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2007 DIGILAW 1663 (RAJ)

Kapoor Chand S/O Chhaju Ram Vaishya v. Municipal Board, Nadbai

2007-09-03

N.K.JAIN

body2007
JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties.Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction in respect of land, in dispute, which was decreed by the trial court, but, on an appeal filed by defendant-respondent No. 1 Municipal. Board, Nadbai, the first appellate court set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. Although, it is a case of reversal of finding of the trial court by the first appellate court, but, after considering the submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant in the light of findings of the first appellate court, I find that the main issues in the present case were Issues No. 1 and 3 and the same relate to question of fact and there is finding of facts recorded by the first appellate court, which cannot be interfered with by this Court in Second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.I have also examined the record of the courts below, which was summoned, in the light of submissions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, but I do not find any illegality or perversity in the finding of the first appellate court in respect of Issue No. 1. The second appeal can only be admitted on substantial, question of law and after considering the submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, I do not find any substantial question of law involved in this second appeal. 3. In Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai, (2005) 10 SCC 553 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others, (2007) 1 SCC 546 , considered the true import, scope and ambit of Section 100 CPC by referring the Section 100 CPC, before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under: "2. Judges must administer law according to the provisions of law. It is the bounden duty of judges to discern legislative intention in the process of adjudication. Justice administered according to individuals whim, desire, inclination and notion to justice would lead to confusion, disorder and chaos. 3. Indiscriminate and frequent interference under Section 100 CPC in cases which are totally devoid of any substantial question of law is not only against the legislative intention but is also the main cause of huge pendency of second appeals in the High Courts leading to colossal delay in the administration of justice in civil cases in our country. ........... 43. Even before the amendment, interference under Section 100 CPC was limited which has now been further curtailed........ ........... 45. The Amendment Act of 1976 has introduced drastic changes in the scope and ambit of Section 100 CPC. A second appeal under Section 100 CPC is now confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such question must be a substantial one. ........... ........... 60. The comprehensive Fifty-fourth Report of the Law Commission of India submitted to the Government of India in 1973 gives historical background regarding ambit and scope of Section 100 CPC. According to the said report, any rational system of administration of civil law should recognise that litigation in civil cases should have two hearings on facts - one by the trial court and one by the court of appeal. ........... 62. The question could perhaps be asked, why the litigant who wishes to have justice from the highest court of the State should be denied the opportunity to do so, at least where there is a flaw in the conclusion on facts reached by the trial court or by the court of first appeal. The answer is obvious that even litigants have to be protected against two persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury. 63. The answer is obvious that even litigants have to be protected against two persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury. 63. The rational behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-established, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, insofar as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on questions of law. ........... 66. The primary cause of the accumulation of arrears of second appeals in the High Court is that laxity with which second appeals are admitted without serious scrutiny of the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the bounden duty of the High Court to entertain second appeal within the ambit and scope of Section 100 CPC. 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. ........... 81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of the fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of the fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court, is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs." 5. In view of the above, the second appeal is dismissed in limine. *******