JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. In these appeals, since common questions of law and facts are involved and common substantial questions of law were formulated, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. By order dated 7.2.2007, these appeals were admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law and liberty was also given to formulate other substantial question of law at the time of hearing of the appeals. (1) Whether a decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity can be sustained in law in favour of a person who instituted the suit for his personal necessity on the basis of an agreement to sale? (2) Whether having regard to the fact that the suit teas instituted by the plaintiff on 12.5.2000 and a sale deed was executed in his favour by the original owner on 6.7.2004, a decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity can be passed in his favour? 3. In course of hearing, the following substantial question of law has also been formulated to be decided in these appeals. i) Whether the findings recorded by both the Courts below on the issue of personal necessity are perverse in law? 4. The plaintiff-respondent namely, Basudha Coke (India) Pvt Ltd, instituted three suits being Title Eviction Suit Nos. 19 of 2000, 22 of 2000 and 23 of 2000 against the appellants for decree of eviction in respect of the suit premises described in the schedules of the plaints. The plaintiff-respondents case in the plaint is that the plaintiff-firm is the owner of the suit premises and the defendants-appellants were inducted as tenants by the outcome owner Shri Kamal Chandrakant Singhvi. Said Kamal Chandrakant Singhvi transferred the suit premises to the plaintiff and informed about the said transfer to the defendants and they were directed to pay rent to the plaintiff from November, 1990. It was alleged that the defendants failed to pay rent of the suit premises and made themselves defaulter and consequently liable to be evicted. The plaintiff- respondent also alleged that the suit premises are required by the plaintiff for their personal necessity as the plaintiff is a business firm and is facing acute shortage of accommodation for the purpose of office as well as staffs for residence purposes. 5. The defendants-appellants contested the suit by filing written statement. The plaintiff- respondent also alleged that the suit premises are required by the plaintiff for their personal necessity as the plaintiff is a business firm and is facing acute shortage of accommodation for the purpose of office as well as staffs for residence purposes. 5. The defendants-appellants contested the suit by filing written statement. The defendants admitted that they are in occupation of the premises as tenant, but they have regularly paid rent and they are not defaulter. It was further alleged that out of 12 flats in the building 5 flats were vacant at the time of institution of the suit. One flat was vacated by Dinkar Bhai and plaintiff got possession of it, but out of six flats, the plaintiff sold three flats. The trial Court, after hearing the parties, decreed the suit on the ground of personal necessity but decided the issue of default against the plaintiff- respondent. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellants-tenants filed appeals being Title Appeal Nos. 140, 141 and 142 of 2005 in the Court of District judge, Dhanbad. The appellate Court framed the following points for determination: 1) Whether the plaintiff-respondents have any right to file the suit and whether there was any cause of action or not? 2) Whether the plaintiff-respondent requires the suit premises of the suits in bona fide and in good faith? 7. While deciding point No. (1), the appellate Court took notice of the fact that the suits were filed on 12.5.2000, but on that date, the suit properties were not transferred in favour of the plaintiff. The original owner executed a sale deed during pendency of the suit on 6.7.2004. After discussing the evidence, the appellate Court held that although there was no transfer of the suit properties when the suit was instituted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff became owner of the suit property on the date the decree was passed by the trial court. As against Point No. (2), the Court of Appeal below affirmed the finding of the trial Court on the issue of personal necessity. 8. Mr. Manjul Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, assailed the impugned judgment and decree as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. As against Point No. (2), the Court of Appeal below affirmed the finding of the trial Court on the issue of personal necessity. 8. Mr. Manjul Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, assailed the impugned judgment and decree as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned Counsel firstly submitted that on the date of institution of the suit, the plaintiff was not the owner of the suit properties, but on the basis of an agreement to sale executed by the real owner of the suit properties, a decree for eviction was sought on the ground of personal necessity. According to the learned Counsel, the decree for eviction, so passed by the trial Court, is vitiated in law. Learned Counsel put reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. and two decisions of the Patna High Court in the case of Tapsendra Nath Lal v. Norodh Baran Haldar 1986 PLJK 734 and in the case of Shyam Sunder Kishan Lal and Ors. v. Sajjan Kumar Singhania and Ors. (1996) 1 PLJR 344 . On the question of bona fide requirement, learned Counsel referred annexures-A and B which were brought on record by way of additional evidence before the appellate Court. Annexure-A is the lease dated 12.3.2004 executed by the plaintiff for a portion of the same building in favour of one Sajjan Agarwal, but the said document has not yet been considered by the appellate Court. Learned Counsel further submitted that the appellate Court failed to consider the mandatory provision which requires the Court to record a finding on the question of partial eviction. 9. Mr. P.K. Prasad, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents, firstly argued that admittedly on the date when decree was passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff-respondent acquired title over the suit premises by obtaining a sale deed in its favour. Learned Counsel submitted that the crucial date for determination of the ownership is the date when the decree was passed and not on the date when the suit was instituted. Learned Counsel also put reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. . Learned Counsel submitted that the crucial date for determination of the ownership is the date when the decree was passed and not on the date when the suit was instituted. Learned Counsel also put reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. . Learned Counsel also put reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vithabhai Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India 2005 AIR SCW 1509 and also the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Jai Prakash Jalan v. Rambilash Madan Gopal 1991(2) PLR 224. 10. In course of argument, both the counsels appearing for the parties have heavily relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M.M. Quasim (supra). 1 will first discuss the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in the said decision. In that case, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for eviction of the defendant under Section 11(2)(c) and (d) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 from the suit premises alleging that the plaintiff in good faith required possession of the suit property for opening an office and a clinic by the first plaintiff who by then became a qualified medical practitioner. Appellant-tenant contested the suit contending that he did not commit default in payment of rent and that the respondents have number of houses in their possession and the plea of bona fide requirement is incorrect and unwarranted. The trial Court decreed the suit. The appellant-tenant preferred appeal which was transferred to the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Giridih for hearing. In appeal, the appellant-tenant filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC contending therein that, as originally contended by him, the shop belonged to a firm and in Suit No. 4 of 1974, there has been a partition of the properties amongst the members of the firm and the suit shop has been allotted to one Pyarelal, who is neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceeding. Hence, plaintiff Manohar Lal Sharma cannot seek to evict the appellant for his personal requirement of the suit shop. Hence, plaintiff Manohar Lal Sharma cannot seek to evict the appellant for his personal requirement of the suit shop. The First Appellate Court observed that allotment of suit shop to Pyarelal has taken place after the suit was filed and that as earlier the respondents were accepted by the appellant as the landlords of the suit shop, the subsequent partition decree would not help the appellant. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed and the finding of the trial Court was affirmed. Thereafter, Second Appeal was filed before the High Court by the tenant which, too, was dismissed. The High Court refused to accept the contention of the appellant that during pendency of the appeal if the house in question was allotted to the share of one of the co- sharers of the decree, the decree, which had been passed in their favour, becomes nullity. The appellant-tenant then moved the Supreme Court. In para. 13 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed: Now, probing the merits of the contention, the first thing that stares in the face is whether where a suit is filed by a person claiming to be landlord on the ground that he in good faith requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation, would he still be entitled to a decree for possession on this ground even if during the course of proceedings his interest in the suit premises has come to an end and on the date of the final decree he had no subsisting interest in the suit premises? In other words, how should the court approach a proceeding under the Rent Act while taking into consideration the subsequent events which would non-suit the plaintiff? 11. After noticing the provision of Section 2(d) and Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, their Lordships further held: Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression "landlord" in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression "landlord" in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. By restricting the meaning of expression "landlord" for the purpose of Section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such us an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11(1)(c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can he the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of Clause (c) of Section 11(1) which reads: "Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation.... " Assuming that the expression "landlord" has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that he wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to Clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression "landlord" would unmistakably show that for the purposes of Clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word owner is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation. 12. The ratio decided by the Supreme in M.M. Quasims case will not be of any help to the plaintiff-respondent. The fact of the case was quite different from the facts of the instant case. In that case, admittedly suit for eviction was filed by the owner of the suit property on the ground of personal necessity. It was sonly during the pendency of the suit, properly was a allotted to one of the co-sharers by virtue of partition. In that context, their Lordships held that allotment of the property will not disentitle the plaintiff from obtaining a decree for eviction. 13. It was sonly during the pendency of the suit, properly was a allotted to one of the co-sharers by virtue of partition. In that context, their Lordships held that allotment of the property will not disentitle the plaintiff from obtaining a decree for eviction. 13. In the case of Vithabhai Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India 2005 AIR SCW 1509, the Apex court was considering the maintainability of a suit for eviction on the ground of expiry of lease where the suit was instituted prior to expiry of the period of lease. After considering various decisions, the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition of law: 22. We may now briefly sum up the correct position of law which is as follows: A suit of a civil nature disclosing a cause of action even if filed before the date on which the plaintiff became actually entitled to sue and claim the relief founded on such cause of action is not to be necessarily dismissed for such reason. The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the court; the court entertaining such a suit and passing decree therein is not acting without jurisdiction but it is in the judicial discretion of the court to grant decree or not. The court would examine whether any irreparable prejudice was caused to the defendant on account of the suit having been filed a little before the date on which the plaintiffs entitlement to relief became due and whether by granting the relief in such suit a manifest injustice would be caused to the defendant. Taking into consideration the explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit before the date of maturity of cause of action, the court may deny the plaintiff his costs or may make such other order adjusting equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may deem fit in its discretion. The conduct of the parties and unmerited advantage to the plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors. A plea as to non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of its being premature should be promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision. It will equally be the responsibility of the court to examine and promptly dispose of such a plea. A plea as to non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of its being premature should be promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision. It will equally be the responsibility of the court to examine and promptly dispose of such a plea. The plea may not he permitted to be raised at a belated stage of the suit. However, the court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases: (i) when there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event; (ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or occurrence of a particular event would have the effect of defeating a public policy or public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root of the courts jurisdiction; and (iv) where the lis is not confined to parties alone and affects and involves persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition which affects and involves the entire constituency. (See Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath 13) One more category of suits which may be added to the above, is: where leave of the court or some authority is mandatorily required to be obtained before the institution of the suit and was not so obtained. 14. The ratio decided by the Supreme Court will also not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case in view of the explanation appended to Section 11(1)(c) of the Act. 15. Section 2(f) defines the word "Landlord" as under: Section 2(f) "landlord" includes the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receive, guardian or who would so receive the rent or he entitled to receive the rent, if the building, were let to a tenant. 16. 16. The aforesaid definition of the term "landlord" clearly points out that the landlord must not necessarily be land owner, but the person who receives rent as an agent, trustee, executor and administrator is also landlord and he can maintain a suit for eviction. 17. Section 11 of the Act lays down the provision under which landlord can maintain a suit for eviction on the grounds mentioned therein. The relevant portion of Section 11 reads as under: 11. Eviction of tenants. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds: (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of, the tenant or of any person residing with the tenant for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible; (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant front a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5; Explanation I. In this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in Clause (f) of Section 2. Explanation II. -.... 18. Explanation II. -.... 18. Sub-section (1)(c) of Section 11 is one of the grounds for eviction provided the owner of the property files the suit and proves that the suit premises is reasonably and in good faith required by him for his own use and occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. From reading of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 11 of the Act, it is clear that a landlord as defined In Section 2(f) can maintain a suit for eviction on the ground of default, expiry of lease or material deterioration of the building, but for obtaining a decree of eviction on the ground of personal necessity, Explanation I makes it clear that such suit shall be maintained only by the owner of the property who proves his bona fide personal necessity. 19. From reading the provision of Section 2(f) along with Section 11(1)(c) and the explanation, it is clear that the owner, who files the suit, must plead in the plaint that he is the owner and requires the premises for his bona fide personal necessity. 20. A similar question arose for consideration before the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Madhusudan Prasad Agarwal v. Smt. Shusma Bala Dasi and Anr. . In the said case, a suit for eviction was filed on the ground of default and personal necessity. However, during pendency of the Second Appeal, some new development took place that the plaintiff-landlord occupied possession of another premises of the same building. It was argued that since requirement has been substantially fulfilled, no decree could be passed. The Division Bench held that the crucial date to determine the requirement is the date on which the suit is filed. Their Lordships observed: 12. Learned Counsel also submitted that since after the filing of this appeal in this Court certain new developments have taken place and that now the plaintiffs cannot be said to require the premises reasonably in good faith for their own occupation. The new developments, according to the appellant is that he has bearable to take possession of another portion of the same building and that portion is sufficient to meet his requirement. The new developments, according to the appellant is that he has bearable to take possession of another portion of the same building and that portion is sufficient to meet his requirement. I do not think now it is possible to hold that the respondents do not require the suit premises reasonably for their own occupation. The crucial date to determine the requirement is the date on which the suit is filed. However, be that as it may, since I have held above that the appellant is a defaulter within the meaning of Section 11(1)(d) of the Act the question of personal necessity loses its significance as the suit has to be decree on that ground alone. 21. In another case of Arun Kumar Sah v. Md. Basir Ahmad and Anr. a Bench of the Patna High Court took the similar view and observed: 9. The second submission of Shri Ghsoe was that the requirement mentioned in Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947, (hereinafter to be referred to us the Act) must be the requirement on the date of institution of the suit, and the Court will not be justified in allowing the prayer for eviction on the ground of the requirement arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. This position cannot be disputed, but, as satisfactorily discussed in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the materials on the record justify a finding about reasonable requirement and in good faith even in the year 1971 when the suit was instituted. At marginally noted page 12 of the lower appellate Courts judgment, it has been found that in the year 1971 the three sons of Basir Ahmad were unemployed. These sons of Basir Ahmad might not have attained majority at the time of institution of the suit and might have students, but the plaintiffs, who are undisputedly running their business since long before the institution of the suit, might have intended to expand their business in the particular context of the employment of the three sons of Basir Ahmad. 22. Admittedly, plaintiff/respondent was not the owner of the suit property in 2000 when the suit for eviction was instituted. 22. Admittedly, plaintiff/respondent was not the owner of the suit property in 2000 when the suit for eviction was instituted. In the year 2000, owner of the suit property entered into an agreement to sale with the plaintiff of the suit property and on the basis of agreement to sale, suit was instituted by the plaintiff-agreement holder claiming to be the owner of the properly, it is well settled that an agreement to sale does not create any interest in the immovable- property. A Division of the Patna High Court in the case of Sukhi Lal Sah v. Angrahit Jha (1979) BBCI 5661 considered the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and observed that a contract of sale of land does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on the property. 23. Similarly, in the case of Rambaran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra 1967 (1) S.C.R. 293 it was observed by Ramaswami, J (speaking for the Court) that a mere contract of sale of immovable property does not create any interest in the immovable property. In my considered opinion, therefore, a person who was not even acquired any right title or interest in the immovable property cannot maintain a suit for eviction, specially on the ground of his personal necessity. 24. Besides the above, the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 was enacted to regulate letting of buildings, particularly to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom. If the holder of an agreement to sale is allowed to institute suit for eviction on the ground of their personal necessity then the whole object of the Act shall be defeated. In other words, a tenant in rightful occupation of the premises shall be forcefully evicted even without having any personal necessity of the real owner by adopting a device of entering into an agreement to sale with the musclemen or any person including the Builders who can prove their personal necessity. In my view, therefore, decree for eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal necessity cannot be passed in favour of plaintiff when on the date of institution of suit, he was merely an agreement-Holder or had no right title and interest in the suit property. 25. In my view, therefore, decree for eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal necessity cannot be passed in favour of plaintiff when on the date of institution of suit, he was merely an agreement-Holder or had no right title and interest in the suit property. 25. The next question and the last question that falls for consideration is as to whether the findings recorded by the Courts below on the issue of personal necessity can be sustained in law? 26. It is well settled that normally High Courts should not interfere in Second Appeals where question is concluded by concurrent finding of fact recorded by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court. At the same time, it is equally well settled that when essential ingredients necessary for finding of fact have not in fact been found by the Courts below, then the Court is bound to examine the question whether injustice or wrong is done (1997) 4 S.C.C. 161 . Similarly where both Courts ignored the weight of prepoundering circumstances and allowed the judgment to be influenced by inconsequential matter, then the High Court would be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and coming to its independent conclusion. 27. In the instant case, it was categorically pleaded by the defendants- appellants that the suit property is big building consisting of 12 flats, out of that 5 flats were vacant at the time institution of the suits, and one flat was vacated by Dinkar Bhai and the plaintiff got possession of it. Out of 6 flats, plaintiff already sold 3 flats. At the appellate State, the appellant filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for adducing additional evidence and the same was allowed by the appellate Court and two documents were marked Exts. A and B. By additional evidence, the appellant brought on record a lease deed dated 12.3.2004 executed by the plaintiff in respect of a portion of the same building in favour of one Sajjan Agarwal. The said document, although admitted into evidence, but was not considered by the appellate Court to show prima facie that the requirement of the plaintiff is not genuine and bona fide. For better appreciation, paragraphs 26 and 27 of the appellate Courts judgment are quoted herein below: 26. The said document, although admitted into evidence, but was not considered by the appellate Court to show prima facie that the requirement of the plaintiff is not genuine and bona fide. For better appreciation, paragraphs 26 and 27 of the appellate Courts judgment are quoted herein below: 26. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted before this Court for a decree of eviction on the ground of personal necessity it must be bona fide and it should not he mere desire and wish of the party. There should be an element of need. The P.W. 3 namely Deepak Kumar Poddar who is one of the Director of the plaintiff-company has deposed on behalf of the plaintiff in his examination in chief. He has categorically stated that the plaintiff required the tenanted premises for its use and occupation as it had extended its business. He has further stated in his evidence in T (E)S No. 22.2000 that there is shortage of space for construction of office of the company and the suit house is near the road and market which is suitable space for it. In cross examination he has stated that it is true that company has purchased 12 flats, 4 garage and 4 shop rooms and the space within the compound of said suit property and 5 to 6 flats were vacant. He has further admitted that suit was filed against Basant Bhai Sanghvi and Manik Keshav but they have purchased the flats. Therefore the suns were withdrawn against them. He has also denied that 4 shop rooms have been sold to Sajjay Agarwal. In cross examination he has further slated that Plaintiff Company is a unit of Pooddar Group and Bajrangbali Metal Industry is also included in the said unit. 27. The learned Counsel of the appellant tried to impress upon this Court that since the godown of Bajrangbah Metal Industry is lying vacant that could have been used by the respondent. It was urged before this Court that the plaintiff has not made out any case as to how much space is required for all the purpose the suit premises are required for the respondent. It was urged before this Court that the plaintiff has not made out any case as to how much space is required for all the purpose the suit premises are required for the respondent. A number of case laws have been cited by the respective parties in support of their contention with regard to personal necessity and tried to impress upon this Court that plaintiffs requirement is mere a wish while the respondent tried to convince that there must be an element of need and selection lies with the landlord as to which particular premises will suit him and the desire or necessity should not be stretched to such extent that it would become impossible for getting a decree. I think no ruling is required to be quoted referred by the respective parties. It is settled principal of law the requirement or the necessity differs according to status of the person the nature of job and it varies man to man at the same time it is also settled law that necessity of the plaintiff should be an honest necessity and it should not be dishonest. There must be an element of need and it has also to be seen whether there is eco personal or not. 28. From bare perusal of the aforesaid finding of the Lower Appellate Court, it is manifestly clear that in spite of the admitted fact that the plaintiff instituted suits against other tenants also, but on their undertakings to purchase those tenanted promises, the suits were withdrawn against them. Although, number of decision were cited by the appellants to show that the requirement of the respondent is not genuine, but the Court of Appeal below held that no decision is required to be quoted as the necessity differs according to status of the person and it varies from man to man. In my considered opinion, the Court below has committed serious illegality in recording the finding on the issue of personal necessity in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. 29. The Courts below have also failed to decide the issue of partial eviction as required under the Law. Proviso to Section 11(1)(c) casts a mandate upon the Court to decide the issue as to whether partial eviction will satisfy the requirement of the landlord. 29. The Courts below have also failed to decide the issue of partial eviction as required under the Law. Proviso to Section 11(1)(c) casts a mandate upon the Court to decide the issue as to whether partial eviction will satisfy the requirement of the landlord. On this issue, the appellate Court simply held that partial eviction will not satisfy the requirement on misappreciation of evidence that it would be inconvenient for the staffs of the plaintiff to work. 30 Taking into consideration all these facts, I have not doubt in holding that the plaintiff-respondent failed to prove the bona fide personal necessity in accordance with law. 31. After having considered all aspects of the matter, in my view, the impugned judgment passed by the Courts below cannot be sustained in law. Consequently, all these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are set aside.