Judgment : 1. Original Petition No.912 of 1999 was filed under Sections 232, 255 and 276 of the Indian Succession Act, seeking the issue of Letters of Administration with the Will annexed, in respect of the last Will and Testament of Smt. R.V.R. Sivagami Amoral. The Will is stated to have been executed on 5. 1988 and the Testatrix R.V.R. Sivagami Ammal died on 17. 1992. 2. The Testatrix left behind three sons, three daughters and two grand-daughters through a pre-deceased daughter. One of the sons filed the Original Petition, seeking Letters of Administration, making his two daughters as co-petitioners 2 and 3. The sisters and brothers of the first petitioner, were cited as respondent Nos.1 to 4 and 7, the daughters of one of his brothers were cited as respondent Nos.5 and 6, the daughter of another brother was cited as respondent No.8 and the grand daughters of the Testatrix through a pre-deceased daughter was cited as respondent Nos.9 and 10. 3. The respondent No.1 in the Original Petition (one of the daughters of the Testatrix) along with respondent No.9 (one of the grand-daughters of the Testatrix through a predeceased daughter) filed a caveat in Caveat Petition No.229 of 2005, along with an affidavit in support of the caveat, opposing the grant of Letters of Administration. In the affidavit in support of the Caveat Petition, the caveators (respondent Nos.1 and 9 in the Original Petition) contended among other things that the Testatrix never had any title, ownership or possession of one of the properties disposed of by Will. 4. In the light of such a stand taken by the caveators, the petitioners in the Original Petition have come up with the present Application No.18 of 2006 praying for the discharge of the caveat on the ground that the caveators have forfeited their caveatable interest on account of setting up a paramount title in themselves. 5. I have heard Mr. R. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the applicants in the present Application (petitioners in the Original Petition) and Mr. A. Venkatesan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the present Application (caveators and respondent Nos.1 and 9 in the Original Petition). 6. Mr. R. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the applicants took me through the averments contained in paragraphs-2 and 3 of the affidavit of the respondents/caveators in support of the caveat. A. Venkatesan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the present Application (caveators and respondent Nos.1 and 9 in the Original Petition). 6. Mr. R. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the applicants took me through the averments contained in paragraphs-2 and 3 of the affidavit of the respondents/caveators in support of the caveat. In the said paragraphs of the affidavit in support of the caveat, the caveators have contended that the property being agricultural lands in Survey Nos.1084/1, 1096/1, 1096/2A, 1097, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1108/2C, 1108/2D and 1108/2E Ayyan Kollamkondan Village, Rajapalayam Taluk, belonged absolutely to the respondent Nos.9 and 10 in the Original Petition, by virtue of an registered partition deed dated 12. 1970 and that therefore the Testatrix never had any title, ownership or possession of the lands at the time of the alleged execution of the Will. 7. In the light of such a stand taken by the caveators setting up paramount title in themselves, Mr. R. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the applicants contended that the caveators have forfeited their caveatable interest in the matter and that therefore the caveat should be discharged. The learned counsel contended that the scope of an enquiry in the Probate proceedings is confined only to the genuineness and the validity of the Will and that the question of title can never be gone into in the Probate Proceedings. 8. In order to drive home the said point, the learned counsel for the applicants relied upon the following decisions: 1. Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh and Others, 1993 (2) SCC 507 . 2. In re: N. Narasimhan and another, AIR 1975 Mad. 330 . 3. Thomas P. Jacob v. M.G. Varghese and Others, AIR 1987 Ker. 193 . 4. Ramyad Mahton v. Ram Bhaju Mahton, AIR 1932 Patna 89. 5. The Goods of Mrs. Lydia and Others, Mrs. Elizabeth Egbert v. A.J. Fanthome and Another, AIR 1952 All. 543 . 6. M.K. Sowbagiammal and Another v. Komalangi Ammal by Guardian, Kandaswami Chetti and Another, 54 MLJ 382. 7. Komalangiammal v. M.K. Sowbhagiammal and Another, AIR 1931 Mad. 37. 8. Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi and Others, AIR 1954 SC 280 . 9. In response, Mr. Elizabeth Egbert v. A.J. Fanthome and Another, AIR 1952 All. 543 . 6. M.K. Sowbagiammal and Another v. Komalangi Ammal by Guardian, Kandaswami Chetti and Another, 54 MLJ 382. 7. Komalangiammal v. M.K. Sowbhagiammal and Another, AIR 1931 Mad. 37. 8. Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi and Others, AIR 1954 SC 280 . 9. In response, Mr. A. Venkatesan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/caveators contended that the Will sought to be proved in common form by the applicants, covered several items of properties described under Schedules A, B, C, D, E and F. Though the respondents/caveators had questioned the title of the Testatrix in respect of the properties described in Schedule C alone, the respondents/caveators have not disputed the title of the Testatrix to the other properties described in Schedules A, B, D, E and F. Moreover, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the objection of the caveators even in respect of the Schedule C property had to be understood only in the context of the averment made in paragraphs-4 and 7 of the affidavit in support of the caveat that the Will was created and concocted by the applicants herein. In other words, the question of title raised in paragraph-3 of the affidavit in support of the caveat has to be understood in the context of the averments in paragraphs-4 and 7 that the Testatrix did not have a free mind nor was in a sound and disposing state of mind. According to the learned counsel for the respondents/caveators, when the caveators raise other issues, apart from the one relating to title, they cannot be said to have lost the caveatable interest. The caveators are not strangers but are admittedly the legal heirs of the Testatrix and that therefore it cannot be said that they have no caveatable interest. 10. In support of his contention that a caveat cannot be discharged when other issues are also raised, the learned counsel for the respondents/caveators relied upon the following decisions: 1. In re: N. Narasimhan and Another, AIR 1975 Mad. 330 . 2. Kalika Singh and Another v. Awadhesh Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1983 Patna 149. 3. M.S. Saraswathi v. M.S. Selvadurai and Another, 1997 (3) LW 541 . 4. Shanta G.Z. Mehta v. Sarla J. Mehta and Others, 2003 AIR SCW 3105. 11. In re: N. Narasimhan and Another, AIR 1975 Mad. 330 . 2. Kalika Singh and Another v. Awadhesh Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1983 Patna 149. 3. M.S. Saraswathi v. M.S. Selvadurai and Another, 1997 (3) LW 541 . 4. Shanta G.Z. Mehta v. Sarla J. Mehta and Others, 2003 AIR SCW 3105. 11. Before adverting to the legal issue raised by the applicants, it has to be noted that there is no dispute about the fact that the caveators are the legal heirs of the Testatrix. While the first caveator-N. Kuppammal is none-else than the daughter of the Testatrix, the second caveator is the grand-daughter of the Testatrix through the pre-deceased daughter of the Testatrix. Therefore, it is clear that but for the Will, the caveators would have succeeded along with others, to the Estate left behind by the Testatrix, by way of intestate succession. Hence, it cannot be disputed and it is also not disputed that the caveators had a caveatable interest to begin with. But the question that arises for consideration is as to whether such persons, who had a caveatable interest would forfeit the same by setting up a rival title in themselves. 12. It is seen from the affidavit filed in support of the caveat that the caveators questioned the title of the Testatrix in respect of the properties in Ayyan Kollamkondan Village, on the basis of a registered partition deed dated 12. 1970. It is seen from the Will filed by the applicants that the said property is described under Schedule C to the Will. It is also seen from the Will that there are other properties described in Schedules A, B, D. E and F. In the affidavit in support of the caveat, the caveators have not questioned the title of the Testatrix to the properties described in Schedules A, B, D, E and F to the Wilt and her right to dispose of the same by Will. Apart from questioning the title of the Testatrix only to C Schedule property, the caveators have also taken a stand in paragraph-4 of their affidavit that the Testatrix "was totally unwell due to old age and that she was not in a sound and disposing state of mind". Apart from questioning the title of the Testatrix only to C Schedule property, the caveators have also taken a stand in paragraph-4 of their affidavit that the Testatrix "was totally unwell due to old age and that she was not in a sound and disposing state of mind". The caveators have further stated that the Testatrix was under the care and custody of the first applicant herein and that she was not in a position to exercise her free Will. They have further stated that had she been allowed to exercise her free Will, she would not have included the C Schedule property in the Will. In paragraph-5 of the affidavit, the caveators have also raised a doubt about the entries made in the Office of the Sub-Registrar in the "Will Register" In paragraph-7 of the affidavit in support of the caveat, the caveators have contended that the Will is nothing but a concocted and false one. Thus, it is clear that the caveators have questioned the genuineness of the Will and the validity of the Will in the sense that it was not executed in a sound and disposing state of mind. In the light of such a multiple stand taken by the caveators, the decisions cited by the counsel on either side and the legal issue raised, have to be decided. 13. At the outset, the learned counsel for the applicants relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in Eramma v. Veerupana and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1879 and Punithavalli Ammal v. Minor Ramalingam and Another, AIR 1970 SC 1730 for the proposition that the full ownership conferred upon a Hindu female under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act is not defeasible by the adoption made by her to her husband after the Act came into force and that the rights conferred under Section 14 are not restricted or limited by any rule of Hindu Law. There is no quarrel with the said proposition, but the question as to whether the Testatrix had a right to dispose of the C Schedule property does not arise for consideration in the present Application. We are now concerned in the present Application, only with the question, as to whether the caveators have a caveatable interest or not. Therefore, these two decisions are of no relevance to the legal issue raised. 14. We are now concerned in the present Application, only with the question, as to whether the caveators have a caveatable interest or not. Therefore, these two decisions are of no relevance to the legal issue raised. 14. Now corning to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants directly on the issue on hand, it is seen that the earliest decision relied upon by him is the one in M.K. Sowbagiammal and Another v. Komalangi Ammal by Guardian, Kandaswami Chetti and Another, 54 MLJ 382, wherein it was held by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao (as he then was) as follows: "Where the interest alleged on behalf of a caveator is that the Testator purported to dispose of by the Will the Stridhanam jewels belonging to the caveator as if they belonged to himself, the interest is not such as to support a caveat." The said decision was upheld by the Division Bench in its decision in Komalangiammal v. M.K. Sowbhagiammal and Another, AIR 1931 Mad. 37, where Mr. Justice Cornish (as he then was) held on behalf of the Bench as follows: "It has long been settled that it is not the province of a Court of probate to determine questions of title to a property which a Testator purports to dispose of by his Will, the reason being that the grant of probate does no more than establish the taciturn of the Will and the appointment of the executors (if any) named in the Will. The grant of probate will not therefore prevent the appellant from bringing a Suit, if she should be so advised, to recover from the executors, or any other persons in possession, the jewels which she claims as her own property." But from the narration of facts made in the aforesaid decisions, it is seen that the caveators questioned only the right of the Testator to dispose of by Will the Stridhanam jewels as if they belonged to him. It is not known whether any question other than the right of the Testator to dispose of by Will, the Stridhanam jewels, was ever raised in the said case. In the present case, as I have noted above, the issue of title raised by the caveators is only with respect to one of the items of properties, covered by the Will. 15. In the present case, as I have noted above, the issue of title raised by the caveators is only with respect to one of the items of properties, covered by the Will. 15. The learned counsel for the applicants next relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Ramyad Mahton v. Ram Bhaju Mahton, AIR 1932 Patna 89, wherein it was held as follows: "Where an objector to the Petition for granting the Letters of Administration claims that he was joint in property which the Testator left by Will, he has no locus standi to object to the granting of the Letters of Administration even where citations have been served on him." But the said decision may not go to the rescue of the applicants for the simple reason that it did not arise out of a Petition for the discharge of a caveat. In the said case, the parties were allowed a full trial of all the issues raised, including the question as to whether the Will was a genuine one or not and whether it was executed in accordance with law or not. The District Judge, Patna granted Letters of Administration by an original decree after allowing the parties to lead evidence on all issues and the said decision was under challenge before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the said case. Therefore, the said decision cannot be taken to be on the point as to whether the caveators should be held to have forfeited their caveatable interest even if their objection is with regard to the title of the Testator to only one item of property. 16. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants is that of Allahabad High Court in The Goods of Mrs. Lydia and Others, Mrs. Elizabeth Egbert v. A.J. Fanthome and Another, AIR 1952 All. 543 , wherein a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court held as follows: "A caveator who lays claim to a particular property and at the same time says that that property does not form part of the deceaseds Estate, is not a person claiming an interest in that Estate and as such has no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate of the draft Will of the deceased. The right of the caveator to institute proceedings for establishment of his title to the property in dispute will not he affected by the grant of probate." But it is seen from the narration of facts contained in paragraph-3 of the said judgment that there were two items of property covered by the Will and the caveators objected to the right of the Testatrix to dispose of both the properties by Will. Therefore, the said decision is also not on the point directly in issue in this case. 17. In Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi and Others, AIR 1954 SC 280 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "The Court of Probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last Will and Testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the Testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or had is not within the purview of the Probate Court." But the said decision is of no help to the applicants. It is seen from the facts detailed in paragraph-1 of the said judgment, the said decision arose out of a Will under which a bequest was made in favour of an idol of Shri Thakurji. The District Judge before whom a Petition for the grant of Probate was made, had a full-fledged trial conducted. Ultimately, the District Judge held that though the Will was proved, it was void for uncertainty and the District Judge held that it was not a Will as defined under Section 2 (h) of the Indian Succession Act. No issue relating to the right of the Testator to dispose of by Will, a particular property was raised in the said case. The objector did not raise any issue of title in that case. But the bequest was held to be bad on account of the fact that it was made in favour of an idol and also on the ground that it was void for uncertainty. It is in the said context that the Supreme Court held that the Probate Court had no business to decide whether a particular bequest was good or bad. 18. It is in the said context that the Supreme Court held that the Probate Court had no business to decide whether a particular bequest was good or bad. 18. In Thomas P. Jacob v. M.G. Varghese and Others; AIR 1987 Kerala 193, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held as follows: "A person who enters a caveat must necessarily show that he has an interest in the Estate derived from the deceased by inheritance or otherwise. By entering the caveat he admits that the particular property forms part of the Estate of the Testator, but objects to the execution of the Will or the proposed mode of dealing with any portion of the Estate. It is settled law that in proceedings for probate or letters of administration, the Court does not enter on the question of title to the property which the Testator by his Will proposed to leave. The only function of the Court is to determine whether the Will had been genuinely made by the Testator out of his free volition; whether it had been properly executed and attested in accordance with the law; and, whether the Testator had the capacity to execute it." But the said decision also cannot be taken advantage of by the applicants, since the facts as narrated in paragraph-2 of the said decision shows that the claim of the caveator in the said case was solely on the basis of his alleged title, by prescription. The relevant portion of paragraph-2 of the said decision reads as follows: "The appellant described himself as an adopted son of the Testator, but set forth his claim solely on the basis of his alleged title by prescription." Therefore, that is not a case where the Will was challenged on other grounds. 19. In chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh and Others, 1993 (2) SCC 507 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "The only issue in a probate proceeding relates to the genuineness and due execution of the Will and the Court itself is under duty to determine. The grant of probate with a copy of the Will annexed establishes conclusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of the Will. Thus, it does no more than establish the factum of the Will and the legal character of the executor. The grant of probate with a copy of the Will annexed establishes conclusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of the Will. Thus, it does no more than establish the factum of the Will and the legal character of the executor. Probate Court does not decide any question of title or of the existence of the property itself." But the applicants cannot take refuge under the said decision in view of the fact that the question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in that decision was as to whether an Arbitrator appointed to decide the other disputes between the parties, would also be competent to decide the Probate proceedings. In the context of the question raised in the said case about the jurisdiction of an Arbitrator to entertain the Probate proceedings, the Supreme Court analysed the nature of the Probate proceedings in the said judgment and held as aforesaid in paragraph-15. The said decision did not deal with the specific question as to whether a caveator would lose his caveatable interest if one of the objections raised was with reference to the title of the Testator. 20. The learned counsel for the applicants relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in In re: N. Narasimhan and Another, AIR 1975 Madras 330, wherein it was held as follows: "In a probate proceeding a caveator will not be entitled to raise title in himself to the whole or any part of the Estate of the deceased. The interest in the estate of the deceased mentioned in Section 283 is but that interest which by citation a person called upon may claim to have in the estate of the deceased and not the interest which the deceased did not own, but the claimant coming into picture by citation claims to be vested in himself. The test for purposes of Section 283(1)(c) is that a person disputing the right of a Testator to deal with the property as his own, cannot be properly regarded as having an interest in the estate of the deceased. The test for purposes of Section 283(1)(c) is that a person disputing the right of a Testator to deal with the property as his own, cannot be properly regarded as having an interest in the estate of the deceased. A caveator is neither a plaintiff nor a defendant and cannot by mere citation be allowed to convert a probate proceeding into a Suit for resolving disputed title." But in paragraphs-3 and 4 of the said decision, the Division Bench ramanded the matter back to the Probate Court for a decision on all other issues raised by the objectors, barring the question of disputed title. Paragraphs-3 and 4 of the said decision read as follows: "3. That the above is the true position in law could not and has not been disputed by Mr. M.S. Sethu on the other side. But what he says is that an Application has been taken out to discharge the defendant even when he put the caveat and that though the disputed question of title to the property would he outside the purview of the probate proceedings, there were other questions well within those proceedings and therefore he should not be discharged. We have no doubt that the learned Judge sitting on the probate side would consider such questions, but not the question of disputed title. 4. We answer the reference accordingly and remit the matter of probate for a decision by the learned Judge, sitting on the probate side." 21. Corning to the decisions cited by the other side, it is seen that in Kalika Singh and Another v. Awadhesh Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1983 Patna 149, relied upon by Mr. A. Venkatesan, learned counsel for the respondents/caveators, a learned Judge of the Patna High Court held in paragraph-7 as follows: "7. On a perusal of these decisions, it is clear that a person who can maintain a Suit in respect of the property of the Testator is a person having interest in the Estate of the deceased. Therefore, such a person can object to the grant of Probate and can enter as a caveator in the Probate proceeding. If such a person raises objection about the validity of the title of the Testator to execute a Will, such challenge cannot be made in a Probate proceeding. Such issue will be tried in a Suit. Therefore, such a person can object to the grant of Probate and can enter as a caveator in the Probate proceeding. If such a person raises objection about the validity of the title of the Testator to execute a Will, such challenge cannot be made in a Probate proceeding. Such issue will be tried in a Suit. But it does not mean that he will have no locus standi to object to the proceeding. He will have the locus standi provided he challenges the genuineness of the Wilt on the grounds other than title. It is the duty of the Court to disengage the chaff from the grain. Suppose a person having interest in the property of the deceased, challenges the Will on two grounds, namely, (i) that the Testator was not competent to execute the Will as he had no right in the subject matter of the Probate proceeding, and (ii) that the Will was a forged document or was not a genuine document; the Court will try and decide issue No.2 and will not try issue No.1." 22. In M.S. Saraswathi v. M.S. Selvadurai and Another, 1997 (3) LW 541 , Mr. Justice K. Sampath (as he then was), considered a similar question when the caveators claimed co-ownership of the property disposed of by Will. The learned Judge found in paragraph-4 that though the caveators claimed the property to be a joint family property, they did not stop with it, but proceeded further to question the genuineness of the Will. In the background of such a fact, the learned Judge held in paragraph-24 as follows: "24. In sum, I hold that there is no denial of title by the caveators in the sense that they claimed co-ownership independent of the Testator as contemplated in the decision in Satish Vishanji Futnani v. Mohanlal Dungarmal Futnani and Others, 1985 (2) MLJ 331 : 85 LW 402. They are the persons interested to intervene in the final adjudication as to the genuineness of the Will as held in Govind M. Asrani v. Jairam Asrani and Another, AIR 1963 Mad. 456 : 76 LW 492. I am satisfied that the caveat is not liable to be discharged. Perhaps in case the caveators are thrown out of the proceedings, they may apply for revocation of the Probate or Letters of Administration. 456 : 76 LW 492. I am satisfied that the caveat is not liable to be discharged. Perhaps in case the caveators are thrown out of the proceedings, they may apply for revocation of the Probate or Letters of Administration. But in my view, that will be an unnecessary exercise, if the caveators are allowed to participate in the present proceedings subject to their satisfying the test laid down by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Komalangiammal v. Sowbhagiammal, AIR 1931 Mad. 37: 32 LW 43, "does the grant displace any right to which the caveator would otherwise be entitled? If so, he has such an interest; if not, he has not." I hold that the grant by the Testator in the instant case displaces the caveators right to succeed to the property as heirs to the Testator and therefore, they have an interest which entitles them to intervene in the present proceedings. I therefore, hold that the caveat is not liable to be discharged. The Application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs." 23. In Shanta G.Z. Mehta v. Sarla J. Mehta and Others, 2003 AIR SCW 3105, the Supreme Court considered the correctness of the order passed by the High Court refusing to discharge a caveat, when the caveators sought to amend their affidavit in support of the caveat so as to include an alternative plea that the properties covered by the Will were joint properties. The High Court refused to discharge the caveat. The order of the High Court (paragraphs-4 and 5 of the judgment of the Single Judge) was extracted in paragraph-2 of its judgment by the Supreme Court as follows: "5. There is dispute about the question of law that the Caveator who denies the title of the Testator has no right to contest the Will and his remedy is to approach the Civil Court to agitate the question of title. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff invited my attention to number of decisions on this point, where it has been uniformly held that the caveator who denies the title of the Testator has no right to contest the Probate proceedings. He has relied on Ramyad Mahton v. Ram Bhaju Mahton. AIR 1932 Patna 89; Eruch Rustom Irani v. Limji Kaikashroo Panday, 1993 (1) Bom. He has relied on Ramyad Mahton v. Ram Bhaju Mahton. AIR 1932 Patna 89; Eruch Rustom Irani v. Limji Kaikashroo Panday, 1993 (1) Bom. CR 340; Kashi Nath Singh v. Dulhin Gulzari Kuer, AIR 1941 Patna 475, and some other decisions where it has been uniformly held that if the caveator disputes the title of the Testator, he has no right to lodge the caveat and the caveat has to be rejected. As already stated there cannot be any dispute about this proposition of law. 6. It may also be noted that in most of the cases cited above, the caveator had no personal interest in the property as an heir. In the present case, the Respondents are daughter-in-law and grand children of the deceased-Testator. If the Will is not in existence or the Will is proved to be not genuine then there can be no dispute that the Respondents are entitled to a share in the property of the Testator. Therefore, the Respondents being heirs are directly interested in challenging the execution of the Will." .24. While upholding the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court held in paragraph-4 as follows: ."4. The learned Single Judge has categorically stated, as noted above, that in most of the cases the caveator has no personal interest in the property as a heir but, in the instant case, the respondents are daughters-in-law and the grand children of the deceased-Testator, as such having a right to enter into a caveat and object to the grant of Probate, and this grant of Probate, by reason of the subsequent alternative plea or additional plea does not alter the situation neither takes away the contentions of the caveator. The objector to the grant of Probate cannot be non suited by reason therefor." .25. Mr. R. Mohan, learned counsel for the applicants sought to distinguish the decisions relied upon by Mr. A. Venkatesan, learned counsel for the respondents, on the ground that in all the cases relied upon by the respondents, the properties were joint family properties and that therefore the Courts allowed the caveators to contest. But such a distinction cannot be imported to the case on hand, since the caveators in the present case are also the Class-1 heirs of the Testatrix, who were entitled to succeed to the Estate of the deceased, but for the Will. But such a distinction cannot be imported to the case on hand, since the caveators in the present case are also the Class-1 heirs of the Testatrix, who were entitled to succeed to the Estate of the deceased, but for the Will. If the caveators had been total strangers to the family and they had come up with a caveat without establishing that they were entitled to succeed to the Estate of the Testator even otherwise, then the question would have been different. 26. Therefore, in the light of the fact- .(a) that the denial of title of the Testatrix by the caveators is only in respect of one item of property covered by the Will described under Schedule C to the Will; .(b) that the caveators have not disputed the title of the Testatrix with regard to the other items of properties described under Schedules A, B, D, E and F to the Will; .(c) that the caveators have also questioned the genuineness of the Will and alleged that it was a concocted and false Will and that it was not executed in a sound and disposing state of mind; and .(d) that the caveators are none other than the daughter and the grand daughter of the Testatrix, who are entitled to succeed to the Estate of the Testatrix, but for the Will; I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the caveators cannot be said to have forfeited their caveatable interest. Therefore, the Application for discharging the caveat is dismissed. Consequently, the Registry is directed to convert the Original Petition into the Testamentary Original Suit.