JUDGMENT PER R.V. MORE, J. Heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties. 2. The abovesaid petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner for declaration that the reservation in respect of the land belonging to the petitioner, namely, Hectares and 93 Are out of Survey No. 19 situated at Mouza Koulkhed, Tq. & District Akola, stands lapsed and the said land stands de-reserved, entitling the petitioner to use and develop the same as permissible in the case of adjacent land under the Development Plan. The petitioner also challenges the communication issued by the respondent No.3 Collector of Akola dated 28.8.2006, rejecting petitioner's application for grant of permission to convert the user of the land for residential purpose, on the grounds that the respondent nos. 1 & 2 have informed the said authority that the aforesaid land belonging to the petitioner is affected by a reservation. 3. Civil Application No. 6402/07 is filed by 3 Councillors of Akola Municipal Corporation for direction to the petitioner to join these applicants as respondent nos. 4 to 6 in the Writ Petition and in the alternative for permission to intervene in the Writ Petition. 4. Civil Application No. 7328/07 is filed by the Mayor of Akola Municipal Corporation for permission to represent the respondent no.1 Akola Municipal Corporation, Akola and in the alternative either to implead him as a party respondent or grant permission to intervene in the aforesaid Writ Petition. 5. We have heard Mr. Kadu and Mr. Haq, learned Counsel appearing for the applicants in Civil Application Nos. 6402/07 & 7328/07 and Mr. M.G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel for petitioner. The applicants in both the Civil Applications are the Corporators and Mayor of the Akola Municipal Corporation. Though the Municipal Commissioner and Municipal Corporation are party respondents, we in the interest of justice, permitted these applicants to advance their arguments on merits. In view of this, both the Civil Applications stand allowed to the extent of the prayer seeking permission to intervene in the aforesaid Writ Petition. 6. We have heard Mr. M.G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.K. Pathan, learned Counsel for respondent nos. 1 & 2, Mrs. K. Joshi, learned A.G.P. for respondent no. 3, Mr. S.J. Kadu and Mr. Z.A. Haq, learned Counsel for intervenors. 7. Rule. By consent of parties, rule is made returnable forthwith. 8. 6. We have heard Mr. M.G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.K. Pathan, learned Counsel for respondent nos. 1 & 2, Mrs. K. Joshi, learned A.G.P. for respondent no. 3, Mr. S.J. Kadu and Mr. Z.A. Haq, learned Counsel for intervenors. 7. Rule. By consent of parties, rule is made returnable forthwith. 8. The brief facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of the present petition are as follows :- The petitioner is a public limited company and is an owner of land admeasuring about 4 Hectare and 93 Are out of Survey No.19 situated at Mouza Koulkheda, Tq. & District Akola (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as .the said land.). The Development Plan of Akola (additional area limit) was approved by the State Government vide notification dated 30.12.1992 and the same came into force with effect from 1.3.1993. In this Development Plan, the said land belonging to the petitioner is reserved vide Reservation site Nos. 71, 73, 75 & 75-A for the purpose of sports complex, primary school, play-ground, P. & T. department and roads. The period of ten years from the date on which the Development Plan came into force, though lapsed on 28.02.2003, the appropriate authority, i.e. the first respondent and the P. & T. Department did not take any steps to acquire the said land. 9. The petitioner, therefore, served notice dated 2.1.2004 under section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as .the MRTP Act.) on Senior Superintendent of Post Office, Akola Division, Akola and called upon the said authority to acquire the said land. The Senior Superintendent of the Post Office, Akola Division, Akola sent reply dated 14.9.2005 and informed the petitioner that the land in question is not required by the postal department. The petitioner also served notice dated 23.1.2004 under section 127 of the MRTP Act on the General Manager, Telecom, Akola and called upon the said authority to acquire the said land. The petitioner received reply on 20.10.2005 from the General Manager, Telecom, Akola that the Telecom department does not require the land in question. 10. The petitioner also served notice dated 23.1.2004 under section 127 of the MRTP Act on the General Manager, Telecom, Akola and called upon the said authority to acquire the said land. The petitioner received reply on 20.10.2005 from the General Manager, Telecom, Akola that the Telecom department does not require the land in question. 10. So far as the reservation of the said land for the purpose of sports complex, primary school, playground and roads is concerned, the respondent no.1 is an appropriate authority and the petitioner served notice dated 26.12.2003 under Section 127 of the MRTP Act on the respondent nos. 1 & 2 calling upon them to acquire the land in question which is reserved for the aforesaid purposes. Along with this letter, the petitioner submitted the documents, list of which was appended below the said letter. The respondent nos. 1 & 2 despite receipt of this notice did not initiate compulsory land acquisition proceedings to acquire the said land within the period of six months from the date of receipt of the said notice. The petitioner thereafter sent communication dated 18.8.2005 to the respondent no.2 and reminded the said authority about purchase notice dated 26.12.2003. In spite of receipt of this reminder on 18.8.2005, the first and second respondents did not initiate any steps to acquire the said land within a period of six months or thereafter till today. The petitioner thereafter submitted an application before the Public Information Officer of the respondent no.1 on 26.12.2005 and sought for information regarding what action has been taken by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 pursuant to the purchase notice dated 26.12.2003. However, the petitioner has not received any response. In the facts and circumstances mentioned above, the petitioner believed that the said land stood de-reserved by operation of law and, therefore, applied to the respondent no.3 the Collector, Akola for conversion of user of the land in question for residential purpose. The Collector, by the letter dated 28.8.2006 which is impugned in this petition, informed the petitioner that the permission sought by him cannot be granted as the respondent no.2 had objected the same on the ground that the said land is under reservation. The Collector, by the letter dated 28.8.2006 which is impugned in this petition, informed the petitioner that the permission sought by him cannot be granted as the respondent no.2 had objected the same on the ground that the said land is under reservation. The petitioner, therefore, was constrained to file abovesaid petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India for declaration that the reservation in respect of his land stands lapsed and they are entitled to use and develop the said land as permissible in the case of adjacent land under the Development Plan. The petition also challenges the aforesaid letter of respondent no.3 Collector rejecting permission to the petitioner for conversion of the user of the land in question for residential purposes. 11. Mr. M.G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the final Development Plan of the Akola Municipal Corporation came into force on 1.3.1993 and in this Development Plan petitioner's said land is reserved for various purposes, namely, sports complex, primary school, playground P. & T. department and roads. He further submitted that the period of ten years from the date of coming into force of Development Plan elapsed on 28.2.2003. However, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 as well as P. & T. Department, the appropriate authority did not initiate any proceedings for acquisition of the said land. He further submitted that thereafter notices dated 1.01.2004 and 23.1.2004 were served on P. & T. department calling upon them to purchase the said land in question for which P. & T. department gave reply on 14.9.2005 and 20.10.2005 informing the petitioner that P. & T. department does not require the land in question. In view of this reply, the said land so far as reservation of P. & T. department is concerned, stands de-reserved. He submitted that the petitioner served notices under Section 127 of the M. R. T. P. Act on respondent nos. 1 & 2 on 26.12.2003 and thereafter reminder on 18.8.2005. He further submitted that on 26.12.2005 the petitioner sought for information regarding what action has been taken by respondent nos. 1 & 2 in pursuance of his purchase notice dated 26.12.2003. However, within the period of six months from the date of receipt of the purchase notice or till today, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 have neither acquired the land nor any steps are taken for the acquisition. 1 & 2 in pursuance of his purchase notice dated 26.12.2003. However, within the period of six months from the date of receipt of the purchase notice or till today, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 have neither acquired the land nor any steps are taken for the acquisition. Since the land is not acquired, the petitioner reasonably believed that land is de-reserved and, therefore, applied for permission for conversion of user of the land in question to the Collector. However, the Collector by the order impugned rejected the permission on the premise that said land is under reservation. Mr. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in view of the statutory provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act and in view of the inaction on the part of respondent nos. 1 & 2, reservation has lapsed and the petitioner's land stood de-reserved and, therefore, he is entitled to use and develop the said land as permissible in the case of adjacent land under the Development Plan. He submitted that the stand of respondent no.1 that land is still under reservation and the order of respondent no.3 Collector rejecting the petitioner's application for use of said land for residential purpose and contrary to law and, therefore, he submitted that the declaration as sought for deserves to be granted and respondent no.3 Collector's order is required to be quashed and set aside. He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhavnagar University .vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & others reported in (2003) 2 S.C.C. 111 , M/s. Girnar Traders .vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2007(10) SCALE 391, W.B. Housing Board & others .vs. Brijendra Prasad Gupta & others reported in (1997) 6 S.C.C. 207 and Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s. C.V. Shah & A.V. Bhat .vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2005(3) ALL MR 197. 12. The petition is contested by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 by filing affidavit of respondent no.2 Commissioner. In para 5 of the reply the respondent nos. 1 & 2 admitted receipt of the petitioner's purchase notice dated 26.12.2003. However, the contention of the respondent nos. reported in 2005(3) ALL MR 197. 12. The petition is contested by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 by filing affidavit of respondent no.2 Commissioner. In para 5 of the reply the respondent nos. 1 & 2 admitted receipt of the petitioner's purchase notice dated 26.12.2003. However, the contention of the respondent nos. 1 & 2 is that on 16.1.2004 immediately on receipt of the notice the petitioner was informed that the purchase notice was not accompanied by the requisite document of title and ownership and, therefore, in the absence of necessary documents in support of claim of ownership, the said purchase notice dated 26.12.2003, being insufficient and vague cannot be considered. It was also submitted that the petitioner made representation on 7.9.2006 and the same was replied by respondent no.2 on 5.10.2006 informing the petitioner that his purchase notice dated 26.12.2003 was incomplete for want of document of ownership and title. The respondent nos. 1 & 2, therefore, contended that the purchase notice being incomplete, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 are not expected to act upon. Consequently, the reservation cannot be said to have lapsed. 13. Mrs. Joshi, learned A.G.P. for respondent no.3, contended that respondent no.3 has rejected the petitioner's application for conversion of user of land for residential purpose as respondent nos. 1 & 2 informed that the said land is under reservation and, therefore, the Collector has rightly rejected the petitioner's application. 14. Mr. Haq & Mr. Kadu, learned Counsel for the intervenors, submitted that the purchase notice dated 26.12.2003 is manipulated. They also submitted that the petitioner is in collusion with the authorities of Akola Municipal Corporation and trying to get the land de-reserved. It was also contended that Akola Municipal Corporation has not received any notices as contemplated by the provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act. Mr. Haq, learned Counsel for the intervenors, contended that the purchase notice is required to be served on Planning Authority, Development Authority or appropriate authority. He further relied upon definition of the .Planning Authority. and pointed out that Planning Authority means a local authority. He further submitted that the definition of local authority as given under section 2(15) shows that Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 is a local authority and consequently a planning authority. He further relied upon definition of the .Planning Authority. and pointed out that Planning Authority means a local authority. He further submitted that the definition of local authority as given under section 2(15) shows that Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 is a local authority and consequently a planning authority. He relied upon provisions of Section 5 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 which deals with constitution of the Corporation and submitted that the petitioner has not placed any material on record to show that he has given notice to Corporation as constituted under Section 5 of B.P.M.C. Act, 1949. The obligation of the petitioner is to serve notice as contemplated by provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act and this notice is required to be served on Corporation constituted under section 5 of the BPMC Act, 1949. 15. Having heard the Counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the relevant pleadings and the case law cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, we find merit in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. Section 127 of the MRTP Act deals with lapsing of reservation which reads as follows :- .S. 127. Lapsing of reservations : If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final Regional plan, or final Development plan comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the Planning Authority, Development Authority or as the case may be, Appropriate Authority to that effect, and if within six months from the date of the service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon the land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development as otherwise, permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan.. There is no dispute that final development plan of Akola Municipal Corporation came into force on 1.3.1993 and, therefore, period of ten years was lapsed on 28.2.1993. Admittedly, petitioner's said land is reserved for sports complex, primary school, playground P. & T. department and roads. There is also no dispute that within the period of these ten years, petitioner's said land is not acquired. Since land is not acquired within the period of ten years, the petitioner gave purchase notice under section 127 of the MRTP Act on 26.12.2003. Respondent no.2 Commissioner categorically admitted in para 5 of his affidavit about receipt of this purchase notice. However, the contention of respondent nos. 1 & 2 is that this purchase notice was immediately replied on 16.1.2004 and petitioner was informed that purchase notice was incomplete inasmuch as same is not accompanied by requisite documents of title and ownership and, therefore, in the absence of necessary documents in support of claim of ownership, the purchase notice is vague and insufficient and could not have been considered. The intervenors doubted the service of purchase notice on the respondent nos. 1 & 2 and their contention is that this notice is fabricated. In view of the unequivocal admission by respondent no.2 about receipt of purchase notice, the allegation of the intervenors that purchase notice is fabricated is liable to be rejected. 16. Now we propose to deal with the contention of the respondent nos. 1 & 2 that petitioner's purchase notice was insufficient and vague for want of requisite document of title and ownership. The contention of the respondent nos. 1 & 2 is that the petitioner was informed immediately after his purchase notice about this fact on 16.1.2004. The contention of the petitioner so far as reply notice by respondent nos. 1 & 2 dated 16.1.2004 is concerned, is that reply notice relied upon by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 is false and fabricated document which is prepared by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 to create defence in the instant petition. In the submission of the petitioner, the said letter was neither tendered to the petitioner or any of the representative of the petitioner nor served upon the petitioner. 1 & 2 is false and fabricated document which is prepared by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 to create defence in the instant petition. In the submission of the petitioner, the said letter was neither tendered to the petitioner or any of the representative of the petitioner nor served upon the petitioner. It is also contended that the respondent no.1 has supplied xerox copy of the said document to the petitioner later on 8.12.2006, which is annexed at page no.52 of the compilation of the petition. We have perused the document relied upon by the respondent nos. 1 & 2 which is alleged to have been received by the petitioner on 16.1.2004. The typed copy of this document is annexed at page no.33 by the respondent no.2 to his affidavit and the xerox copy of the said document is annexed by the petitioner at page no.52 to the rejoinder. We have already pointed out that the petitioner had seriously challenged this communication and it is its specific contention that this letter is false, fabricated and prepared by respondent nos. 1 & 2 to create defence in the instant petition. After perusal of this document, typed copy of which is annexed at page no.33 and xerox copy at page 52, we find that the document in question bears neither any date nor any outward number. Xerox copy of the said document shows that on the top of it interalia month September is typed, which shows that letter in question was typed on computer sometime in the month of September. It is common knowledge that the statutory body like the respondent no.1 Corporation makes correspondence under outward numbers and with a date. In the absence of outward number and date on the abovesaid communication coupled with the fact that presence of words .September. on the top of document, when it is the specific case of the respondent nos. 1 & 2 that the said document was acknowledged by the petitioner on 16.1.2004, we are of the opinion that the respondent nos. 1 & 2 are not entitled to rely on this communication. 17. Even if we accept that the said undated communication of respondent no.1 allegedly received by the petitioner on 16.1.2004 as true, in that case also, the same does not take the case of respondent nos. 1 & 2 any further. 1 & 2 are not entitled to rely on this communication. 17. Even if we accept that the said undated communication of respondent no.1 allegedly received by the petitioner on 16.1.2004 as true, in that case also, the same does not take the case of respondent nos. 1 & 2 any further. The purchase notice dated 26.12.2003 is annexed at page 19. The purchase notice is addressed to respondent nos. 1 & 2. The petitioner has attached 4 documents to this purchase notice and one of them is 7/12 extract of the said land. The petitioner in para 4 of the petition has made following pleadings :- .The petitioner further submits that the petitioners served notice dated 26.12.2003 under Section 127 of the MRTP Act on respondent nos. 1 & 2 calling upon them to acquire the land in question which was affected by reservation nos. 71, 73, 75. Along with this letter, the petitioner submitted the documents, list whereof was appended below the said letter.. This contention in the petition is not denied by the respondents. The respondent no.2 by filing reply specifically admitted receipt of the purchase notice. Respondent nos. 1 & 2 have not denied the specific contention of the petitioner that purchase notice was submitted along with the document, list of which was appended below the said letter and one of the documents was 7/12 extract. Therefore, in view of above, we accept the contention of the petitioner that certified copy of the 7/12 extract was sent along with the purchase notice. 7/12 extract is combination of record of rights and crop statement. Rights of the parties are recorded in 7/12 extract. This record of right is a statutory document maintained by the prescribed authority under the Land Revenue Code, 1966 and same is the notice to the public at large as to who are the owners of the land in the record of authorities. In view of this, we are of the considered view that there was no propriety on the part of respondent nos. 1 to 2 to doubt the title of the petitioner. The purchase notice was accompanied with following documents namely, (1) part plan of D.P., Akola (additional area) attached by reservation site Nos. 71, 73 & 75, (2) part plan of D.P. Akola additional area showing petitioner's land in red outline and reservation site nos. 1 to 2 to doubt the title of the petitioner. The purchase notice was accompanied with following documents namely, (1) part plan of D.P., Akola (additional area) attached by reservation site Nos. 71, 73 & 75, (2) part plan of D.P. Akola additional area showing petitioner's land in red outline and reservation site nos. 71, 73 & 75, (3) 7/12 extract, (4) area statement of reserved site 71, 73, 75 and the roads. In view of these facts, we are of the opinion that even assuming that communication sent by the respondent no.1 which allegedly was received by the petitioner on 16.1.2004 is true, in that case also, in our opinion, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 are not justified in doubting petitioner's title to the said land and in any case, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 could not have termed petitioner's notice as vague and insufficient. We are of the considered opinion that even this letter cannot be termed as a step by respondent nos. 1 & 2 towards acquisition of the said land. In this regard, we find that learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is right in placing reliance upon the observations in para 8 of the Supreme Court decision in the case of W.B. Housing Board (supra), which read as follows :- .8. The principal question that arises for consideration is if it were the writ petitioners who were entitled to notice under section 3(2) of the Act or that this provision stood complied with by serving notice on the recorded owners of land in the Record of Rights maintained under Section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. We are of the view that the provisions of service of notice stood complied when notices were served on the persons recorded as owners in the Record of Rights. Record of Rights is a statutory document maintained by the prescribed authority under Section 50 of the Act and it is a notice to the public at large as to who are the owners of the land in the records of the authorities. That would be the reason as to why the writ petitioners themselves applied for mutation of the lands in their names in the year 1990 when in fact they had purchased the same in 1988. That would be the reason as to why the writ petitioners themselves applied for mutation of the lands in their names in the year 1990 when in fact they had purchased the same in 1988. Under Section 3 of the West Bengal Land Reforms act, 1955, the Act overrides other laws if there is anything inconsistent with what is stated in that Act. Section 50 of the Act provides for maintenance of the Record of Rights by the prescribed authority by incorporating therein the changes on account of mutation of names as a result of transfer or inheritance or partition, exchange, etc. Under sub-section (9) of Section 51-A every entry in the Record of Rights shall be presumed to be correct until it is proved that the entry in the Record of Rights is incorrect, proceedings for that, however, will have to be initiated under the Act itself. Otherwise there is every presumption about the correctness of the Record of Rights. As noted above, mutation was effected in September 1995. The Division Bench has observed that the Collector would have been aware of the pendency of the applications of the writ petitioners for mutation of lands in their names when the same were pending in his office. The Bench in effect observed that it was a case where the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing. This observation sounds good, but knowing the working of the government offices it appears to have no place. Of course, the Collector could have asked for a report from the prescribed authority concerned if any application for mutation of the land was pending with him. But that would be expecting too much from the Collector. It is no part of the duty of the Collector to make a roving inquiry into ownership of the persons. We are of the opinion that the requirements of the law were met when notices were served upon the recorded owners as per the Record of Rights. Again we do not think in a case like the present one, it is for the Collector to make enquiries from the registration office to find out if the land had since been sold by the recorded owners. Again we do not think in a case like the present one, it is for the Collector to make enquiries from the registration office to find out if the land had since been sold by the recorded owners. In Winky Dilawari v. Amritsar Improvement Trust this Court observed that the public authorities were not expected to go on making enquiries in the Sub-Registrar's office as to who would be the owner of the property. The Collector in the present case was thus justified in relying on the official record being the Record of Rights as to who were the owners of the land sought to be requisitioned and prudence did not require any further enquiry to be made. We are therefore of the view that notices were properly served under Section 3(2) of the Act on the owners of the land.. The plain reading of above observation does support petitioner's contention that 7/12 extract is a statutory document maintained by the prescribed authority and since this document is annexed with the purchase notice, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 could not have doubted the petitioner's ownership to the said land and termed purchase notice as insufficient. 18. Mr. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel rightly placed reliance on Supreme Court judgment in case of Bhavnagar University & Girnar Traders (cited supra) to contend that failure of respondent nos. 1 & 2 to acquire the land within a period of ten years from the date of issuance of final development plan and even six months thereafter, after issuance of purchase notice, has resulted in lapsing of reservation. The Supreme Court in para nos. 32, 33 & 34 in Bhavnagar University has observed as follows :- .32. Sub-section (2) of Section 20, however, carves out an exception to the exercise of powers by the State as regards acquisition of the land for the purpose of carrying out the development of the area in the manner provided for therein; a bare reading whereof leaves no manner of doubt that in the event the land referred to under sub-section (1) of Section 20 thereof is not acquired or proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced and further, in the event an owner or a person interested in the land serves a notice in the manner specified therein, certain consequences ensue, namely, the designation of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed. A legal fiction, therefore, has been created in the said provision. 33. The purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is well known. When a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect. In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. .v. Finsbury Borough Council Lord Asquith, J. stated the law in the following terms : (All ER p. 599 B-D) If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. See also Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories, Voltas Ltd. v. Union of India, Harish Tanson v. ADM, Allahabad and G. Viswanathan v. Hon'ble Speaker, T.N. Legislative Assembly. 34. The relevant provisions of the Act are absolutely clear, unambiguous and implicit. A plain meaning of the said provisions, in our considered view, would lead to only one conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued by the owner of the land or other person interested therein asking the authority to acquire the land upon expiry of the period specified therein, viz. ten years from the date of issuance of final development plan and in the event pursuant to or in furtherance thereof no action for acquisition thereof is taken, the designation shall lapse.. Plain reading of these observations reveals that failure of Planning Authority to acquire land within ten years of issuance of final development plan and six months thereafter from the issuance of purchase notice will result in lapsing of reservation. The above observations can safely be applied to petitioner's case. 19. The question before the Supreme Court in Girnar Traders was what would constitute a .step. taken by the Municipal Corporation as contemplated under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. The above observations can safely be applied to petitioner's case. 19. The question before the Supreme Court in Girnar Traders was what would constitute a .step. taken by the Municipal Corporation as contemplated under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. In this case, the appellants addressed a purchase notice on 15.3.2002 to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai under Section 127 of MRTP Act stating therein that ten years' period had lapsed on 16.2.2001 and since no proceeding for acquisition of the land as contemplated under Section 127(1) of the MRTP Act or under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 having been commenced, the property should be de-reserved. The purchase notice was served on Municipal Commissioner on 19.3.2002. On 9.9.2002 the Improvement Committee passed resolution recommending the Municipal Corporation to initiate the acquisition proceedings under the provisions of Section 126(2) & (4) of MRTP Act read with Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act. On 13.9.2002 without there being any resolution sanctioning acquisition or taking steps for acquisition, application was sent by the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) to the State Government for initiating acquisition proceedings under Section 126 of the MRTP Act. Thereafter on 16.9.2002 the Corporation passed Resolution No. 956 whereby sanction was given to initiate the acquisition proceedings of the land and the Municipal Commissioner was authorised to make an application to the State Government under the provisions of Section 126(2) & (4) of MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and after the aforesaid resolution was passed, on 17.9.2002 a letter was written by the Chief Engineer, Development Plan to the Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra informing that the Corporation has accorded sanction to initiate acquisition proceedings and later on the State Government on 20.11.2002 issued notification exercising the powers conferred by subsection (4) read with sub-section (2) of section 126 of the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Apex Court in para nos. 31 & 32 observed that the steps towards commencement of acquisition in such a situation would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and not a step which may not result in acquisition and merely for the purpose of seeking time so that Section 127 does not come into operation. Supreme Court further observed that the step taken under the Section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of the land. Supreme Court further observed that the step taken under the Section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of the land. It is step of acquisition of land and not a step for acquisition of the land. Finally it was observed that making of the application to the State Government for acquisition of the land would not be a step for acquisition of the land under reservation. Thus, the step towards acquisition would really commence when the State Government permits the acquisition and as a result thereof, publishes a declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act. 20. In the present case, the respondent nos. 1 & 2 admittedly have not acquired petitioner's land within the period of ten years from the date of commencement of final development plan and within the period of six months thereafter from the date of issuance of purchase notice. We have already observed that alleged reply to the purchase notice by respondent nos. 1 & 2 cannot be relied upon and even if the same is relied upon, the Corporation cannot find any justification to doubt petitioner's title to the said property. In any case, we are of the considered view that the alleged reply by the Corporation also will not constitute a step taken by the respondent nos.1 & 2 as provided under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that failure of respondent nos. 1 & 2 has resulted in lapsing of the reservation insofar as the said land belonging to the petitioner is concerned. 21. This takes us to consider the submission of Mr. Haq, learned Counsel for the intervenor, that in view of the definition of the Planning Authority, the purchase notice ought to have been served on Corporation or ought to have been placed before Councillors in the House and in the absence of placing any material on the part of the petitioner to show that he has given notice to the Corporation as constituted under section 5 of BPMC Act, 1949, petitioner cannot claim lapsing of reservation. This issue is covered by the Division Bench judgment in M/s. C.V. Shah & A.V. Bhat .vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005(3) ALL MR 197). The Division Bench in paragraph nos. 21, 22 & 23 observed as follows :- 21. This issue is covered by the Division Bench judgment in M/s. C.V. Shah & A.V. Bhat .vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005(3) ALL MR 197). The Division Bench in paragraph nos. 21, 22 & 23 observed as follows :- 21. The contention that the notice dated 14.6.2001 is addressed to the Commissioner, Pune Municipal Corporation, Pune and not to the Planning Authority and therefore, not a legal notice is noted to be rejected. Section 136 of the MRTP Act, 1966 provides for the service of notice thus :- S. 136. Service of notice, etc.:- (1) All documents including notices and orders required by this Act or any rule or regulation made thereunder to be served upon any person shall save as otherwise provided in this Act or rule or regulation, be deemed to be duly served - (a) where the document is to be served on a Government department, railways, local authority, statutory authority, company, corporation, society or other body, if the document is addressed to the head of the Government department, General Manager of the Railway, Secretary or Principal Officer of the local authority, authority, company, corporation, society or any other body at its statutory principal, branch, local or registered office, as the case may be, and is either (i) sent by registered post to such office, or (ii) delivered at such office, (b) ................... (c) ................... (2) Any document which is required or authorised to be served on the owner or occupier of any land or building may be addressed .the owner. or .the occupier., as the case may be, of that land or building (naming or describing that land or building) without further name or description and shall be deemed to be duly served. (a) if the document so addressed is sent or delivered in accordance with clause (c) of sub-section (1); or (b) if the document so addressed or a copy thereof so addressed, is delivered to some person on the land or building, (3) ................ (4) ................ (5) ................ (6) ................ 22. Section 136 of the MRTP Act, 1966 provides, interalia, that any notice required under the MRTP Act may be served upon the Principal Officer of the local authority and if such notice is addressed to the Principal Officer of the local authority that shall be deemed to be duly served on the local authority. (5) ................ (6) ................ 22. Section 136 of the MRTP Act, 1966 provides, interalia, that any notice required under the MRTP Act may be served upon the Principal Officer of the local authority and if such notice is addressed to the Principal Officer of the local authority that shall be deemed to be duly served on the local authority. It is not in dispute that the Commissioner is the Principal Officer of the Municipal Corporation. The contention that the expression .any person. in section 136 does not include the Planning Authority is wholly fallacious. The expression .any person. is too wide and comprehensive and includes both natural and unnatural person. That it would include the local authority is clear from clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 136 itself. We may immediately notice here that the Planning Authority is defined as 'local authority' in section 2(19) and the 'local authority' in section 2(15) means, interalia, the Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Fort short, BPMC Act). That the Pune Municipal Corporation is the Municipal Corporation constituted under the BPMC Act is not in doubt. 23. Moreover, section 152 of the MRTP Act, 1966 also provides that the powers and functions of the Planning Authority shall interalia for the purposes of section 136 be exercised and performed in the case of Municipal Corporation by the Municipal Commissioner or such other officer as he may be appointed in this behalf. Thus, the notice contemplated in section 127 of the MRTP Act, 1966 on the Planning Authority if served on its Principal Officer is a good service.. A plain reading of these observations does show that purchase notice though contemplated to be served on planning authority can be served on its principal officer. The respondent no.1 has admitted service of purchase notice and it cannot be said that the notice is not in accordance with the Section 127 since it is not served on Corporation. In our view, petitioners have complied with provisions of Section 127 of the Act and the submission of Mr. Haq, learned Counsel for the intervenors, deserves to be rejected. 22. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that said land belonging to the petitioner stands de-reserved. Consequently, the impugned order passed by respondent no.3 Collector dated 28.8.2006 is quashed and set aside. The petition, therefore, succeeds. Haq, learned Counsel for the intervenors, deserves to be rejected. 22. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that said land belonging to the petitioner stands de-reserved. Consequently, the impugned order passed by respondent no.3 Collector dated 28.8.2006 is quashed and set aside. The petition, therefore, succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (1) & (2) with no order as to costs.