Judgment :- The petitioner, a registered educational society with Registration No.13 of 1978 (K.K.Dist.), has filed the present Writ Petition challenging the order of the second respondent dated 27.7.2006, issued under Section 36(9) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 1975 (In short "Societies Act"). 2. Under the direction issued by the second respondent/Registrar, the petitioner was directed to restore the original Bye-law No.11(A), which was in existence right from the time of registration of the Society, and also to include the 25 Priests under Colachal and Thoothoor Dioces Parish Priests and further convene a General Body Meeting to conduct affairs of the Society and to elect Executive Committee in General Body Meeting. This direction was to be implemented within 30 days by the petitioner/Society. 3. An Interim order was granted on 31.7.2006 against the implementation of the said order and it was further extended from time to time. Thereafter, respondents 3 to 5 got themselves impleaded by order dated 22.9.2006. They have also filed a vacate stay application. Thereafter, with the consent of all the parties, the main Writ Petition is taken up for final hearing. 4. Heard the arguments of Mr. Issac Mohanlal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.D.Sasikumar, learned Government Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. S.James, learned counsel appearing for the impleaded respondents 3 and 5, and 4th respondent having not been represented by any person. Perused the records. 5. It is admitted by all the parties that the petitioner/Society is a Society registered under Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 1975 and it is bound by the provisions made thereunder. Mr. Issac Mohanlal, learned counsel for the petitioner states that bye-laws of the society were amended by a special resolution and the amendments were sent to the second respondent for being registered in terms of the Societies Act. The second respondent being a statutory authority and having been satisfied, registered the amendments on 7.11.2002. The amendment of the bye-laws were registered as Document No.3/2002 and amendment of the memorandum of the society was registered as Document No.2/2002 under his name and seal. 6. None of the persons who are ex-Officio Members of the Society and whose membership was removed by amendment have challenged the said amendment and the subsequent approval by the second respondent. The amendment of the bye-laws were registered as Document No.3/2002 and amendment of the memorandum of the society was registered as Document No.2/2002 under his name and seal. 6. None of the persons who are ex-Officio Members of the Society and whose membership was removed by amendment have challenged the said amendment and the subsequent approval by the second respondent. On the contrary, 4th respondent Rev.Fr.A.Rajendran, participated in all the further proceedings and attended the subsequent meetings of the Society. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the bye-laws were amended in the General Body Meeting held on 14.9.2002 and submitted to the second respondent/Registrar on 7.11.2002. In the General Meeting held on 14.9.2002, 4th and 5th respondents have participated and the Board of Directors were elected. In the said election, 4th and 5th respondents were also elected as the Board of Directors. Subsequently, the Board met and the 4th respondent was elected as the Vice President and he continued for the elected term i.e. for a period of three years viz., from 2002 to 2005. Thereafter, on 27.8.2005, the General Body Meeting was held in which the 4th respondent had participated and once again by resolution No.10, he was elected to the Board for a further period from 27.8.2005 to 26.8.2008 and is also continuing in the said position. Therefore, it is not open to the 4th respondent to get impleaded and support the order of the second respondent/Registrar, which is impugned in the Writ Petition. 8. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner states that the 5th respondent/Rev.Fr.Xavir Alexander, who was a signatory to the 2002 meeting, has subsequently filed a suit against the Society in O.S.No.328 of 2004 for the relief of holding that the General Body Meeting held on 30.9.2000 was illegal and the amended bye-laws of the Society passed in the meeting held on 21.9.2002 was also null and void. The said suit is still pending. Therefore, the learned counsel pointed out that the conduct of the 5th respondent was highly objectionable and he cannot seek to get some thing which he could not achieve in the suit. 9. Apart from that, the learned counsel submitted that there were two other suits pending before the Civil Court. Fr.A.Tobias filed o.S.No.479 of 2003 seeking for declaration that the amendments made were null and void. The said suit was dismissed. 9. Apart from that, the learned counsel submitted that there were two other suits pending before the Civil Court. Fr.A.Tobias filed o.S.No.479 of 2003 seeking for declaration that the amendments made were null and void. The said suit was dismissed. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred in A.S.No.60 of 2004 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil. That was also dismissed on 25.8.2004. After the said dismissal, another suit was filed by Fr.Geno Mathew in O.S.No.105 of 2003 before the District Munsif Court, Eraniel seeking for some other relief. The said suit was erroneously decreed on 26.3.2007 against which the petitioner/society has filed an appeal and the appellate Court has granted stay of the Judgment and Decree on 27.4.2007. 10. Under the circumstances, the learned counsel submitted that since the subject matter of the amendment are agitated before the appropriate Civil Courts, it will not be open to the second respondent/Registrar to invoke power under Section 36 of the Societies Act and set aside the amendment for which certificates were granted by him as early as in the year 2002. 11. Learned counsel further stated that impugned proceedings is vitiated as under Section 36 of the Societies Act, the petitioner/Society is entitled for a notice about the proceedings and they have never received any notice and the impugned order was passed by the second respondent without prior notice. Notice was given only to the President and Secretary of the petitioner/Society on 9.6.2006 by the second respondent only in terms of Section 36(8) of the Societies Act, where they were summoned to appear with all the relevant documents and to give correct details. The said notice was intended to summon necessary witnesses for passing appropriate orders under Section 36 and that cannot be construed as notice to the Society. Therefore, the impugned order is also violative of the principles of natural justice. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner took this Court to the various documents filed in the voluminous typed set of papers in support of his arguments. He also stated that none of the ex-officio members removed by the amendment have chosen to file the present Writ Petition. Even the persons viz., Fr.Laberin Yesu and Fr.Stanislaus, who have filed original Petition dated 16.10.2004 before the Inspector General of Registration have not chosen to come forward to file the present Writ Petition. He also stated that none of the ex-officio members removed by the amendment have chosen to file the present Writ Petition. Even the persons viz., Fr.Laberin Yesu and Fr.Stanislaus, who have filed original Petition dated 16.10.2004 before the Inspector General of Registration have not chosen to come forward to file the present Writ Petition. In fact, when they complained to the I.G. Of Registration/1st respondent, he after conducting enquiry informed them by order dated 27.10.2005 stating that the bye-laws of the society had been amended by a special resolution and it has been filed before the Registrar and also certified by him and that out of 22 members of the society, 14 have participated. Therefore, no further action was taken by him. Even that order is not under challenge. 13. He also stated that when the second respondent conducted an enquiry under Section 36 of the Societies Act, he had not given his report before finalising his order, which is a gross irregularity in the procedure adopted by him. Thereafter, learned counsel also referred to the counter affidavit dated 25.8.2006 filed by the second respondent, more particularly to paragraph 13 in which it is stated that in passing the impugned order, the second respondent had relied upon the documentary and oral evidence. He stated that neither documents nor oral evidence is found reflected in the impugned order and to the knowledge of the petitioner, no such oral evidence was recorded in their presence. 14. The learned counsel also stated that the stand of the second respondent with the earlier amendments, which were registered by him was stated to be null and void and that the second respondent came to know about illegality only at the time of enquiry conducted by the second respondent under Section 36, was totally false and contrary to the materials on record. The stand of the second respondent that he was not a party in any of the suit is not relevant because under the scheme of the Societies Act if any order is passed by any competent Civil Court between the members of the society, the second respondent is automatically bound by the said decision and he has to carry out the said order. Therefore, he submitted that the second respondent, at that time, registered the amendment as per Section 12 of the Societies Act and thereafter, registered Form-VII regarding newly elected Executive Committee. Therefore, he submitted that the second respondent, at that time, registered the amendment as per Section 12 of the Societies Act and thereafter, registered Form-VII regarding newly elected Executive Committee. Further, when informed the I.G. of Registration, vide his communication dated 16.8.2005, he was clearly aware of the amendment and he justified the action taken by him. It is only on the strength of his communication, the I.G. of Registration/1st respondent rejected the petition sent by the two aforesaid aggrieved persons. On the date on which, he sent reply to the first respondent viz., on 16.8.2005, he was well aware of the District Collectors letter dated 29.11.2004 by which only, he initiated present impugned proceedings. The proceedings initiated by him under Section 36 was not a suo-motu proceedings as contemplated under Section 36(1) of the Societies Act and that on the District Collector directions, he initiated the proceedings under Section 36(1) of the Societies Act. Therefore, the affidavit filed by the second respondent suffers from Suppressio veri and suggestio falsi. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner without prejudice to the submission also referred section 55(c) of the Societies Act, which clearly states that any defect in the proceeding will not invalidate the action taken by the society and therefore, the second respondent cannot press into service the so-called lack of quorum. The question of quorum can be raised only by the members of the society and not by any outsider. He further submitted that once a statutory period is exercised under Section 12 and the order has become final, in the absence of very power of review, Registrar cannot nullify his own order or resort to any other provisions to nullify his order. 16. Learned Government Advocate, who represents the first and second respondents could not answer all these allegations, and merely stated that there is a power under Section 36 of the Societies Act to the second respondent to go into constitution of the society. He was unable to state as to why the second respondent did not give any notice to the petitioner/society and also did not give copies of the final report to the society before the impugned order was passed. 17. He was unable to state as to why the second respondent did not give any notice to the petitioner/society and also did not give copies of the final report to the society before the impugned order was passed. 17. Further, he is unable to state as to why the impugned order did not refer to various documents and oral evidence taken by the second respondent and it has not been even discussed in the impugned order. He fairly conceded that under Section 36 of the Societies Act, power is given to the Registrar only for the purpose of enabling the witnesses to produce documents and it cannot be construed as a notice to the society. 18. Mr. S.James, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 3 and 5, not only elaborately argued but also gave a written brief in support of his contention. When questioned, the learned counsel has stated that pendency of the suit is not a bar for the second respondent in invoking Section 36 and the earlier registration done by him in the year 2002 under Section 12 cannot be said to be final especially when a fraud is pointed out. He also pointed that the notice under Section 36(8) can be a valid notice given to the society and the petitioner and the Secretary having participated, cannot now seek for a fresh notice. The argument that none of the Ex-officio members, who were deposed and persons who have made earlier complaint have not come to this Court, he stated that the petitioner has no locus-standi in the case and they can come to support the order of the second respondent. 19. With reference to the 5th respondent, having filed a suit with reference to the invalidation of the bye-laws, he has no answer and merely stated that the present Writ Petition is only confined to the order passed by the second respondent and therefore, he has come in support of the same. 20. Withreference to the total lack of any discussion of the materials allegedly, the second respondent has averred in the counter affidavit, he had no answer for the same. In the written brief, there is no answer to the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. 21. In the light of the rival submissions, it is necessary to look into the jurisdiction vested on the Registrar of the Societies under the Societies Act. In the written brief, there is no answer to the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. 21. In the light of the rival submissions, it is necessary to look into the jurisdiction vested on the Registrar of the Societies under the Societies Act. The Full Bench of this Court vide in its decision reported in 2005-2-L.W.550 (C.M.S. Evangelical Suvi David Memorial Higher Secondary School Committee v. The District Registrar Cheranmahadevi & 4 others) had an occasion to deal with the extent of power vested on the Registrar. The contentions raised in that case is found in paragraph 16 of the judgment, which reads as follows: "16. ... It is argued that in view of the word "into the constitution employed in Section 36, the power of the Registrar to inquire into the affairs of the society shall include the power to inquire into the election of members..." 22. In answer to the same, the Full Bench in Paragraph 17 observed as follows: "17. ... the provisions confer only the administrative power of the Registrar to ensure that the registered society to function strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder, more particularly for maintenance of accounts for audit purpose; framing of bye-laws in conformity with the object of the society for which it is formed and registered; in respect of application of funds of the registered society, conduct of annual General Meetings and extraordinary general meeting and amalgamation and division of registered societies. The Registrar has power to direct the registered society to furnish in writing such information or explanation in respect of any document which the registered society is required to file with him." (Emphasis added) 23. Further, in paragraph 18, it has been observed as follows: "18. ... The said power cannot be construed as the power of appeal. Under Section 36, the Registrar has not been empowered to adjudicate upon the conflicting claims to represent the society based upon question of fact. A plain reading of Section 36 shows that the Registrar could look only the provisions of the Act and the Rules and prima facie materials to arrive at a conclusion either to believe or not to believe Form NO.VII in order to effect change in the register. ...The power in our view is incidental and it is only for the purpose of maintaining correct records. ...The power in our view is incidental and it is only for the purpose of maintaining correct records. As the power to conduct inquiry is only limited in order to find out whether constitution of members are valid, the inquiry is limited only for the purpose of making entries in the register. However, the exercise of power must not be arbitrary as the orders passed or directions issued by the Registrar is amenable to challenge in the Writ Jurisdiction." (Emphasis added) 24. Finally, in paragraph 20, the Full Bench held as follows: "20. ...Hence, the power under Sub-Section (9) of Section 36 cannot be stretched to a power on the Registrar to direct the registered society to hold fresh election. A direction to hold fresh election would amount to indirectly setting aside the earlier election and such power is not conferred on the Registrar under any of the provisions of the Act. So long as the election is not declared invalid in the manner known to law, no direction for fresh election could be ordered. Validity of the election could very well be decided only by the competent Civil Court as the parties are entitled to let in their evidence to sustain their respective claims. In the event the Registrar satisfies himself as to the particulars furnished in Form VII as correct, he should enter the names in the register maintained for that purpose. In the event if he does not satisfy as to the particulars and thereby does not accept Form VII, he has to issue a direction relegating the parties to approach the Civil Court for appropriate orders and thereafter shall act as per the orders of the Civil Court..." (Emphasis added). 25. Though the Full Bench dealt with an issue in the context of the power of the Registrar to go into an election dispute, it has also the same power when the Registrar looks into the question of any constitution of the society. In the present case, the second respondent did not recommend to the Government any supercession of the society but on the contrary, chose to give a direction under Section 36(9) of the Societies Act to restore the original bye-laws thereby set at naught as to what had happened in the last five years including his order of certification made under Section 12 of the Societies Act as early as on 7.11.2002. 26. 26. In the light of the observations made by the Full Bench and in the absence of any provisions for review, it is not open to the second respondent to set at naught certification granted by him through some collateral proceedings. It is not as if the members of the society are in an helpless situation. They can always resort to the civil proceedings both on the question of legality of the meeting as well as validity of the amendments as held by the Full Bench stating that there is finality to the order passed by the Registrar. 27. Apart from this, it must be stated that a person who becomes a member and serves the society cannot turn back and challenge the very bye-laws accepted by him as the bye-laws were held to be contractual in nature. 28. In State of U.P. v. C.O.D Chheoki Employees Coop.Society Ltd., [(997) 3 SCC 681], the Supreme Court in paragraph 16 held as follows: 16. Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a cooperative society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfilment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source." (Emphasis added) 29. The very same decision was noted with approval in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Zorastrian cooperative Housing Society Ltd., and another vs. District Registrar, Cooperative Societies (Urban) and others [(2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 632]. The Supreme Court in paragraph 39 has held as follows: "39. The stream cannot rise higher than the source." (Emphasis added) 29. The very same decision was noted with approval in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Zorastrian cooperative Housing Society Ltd., and another vs. District Registrar, Cooperative Societies (Urban) and others [(2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 632]. The Supreme Court in paragraph 39 has held as follows: "39. ...It is also open to the members of that community, who came together to form the cooperative society, to prescribe that members of that community for whose benefit the society was formed, alone could aspire to be members of that society. There is nothing in the Bombay Societies Act or the Gujarat Societies Act which precludes the formation of such a society. In fact, the history of legislation referred to earlier, would indicate that such coming together of groups was recognised by the Acts enacted in that behalf concerning the cooperative movement. Even today, we have womens coperative societies, we have cooperative societies of handicapped persons, we have cooperative societies of labourers and agricultural workers. We have cooperative societies of religious groups who believe in vegetarianism and abhor non-vegetarian food. It will be impermissible, so long as the law stands as it is, to thrust upon the society of those believing in say, vegetarianism, persons who are regular consumers of non-vegetarian food. May be, in view of the developments that have taken place in our society and in the context of the constitutional scheme, it is time to legislate or bring about changes in Cooperative Societies Acts regarding the formation of societies based on such a thinking or concept. But that cannot make the formation of a society like the appellant Society or the qualification fixed for membership therein, opposed to public policy or enable the authorities under the Act to intervene and dictate to the society to change its fundamental character." (Emphasis added) 30. In the present case, aggrieved members of the society themselves have gone to Civil Court and there are several suits pending. Even though the Registrar/the second respondent is not a party, any decision or decree of the suit is automatically biunding on the Registrar who has power only to supervise the functioning of the society. 31. Therefore, the arguments of the impleaded parties are totally contrary to law and it does not have any merits. Even though the Registrar/the second respondent is not a party, any decision or decree of the suit is automatically biunding on the Registrar who has power only to supervise the functioning of the society. 31. Therefore, the arguments of the impleaded parties are totally contrary to law and it does not have any merits. The conduct of the 4th respondent in getting himself impleaded and supporting the impugned order is highly objectionable because he was party to all the proceedings and in 2002, he was also beneficiary of two elections in which he also held the post of Vice President. On this short ground, his case is liable to be thrown out. Even the conduct of the 5th respondent who has filed a civil suit for an identical reason cannot come to support the order of the second respondent since the issue will have to be decided only by a civil Court. None of these persons had raised any objection in the last five years and had beneficial orders at the hands of the second respondent. When the impugned order was questioned by the petitioner, they have now come forward to defend the same by getting themselves impleaded in the present Writ Petition. These respondents 3 to 5 cannot expand the scope of the Writ Petition and support the impugned order on the grounds other than mentioned therein. Therefore, this Court is unable to expand the scope of the Writ Petition. 32. The impugned orders of the second respondent suffers from lack of jurisdiction and also violative of the principles of natural justice. The impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the impugned order of the second respondent in Reference No.7106/U/2004 dated 27.6.2006 is set aside. In the light of the above discussion, the Writ Petition stands allowed. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2006 is closed. However, this will not preclude the parties in agitating in accordance with law the suits pending in various Civil Courts.