JUDGMENT Hon’ble H.L. Gokhale, CJ.—The following questions are referred for the determination of this Bench : 1. Whether Rule 17 (1) (a) of the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 prohibits passing of a suspension order during the pendency of preliminary enquiry. 2. Whether the Division Bench judgment rendered in Kripa Shanker Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2004(1) ESC 33, lays down the correct law. 2. Inasmuch as the reference refers to Rule 17 (1) (a), we may quote the said Rule, which reads as follows : “17 (1)(a). A Police Officer against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the enquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority or by any other authority not below the rank of the Superintendent of Police, authorised by him in this behalf.” 3. The short facts leading to this reference are as follows : The appellant is a Sub-Inspector in the Civil Police. The appellant has been suspended by an order dated 9.2.2007. He challenged the suspension order. The order contains some serious allegations against the appellant. The order stated that a preliminary inquiry will be held, but in the meanwhile, the appellant was being suspended. The learned Judge has dismissed the writ petition by his order dated 27.2.2007, considering the nature of the charges. This order has led to the appellant filing the special appeal to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge. 4. Mr. Suneet Kumar learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the order of the learned Single Judge is contrary to the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Kripa Shanker Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2004(1) ESC 33. there the Division Bench had taken the view that a suspension order could not be passed during the pendency of preliminary inquiry (see para 13 of that judgment). 5. The Division Bench in Kripa Shanker Prasad’s case (supra) has placed reliance on an earlier judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, in which Rule 17 of the same Rules, was under consideration, i.e., Hari Nath Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, reported in 1997(3) ESC 1833. 5. The Division Bench in Kripa Shanker Prasad’s case (supra) has placed reliance on an earlier judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, in which Rule 17 of the same Rules, was under consideration, i.e., Hari Nath Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, reported in 1997(3) ESC 1833. The Division Bench has also referred to the judgment of the apex Court in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 ; Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and others v. Tarak Nath Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 823 and Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerathkhar v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1997 SC 2148 . The Division Bench had allowed the appeal accepting the contention of the appellant that the suspension cannot be ordered during the pendency of preliminary inquiry. 6. The referring Court was of the view that the opinion taken by the Division Bench in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra) required a reconsideration and hence, this reference has been made to this larger Bench. 7. The Division Bench in Kripa Shanker Prasad’s case (supra) had referred to a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Hari Nath Sharma (supra). That was a writ petition, wherein a preliminary inquiry was already held against the petitioner and thereafter he was issued an order of suspension, which was challenged by filing a writ petition, which came before the learned Single Judge. As far as the order suspending the petitioner was concerned, it did not disclose that a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against the petitioner. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that a preliminary inquiry had been held and the petitioner had been found guilty and, therefore, the order of suspension had been issued in contemplation of the inquiry. It was further contended that the order of suspension had been issued under the above Rule 17 (1) (a) and by reason of the order of suspension, it is presumed that the inquiry is contemplated. The learned Single Judge, in para-7 of his order, held that mere passing of an order under Rule 17 (1)(a) did not absolve the respondents from indicating the formation of opinion that the order had been passed in contemplation of an inquiry, without indicating the same in the order itself. For that reason, he interfered into the order of suspension. 8. For that reason, he interfered into the order of suspension. 8. The Division Bench, which decided the Kripa Shanker Prasad’s case (supra), referred to the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. District Traffic Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, Katihar, AIR 1960 SC 992 . That was a case, where a statutory departmental inquiry had been held into a railway accident at a level crossing in order to find out as to who was responsible for that accident. The appellant, who was working as an Assistant Station Master at the same place and the pointsman were held responsible in that inquiry. On that basis itself, the appellant was served with a notice to show cause as to why penalty for reduction in rank should not be imposed. The Apex Court held that the statutory inquiry was not directed against the appellant as such, and it was necessary that he should have been given a chance to show his innocence by holding an inquiry in respect of the charge that he was responsible for the accident. That had not been done in that matter. The Apex Court held that the findings reached by the enquiry committee, as a result of the statutory inquiry, cannot be said to be findings made against the appellant in a departmental inquiry made against him for alleged neglect of duty or violation of the statutory rules. 9. The next judgment referred by the Division Bench was in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah (supra). That was a case of termination of a temporary Government servant under Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. The issue, which has been raised in the present case, did not fall for consideration before the Apex Court in that matter as also in the earlier case of Amalendu Ghosh (supra). In para-11 of the judgment, the Apex Court specifically stated that before considering the facts of the case, it would like to make certain general observations in connection with the disciplinary proceedings. In para-11 of the judgment, the Apex Court specifically stated that before considering the facts of the case, it would like to make certain general observations in connection with the disciplinary proceedings. While discussing this aspect, the Apex Court observed that a preliminary inquiry is held for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and the work of a Government servant and, that a preliminary inquiry is usually held to determine whither a prima facie case for a formal departmental inquiry is made out and it is very necessary that the preliminary inquiry and regular inquiry should not be confused. 10. Then the Division Bench, deciding Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra), referred to the judgment in the case of Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and others v. Tarak Nath Ghosh (supra). The respondent, in that matter, was a Deputy Superintendent of Police at Ranchi in Bihar. There was serious allegation of corruption and malpractice against him, and the inquiry made by the Government into those allegations revealed that there was a prima facie case. By recording these facts, an order was issued stating that a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated and, therefore, the respondent was placed under suspension. It was this order, which was under challenge. The relevant Rule-7 (1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules (1995), read as follows : “Suspension during disciplinary proceedings.—(1) If having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the Service against whom such proceedings are started that Government may— (a) if the member of the Service is serving under it pass an order placing him under suspension, or (b) if the member of the Service is serving under another Government, request that Government to ;place him under suspension, pending the conclusion of the inquiry and the passing of the final order in the case : Provided that in cases where there is a difference of opinion between two State Government, the matter shall be referred to the Central Government whose decision thereon shall be final.” The Apex court, in terms, held as follows : “Rule 7 of the Service Rules expressly provides for suspension of a member of the Service for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. When serious allegations of misconduct are imputed against a member of a Service normally it would not be desirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. If the disciplinary authority takes note of such allegations and is of opinion after some preliminary enquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation to be made before definite charges can be framed, it would not be improper to remove the officer concerned from the sphere of his activity inasmuch as it may be necessary to find out facts from people working under him of look into papers which are in his custody and it would be embarrassing and inopportune both for the officer concerned as well as to those whose duty it was to make the enquiry to do so while the officer was present at the spot.” 11. The next judgment referred in Kripa Shanker Prasad’s case (supra), was Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerathkhar v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra). In that matter, the allegation against the petitioner was that he had misappropriated certain amounts. The findings recorded by all the authorities confirmed this and the disciplinary authority removed him from service. The apex Court did not find any error in that order. Thereafter it was contended before the Apex Court that the preliminary inquiry had not been conducted properly and, therefore, the inquiry was vitiated by principles of natural justice. In this context, the Apex Court, observed that the preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with inquiry conducted after the issue of the charge-sheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary inquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. After a full-fledged inquiry was held, the preliminary inquiry had lost its importance. 12. There are few other judgments of some other Judges of this Court on this Rule 17, which were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench, which decided Kripa Shanker Prasad. Thus, there is a judgment in Tej Pal Singh v. Deputy Director General of Police, P.A.C., 1999 (2) ESC 1372 (All), where a view similar to one Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra) was taken, namely that at the stage when only preliminary inquiry had been directed, the suspension was nor justified. There are two other judgments, however, to the contrary. Thus, there is a judgment in Tej Pal Singh v. Deputy Director General of Police, P.A.C., 1999 (2) ESC 1372 (All), where a view similar to one Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra) was taken, namely that at the stage when only preliminary inquiry had been directed, the suspension was nor justified. There are two other judgments, however, to the contrary. One is in the case of M.B. Yadav v. State of U.P., 2001 (1) LBESR 288 , wherein it was held that the punishing authority can adopt the appropriate course, keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct alleged even without a preliminary inquiry. Similarly, in Constable C.P. 117 Yad Ali and others v. Superintendent of Police, Chandaoli and another, 2001(1) ESC 152 (All). The learned Single Judge considered all earlier cases including the one in Hari Nath Sharma (supra). The learned Judge, in terms, held that even without a preliminary inquiry, suspension can be ordered, if the disciplinary authority feels so satisfied, or convinced. In sub-paras (13, 14, 15 and 16) of para-28, the learned Judge held as follows : “28. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court, as discussed above, may be stated in a condensed form for the sake of clarity and future guidance of the appointing / disciplinary authority concerned dealing with the matters of Government servants, particularly in relation to orders of suspension, pending enquiry or in contemplation thereof or during investigation, enquiry or trial of a criminal charge. (13) It is a rule of prudence that the disciplinary authority should await the result of the preliminary enquiry before passing an order of suspension but it is not an inflexible rule of law. Since suspension is not a punishment but is only one way of forbidding from disobeying to discharge of duties by an employee of the office or post held by him, an order of suspension, even without a preliminary enquiry, may be passed to refrain the delinquent employee to avail further opportunity to prepare the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruit and the offending employee would get away even pending inquiry without any indictment. There may be cases where an employee may be suspended to prevent an opportunity to scuttle the enquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or enquiry etc. (14) The discretion of the disciplinary authority to suspend an employee pending enquiry or in contemplation of enquiry cannot be taken away by prescribing a straitjacket formula. Each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations gravity of the situation and the indelible impact which creates in the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry or investigation. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or enquiry. (15) Even without a preliminary enquiry, if the disciplinary authority feels satisfied or convinced that the accusations against a delinquent employee are trustworthy, substantial and serious enough and with a view to maintain discipline, it is necessary to suspend him, he shall brooke no delay to pass an order of interim suspension in public interest. (16) The decision of Tejpal Singh’s case (supra) cannot be stretched to the unreasonable length that without receipt of the preliminary enquiry report an employee in no circumstance can be suspended in spite of the fact that the expression ‘enquiry’ occurring in the Rules of 1991 means a regular departmental enquiry.” 13. The Counsel for the appellant firstly referred to para 10 of the judgment in Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers Union, (AIR1959 SC 1342) to submit that the power to suspend is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be a creature of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. In the present case, that problem does not arise since the power is very much reserved in the concerned rule. We are concerned with the stage at which it is permissible to exercise it. Here, the rule very much lays down that a police officer against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or proceeding, may be placed under suspension. As far as the second part of this provision is concerned, namely, a police officer may be suspended where an inquiry is proceeding, there is not much controversy. Here, the rule very much lays down that a police officer against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or proceeding, may be placed under suspension. As far as the second part of this provision is concerned, namely, a police officer may be suspended where an inquiry is proceeding, there is not much controversy. That is clearly laid down by the Apex Court in Tarak Nath Ghosh (supra). 14. The question, which comes up for our consideration, is with respect to the earlier part of the provision, namely, as to what is the connotation of the phrase ‘when an inquiry is contemplated’? Does the term ‘enquiry’ cover only a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry or also a preliminary inquiry? Does it mean that an officer cannot be placed under suspension unless preliminary inquiry is first held? Is it impermissible to place an officer under suspension before holding a preliminary inquiry, as held by the Division Bench in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra)? Kripa Shanker Prasad’s case (supra) has, in terms held that a police suspension order cannot be passed during or before conducting a preliminary inquiry. However, as we have noted above, no such proposition has been laid down by the Apex Court in any of the cases, which were referred to in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra). 15. The wording of the Rule is also clear, inasmuch as it provides for a suspension in a situation where an inquiry is contemplated. The judgment in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra) has read the word ‘inquiry’ to mean only a full-fledged departmental inquiry. No such specific provision has been made in the relevant rule. The question is, was the Division Bench right in reading any such provision in that rule. Can such a fetter be read or implied into the rule, when the rule itself does not specifically so provide? The term ‘contemplation’ is quite a wide term. Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, amongst others defines ‘contemplation’ as a deliberation on something to be done. The Oxford Dictionary gives four different shades of meaning of the verb to contemplate’. They are as follows: (1) to survey with the eyes, or in mind, (2) to regard an event as possible, (3) to intend, to have as one’s purpose, and (4) to meditate. The Oxford Dictionary gives four different shades of meaning of the verb to contemplate’. They are as follows: (1) to survey with the eyes, or in mind, (2) to regard an event as possible, (3) to intend, to have as one’s purpose, and (4) to meditate. When a disciplinary authority contemplates holding of an inquiry, it may take variety of steps, which may include collecting material for finding out the nature and details of the allegations. For that purpose, a preliminary inquiry can certainly be held, but as the rule stands, can it be read to mean that an officer cannot be suspended before a preliminary inquiry. It is also to be noted that a preliminary inquiry and the full-fledged departmental inquiry are not be confused with each other as observed in the case of Amalendu Ghosh (supra). It is undoubtedly true that on most of the occasions suspension may not be required before holding of a preliminary inquiry. At the same time, we cannot ignore that there may be occasions when suspension may be necessary even before a preliminary inquiry is initiated. 16. The Rule provides that when an inquiry is contemplated, an officer may be suspended. It will have to mean and include the power to suspend an officer when an inquiry is intended or thought of as the likely possibility. The moment appointing authority or superior officer takes into their contemplation conducting of an inquiry, the rule will have to be held as permitting them to suspend the police officer. Any reading contrary thereto, will mean adding the words into the rule, which will result into restricting the powers, which are otherwise provided in the rule. The rules of interpretation do not permit us to add the words or to read them into the rule if the rule otherwise contains a clear provision. Therefore, if a rule specifically permits suspending of an officer when an inquiry is contemplated, surely the rule cannot be read down that it will be confined only to a full-fledged departmental inquiry and/or to read that a suspension is not available before conducting a preliminary inquiry. The view taken in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra), on the face of it, therefore, runs contrary to the straight reading of the Rule and the idea underlined therein. 17. Besides, an authority’s power to appoint always includes therein the power to suspend. The view taken in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra), on the face of it, therefore, runs contrary to the straight reading of the Rule and the idea underlined therein. 17. Besides, an authority’s power to appoint always includes therein the power to suspend. That is, of course, subject to the rules in that behalf. It will not be out of place to mention that Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, specifically provides that power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss. This Section provides as follows: “16. Power to appoint to include power to suspend or dismiss.—Where, by any [Central Act] or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having [for the time being] power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed [whether by itself or any other authority in exercise of that power.” In para 11 of R.P. Kapur v. Union of India ( AIR 1964 SC 787 ), a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has referred to this section specifically while upholding the suspension of the appellant pending his prosecution. We may as well mention that in the case of The Manager, Govt. Branch Press and another v. D.B. Belliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 , the Apex Court, again observed at the end of para 18 “moreover, according to the principle underlying Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, the expression ‘appointment’ used in Article 16 (1) will include termination of or removal from service also”. That was in the context of a Civil Appeal concerning termination of a temporary Government servant and the Apex Court observed that expression appointment’ used in Article 16 (1) includes termination of or removal from service also. That will equally cover the power to suspend. 18. We may mention in this behalf that in State of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, 1947 ALJ 282 (decided on 25th of February, 1974), The construction of a similar Rule No. 49-A of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules came up for consideration before a Bench of three Judges. The Full Bench took the view that the word ‘inquiry’ occurring in Rule 49-A, cannot be construed as covering both the inquiries, i.e., the preliminary fact finding inquiry as well as formal inquiry to be held subsequently under Rule 55. The Full Bench took the view that the word ‘inquiry’ occurring in Rule 49-A, cannot be construed as covering both the inquiries, i.e., the preliminary fact finding inquiry as well as formal inquiry to be held subsequently under Rule 55. Therefore, a suspension could not be passed before the preliminary fact finding inquiry was conducted. The order of suspension, pending an inquiry came to be quashed in a few cases thereafter based on this interpretation by a number of learned Single Judges. When Special Appeals against those judgments were preferred, they were placed before a Bench of Five Judges, which had a re-look at that Rule 49-A in its judgment rendered on 11th of November, 1974. This is in the case of State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1947 ALJ 862. 19. Before we refer to the proposition laid down, we may mention that the relevant Rule-49-A reads as follows: “A Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or is proceeding, may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority : Provided that in the case of any Government servant or class of Government servants, not belonging to a State service the appointing authority may delegate its power under this rule to the next lower authority. N.B. As a rule, suspension should not be recorded to unless the allegations against the Government servant are so serious that in the event of their being established, they may ordinarily be expected to warrant his dismissal, removal or reduction. Suspension, where deemed necessary, should, as far as possible, immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication to the Government servant charged.” As stated in Jai Singh Dixit’s case, Rule 1-A of the U.P. Punishment and Appeal Rules has been similarly worded. The Note below Rule 49-A of the C.C.A. Rules was deleted under Notification No. 16/111-1973-Apptt. (3) dated March 23, 1974, and the Note below Rule 1-A of the Punishment and Appeal Rules under Notification No. 18/111-1973 (3) Apptt. (3) dated March, 23, 1974, and in both the cases, the deletion was to take effect from October 29, 1968. 20. The Bench, by majority took a view contrary to the view in Jawahar Lal Bhargava’s case (supra). D.S. Mathur, C.J., observed as follows in paragraphs 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 : “33. (3) dated March, 23, 1974, and in both the cases, the deletion was to take effect from October 29, 1968. 20. The Bench, by majority took a view contrary to the view in Jawahar Lal Bhargava’s case (supra). D.S. Mathur, C.J., observed as follows in paragraphs 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 : “33. The proper meaning which can be assigned to the word “contemplate” used in Rule 49-A or in Rule 1-A therefore, is to have in view ‘to expect’, take into account as a contingency’. Therefore, whenever it is in the mind of the appointing authority that in due course a formal departmental inquiry shall be held or there exits a contingency for such an inquiry, one can say that a formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. It is, however, necessary that there should be application of mind, in the eye of law, in good faith, and not arbitrarily. 34. A formal departmental inquiry is invariably preceded by an informal preliminary inquiry which itself can be in two phases. There can be a summary investigation to find out if the allegations made against the Government servant have any substance. Such investigation or inquiry is followed by a detailed preliminary or fact finding inquiry whereafter final decision is taken whether to initiate disciplinary proceeding. The first preliminary inquiry may be in the shape do secret inquiry and the other, of an open inquiry. In the alternative, when complaints containing serious allegations against a Government servant are received, the authority may peruse the records to satisfy itself if a more detailed preliminary inquiry be made. 35. In many instances the appointing authority will be in a position to form an opinion after the summary investigation, secret inquiry or inspection of records that the allegations made against the Government servant have substance and in due course formal departmental action shall be taken against him. These all would be cases covered by Rule 49-A, i.e., cases where formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. 36. In a few cases it may be possible for the appointing authority to form such an opinion at an earlier stage also., i.e., at the stage of receiving or entertaining a complaint. These also shall be cases where it can be said, in good faith, that formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. 37. 36. In a few cases it may be possible for the appointing authority to form such an opinion at an earlier stage also., i.e., at the stage of receiving or entertaining a complaint. These also shall be cases where it can be said, in good faith, that formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. 37. To put it in brief, a departmental inquiry is contemplated when on objective consideration of the material the appointing authority considers the case as one which would lead to a departmental inquiry, irrespective of whether any preliminary inquiry, summary or detailed, has or has not been made or if made, is not complete. There can, therefore,, be suspension pending inquiry even before a final decision is taken to initiate the disciplinary proceeding, i.e., even before the framing of the charge and the communication thereof to the Government servant.” (Emphasis supplied) The Counsel for the appellant had referred to the majority judgment of the Apex Court in P.R. Nayak v. Union of India ( AIR 1972 SC 554 ). The Court was concerned with Rule 3 (1) of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, which reserved power for suspension to the Government, which initiates disciplinary proceeding. The majority took the view that initiation of disciplinary proceeding was condition precedent to suspension. In para 32 of Jai Singh Dixit (supra), the majority judgment noted that Rule 49-A or 1-A was not under consideration before the Apex Court in P.R. Nayak (supra). In para 32 a reference was made to para 15 of P.R. Nayak (supra), where there is a discussion about the legislative scheme and the following statement. ‘It does not suggest that suspension can be ordered merely when the disciplinary proceeding is contemplated’. The judgment in Jai Singh Dixit (supra) specifically noted that the two provisions were different. Satish Chandra, J. writing the separate concurring judgment, observed as follows in paragraph 70 : “70. In this view, the word ‘contemplated’ occurring in the phrase ‘inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding’ must refer to a stage earlier than when the inquiry is proceeding. The term contemplated means ‘to have in view’, ‘expected’, ‘to take into account as a contingency’. A person can have an inquiry in view, or expect an inquiry before he decides to hold it. The term contemplated means ‘to have in view’, ‘expected’, ‘to take into account as a contingency’. A person can have an inquiry in view, or expect an inquiry before he decides to hold it. This also corroborates the interpretation that the word ‘contemplated’ occurring in the phrase ‘inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding’ points to a stage when the inquiry is suspected; that is, prior to the taking of the decision to hold the inquiry. We are unable to share the view expressed by the Full Bench in J.L. Bhargava’s case that the word contemplated is equivalent to decide.” 21. In view of what is stated above, it is clear that the phrase ‘when an inquiry is contemplated’ will have to be read as meaning that an inquiry is under consideration or is thought of or is proposed. It cannot mean that a decision to hold an inquiry is arrived at. After that decision is arrived at, undoubtedly, a full-fledged departmental inquiry follows. Therefore, the phrase ‘an inquiry is contemplated’ will cover an earlier stage. It will certainly cover a stage when even a preliminary inquiry is under consideration. A preliminary inquiry cannot be excluded from the term ‘inquiry’ as covered under this clause. That would place a fetter on the powers of the administration. As noted earlier, the authorities may be confronted with various situations and they ought to have the freedom to deal with those situations. It will be for them to decide what steps they ought to take. The authorities may, undoubtedly, initiate a preliminary inquiry, or may even be required to resort to suspension while initiating a preliminary investigation. It cannot be said that the authorities will hold the preliminary investigation or inquiry for quite sometime, allow the officer concerned, about whom there are serious grievances, to function in the meanwhile and thereafter will decide to suspend. Such restriction is not contemplated under the Rules. 22. In the circumstances, we answer the two questions, referred to for our determination as follows : (1) Rule 17 (1) (a) of the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, does not prohibit passing of a suspension order during the pendency of a preliminary inquiry. (2) The Division Bench judgment rendered in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra), does not lay down the correct law. 23. (2) The Division Bench judgment rendered in Kripa Shanker Prasad (supra), does not lay down the correct law. 23. In view of this decision, the matter may be placed before the Division Bench, for a decision in accordance with this opinion. ———