Judgment R.M. Lodha, J.-On 08.05.1991, the present petitioner (for short, the employer) issued an order appointing the present Respondent No. 1 (for short, the employee) to the post of Safaiwala in the scale of 750-12-870-EB-14,940. The appointment letter mentions that his appointment was against temporary post but likely to be made permanent. The appointment letter provided that he appointee would make declaration as per Schedule I annexed thereto and that his appointment was subject to the character and antecedent verification by the District Magistrate. Pursuant thereto, the employee gave declaration in Schedule I. Against the column, as to whether he has been fined by any Court, the employee mentioned No. So also against the column, as to whether any criminal offence has been proved against him before the Court, the employee mentioned No. 2. For the verification of the employees character and antecedents, the matter was referred to the office of District Magistrate. The District Magistrate referred the matter pertaining to the employees character and antecedents to the police authorities who found that criminal challan against the employee was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 12 (380/90) on 111.1990 for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said criminal case, as regards the offence under Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code, the offence was compounded. In respect of the offence punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, a fine of Rs. 300/-was imposed by the said Court open the employee. Thus, the employer got the report from the Office of the District Magistrate that the employee has concealed facts regarding the aforesaid criminal case. Upon receipt of the report from the office of District Magistrate on 211.1992, the employee was issued notice on 01.02.1993, by the employer informing him that he concealed the material fact of Criminal Case No. 380 of 1990 wherein a fine of Rs. 300/-was imposed on him for the offence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He was asked to show cause within three days of the said letter, failing which he was warned that appropriate action would be taken against him. 3. Upon receipt of the notice dated 01.02.1993, the employee sent his reply. 300/-was imposed on him for the offence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He was asked to show cause within three days of the said letter, failing which he was warned that appropriate action would be taken against him. 3. Upon receipt of the notice dated 01.02.1993, the employee sent his reply. His explanation was that being an illiterate person he was not aware as to what information was required to be given by him concerning his character and antecedents. He did not commit any offence involving moral turpitude. As regards offence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code and imposition of fine, he stated that did not make his ineligible in the government service. 4. Upon receipt of the employees reply, the employer by the order dated 10.1994 terminated his service. 5. The order dated 10.1994 was challenged by the employee before the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short, the Tribunal). 6. The Tribunal allowed the original application by its order 25.01.2001 holding that the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India were not followed; the order being stigmatic without following the provisions of Article 311(2), the petitioners service could not have been terminated. It is this order which is impugned in the present writ petition at the instance of the employer. 7. That the employee was governed by Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 is not disputed before us. Rule 5(1) thereof provides that the services of a temporary government servant may be terminated at any time by a notice in writing, the period of such notice shall be one month. It also provides that the services of such temporary government servant can also be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice. 8. That the employees appointment was against temporary post and, thus, he was temporary government servant, is an admitted position. It may also be noticed here that the appointment order mentions that his appointment was on probation for a period of two years which could be extended for a further period of two years. That the employees appointment has been brought to an end during the probation period is also not in dispute. 9. It may also be noticed here that the appointment order mentions that his appointment was on probation for a period of two years which could be extended for a further period of two years. That the employees appointment has been brought to an end during the probation period is also not in dispute. 9. As noticed above, the Tribunal found that the order dated 10.1994 was stigmatic and, therefore, without following the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the order of termination was bad in law. The question for consideration before us : "is the order dated 10.1994 stigmatic warranting compliance of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India?" 10. The Counsel for both the sides cited good number of decisions in support of their respective contentions. We do not deem it necessary to burden this order by referring to all the cases cited at the bar. Reference to the few decisions which have surveyed the entire case law shall suffice. 11. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGO of Medical Sciences & Anr., 2002 (1) SCC 520 , the Supreme Court surveyed its decisions namely (1) Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 ; (2) State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 ; (3) Benjamin (A.G.) vs. Union of India, 1967 LLJ 718(SC);(4) Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1974(2) SCC 831 ; (5) S.P. Vasudeva vs. Union of India, 1976 (1) SCC 236 ; State of U.P. vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991 (1) SCC 691 ; (6) Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Limited, 1999 (2) SCC 21 ; (7) Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, 1999 (3) SCC 60 ; (8) V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab, 2000 (3) SCC 239 ; (9) Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P., 2000 (5) SCC 152 ; (10) H.F. Sangati vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, 2001 (3) SCC 117 and; (11) Krishnadevaraya Education Trust vs. L.A. Balakrishna, 2001 (9) SCC 319 and culled out the legal position in Paragraphs 28 and 29 thus : "28. Therefore, whenever a probationer challenges his termination the Courts first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the "form" test. Therefore, whenever a probationer challenges his termination the Courts first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the "form" test. If the order survives this examination the "substance" of the termination will have to be found out. 29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a probationers appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states that is implicit in every order of termination of a probationers appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decision cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job". 12. In the case of Abhijit Gupta vs. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences & Ors., 2006 (4) SCC 469 , the Supreme Court again referred to some of its decisions, particularly, Parshotam Lal Dhingra, Dipti Prakash Banerjee and Pavanendra Narayan Verma and held in Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the report thus : "14. The real test to be applied in a situation where an employee is removed by an innocuous order of termination is : Is he discharged as unsuitable or is he punished for his misconduct? In Allahabad Bank Officers Association vs. Allahabad Bank, this Court was considering a challenge to a compulsory retirement and formulated a practical test to answer the question posed above. This Court (vide Para 17) observed that if the order of compulsory retirement from the service casts a stigma in the sense that it contains a statement casting aspersion on his conduct or his character, then it can be treated as an order of punishment but not if it merely amounts to highlighting the unsuitability of the employee. This Court (vide Para 17) observed that if the order of compulsory retirement from the service casts a stigma in the sense that it contains a statement casting aspersion on his conduct or his character, then it can be treated as an order of punishment but not if it merely amounts to highlighting the unsuitability of the employee. As pointed out in this Judgment , expressions like "want of application", "lack of potential" and "found not dependable" when made in relation to the work of the employee would not be sufficient to attract the charge that they are stigmatic and intended to dismiss the employee from service. 15. Thelearned Counsel for the appellant, however, strongly contends that the "stigma" cast on the employee may not be confined to his personal character but may also affect his capacity to work. The test, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted, is that, if what is stated in the order of termination is read by a future employer, it prejudices the future employment of the employee. In the fact of the law laid down in the Judgment just referred, we are unable to accept this as the correct test". 13. In a recent decision in the case of Jai Singh vs. Union of India & Ors., 2006 (9) SCC 717 , the Supreme Court again had an occasion to consider the cases of Dipti Prakash Banerjee and Pavanendra Narayan Verma and explained as to when an order of termination can be treated simplicitor and when it can be treated as punitive and when stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during the period of probation. We extract Para 9 of the report as it is : "9. . . . . The question whether the termination of service is simpliciter or punitive has been examined in several cases e.g. Dhananjay vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad and Mathew P. Thomas vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. . . . . The question whether the termination of service is simpliciter or punitive has been examined in several cases e.g. Dhananjay vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad and Mathew P. Thomas vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. The recent two decisions of this Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences and Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences after survey of most of the earlier decisions touching the question observed as to when an order of termination can be treated as simpliciter and when it can be treated as punitive and when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during the period of probation. The learned Counsel on either sides referred to and relied on these decisions either in support of their respective contentions or to distinguish them for the purpose of application of the principles stated therein to the facts of the present case. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee after referring to various decisions it was indicated as to when a simple order of termination is to be treated as founded on the allegations of misconduct and when complaints could be only as a motive for passing such a simple order of termination. In Para 21 of the said Judgment a distinction is explained thus : (SCC Pages 71-72) "21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as founded on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquiry into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid". Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquiry into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid". From a long line of decision it appears to us that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a time the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categories or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service". 14. Without multiplying the authorities, that in our view is unnecessary. It is clearly established position in law that to find out as to whether an order of termination is simplicitor or punitive, the due regard has to be given to the facts and circumstances obtaining in a particular case. It is on overall consideration of the facts and the context it has to be found as to whether the order on its face is stigmatic by applying the form test. If the order survives the form test, the substance of the termination will have to be found out. 15. It would be proper to refer to the order dated 10.1994 at this stage. For better appreciation, we have given number to the Paragraphs. It reads thus : 16. Paragraph 1 of the said order refers to the employees appointment order dated 08.05.1991; the condition contained in Paragraph 8(1) and the information given by him in Paragraph 12 of the declaration. Paragraph 2 refers to the report received from the Additional District Magistrate disclosing that the employee was involved in criminal case No. 251 of 1990 wherein by the decision given by the criminal Court, on 111.1990, he was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code and that he concealed the said fact. Paragraph 3 refers to the notice dated 01.02.1993 given by the employer to the employee and the reply dated 11.02.1993 received from the employee. Paragraph 3 refers to the notice dated 01.02.1993 given by the employer to the employee and the reply dated 11.02.1993 received from the employee. Paragraph 4 thereof records that the reply received from the employee was not found satisfactory and that he made wrong declaration and thus, was guilty of a criminal act and second appointment wrongly. The last Paragraph (5) records that reserving their right to take criminal action against the employee, the services of the employee are terminated and the employment shall come to an end on expiry of one month. How can such order be said to be stigmatic when it only re cords facts starting from issuance of the appointment order dated 08.05.1991 upto the receipt of his reply and that his reply was found unsatisfactory. The facts mentioned in the order dated 10.1994 are only intended to reflect that the employee was not suitable for continuation in the employment as he secured his employment wrongly by giving wrong information about the criminal case. The order of termination is neither founded on misconduct nor it is motivated by the delinquents misconduct. We, thus, find that the Central Administrative Tribunal seriously erred in holding that the order dated 10.1994 was stigmatic and that it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 17. We, accordingly, set aside the order dated 25.01.2001, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench. The Original Application No. 551 of 1994 filed by the Respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.