( 1 ) THE petitioner, at the relevant point of time working as a category one officer, is questioning the order of the Chairman and Managing Director, Food corporation of India dated March 28th, 2006 imposing on him "the penalty of 'censure' and 'token recovery of Rs. 5 lakhs'. " It was made under provisions of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971. ( 2 ) BY issuing a charge-sheet dated November 28th, 2005 the chairman and managing director initiated the disciplinary proceedings. It was alleged that during the period from July 15th, 1999 to January 21st, 2002 while functioning as District Manager, FCI, North Lakhimpur the petitioner had failed to work faithfully and honestly in the discharge of his duties, and that such failure resulted in abnormal storage loss and down gradation of rice stock resulting in financial loss to the corporation. He denied the correctness of the allegations by submitting reply dated January 25th, 2006. No inquiry was held, and the chairman and managing director, acting as the disciplinary authority, made the finalorder dated March 28th, 2006 straight imposing the above- noted punishment. The order was served on him at the time of his retirement on March 31st, 2006, the sum of rupees five lakh was recovered from his provident fund, gratuity, leave encashment, etc. He was not paid anything on account of retirement benefit. Feeling aggrieved he took out the present writ petition. ( 3 ) ON the strength of the Apex Court decision in Food Corporation of india, Hyderabad and Ors. v. A. Prahalada Rao and Am. , (2001)1 SCC 165 , and the provisions in regn. 60 (1) (b) of the regulations, Counsel for the petitioner submits that the punishment order is liable to be quashed on the sole ground that the authority made final order in the disciplinary proceedings without holding any regular inquiry in terms of provisions in regn. 58 and without forming and recording his opinion that such an inquiry was not necessary. He says that on this ground in a large number of cases this Court set aside the minor penalty orders made by the authorities of the corporation. This fact is not disputed by counsel for the corporation. 58 and without forming and recording his opinion that such an inquiry was not necessary. He says that on this ground in a large number of cases this Court set aside the minor penalty orders made by the authorities of the corporation. This fact is not disputed by counsel for the corporation. He also concedes that there is nothing to show that the chairman and managing director who made the final order had recorded his opinion in writing, before making the final order, that there was no need to hold a regular inquiry, though the petitioner had denied the correctness of the allegations made in the charge-sheet. ( 4 ) HIS contention is that provisions in regn. 60 (1) (b) did not cast any obligation on the authority to form and record any opinion before imposing a minor penalty dispensing with the requirement of holding a regular inquiry. He says that the apex Court, in the decision relied on by Counsel for the petitioner, did not hold that without forming and recording his opinion for dispensing with a regular inquiry the disciplinary authority would not be empowered to impose a minor penalty. His further contention is that the writ petition should be dismissed, since, though the petitioner was entitled to prefer an appeal against, the punishment order, he chose to approach the writ Court straight. He says that since the chairman and managing director made the final order, the petitioner was entitled to prefer appeal to the board. ( 5 ) IN my view, there is no reason to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner did not prefer any appeal. His disciplinary authority was the managing director, and the appellate authority was the chairman; but here the order imposing penalty was made by his appellate authority; nothing was indicated in the punishment order that he would be entitled to prefer an appeal to the board. I have not been shown any provision that since the appellate authority of the petitioner initiated the disciplinary proceedings and made the final order, he was entitled to prefer an appeal to the board. ( 6 ) IN any case, I do not think availability of remedy of appeal should be a ground to dismiss the writ petition at this distance of time. ( 6 ) IN any case, I do not think availability of remedy of appeal should be a ground to dismiss the writ petition at this distance of time. It was admitted, after hearing Counsel forthe corporation, on August 9th, 2006; the question of availability of alternative remedy was not taken at that point of time. I do not see any valid reason to entertain the plea at this belated stage, particularly when the petitioner raised the question of very authority of the chairman and managing director to impose the minor penalty without recording his opinion in writing regarding the necessity of holding a regular inquiry. The precise case of the petitioner is that the authority acted in patent violation of the provisions in regn. 60 (1) (b ). ( 7 ) IT is true that the charge-sheet had been issued under regn. 60, the relevant portions whereof are: " (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 50, no order imposing on an employee any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Regulation 54 shall be made except, after : (a) informing the employee in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal; (b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in Sub-regulation (3) to (23) of Regulation 58, in every case in which the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary;". The minor penalties specified in regn. 54 are: " (i) censure; (ii) withholding of his promotion; (iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders; (iv) withholding of increments of pay. " ( 8 ) PROVISIONS in regn. 60 read with regns. 54 and 59 (3) make it very clear that the disciplinary authority was not given such unfettered power as was exercised in this case. " ( 8 ) PROVISIONS in regn. 60 read with regns. 54 and 59 (3) make it very clear that the disciplinary authority was not given such unfettered power as was exercised in this case. Regulation 60 (2) said, "notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of Sub-regulation (1), if in a case it is proposed, after considering the representation, if any, made by the employee under clause (a) of the sub-regulation, to withhold increment of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of retirement benefits payable to the employee or to withhold increments of a pay for a period exceeding 3 years or to withhold increments of pay with cumulative effect for any period, an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in Sub-regulations (3) to (23) of Regulation 58 before making any order imposing on the employee any such penalty. " ( 9 ) REGULATION 59 (3] said, "if the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of Regulation 54 should be imposed on the employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 58, make an order imposing such penalty. " Thus even after holding inquiry, in a fit case only a minor penalty can be, or rather is to be, imposed. In a minor penalty action inquiry will be held when the authority is of the opinion that it is necessary. Before making the final order he is to decide whether in the case an inquiry is necessary; if not. He can proceed to make the final order. I am therefore unable to agree with Counsel for the corporation that the provisions in regn. 60 (1) (b) did not require the authority to record his opinion in writing regarding the necessity of holding a regular inquiry, when the petitioner had disputed the correctness of the allegations made in the charge-sheet. ( 10 ) IN the apex Court decision given to me their Lordships held that the provisions in regn. 60 (1 ) (b) cast a mandatory obligation on the disciplinary authority to form his opinion regarding the necessity of holding an inquiry. Here the admitted position is that without, forming and recording any opinion the authority just issued the punishment order. 60 (1 ) (b) cast a mandatory obligation on the disciplinary authority to form his opinion regarding the necessity of holding an inquiry. Here the admitted position is that without, forming and recording any opinion the authority just issued the punishment order. From the provisions it is clear that before imposing a minor penalty by making final order in the proceedings initiated for that the disciplinary must form an opinion regarding the necessity of holding an inquiry. His such opinion is not to be formed in the abstract; it is, to be recorded in writing, must form part of the proceedings; for his decision, taken in exercise of his discretion, that no inquiry is necessary in the case is subject to judicial review. I therefore hold that the impugned order, being illegal, cannot be sustained. ( 11 ) THE petitioner has already retired from service, and there is no scope to give liberty to the corporation to proceed further with the charge- sheet for holding a regular inquiry. It is significant to note that for no valid reason the corporation remained inactive in the matter, though the events allegedly happened years ago. It is only a few months before, the petitioner was to retire that, the corporation initiated the disciplinary proceedings. It is very difficult to countenance such an action taken by a statutory corporation which was under the obligation to act fairly and reasonably. I am unable to hold that its actions satisfy the elementary requirements of the rule of fairness in administrative actions. It ought not to have chosen a cruel way to bid farewell to the petitioner. ( 12 ) FOR these reasons, I set aside the impugned punishment, order dated March 28th, 2006 and order that the charge-sheet dated November 28th, 2005 shall be deemed to be dropped. I further order that all retirement benefits to which the petitioner became entitled shall be paid to him within three weeks from date of communication of this order, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum; interest shall be paid for the period from March 31st, 2006 to the date, of actual payment. Since I have granted interest. I am not inclined to make an order for costs, though I have no doubt that this is a fit case for making an order for exemplary costs. Since I have granted interest. I am not inclined to make an order for costs, though I have no doubt that this is a fit case for making an order for exemplary costs. Accordingly I order that there shall be no order for costs in the case.