ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. This is a second appeal by the defendant, who has been directed by the appellate court to pay interest at 24% on the decretal amount, modifying the order of the trial court by directing to pay interest at 12%. 2. The facts of the case are as follows - The plaintiff/respondent . Company deals in sale of machinery and its parts. The defendant/appellant runs a Ginning and Pressing Factory and is a Co-operative Society. It is alleged that the appellant used to purchase the goods from the shop of the respondent on credit. The appellant agreed to pay interest on the amount due if the bill amount was not paid within period of three days. The defendant had purchased the goods worth Rs.31950/- on 13/12/1991 and made repayment of Rs.20,000/- against that bill on 7/12/1991 leaving a balance of Rs.11,950/-. The respondent, therefore, claimed Rs.11,950/- as principal and Rs.7585/- as an interest with future interest at 24%. 3. The appellant/defendant resisted the suit. The appellant did not dispute that it has purchased goods worth Rs.31950/- and that it has repaid Rs.20,000/-. It did not even dispute that it has to pay Rs.11950/- towards the principal sum. The appellant, however, disputed that there was any agreement to charge interest at 24% as alleged by the respondent. The appellant contends that the respondent is not entitled to such interest at 24%. 4. The learned judge of the trial court passed a decree of Rs.11950/- with 12% interest which comes to Rs.3787.50. He also directed to pay future interest at 12%. Being aggrieved by this judgment, both respondent/plaintiff as well as appellant/defendant preferred appeals. The appeal preferred by the appellant/defendant came to be dismissed while that of the plaintiff/respondent came to be allowed and the learned judge of the first appellate court directed the interest to be charged at 24%. Being aggrieved by that, this second appeal has been preferred by the appellant/defendant. 5. Following substantial question of law has been formulated by me although the appeal was admitted on grounds no.1 and 2. .Whether on the basis of the Bill Exh.18, 24% interest could have been awarded by the first appellate court ?. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was in fact no agreement to charge interest at 24% and, therefore, the first appellate court was not justified in awarding interest at 24%. .Whether on the basis of the Bill Exh.18, 24% interest could have been awarded by the first appellate court ?. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was in fact no agreement to charge interest at 24% and, therefore, the first appellate court was not justified in awarding interest at 24%. He did not urge any other point. He also conceded that the plaintiff was entitled to 12% interest. 7. The award of interest is governed by section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 34 reads thus - 34. Interest.-(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, [with further interest at such rate not exceeding six percent per annum, as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum], from the date of the decree to the date of the payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit: [Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which money are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest [on such principal sum] from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefore shall not lie. It is not in dispute that claim for interest arises out of commercial transaction. The instant case is, therefore, governed by the proviso to Section 34. What proviso says is that in case of commercial transaction, the rate of interest may exceed 6% but shall not exceed contractual rate and when there is no contract, it shall not be above the rate of interest charged by the nationalised bank. The instant case is, therefore, governed by the proviso to Section 34. What proviso says is that in case of commercial transaction, the rate of interest may exceed 6% but shall not exceed contractual rate and when there is no contract, it shall not be above the rate of interest charged by the nationalised bank. In this case, the learned judge of the trial court had awarded interest at 12% but the appellate judge enhanced it to 24%. Mr.Chandurkar, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that there was, in fact, no reason for the learned judge to interfere with the decree passed by the trial court. He contended that the learned judge of the appellate court has wrongly observed that the condition on the bill to pay 24% interest cannot be discarded merely because the bill is not signed by the defendant or his agent and further D.W.1 Panjabrao has admitted that there was an agreement to pay interest. These are only two grounds why the learned judge of the first appellate court proceeded to award interest at 24%. The bill is admittedly not signed by the office bearer of defendant Society. It is a matter of common knowledge that bill is always issued uniterally. It can be issued even behind the back of the purchaser where an order can be placed even on a telephone. The bill can be dispatched later. Therefore, unless the bill is signed and that too consciously agreeing to such condition, it cannot be said that the purchaser has agreed to pay interest at 24%. Wherever the appellant/defendant is to be fastened with liability to pay interest, a contract between the parties has to be proved. There is, in fact, no evidence that there was any contract between the parties that interest at 24% would be charged. For saying so, the reasons would follow. In a decision reported in AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 330 (C.Satyanarayana and ors. ..vs.. Kanumarlapudi Lakshmi), the High Court observes as follows – 9. The real question in such cases is whether the parties agreed as a part of the transaction that any dispute arising out of the transaction would be heard and decided by a particular Court. No single party can impose any term of the contract upon the other, unless it is agreed to by the other party. The real question in such cases is whether the parties agreed as a part of the transaction that any dispute arising out of the transaction would be heard and decided by a particular Court. No single party can impose any term of the contract upon the other, unless it is agreed to by the other party. Merely because the defendants have written a letter on the top of which subject to Madras jurisdiction is printed, it cannot become a part of the contract unless it is expressly agreed to by the plaintiff. The lower Courts have categorically found that .Subject to Madras jurisdiction was not a term of the transaction between the parties. I find, therefore, no substance in the contention and I do not feel any difficulty in rejecting it.. 8. This court also in a case (M/s Jawahar Kirana Shop v. M/s. Bharat Kumkum) reported in 1975 Mh.L.J.Note 62 held as follows - .To oust the jurisdiction of Court it has to be established that there was such a conscious agreement between the parties. Plaintiff sued in Nagpur Court for excess payment made by him for goods purchased from defendant doing business at Amravati. Plaintiff was doing business at Nagpur and the delivery of goods was taken at Nagpur. Payment of price was also made by a cheque issued at Nagpur. Defendant contended that Nagpur Court had no jurisdiction and relied on the printed endorsement on the bill 'Subject to Amravati jurisdiction'. No evidence was given to show that there was any specific agreement about jurisdiction nor was it shown that plaintiff had consciously accepted the term printed on the bill. Held, that the jurisdiction of the Nagpur Court was not ousted. 9. Therefore, there ought to be an actual agreement. Simple condition or sentence on a bill will not be enough to make a party liable to pay interest as mentioned on the bill. After having gone through the evidence of DW 1 Panjabrao, I do not find that Panjabrao admits of any agreement to pay any interest to plaintiff. What Punjabrao admits is that his Society had once agreed to pay interest at 18% to the sister concern of the plaintiff and not with the plaintiff. On the other hand, he says that there was no agreement with the plaintiff with regard to the interest. What Punjabrao admits is that his Society had once agreed to pay interest at 18% to the sister concern of the plaintiff and not with the plaintiff. On the other hand, he says that there was no agreement with the plaintiff with regard to the interest. Therefore, this observation of the learned judge of the first appellate court that Punjabrao had admitted that there was an agreement to pay interest with plaintiff in connection with this transaction was not correct. In fact, PW 1 Brijmohan admits that defendant purchased goods on many occasions on credit and made payment after 2-3 months but on no occasion interest was charged. If this admission is taken into consideration, in no case the plea of plaintiff that there was an agreement to charge interest at 24% can be accepted. In fact, the admission goes to show that there was no agreement to charge interest at all. The learned judge of the first appellate court has completely misread the evidence and misdirected himself. The evidence does not show that there was any oral agreement to charge interest nor can a term of bill (Exh.18) be taken as an agreement to pay interest binding on the defendant. There was, in fact, therefore no reason for the first appellate court to interfere with the order of the trial court. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate court and restore that of the trial court. Appeal is allowed. Respondent to pay costs of the appeal.