ORAL JUDGMENT :- This is a second appeal by the plaintiff. 2. A few facts may be narrated thus Plaintiff's father Ramdas was serving with the Municipal Council, Buldhana, who is the defendant in this suit. He died while in service in the year 1975. The plaintiff applied for her appointment on a compassionate ground. The Municipal Council i.e. the defendant appointed the plaintiff in place of her father. She was, however, appointed as a Class IV servant. She, in fact, possessed the qualification for being appointed as a Clerk but she was appointed on daily wages as Class IV. She was later confirmed W.EJ. 1-2-1982 on the class IV post. Although she was appointed as Class IV servant, she was discharging duty of class III servant. It is the contention of the plaintiff that her claim for being appointed as Class IV was always ignored by the defendant. The defendant made certain appointments on 31-8-1982 but did not consider the plaintiff. Ultimately, it is contended by the plaintiff that on 26-8-1985 a Resolution was passed by the defendant deciding to promote her in Class III cadre. However, she was never given appointment in the Class III cadre by the defendant. It is contended that thereafter certain persons were appointed in Class III cadre but her claim was once again ignored. She, therefore, prayed for decree that a direction be given to the defendant to appoint her as a clerk W.EJ. 31-7-1982 and to give her consequential reliefs or it is contended that she be promoted w.e.f. 26-8-1985 in the Class-III cadre. 3. The defendant resisted the suit. It is the contention of the defendant that the suit is untenable. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try such suit. No notice under section 304 was given to the defendant. It is contended by the defendant that in the year 1982 when plaintiff was appointed, the only post available for her appointment was in Class IV cadre and she was accordingly given appointment. It is also contended that these promotions are given according to seniority. Her name appears at Sr. No. 42 and no person, who is below her in the seniority list has been promoted as yet. It is, therefore, contended that the suit is misconceived. Further, it is contended that there is no vested right in the plaintiff to seek promotion. 4. Her name appears at Sr. No. 42 and no person, who is below her in the seniority list has been promoted as yet. It is, therefore, contended that the suit is misconceived. Further, it is contended that there is no vested right in the plaintiff to seek promotion. 4. The learned judge of the trial Court framed issues. She found that the plaintiff was not entitled to be appointed as a clerk on 31-7-1982 and was not entitled to any relief. Holding so, she dismissed the suit. The Appellate Court, however, partly allowed the appeal and directed the Municipal Council to appoint the plaintiff as a clerk on priority basis in clerical vacancy whenever vacancy in the open category may occur. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent. 6. While admitting this appeal, no specific substantial question of law was formulated by this Court. However, I find that the following substantial questions of law need consideration. 1. Whether the plaintiff should have been promoted in the cadre of Clerk on account of the Resolution passed by the Municipal Council?" 2. Whether such passing of Resolution gives vested right to the plaintiff to seek a decree for promotion?" 7. The plaintiff, as stated earlier, as appointed on a compassionate ground. She was appointed on a Class IV post although her father was a class III employee and she possessed the requisite qualifications required for a class III employee. Her prayer in the suit is that she should be appointed as Clerk w.e.f. 31-7-1982 retrospectively. She seeks appointment as Clerk from this date since, according to her, appointment in that cadre were made on 31-7-1982 ignoring her claim. It is also her contention that she was superseded and was not given promotion. In this regard, the evidence of PW 1 Seema would go to show that only those who were senior to her, were promoted and appointed in Class III post. She admits that they were appointed after following all rules of appointment. She also admits that she was made permanent in 1985 and no person made permanent in 1985 is as yet promoted. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff was not ignored and no person junior to her was promoted. She admits that they were appointed after following all rules of appointment. She also admits that she was made permanent in 1985 and no person made permanent in 1985 is as yet promoted. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff was not ignored and no person junior to her was promoted. It is also clear from the evidence that the appointment and promotion were made after following the rules. If that is so, she could not have any grievance at all. 8. Shri Shelat, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, contended that Municipal Council had passed a Resolution to promote her and yet no promotion was given to her. He contended that she should be deemed to have been promoted from the date Municipal Council passed a resolution in 1982. Shri Jaiswal, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that even though the Municipal Council may have passed a Resolution that does not entitle her to be appointed to promotional post as promotion is not a vested right. By catena of decisions, Law is well settled that the promotion is not a vested right. The Supreme Court is following decision has held so. (2003) 4 SCC 712, High Court of Gujarat and anr. vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and ors. and 2002(1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 1 = (2001)7 SCC 394 , Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar vs. Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board and anr. What right, therefore, the plaintiff had was to be considered for promotion. Even though the Municipal Council may have passed a Resolution to promote the plaintiff, she cannot seek euforcement of that Resolution. It is employer's choice whether to actually appoint on promotional post or not. 9. Mr. Shelat, learned counsel, argued that the Municipal Council was bound to, in fact, appoint her to the post of clerk since her father was serving as a clerk in Class III post. He submitted that the dependent of such deceased employee is entitled to be appointed to the same post which the deceased was working. The argument has no force. Mr. Shelat, learned counsel, has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1976 . Smt. Sushma Gosain and ors. vs. Union of India and ors. The decision would not help the cause of Mr. Shelat's client at all. The argument has no force. Mr. Shelat, learned counsel, has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1976 . Smt. Sushma Gosain and ors. vs. Union of India and ors. The decision would not help the cause of Mr. Shelat's client at all. It may be mentioned that PW 1 Seema admits that when she was appointed on a Class IV post, she did not protest. Thus, it is clear that she herself accepted the post which was offered to her. She cannot now make a grievance that she could have been appointed in Class III post initially. Secondly, the Supreme Court has in a case reported in 2005(1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 502 = AIR 2004 SC 4155 has quoted the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1998(5) SCC 192 as under "6. ........ In Director of Education (Secondary) and another vs. Pushupendra Kumar and others, 1998(5) SCC 192 :It was observed that in matter of compassionate appointment there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment." With the above observations of the Supreme Court, the argument of Mr. Shelat, learned counsel, has to be rejected. In view of this, I do not find any substance in the appeal. It is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.