HIMA KOHLI, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONERS by this petition seek, inter alia issuance of directions to the respondents to award the contract in respect of Tender No. DRTS/aren/jan-2005 floated by respondent No. 2, Bharat Electronics limited on behalf of respondent No. 1/uoi to it. Petitioners further seek directions to restrain respondents No. 1 and 2 from negotiating with any other bidder except it on the ground that it is the lowest bidder of the said tender. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are: Respondent No. 2, Bharat Electronics Ltd. was nominated by respondent No. 1, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, as the prime contractor for Indian Army's modernization plan for Technical communication System (TCS ). Respondent No. 2 floated a Request for proposal (RFP) for procurement of Digital Radio Trunking System (DRTS), also popularly known as Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) which is a major component in the TCS Programme of the Indian Army, vide Tender no. DRTS/aren/jan-2005. In the RFP floated by respondent No. 2 for the drts, the vendors were called upon to make firm technical and commercial proposals for the supply and transfer of technology of DRTS to respondent no. 2 for incorporating in their solution to Indian Army. It was specified that the commercial offers should be for quantities of 80 systems as per Bill of material enclosed with the RFP. ( 3 ) THE technical specifications detailed the components of the DRTS by splitting them into 9 sub-systems. The tender also stipulated that the licensed manufacture of DRTS shall be undertaken by respondent No. 2 through a Transfer of Technology (Tot) for both hardware and software by executing a Tot Agreement between the vendor and respondent No. 2 ( 4 ) IN terms of the tender document, the evaluation, trials and completion of the contract was proposed to be carried out in five phases spread over a period of time. Phase-I comprised a Preliminary Evaluation of Vendor Proposal and technical analysis, including presentations to be made by the vendors as also clarifications to be provided on questions raised during the presentations and subsequent analysis to the Technical evaluation Committee (TEC) for being shortlisted for the Phase-II evaluations. Phase-I comprised a Preliminary Evaluation of Vendor Proposal and technical analysis, including presentations to be made by the vendors as also clarifications to be provided on questions raised during the presentations and subsequent analysis to the Technical evaluation Committee (TEC) for being shortlisted for the Phase-II evaluations. Phase-II evaluations comprised the visits of the empowered technical team to assess the vendor system at the vendor premises to assess the technical capability, encryption, implementation, confirmation of essential parameters and suitability of equipment as per RFP, demonstration of system capability, mock up installation at the location of the vendors and vendors found qualified by the above criteria were to be shortlisted for Phase-Ill evaluation. ( 5 ) PHASE-ILL evaluation required the vendors to offer three systems for user trials; one of them was to be installed in a shelter provided by respondent No. 2, which was to be followed by user trials to be conducted by an evaluation team from the Indian Army. The vendors were also required to give a written undertaking that their systems will meet all the requirements of technical and environmental evaluations, maintainability evaluation trials etc. to be conducted in Phase-V. ( 6 ) PHASE-IV comprised opening of the commercial offers of such of the vendors whose systems were shortlisted after Phase-Ill by a Committee in the presence of the tenderers and further negotiations were to be made only with the lowest bidder (L1) as determined by the Committee. Final Phase-V came into play after placement of order when the successful tenderer was required to supply the three systems. ( 7 ) AS a run up to understand the dispute interse the parties, it is also necessary to be apprised of the relevant dates and events. ( 8 ) ON 8th February, 2005, a pre-bid meeting was held by respondent no. 2 where the prospective bidders were apprised of the contents and basic requirements of the tender. In March 2005, eight bidders, including petitioner No. 1 submitted their bids in response to the RFP. Phase-I evaluation was carried out by the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC)which shortlisted six vendors for Phase-II evaluation. 2 where the prospective bidders were apprised of the contents and basic requirements of the tender. In March 2005, eight bidders, including petitioner No. 1 submitted their bids in response to the RFP. Phase-I evaluation was carried out by the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC)which shortlisted six vendors for Phase-II evaluation. Phase-II evaluation was carried by the Empowered Technical Committee (ETC), which after visiting the factory sites of the six qualified bidders, including petitioner No. 1 recommended three vendors, namely, petitioner No. 1, respondent No. 3/m/s Selex Communications Spa (M/s Selex) and M/s Thales Land and Joint systems (M/s Thales) for Phase-Ill evaluation. In Phase-III evaluation, field trials, maintainability evaluation trials, EMI/emc testing and discussions on feasibility etc. were held and further evaluation trials were carried out. After approval of the Technical Committee's report, all the three vendors as referred to hereinabove, qualified for Phase-IV evaluation and clearance was accorded for the next phase of evaluation. In Phase-IV, commercial bids were opened on 23rd January, 2007 in the presence of the representatives of all three vendors and the prices of the main items as per their commercial bids were read out. The total price of the three bidders worked out as under: (i) M/s Siemens (Petitioner No. 1) 16,100,969 Euros (ii) M/s Selex (Respondent No. 3) 25,775,048 Euros (iii) M/s Thales (Respondent No. 4) 22,781,769 Euros ( 9 ) HOWEVER, as the proposals of the vendors comprised various details contained in the enclosures to the bid, they were informed that a comprehensive evaluation would be carried out by the Expert committee for arriving at L1 vendor and that any further interaction would only be held with L1 vendor. An Evaluation Committee was constituted and the bids of all the three vendors were analyzed. Vide letter dated 1st February, 2007, the Evaluation Committee asked for certain clarifications in the form of queries from all the three vendors, including petitioner No. 1. In the meeting dated 7th February, 2007 with all the three vendors, they gave their clarifications to the queries raised by respondents No. 1 and 2. As a result, the Evaluation Committee completed its evaluation of the bids of all the three vendors and on 10th February, 2007 finalized the total package cost for each vendor, working out a comparative statement containing the details as per the scope of the RFP. As a result, the Evaluation Committee completed its evaluation of the bids of all the three vendors and on 10th February, 2007 finalized the total package cost for each vendor, working out a comparative statement containing the details as per the scope of the RFP. ( 10 ) AS respondent No. 2 was not announcing the name of L1 vendor, petitioner wrote to respondents on 16th February, 2007 stating inter alia that though the price bids had been opened by respondent No. 1 more than three weeks ago, but the name of the L1 had not yet been announced. It is further stated that based on the read out prices of all the three vendors on 23rd January, 2007, the petitioner had emerged as the lowest bidder and was therefore entitled to be intimated the results of the tender. The petitioners further stated that having not got any response from the respondent No. 2 to the aforesaid letter, they sent a reminder on 22nd february, 2007 and also personally met the Director of respondent No. 2 on 23rd February, 2007. Finally, vide letter dated 27th February, 2007, the petitioners received a response from respondent No. 2 acknowledging their representation but remaining silent on the outcome of the tender. The tone and tenor of the reply of respondent No. 2 to the representation of the petitioner, made the petitioners apprehensive that their bid had been rejected and the tender had been awarded in favour of respondent No. 3. In these circumstances, the petitioners filed the present writ petition seeking a mandamus to the respondent No. 2 to award the tender in their favour, being the lowest bidder. ( 11 ) NOTICE was issued on the writ petition on 14th March, 2007, on which date, it was also ordered that until the next date of hearing, the tender shall not be finalized and the matter was adjourned to 2nd April, 2007. In the meantime, a counter affidavit was filed by respondent No. 2. On 2nd April, 2007, when a preliminary objection was raised by the respondents regarding non-impleadment of other two bidders, the oral request made on behalf of the petitioners, seeking impleadment of other two bidders as respondents was allowed and the petitioners were called upon to take necessary steps for their impleadment. On 2nd April, 2007, when a preliminary objection was raised by the respondents regarding non-impleadment of other two bidders, the oral request made on behalf of the petitioners, seeking impleadment of other two bidders as respondents was allowed and the petitioners were called upon to take necessary steps for their impleadment. At the same time, notice was issued for the next date to the newly added respondents upon filing of the amended memo of parties. ( 12 ) IN the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 2, it took a stand that the Evaluation Committee finalized the total package cost for each of the three vendors on 10th February, 2007, as below: (i) M/s Selex (Respondent No. 3.) EU 257. 12 lakhs (ii) M/s Thales (Respondent No. 4) EU 265. 72 lakhs (iii) M/s Siemens (Petitioner No. 1) EU 285. 5 lakhs ( 13 ) IT was submitted that the aforesaid values were based on DCF calculations and since M/s Selex, respondent No. 3 had emerged as L1 bidder, discussions were held by respondents No. 1 and 2 with respondent no. 3. ( 14 ) IT was averred by respondent No. 2 that before opening of the commercial bids in the meeting held between the three successful vendors and respondent No. 2 on 23rd January,2007, respondent No. 2 categorically declared the quantity of the "vehicular Mobile Terminal (VMT)" as 1200 in number based on the requirement of the Indian Army to whom the systems were to be supplied. A perusal of the tender of the petitioners reflected that the petitioners, while aggregating the total amount of the tender, did not take into consideration the full quantity of certain items of the tender and thereby projected that their bid was the lowest, though in fact it was not so. Respondent No. 2 elucidated its aforesaid stand by referring to item No. 11 of the format for Bill of Materials, annexed as Annexure P-5 to the writ petition described as "software for client PCs connected to portable, mobile stations and external LAN" to state that in the column of "quantity", while the petitioners had shown the quantity as "as required", and in the columns of "unit Price" as also "total Price", the price for the said item was given as eu 8,977. 34, the actual quantity to be supplied by the vendor was 1200 units and therefore the unit price of EU 8,977. 34 had to be multiplied by 1200 which would come to a total figure of EU 107,728,08. 00. It was contended that, the petitioners had deliberately not. entered the total cost of 1200 units and that if the total cost, of this very item No. 11 is added into the figure furnished by the petitioners in the writ petition, the same would be much more than the bid cost of the other two vendors, in whose cases also, the cost of 1200 units had been taken into consideration and added in the total amount of the tender for the purpose of reaching the total package cost. Apart from the aforesaid item No. 11, in the Bill of Material, respondent No. 2 also referred to some other items the cost of which the petitioners had not considered, to state that the total difference for these items in cost work out to eu 14,459,500 and that the petitioner had deliberately not considered the said quantity of items so as to meet the requirements of the RFP. Thus as per respondent No. 2, the actual package cost of the petitioners does not work out to EU 16,100,969 as alleged by the petitioners, but to EU 30,560,459. 00 (EU 16,100,969 + EU 14,459,500 ). In support of its contention, respondent No. 2 also enclosed the details of the deficiencies of items pertaining to the petitioners while comparing the same with the other two vendors. ( 15 ) PETITIONERS vehemently disputed the above position. It was contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that despite the fact that petitioner No. 1's bid was the lowest of the three technically qualified bidders whose commercial bids were opened, petitioner No. 1 was sought to be excluded by adding an imaginary price of EU 11 million (Rs. 60 crore approximately) to its bid which the petitioners never quoted and such an addition to its bid was unwarranted and amounted to padding/ loading the bid. He submitted that apart from revealing the number of Vehicular mobiles, the quantity of no other item, including item No. 11 was declared in the RFP. 60 crore approximately) to its bid which the petitioners never quoted and such an addition to its bid was unwarranted and amounted to padding/ loading the bid. He submitted that apart from revealing the number of Vehicular mobiles, the quantity of no other item, including item No. 11 was declared in the RFP. It was categorically denied that in the meeting held on 23rd january, 2007, respondent No. 2 declared the quantity of the VMT as 1200 in number. It was submitted that the software at item No. 11 had no connection or relationship with the Vehicular Mobile Stations as specified in item No. 4. 1 and thus the quantity of 1200 could not be co-related with item No. 11 to state that the quantity to be supplied against item No. 11 was declared. It was also submitted that respondent No. 2 while filing its counter affidavit, stated for the first time that the quantity against item No. 11 of the Bill of Materials was declared as 1200. As per the petitioners, the addition of EU 11 million to the bid of the petitioners on account of the said item alone has resulted in increasing its total bid to EU 28 million which, on the face of it is absurd for the reason that item No. 11 is nothing but basic software (Window. XP) and by no stretch of imagination the cost of 1200 licences of the same would cost EU 11 million in a contract, which itself was of a total value of EU 16 million approximately. Thus it was vehemently argued that no quantity was ever announced for item No. 11 and the software mentioned at item No. 11 had no connection with the Vehicular mobile Stations as the same was to be used on PCs at Base Stations which were specified as only 80 in number. ( 16 ) IT was further submitted that the unit price of item No. 11 as reflected by the petitioners in its Bill of Materials was on account of license for 100 users and if the requirement of the respondent No. 2 was for 1200 users, the price specified by the petitioners at item No. 11 should have been at best multiplied by the figure of 12 and not by the figure of 1200 which would work out to EU 107,728,08. 00. 00. ( 17 ) FINALLY, it was submitted that if there was any confusion in this regard, respondent No. 2 could have sought necessary clarifications from the petitioners as it did in respect of other issues raised on 7th February, 2007. In any case, the petitioners submitted in the course of arguments that they were willing to provide software for 1200 users at the price quoted by them in the bid, i. e. for a total amount of EU 8,977. 34. It was emphasized that the bid of the petitioners was still the lowest whereas that of respondent No. 3, m/s Selex was. 40% higher and if the figure of EU 107,728,08. 00 (EU 8,977. 34 x 12) was excluded, the petitioners' bid would be less than 30% of M/s Selex, thus it was canvassed that if the submission of respondent No. 2 is accepted that respondent No. 3 was found to be L1, then the same would result in a loss of about EU 11 million (Rs. 60 crores approximately) detrimental to the State exchequer and such waste of public funds should not be permitted. In support of their contentions, the petitioners relied on the following judgments: (i) Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe and Hodgkinson (P) Ltd. and another, (2005) 3 SCC 138. . (ii) Goa Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals and another v. Union of India and others, 1993 IV AD (Delhi) 777: 1994 (28)DRJ 1 . ( 18 ) THE submissions of the petitioners were strongly refuted by the learned counsels for the respondents by contending that the entire approach of the petitioners was faulty. In evaluating the tender, the respondents were neither expected to nor required to evaluate and give an interpretation favouring the petitioners. The petitioners cannot be permitted to fill up the lacunae in their bid, i. e. in the Bill of Materials submitted by it by now filling in the suitable quantity of units and then on that basis computing the total price. It was contended that the petitioners had not approached the court with clean hands as they had not only deliberately suppressed the material facts but also made false and misleading averments so as to cause confusion. It was contended that the petitioners had not approached the court with clean hands as they had not only deliberately suppressed the material facts but also made false and misleading averments so as to cause confusion. In support of its contention, respondent No. 2 referred to the tabulated chart annexed as Annexure P-5 to the writ petition to state that the same was not the actual quotation given by the petitioners and that it had deliberately altered the figures in the description given for item No. 11 as against the actual figures quoted in the tender. ( 19 ) SINCE the entire dispute in the present writ petition hinges on item no. 11 which relates to "software for client PCs connected to portable, mobile stations and external LAN", it is necessary to reproduce the said item in the comparative statement as annexed by the petitioner with the writ petition as Annexure P-5, in comparison with the copy of the original format for Bill of Materials submitted by petitioner No. 1, and annexed by respondent No. 2 with its counter affidavit as Annexure R-6, for ready reference as below:- ANNEXURE P-5 Siemens (As quoted in bid and confirmed in meeting on 07th Feb, 2007 ) Thales (As read out in price bid opening on 23rd Jan 2007) Selex (As read out in price bid opening on 23rd Jan 2007 ) Import content ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? Local Content Import content Import content S. No . Nomenclature of system Quantity unit price Euro total price Euro Unit prices INR Total price INR Quantity Unit Price euro Total price Euro Quantity Unit Price euro Total price Euro 11. Software for client PCs connected to portable, mobile stations and external LAN As required 8,977. 34 8,977. 34 389. 00 ANNEXURE R-6 Import content Local Content S. No . Nomenclature of System Quantity Make, model & version Unit Price Euro Total price Euro Unit Price INR Total Price INR Remarks 11 software for client PCs connected to portable, mobile stations and external LAN As required 8,977. 34 8,977. 34 389. 00 ANNEXURE R-6 Import content Local Content S. No . Nomenclature of System Quantity Make, model & version Unit Price Euro Total price Euro Unit Price INR Total Price INR Remarks 11 software for client PCs connected to portable, mobile stations and external LAN As required 8,977. 34 ( 20 ) LEARNED counsels for the respondent No. 2 contended that a comparison of the aforesaid tabulated statement filed by the petitioners with the actual Bill of Materials submitted with its bid would show that the petitioners had deliberately tried to create an impression before the court that while calculating the total bid price, respondent No. 2 was required to take into consideration the rate of EU 8,977. 34 for item No. 11 and there was no justification for respondent No. 2 to have multiplied the same by the figure of 1200 as the total price given in Annexure P-5 showed EU 8,977. 34, whereas fact of the matter is that in the column " Quantity" the figure was given as "as Required", while in the column of "unit Price EU", the amount was mentioned as "eu 8,977. 34" and the next three columns", namely, "total price EU", "unit Price INR" and "total Price INR" were left blank. Thus, it was submitted that after mentioning the quantity "as Required", the petitioners had quoted the price of only one unit in EU, knowing very well that at the time of submitting the tender, the quantity to be furnished under item No. 11 was not known to respondents No. 1 and 2 and the same was to be communicated by the Indian Army at a later stage and that is why against the column, "quantity", the petitioners had endorsed "as Required". Resultantly, respondent No. 2 had no option but to multiply the figure of EU 8,977. 34 filled in by the petitioner with the number of units required, namely, 1200 units so as to arrive at the total figure of EU 107,728,08. 00 as against item No. 11. ( 21 ) IT was further submitted on behalf of respondent No. 2 that vide communication dated 19th January, 2007, the Indian Army for the first time informed the respondent No. 2 that they required 1200 Vehicle Mobile terminals (VMTs ). 00 as against item No. 11. ( 21 ) IT was further submitted on behalf of respondent No. 2 that vide communication dated 19th January, 2007, the Indian Army for the first time informed the respondent No. 2 that they required 1200 Vehicle Mobile terminals (VMTs ). As the items No. 4,7 and 11 of the Bill of Materials, namely, Vehicular Mobile Station with integrated GPS and all accessories, end to End Encryption modules/sub systems in all base stations and portable/mobile terminals (Additional Item) and software for client PCs connected to portable mobile stations and external LAN were interconnected and were to be fitted in each vehicle and in the present case, as there were 1200 VMTs in which items No. 7 and 11 were to be fitted to be made operational, therefore the said position was made clear to all the vendors including the petitioner No. 1 before opening of the tenders in the meeting held on 23rd January, 2007. ( 22 ) SUBSEQUENT to the opening of the tenders, certain clarifications were asked for in the meeting held on 7th February, 2007 with all vendors, in response to which the petitioners vide letter dated 7th February, 2007 gave clarifications and submitted some documents. Along with the documents furnished on 7th February, 2007, the petitioners submitted yet another composite price sheet showing various figures and prices mentioned by them, including those for items No. 4, 7, and 11 referred to hereinabove. It was submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that in respect of items No. 4,7, and 11, the petitioners furnished the following information, which is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: Import Content Local Content S. No. Nomenclature of System Quantity Make, model & version Unit Price Euro Total price Euro Unit Price INR Total Price INR Remarks 4. 1 Vehicular Mobile station with integrated GPS and all accessories 4. 1. 1. 1-500 . ? . . 4. 1. 2 501-1000 ? . . ? . 4. 1. 3 1001-2500 1200 1,075. 36 1,290,431. 39 4. 1. 4 2501-5000 1,017. 46 ? . ? . 4. 2 Complete installation kit,antenna,remote control cable and hands free kit 1200 ? . ? . . ? . 183. 54 ? . ? . ? . ? . 220,245. 45 . . . . 7. . . ? . 4. 1. 3 1001-2500 1200 1,075. 36 1,290,431. 39 4. 1. 4 2501-5000 1,017. 46 ? . ? . 4. 2 Complete installation kit,antenna,remote control cable and hands free kit 1200 ? . ? . . ? . 183. 54 ? . ? . ? . ? . 220,245. 45 . . . . 7. End to End Encryption modules/sub systems in all base stations and portable/mobile terminals (Additional item) 1200 . . . . 131. 80 . . . . 158,162. 84 . . . . End to End not required for base station 11. Software for client PCs connected to portable, mobile stations and external LAN 1 8,977. 34 . . . . 8. 977. 34 . . . . ( 23 ) IT was contended on behalf of respondent No. 2 that the aforesaid tabulated statement was at variance with the one filed along with the writ petition as Annexure P-5 as also with the original tender submitted to respondent No. 2 (Annexure R-6) [both already reproduced hereinabove]. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 stated that the petitioners had quoted the price for one unit as EU 8,977. 34 and since the total quantity required for item No. 11 was 1200, therefore, respondent No. 2 was required to multiply the figure of EU 8,977. 34 by 1200 in order to arrive at a total amount EU 11 million (Rs. 60 crores approximately ). As the items No. . 4, 7 and 11 were interconnected and inter-related, the quantities for all the three items had to be the same which fact was very well known to the petitioners and to substantiate the said contention, it was argued on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that while furnishing the tabulated chart on 7th February, 2007, the petitioners mentioned the quantity as 1200 against both the items i. e. , items No. 4 and 7 whereas against item No. 11, they had deliberately inserted the figure of "1" under the column of "quantity". ( 24 ) THE plea of the petitioners that one software unit would cover 100 units of VMTs and therefore, the requirement of software unit was 12 (12x100), was also disputed by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 on the ground that there was no such clarification furnished by the petitioners anywhere that one software could cover 100 units of VMTs. ( 25 ) LASTLY, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 canvassed that while exercising its power of judicial review in tender matters, the court is not required to go into minute details, particularly when the tender in question is an internationally floated one. In a case of tender, the court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision to award the contract was taken, as the court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision by substituting the said decision with its own. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Others, (2001) 2 SCC 451 to state that in international competitive bidding, the bidder should have assistance of technical experts and the degree of care required in such a bidding is greater than in ordinary local bids for small works. Referring to the aforementioned judgment, it was submitted that the Supreme Court while examining the scope and power of the High Court for judicial review in such matters had concluded that the court shall exercise restrain in reviewing administrative action and shall confine itself only to reviewing the manner in which the decision was taken. It was submitted that in the present proceedings, the petitioner wants the court to do a full evaluation of the tender bid which is impermissible, that all the arguments put forth on behalf of the petitioner are nothing but post tender working and that the petitioner has intentionally tried to mislead the Court by furnishing incorrect comparative statements in the pleadings which are contrary to the data furnished in the actual bid documents. ( 26 ) REPELLING the aforesaid arguments put forth on behalf of the respondents, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners in rejoinder that reliance placed on the case of Patel Engineering (supra) is misplaced as there was no error which required correction in the tender of the petitioners as sought to be contended by the respondents, that it was not a case where the petitioner No. 1 was technically unqualified or found to be ineligible, that overlooking the bid of the petitioner which was cheaper at EU 11 million (Rs. 60 crores approximately) would amount to a plunder of the Union exchequer and lastly, that respondent No. 2 could have sought clarifications from the petitioners in respect of item No. 11 in its meeting held on 7th february, 2007 if it so wanted but had not done so. ( 27 ) BEFORE embarking on the respective contentions raised by both the parties, it is necessary to etch out the contours of powers that are to be exercised in a writ filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, where the challenge is to the exercise of contractual powers by the Government and Government bodies for the purposes of awarding of a contract. ( 28 ) IN the case of Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. (supra) after taking notice of a plethora of decisions, the Supreme Court stated as below: "para 11: The principles which have to be applied in judicial review of administrative decisions, especially those relating to acceptance of tender and award of contract, have been considered in great detail by a three- Judge Bench in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 . It was observed that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down, (emphasis added) Para 12: After an exhaustive consideration of a large number of decisions and standard books on Administrative Law, the Court enunciated the principle that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down, (emphasis added) Para 12: After an exhaustive consideration of a large number of decisions and standard books on Administrative Law, the Court enunciated the principle that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible. The Government, must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi- administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principles of reasonableness but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. It was also pointed out that quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure, (emphasis added) Para 13: In Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M. N. Publications Ltd. , (1993) 1 SCC 445 it was held as under: "18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the 'decision making process. . . ' By way of judicial review the court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Court have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But at the same time. . . the Courts can certainly examine whether "decision making process" was reasonable rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 19. If the contract has been entered into without ignoring the procedure which can be said to be basic in nature and after an. objective consideration of different options available taking into account the interest of the State and the public, then Court cannot act as an appellate authority by substituting its opinion in respect of selection made for entering into such contract. . . . . objective consideration of different options available taking into account the interest of the State and the public, then Court cannot act as an appellate authority by substituting its opinion in respect of selection made for entering into such contract. . . . . . . . . . . " (emphasis added)Para 14: In Raunaq International Ltd. v. I. V. R. Construction ltd. , (1999) 1 SCC 492 it was observed that the award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are of paramount importance are commercial considerations, which would include, inter alia, the price at which the party is willing to work, whether the goods or services offered are of the requisite specifications and whether the person tendering is of ability to deliver the goods or services as per specifications. Para 15: The law relating to award of contract by State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International airport Ltd. , (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should interfere. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should interfere. " (emphasis added) ( 29 ) IN a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s B. S. N. Joshi and Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. , AIR 2007 SC 437 , the supreme Court while summarizing the scope of judicial review and the interference of superior courts in the award of contracts, held as below: "para 67: We are not oblivious of the expansive role of the superior courts on judicial review. Para 68: We are also not shutting our eyes towards the new principles of judicial review which are being developed; but the law as it stands now having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions may be summarized as under: (i) If there are essential conditions, the same must be adhered to; (ii) If there is no power of general relaxation, ordinarily the same shall not be exercised and the principle of strict compliance would be applied where it is possible for all the parties to comply with all such conditions fully; (iii) If, however, a deviation is made in relation to all the parties in regard to any of such conditions, ordinarily again a power of relaxation may be held to be existing (iv) The parties who have taken the benefit of such relaxation should not ordinarily be allowed to take a different stand in relation to cdmpliance of another part of tender contract, particularly when he was also not in a position to comply with all the conditions of tender fully, unless the court otherwise finds relaxation of a condition which being essential in nature could not be relaxed and thus the same was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. (v) When a decision is taken by the appropriate authority upon due consideration of the tender document submitted by all the tenderers on their own merits and if it is ultimately found that successful bidders had in fact substantially complied with the purport and object for which essential conditions were laid down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with. (vi) The contractors cannot form a cartel. (vi) The contractors cannot form a cartel. If despite the same, their bids are considered and they are given an offer to match with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public interest would be given priority. (vii) Where a decision has been taken purely on public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint. " ( 30 ) IN yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India and others, (2006) 10 SCC 1 , it was held as below: "para 56: One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of Governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary (See State of u. P. and Ors. v. Renusagar Power Co. and Ors. , (1988) 4 SCC 59 ). At one time, the traditional view in England was that the executive was not answerable where its action was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor De Smith in his classical work 'judicial review of Administrative Action' 4th Edition at pages 285-287 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Para 57: The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to deployment of troupes, entering into international treaties, etc. The distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness of the Courts to assert their power to scrutinize the factual basis upon which discretionary powers have been exercised. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is 'illegality' the second 'irrationality',, and the third 'procedural impropriety'. . . " (emphasis added) ( 31 ) WHILE arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Supreme Court also took note of the judgment rendered in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 wherein it was held as under: "para 77: The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers, 2. committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision- making power and must give effect to it; (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness, (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. Para 94: (1) the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting-its own decision, without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principles of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principles of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. " ( 32 ) ANOTHER important judgment to which reference is invited is Asia foundation and Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I)Ltd. , (1997) 1 SCC 738 , wherein it was held as under: "para 10: Therefore, though the principle of judicial review cannot be denied so far as exercise of contractual powers of government bodies are concerned, but it is intended to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism and it is exercised in the larger public interest or if it is brought to the notice of the court that in the matter of award of a contract power has been exercised for any collateral purpose. But on examining the facts and circumstances of the present case and on going through the records we are of the considered opinion that none of the criteria has been satisfied justifying Court's interference in the grant of contract in favour of the appellant. We are not entering into the controversy raised by Mr parasaran, learned Senior Counsel that the High Court committed a factual error in coming to the conclusion that Respondent-1 was the lowest bidder and the alleged mistake committed by the consultant in the matter of bid evaluation in not taking into account the customs duty and the contention of Mr. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel that it has been conceded by all parties concerned before the High Court that on corrections being made respondent-1 was the lowest bidder. As in our view in the matter of a tender a lowest bidder may not claim an enforceable right to get the contract though ordinarily the authorities concerned should accept the lowest bid. " (emphasis added) ( 33 ) IN the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board (supra), while considering the scope of judicial interference in global tenders, the Supreme court held as below: "para 24: The controversy in this case has arisen at the threshold. It cannot be disputed that this is an international competitive bidding which postulates keen competition and high efficiency. The bidders have or should have assistance of technical experts. It cannot be disputed that this is an international competitive bidding which postulates keen competition and high efficiency. The bidders have or should have assistance of technical experts. The degree of care required in such a bidding is greater than in ordinary local bids for small works. It is essential to maintain the sanctity and integrity of process of tender/bid and also award of a contract. The appellant, Respondents 1 to 4 and Respondents 10 and 11 are all bound by the ITB which should be complied with scrupulously. In a work of this nature and magnitude where bidders who fulfil prequalification alone are invited to bid, adherence to the instructions cannot be given a go-by by branding it as a pedantic approach, otherwise it will encourage and provide scope for discrimination, arbitrariness and favouritism which are totally opposed to the rule of law and our constitutional values. The very purpose of issuing rules/instructions is to ensure their enforcement lest the rule of law should be a casualty. Relaxation or waiver of a rule or condition, unless so provided under the ITB, by the State or its agencies (the appellant) in favour of one bidder would create justifiable doubts in the minds of other bidders, would impair the rule of transparency and fairness and provide room for manipulation to suit the whims of the state agencies in picking and choosing a bidder for awarding contracts as in the case of distributing bounty or charity. In our view such approach should always be avoided. Where power to relax or waive a rule or a condition exists under the rules, it has to be done strictly in compliance with the rules. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that adherence to the ITB or rules is the best principle to be followed, which is also in the best public interest. " (emphasis added) ( 34 ) IN the case of Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, 2006 (14)SCALE 224, The Supreme Court while examining the scope of interference in judicial review of tender processes and award of contracts, observed as below: "para 19: Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills or some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is malafide or intended to favour someone. OR whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: ' the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached. ' (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. . . " (emphasis added) ( 35 ) IN the instant case, it may be noted that it is not denied by any of the parties that at the time of floating the tender, no separate quantities were furnished to the vendors in respect of item No. 11. Thus all the bidders were in the same state as regards the required quantity by respondent No. 1. Thus all the bidders were in the same state as regards the required quantity by respondent No. 1. While petitioners inserted the words "as Required" in the column of "quantity" against the said item, respondent No. 3 inserted the figure "1" in the column of "quantity" and respondent No, 4 left the column of "quantity" as blank. However, unit price was entered in the column "unit price" by each of the vendors. This was at the time of submitting the bid documents. The next relevant stage arrived on 23rd January, 2007 when the commercial bids were opened in the meeting held where the three successful vendors, namely, petitioner No. 1 and the respondents No. 3 and 4 were called. At that stage, respondent No. 2 for the first time declared the quantity of Vehicular Mobile Terminals as 1200 in number, based on the requirement given by the Indian Army to whom the systems were to be ultimately supplied by it. Thus the bids of each of the vendors became public on 23rd January, 2007. Once the bids became public, there was no question of changing/adding/altering/modifying the same by any of the parties. ( 36 ) AFTER opening of the bids, the Expert Committee was required to carry out a comprehensive evaluation for arriving at the L1 bidder. The evaluation Committee while undertaking the said process, analyzed the bids of each of the vendors and sought clarifications from all the three vendors wherever felt necessary and also held meetings with each of them to enable them to furnish their clarifications. In so far as petitioner No. 1 was concerned, a meeting was held on 7th February, 2007, on which date, only two queries were raised on it, neither of which related to item No. 11. However, petitioner No. 1 while responding to the two queries raised by respondent No. 2, gave a written reply under cover of letter dated 7th february, 2007 where at the end of the response, it noted as below: "separate pricing sheets of FF, SKD and CKD which is breakup of the composite Price Schedule are enclosed for your ready reference. Enclosed please find the composite price schedule as well for ready reference in line with RFP requirements. Enclosed please find the composite price schedule as well for ready reference in line with RFP requirements. " ( 37 ) IN the composite price sheet in respect of item No. 11, as indicated in the statement reproduced in para 22 hereinabove, petitioner No. 1 endorsed the figure "1" in the column of "quantity", and while filling in the price in the column of "unit Price Euro" as also "total Price Euro", inserted the figure, "8,977. 34". It is relevant to note that the said composite price statement was at variance with the original Bill of Materials submitted by the petitioner No. 1 in respect of item No. 11 for the reason that, as indicated above, in the original Bill of Materials, in the column of "quantity", the petitioners had indicated "as required" and the column of "total Price Euro" was left blank by it. The petitioners have placed heavy reliance on the composite price schedule to state that there was no corelation of the quantity of 1200 given for Vehicular Mobile Stations, as specified in item No. 4. 1, with item No. 11 to state that the quantity against item No. 11 was never declared and further, that at best the respondent No. 2 could have bound the petitioner No. 1 down to the price indicated in the column "total Price Euro" indicated in the composite price schedule, but it could not have multiplied the rate given in the "unit Price" with the figure of 1200 which had resulted in absurdity. ( 38 ) WE find no force in the aforesaid submission, as any reference to or reliance upon the said composite price schedule submitted after opening of the commercial bids of all the vendors on an earlier date, is impermissible. Had respondent No. 2 taken the composite price schedule into consideration in respect of item No. 11, it would have created justifiable doubts in the minds of respondents No. 3 and 4 and defeated the rule of transparency and fairness on the part of respondent No. 2, as it would have amounted to improving the bid made originally by petitioner No. 1, by supplying details upon ascertaining the rates quoted by the others. It was not as if the respondent No. 2 had asked any of the vendors to furnish a composite price bid to it on 7. 2. 2007. It was not as if the respondent No. 2 had asked any of the vendors to furnish a composite price bid to it on 7. 2. 2007. Instead, perusal of the original records reflect that specific queries were put forward by respondent No. 2 to each of the three bidders wherever clarifications were required qua particular items in the bill of Materials submitted and other aspects of the bid. No query was raised by the respondent No. 2 on the petitioner No. 1 in respect of item No. 11. Hence, the question of taking into consideration the clarifications given thereon by petitioner No. 1 did not arise. ( 39 ) THUS, while taking note of the changes made by petitioner No. 1 in respect of item No. 11 in the composite price schedule, as against the original bill of Materials submitted, the former was not taken into consideration by the Committee. Instead, the Committee made a point to observe in its analysis that no technical explanation was given by the petitioners as to why the quantity had been changed by petitioner No. 1 from "as required" to "1" while the "unit Price" and "total Price" was kept as the same in the composite price schedule. Thus the Committee multiplied the unit price furnished by petitioner No. 1 with the figure 1200 to arrive at the total price, and the same method was uniformly adopted for the other two vendors. Looking at it from another angle, had the respondent No. 2 proceeded on the basis of the rate furnished by the petitioners in the composite price schedule in the column, "total Price Euro", then nothing could have precluded the petitioners from turning around later on, and seeking to bind respondent no. 2 down to the rates as offered by it for a single unit in the original Bill of Materials, the same being a part of the original tender documents. Thus, respondent No. 2 cannot be faulted for strictly adhering to the rates furnished by petitioner No. 1 in its original bid documents. ( 40 ) THE plea of petitioner No. 1 that the software at item No. 11 had no connection or relationship with Vehicular Mobile Stations as specified in items No. 4. Thus, respondent No. 2 cannot be faulted for strictly adhering to the rates furnished by petitioner No. 1 in its original bid documents. ( 40 ) THE plea of petitioner No. 1 that the software at item No. 11 had no connection or relationship with Vehicular Mobile Stations as specified in items No. 4. 1 and 7 is also not acceptable inasmuch as for the Vehicular mobile Stations to be operational and functional, they have to be attached to PC with software to enable a sending/receiving party to send/receive any speech/image, to/from another vehicular mobile. Thus all the three items mentioned at items No. 4, 7 and 11 were inter-connected and inter-related and only upon being integrated could they be used for the DRTS. In any case, nothing material would turn on this for the reason that originally, prices were quoted by all the three vendors for item No. 11 on a unit rate basis. The figure of 1200 cropped up much later. It is the common case of all the parties that commercial offers were to be made by all the vendors for quantities of 80 systems as per the Bill of Materials enclosed with the RFA. As no quantity was disclosed for item No. 11 in the Bill of Materials, none of the vendors quoted rates for any specific quantity, but did so only for a single unit. Thus the unit rate quoted remained the deciding factor for the committee, while finally analyzing the bids. ( 41 ) THE contention of the petitioners that they had a license for the software under which one software unit would serve 100 units of Vehicular mobile Terminals and as a result, the total requirement of software unit was only 12 (12x100=1200) and not 1200 (1x1200=1200), is misconceived and without any basis for the reason that a perusal of item No. 11 of the Bill of materials submitted by the petitioners does not show that any such remarks were made therefor. In fact, the remarks column in the said Bill of Materials was left blank. Had such been the intention of petitioner No. 1, nothing prevented it from indicating so in the remarks column. In fact, the remarks column in the said Bill of Materials was left blank. Had such been the intention of petitioner No. 1, nothing prevented it from indicating so in the remarks column. This conclusion is further fortified by the fact that remarks were specifically given by petitioner No. 1 in the remarks column of the Bill of Materials in respect of other items, wherein it made observations to indicate wherever the price of a particular item was included in another item or where the price quoted in respect of an item was exclusive of certain other items. Thus, if petitioner no. 1 wanted to offer the price of one unit which as per its contention, was good to serve 100 users, then the same should have been so indicated in the bill of Materials. There being no such indication in the original-hid documents, respondent No. 2 could not have been expected to assume dr. own that petitioner No. 1 possessed a license which permitted it to use the software mentioned at item No. 11 for serving 100 units. Nor can respondent no. 2 be blamed for using the multiplying factor of 1200 to arrive at the total price of units required under item No. 11. ( 42 ) THE petitioners have also not been able to establish that respondent no. 2 adopted a pick and choose policy or discriminated against petitioner no. 1. A perusal of the commercial evaluation report produced by respondent no. 2 in the course of arguments shows that respondent No. 2 dealt with all the three vendors with an even hand as the same method was adopted for arriving at the total price of materials specified in item No. 11 in respect of all the three vendors. Thus while respondent No. 3 offered the unit price of item No. 11 as Euro 70, by multiplying the said price with the figure of 1200 (being the quantity required), the total price of Euros 84000 was worked out by respondent No. 2. In the case of respondent No. 4, who had offered unit price of Euro 389, by multiplying with the figure of 1200, the total price arrived at was Euros 466800 and for the petitioners, while multiplying the unit price of Euros 8,977. 34 with the figure of 1200, the total unit price arrived at was Euros 107,728,08. In the case of respondent No. 4, who had offered unit price of Euro 389, by multiplying with the figure of 1200, the total price arrived at was Euros 466800 and for the petitioners, while multiplying the unit price of Euros 8,977. 34 with the figure of 1200, the total unit price arrived at was Euros 107,728,08. Adoption of the above method on the part of respondent No. 2 can by no stretch of imagination be termed as "padding" the bid of petitioner No. 1, nor can it be called an unwarranted addition to the prices quoted by petitioner No. 1. It is not the case of the petitioners that they had not quoted the said price as that of a single unit. There is nothing on record by way of any remarks in the bid document to the effect that the said price of a single unit was to hold good for 100 units on the ground that petitioner No. 1 was granted a software license which catered to 100 users at one time. A basic distinction has to be drawn between a case where against an item, no rates or prices or quantities are quoted, and those where some rate is quoted. Petitioner No. 1 having quoted a rate on a unit basis in respect of item No. 11, -respondent No. 2 had no option but to make the said rate the basis for arriving at the total price. Petitioner itself is responsible for the inadequacy in its bid and cannot lay the blame therefor at the door of respondent No. 2 under the garb of saving of revenue. In these circumstances, the plea of the petitioners that respondent No. 2 had grossly erred in processing the bids cannot be sustained. ( 43 ) PERMITTING such an interpretation as sought to be given by the petitioners would amount to re-writing the entries in the bid document and reading into the bid document, terms that did not exist therein. An international bidding of such a nature being highly competitive, is also expected to be extremely precise. The technical nature of the subject matter of the contract itself postulated assistance of technical experts and thus, a very high degree of care and meticulous adherence to the requirements of the bid was inherent in such a bidding. An international bidding of such a nature being highly competitive, is also expected to be extremely precise. The technical nature of the subject matter of the contract itself postulated assistance of technical experts and thus, a very high degree of care and meticulous adherence to the requirements of the bid was inherent in such a bidding. On its part, respondent No. 2 was under an obligati6n to not only maintain a great degree of transparency and fair dealing on its part, but was also expected to maintain the sanctity and integrity of the entire process. Thus it was incumbent upon respondent No. 2 to ensure that no different yardsticks were adopted for any of the vendors and at the same time, to ensure that there was not the remotest possibility of discrimination, arbitrariness or favouritism. ( 44 ) THERE was no scope for respondent No. 2 to read into the documents, terms and conditions which did not exist in the bid documents. The petitioners have also not levelled any personal allegations of malafides or favouritism against respondent No. 2. Similarly, a perusal of the records, particularly the analysis carried out by the Expert Committee shows that no relevant facts were left out by the said Committee, nor were irrelevant facts taken into consideration. Instead, the Committee went strictly by the rates quoted and terms and conditions as offered by the vendors in their Bill of Materials. There being no illegality, arbitrariness, irrationality or procedural impropriety on the part of respondent No. 2, we have no hesitation in concluding that the path followed by respondent No. 2 in analyzing the bids of all the three vendors was the only option available to it in the given circumstances. ( 45 ) LASTLY, the plea of the petitioners that their bid being much lower than that of respondent No. 3, public interest demanded that petitioner No. 1 ought to have been declared the successful bidder, needs to be addressed. In this context, reference is made to the following observations made by the supreme Court in the case of Patel Engineering Co. (supra): "para 31: The submission that remains to be considered is that as per the price bid of Respondents 1 to 4 is lesser by 40 crores and 80 crores than that of Respondents 11 and 10 respectively, public interest demands that the bid of Respondents 1 to 4 should be considered. (supra): "para 31: The submission that remains to be considered is that as per the price bid of Respondents 1 to 4 is lesser by 40 crores and 80 crores than that of Respondents 11 and 10 respectively, public interest demands that the bid of Respondents 1 to 4 should be considered. The project undertaken by the appellant is undoubtedly for the benefit of the public. The mode or execution of the work of the Project should also ensure that the public interest is best served. Tenders are invited on the basis of competitive bidding for execution of the work of the Project as it serves dual purposes. On the one hand it offers a fair opportunity to all those who are interested in competing for the contract relating to execution of the work and, on the other hand it affords the appellant a choice to select the best of the competitors on a competitive price without prejudice to the quality of the work. Above all, it eliminates favouritism and discrimination in awarding public public works to contractors. The contract is, therefore, awarded normally to the lowest tenderer which is in public interest. The principle of awarding contract to the lowest tenderer applies when all things are equal. It is equally in public interest to adhere to the rules and conditions subject to which bids are invited. Merely because a bid is lowest the requirements of compliance with the rules and conditions cannot be ignored. It is obvious that the bid of respondents 1 to 4 is the lowest of bids offered. As the bid documents of respondents 1 to 4 stand without correction there will be inherent inconsistency between the particulars given in the annexure and the total bid amount, it (sic they) cannot be directed to be considered along with the other bids on the sole ground of being the lowest. " (emphasis added) ( 46 ) IN the case of M/s. B. S. N. Joshi and Sons Ltd. (supra), the Supreme court held as under: "para 57: It may be true that a contract need not be given to the lowest tenderer but it is equally true that the employer is the best judge therefor; the same ordinarily being within its domain, court's interfer-ence in such matter should be minimal. The High Court's jurisdiction in such matters being limited in a case of this nature, the Court should normally exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the employer is apparent on the face of the record. Para 70: The employer concededly is not bound to accept a bid only because it is the lowest. It must take into consideration not only the viability but also the fact that the contractor would be able to discharge its contractual obligations. It must not forget the ground realities. . . Para 71: While saying so, however, we would like to observe that that having regard to the fact that a huge public money is involved, a public sector undertaking in view of the principles of good corporate governance may accept such tenders which is economically beneficial to it. It may be true that essential terms of the contract were required to be fulfilled. If a party failed and/or neglected to comply with the requisite conditions which were essential for consideration of its case by the employer, it cannot supply the details at a latter stage or quote a lower rate upon ascertaining the rate quoted by others. . . " ( 47 ) IN the present case, merely because the petitioners claim that their bid is the lowest, the same cannot automatically entitle them to be declared as the successful bidder, as respondent No. 2 had the right to refuse even the lowest bidder and a right to choose cannot be considered to be an exercise of arbitrary power as long as the procedure adopted in the decision making process is bonafide and based on objective considerations and so long as the decision is arrived at by taking into account the interest of the State and the public. ( 48 ) THE validity of the decision of the Expert Committee taken on the material available to it at the time of considering the tenders cannot be tested with reference to the subsequent offer made on behalf of the petitioners during the course of arguments that they were willing to supply the entire quantity in respect of item No. 11, at the rate mentioned under the head' "unit Price". This court is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Committee and nor can this Court, by relying on a subsequent offer made by the petitioners in the course of the writ proceedings, hold that the expert Committee was wrong in arriving at the conclusion that it did while finally analyzing the bids of all the vendors. ( 49 ) THE question for consideration before this court is as to whether the committee acted arbitrarily or irrationally in not accepting or evaluating the bid of the petitioners as the lowest. Having arrived at the conclusion that the decision making process adopted by the Respondent No. 2 was not ] malafide or intended to favour any one of the vendors and nor was the decision made so arbitrary or irrational as to deserve interference, a mere plea of public interest being adversely affected on account of difference in pricing cannot sway the Court. On the contrary, accepting such a plea may result in holding up the entire project as also result in unplanned escalation of the cost of the project which is specially designed to cater to the needs of the Indian Army. ( 50 ) IN these circumstances, interference in writ jurisdiction exercising the powers of judicial review in the present case is not warranted. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.