Judgment 1. Two Co-operative Societies were amalgamated. In view of such amalgamation, the erstwhile Managing Committees of these two amalgamated Societies could not function. In such situation an order was issued appointing an Administrator to take charge of the amalgamated Co-operative Societies. The Managing Committee of one of the Co-operative Societies so amalgamated whose terms had not by then expired, filed a writ petition and thereby sought the decision to appoint the Administrator to be quashed. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Against the order of dismissal, an appeal was preferred. Before the Appellate Court it was pointed out that while the learned Single Judge dealing with the writ petition proceeded on the basis that no challenge has been thrown to the amalgamation of those two Cooperative Societies, but, in fact, a challenge thereto has been thrown in a writ petition. Having regard to such contention, the appeal was disposed of by an order as follows: "In that view of the matter everything depends upon the decision of that case. If the amalgamation order is quashed by the Court then the Managing Committee of the Society will be treated to be in existence and they will manage the affairs in accordance with the provision of the Act and in case of an adverse order, the question of appointment of an Administrator will arise. Accordingly, with the aforesaid observation, this appeal stands disposed of." 2. The applicant herein was neither a party to the aforementioned writ petition for was a party to the aforementioned appeal. He filed an independent writ petition seeking a direction for appointing an Administrator for managing the amalgamated society. On the said writ petition I passed an order and thereby issued a direction for appointment of an Administrator. Subsequent thereto by filing a review application, the respondents to the said writ petition brought to my notice the order of the Appellate Court as quoted above. In view of the said order of the Appellate Court, I recalled the order directing appointment of the Administrator and restored the writ petition. The writ petition is since then pending. 3. Subsequent thereto by filing a review application, the respondents to the said writ petition brought to my notice the order of the Appellate Court as quoted above. In view of the said order of the Appellate Court, I recalled the order directing appointment of the Administrator and restored the writ petition. The writ petition is since then pending. 3. By the instant application, the applicant is seeking review of my order by which I recalled the direction for appointing the Administrator and restoring the writ petition to its file on the ground that inasmuch as the Appellate Court did not interfere with the decision to appoint the Administrator, which was the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition and which matter came before the Appellate Court, there was no impediment on my directing appointment of an Administrator. 4. In order to support the above contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner is seeking to rely upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sheo Kumari Devi, reported in (1986) PLJR 743. In that case the Court was concerned with the effect of an order dismissing a Special Leave Petition in limine by the Honble Supreme Court. Dismissal of a Special Leave Petition does not tantamount to dismissal of an appeal. Only when a Special Leave Petition is allowed, the Appeal before the Honble Supreme Court is registered. The moment the Honble Supreme Court refuses to grant Special Leave to appeal, it denotes that it has decided to refuse to exercise its discretionary power to accept an appeal before it. User of such discretion one way or the other does not touch the merit of the matter. 5. In the matter of preferring a Letters Patent Appeal, the Appellate Court has no discretion whatsoever not to allow a litigant to prefer such appeal. It may allow the appeal or may dismiss the appeal. When it would allow the appeal or would dismiss the same, it can do so only on merits of the matter. A decision rendered thereby is binding inter se the parties. 6. In the instant case, the Division Bench by the order quoted above made it abundantly clear that question of appointment of an Administrator will arise only when the challenge thrown to the order of amalgamation is defeated. A decision rendered thereby is binding inter se the parties. 6. In the instant case, the Division Bench by the order quoted above made it abundantly clear that question of appointment of an Administrator will arise only when the challenge thrown to the order of amalgamation is defeated. An order passed by the Division Bench in relation to the selfsame subject is not only binding on the parties, but also binds a Single Judge. He cannot pass an order contrary thereto and accordingly I had no other option but to recall the order directing appointment of Administrator, which order I had passed without knowledge of the order of the Division Bench. 7. In the circumstances the present review application is not only misconceived but is utterly frivolous and based on totally inapplicable law discussed with aforementioned judgment. The application is dismissed without any order as to costs.