JUDGMENT An accident occurred on 25-10-1996 at 6.30 P.M., near K.B. Cross, involving Lorry bearing No. KA-34-5999, driven by the first respondent and another Lorry bearing No. TMD-5099, driven by the driver concerned and consequent to that, the first respondent herein wanted to have the matter settled with other driver. At about 7.00 P.M., the first respondent-driver questioned the driver of the other vehicle for not giving the compensation and this led the driver of the Lorry No. TMD-5099 pushing the first respondent, leading to the first respondent sustaining injuries to his left knee. The application filed by the first respondent for compensation before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner came to be allowed putting the liability on the appellant herein who is the insurer of the Lorry bearing No. TMD-5099. The compensation of Rs. 1,31,082/- was awarded and it is this order of the W.C. Commissioner that is called in question on the ground that the injury sustained by the first respondent-driver was not an injury that arose out of and in the course of employment. 2. I have heard the submission made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 3. The .learned Counsel for the appellant Sri U. Abdul Khader submitted that the injury sustained by the first respondent was not on account of an accident which arose out of employment or in the course of employment but on the other hand, there is no nexus between the accident and the injury sustained by the first respondent inasmuch as the act of the first respondent seeking compensation from the driver of the opposing vehicle and on failure of the compensation being paid, the appellant pressing for the same and the driver of the opposing vehicle pushing down the first respondent and consequent injury suffered therefore are not the acts coming within the purview of the expression "arising out of and in the course of employment". Therefore, the W.C. Commissioner was totally in error in allowing the claim application filed by the first respondent and awarding compensation as above and putting the liability on the appellant. In this connection, the learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Apex Court reported in Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Another v Francis De Costa and Another and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Another and other decisions. 4. In this connection, the learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Apex Court reported in Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Another v Francis De Costa and Another and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Another and other decisions. 4. On the other hand, Sri K.R. Muralikrishna, the learned Counsel for the first respondent-driver submitted that following the accident, the first respondent had the responsibility to take care of the interest of his employer and therefore, the first respondent waited for some time to get the compensation from the driver of the opposing vehicle and when there was no response to this, the first respondent was constrained to demand the compensation from the driver of the vehicle and when he did so, the driver of the opposing vehicle pushed the first respondent leading to injuries being caused to the first respondent. Therefore, in the light of the above circumstances, the injury caused to the first respondent will have to be deemed as an injury that is caused on account of he being in employment as a driver at the relevant point of time and therefore, it has to be held as a case coming within the purview of the expression "arising out of and in the course of employment". Hence, the order of the W.C. Commissioner allowing the application of the first respondent is in accordance with law and as such, no interference is called for by this Court in this appeal. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in Smt. Rita Devi and Others v New India Assurance Company Limited and Another. 5. In the light of the contentions put forward and the rulings cited and after going through the entire material on record, the only point for consideration is whether in the instant case, the injury sustained by the first respondent can be said to be an injury caused in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 5. In the light of the contentions put forward and the rulings cited and after going through the entire material on record, the only point for consideration is whether in the instant case, the injury sustained by the first respondent can be said to be an injury caused in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The expression "arising out of and in the course of employment" came up for interpretation before the Apex Court in a number of cases and dealing with the theory of notional extension of employment, the Apex Court in the case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing, Company v Bai Valu Raja and Others, has laid down the law thus.- "As a rule•, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises. The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension. When a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on is way to his work. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on is way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him". 6. In the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to large number of decisions has laid down the following test to attract Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The said principles which are to be found at paragraph Nos. 24 to 26 are as under: "24. The principles are.- (1) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment; (2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the injury; (3) If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the fact of each case. 25. 'Injury suffered should be a physiological injury. Accident, ordinarily, would have to be understood as unforeseen or uncomprehended or could not be foreseen or comprehended. A finding of fact, thus, has to be arrived at, inter alia, having regard to the nature of the work and the situation in which the deceased was placed. 26. There is a crucial link between the causal connections of employment with death. Such a link with evidence cannot be a matter of surmise or conjecture. If a finding is arrived at without pleading or legal evidence the statutory authority will commit a jurisdictional error while exercising jurisdiction". 7. Keeping the above principles of law in view, let me examine the facts of the present case, so as to find out whether the case before us is one which comes within the expression 'arising out of and in the course of employment'. 7. Keeping the above principles of law in view, let me examine the facts of the present case, so as to find out whether the case before us is one which comes within the expression 'arising out of and in the course of employment'. It is not in dispute that an accident occurred involving vehicle Lorry bearing No. KA-34-5999 driven by the first respondent herein and another Lorry bearing No. TMD-5099 driven by the driver concerned and the said accident took place on 25-10-1996 at 6.30 AM., near KB. Cross. It is also not in dispute that at that point of time, notwithstanding the accident having taken place as aforesaid, the first respondent-driver had not sustained any injury. It is also not in dispute that the first respondent met the driver of the opposing vehicle near Huliyal for settlement of compensation and this was about 7.00 P.M. on the very same day. When the first respondent-driver failed to get the compensation, he started to demand for the same and followed the Lorry No. TMD-5099. It was at this juncture, that the driver of the opposing Lorry assaulted and pushed the first respondent leading to the first respondent falling down from the moving Lorry and suffered injuries. These facts are admitted by the parties themselves inasmuch as, the first respondent in his claim application before the W.C. Commissioner has admitted that he sustained injuries when he fall down from the moving Lorry and this was on account of he being pushed down by the driver of the opposing vehicle and this was at 7.00 P.M. The FIR produced before the W.C. Commissioner also is to the same effect. 8. Therefore, it becomes clear from the admitted facts that no injury was caused to the first respondent when the accident occurred at 6.30 AM., but it was only almost after 12 hours, that is at 7.00 P.M. on the same day, that the first respondent sustained injuries when he tried to press for compensation from the driver of the opposing Lorry. From these admitted facts, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the injury caused to the first respondent was on account of accident that took place at 6.30 A.M. 9. From these admitted facts, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the injury caused to the first respondent was on account of accident that took place at 6.30 A.M. 9. Apart from this, the first respondent when examined before the W.C. Commissioner had suppressed the important fact of long gap between the accident which occurred at 6.30 A.M. and the injury that was caused to him at 7.00 P.M. on the same day, but he had tried to give the impression in his evidence that the accident and the injury to him took place simultaneously without loss of any time. Therefore, when the first respondent-driver suppresses such an important fact of enormous gap between the time of accident and the time at which he was injured, this conduct itself goes to show that the first respondent-claimant had not approached the W.C. Commissioner with clean hands. 10. Apart from the above, there is no material placed by the first respondent before the W.C. Commissioner to the effect that he was discharging his duty as required by his employer when he made demand for compensation at 7.00 P.M. on the very same day. Even in the absence of such evidence being forthcoming from the material placed on record, it is impossible to arrive at the conclusion that the demand of compensation by the first respondent from the driver of the opposing vehicle at 7.00 P.M. on the same day is an act which arose out of the employment of the first respondent. Therefore, the instant case, in my considered opinion does not come within the purview of Section 3 of the W.C. Act or for that matter, within the ambit of expression "the accident arising out of and in the course of employment". 11. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the first respondent that is in M.F.A No. 4609 of 2006 of this Court does not come to his aid as the facts and circumstances of that case are not the same as the one with which we are concerned in this appeal. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Francis De Costa is applicable to the case on hand and so also the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti's case. 12. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Francis De Costa is applicable to the case on hand and so also the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti's case. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the W.C. Commissioner was totally in error in allowing the claim application filed by the first respondent as if the injury caused to the first respondent was an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment as a driver. The W.C. Commissioner has failed to take note of the admitted facts and has also failed to take note of the conduct of the first respondent inasmuch as pleading is one thing and the evidence of the first respondent-driver is another thing and the crucial aspect of long delay between the time of accident and the time at which the first respondent sustained injury have not been stated by him in his evidence. Hence, the impugned order of the W.C. Commissioner is unsustainable in law both on facts and in law and as such, I have no hesitation to set aside the said order. In the result, I pass the following order.- The appeal is allowed. The impugned award of the W.C. Commissioner putting the liability on the appellant to satisfy the award amount to the first respondent is set aside. The amount in deposit be refunded to the appellant-Insurance Company.