointed, but the argument is totally misconceived. A perusal of the order shows that it is only an order granting promotional pay scale to seasonal employees of the Society who had completed 16 years of continuous satisfactory service and it is not a seniority list. A perusal of the order shows that it is only an order granting promotional pay scale to seasonal employees of the Society who had completed 16 years of continuous satisfactory service and it is not a seniority list. Neither there is any specific denial to the seniority list filed alongwith the counter-affidavit nor any other seniority list has been annexed. Therefore, it is apparent that the order dated 19.7.2005 granting appointment on the permanent strength of the Society was against the specific provisions of Regulation 40 and 41 of the Regulations. 7. No doubt when an order is passed against the interest of a person, the general principle is of giving a reasonable opportunity. However, this principle of natural justice has given way to certain exceptions. 8. The Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Sughar Singh, AIR 1974 SC 423 , while dealing with a case of reduction or reversion of an incumbent to a lower rank or post, has considered the right of an incumbent as protected under Article 311 of the Constitution it held in paragraph 13 as follows : “……….If, on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311……..” 9. Again in the case of Kishore Chandra Panigrahi v. State of Orissa and others, JT 1996 (9) S.C. 669, it refused interference in a case of reversion on the ground that the appointment on the promoted post was illegal and against the statutory provisions, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others, 1999 (6) SCC 237 , though the Court was not considering a service case, but on the proposition as to whether the Court is bound to strike down an order passed prejudicing the right of a party without hearing him, went on to reiterate the exception in the following words in paragraph 17 : “…………The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 10. Since the order promoting the petitioner to the permanent cadre was de hors the Rules, quashing the present impugned order would result in restoration of the earlier order and, therefore, the Court can refuse to exercise its discretion. 11. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 SC 2783 , the Apex Court approved the principle that where providing any opportunity would only be an empty formality as the result would be the same, it refused interference. 12. Keeping in mind the exceptions as carved out by the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases and applying it to the present scene of fact, it would be evident that as the petitioner was granted appointment by preferment was de hors the Rules and he has also failed to justify the order of preferment, the quashing of the order would necessary perpetuate another illegal order, in spite of sufficient opportunity the petitioner has also failed to show any prejudice by not complying with the principles of natural justice. 13. For the reasons above, this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rejected. ————