P. R. BORKAR, J,:- This is an appeal preferred by the original accused Deepak, who is convicted of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Majalgaon in Sessions Case No.3 of 2005 decided on 30.8.2005. For offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code the appellant is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for one year; and for offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code he is sentenced to suffer R.I. for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.1.000/- in default to undergo R.I. for six months. 2. Appellant- Deepak was tried with his wife Dwarkabai and mother Sushilabai for committing offences punishable under Sections 302. 307. 324 all read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is alleged that in furtherance of their common intention the three accused had caused murder of Urmila Gajendra Thorat, attempted to commit murder of PW-6 Gajendra Thorat and also voluntarily caused hurt to PW-9 Malanbai with an axe, a deadly weapon and thus committed offences punishable under Sections 302. 307, 324 each read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant is acquitted of offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Mother and wife of the appellant are acquitted of all offences charged. 3. Briefly stated facts giving rise to this case are as follows. The appellant Deepak is cousin of PW6 Gajendra. Their houses are adjoining each other at village Pangari, Taluka OharaI', District Beed. On 3.10.2004 PW-6 Gajendra, his mother PW-9 Malanbai and his wife Urmilabai had gone to their field for thrashing Sunflowers. In the evening when deceased Urmila and PW-9 Malanbai came home, they saw that the accused had removed parapet wall above roof on the common wall of the houses of appellant and PW-6 Gajendra. The roof consisted of corrugated tin sheets. They also found debris. So deceased Urmila and PW -9 Malanbai started quarrelling with the appellant, his wife and mother. There was exchange of words. At that time PW-9 Gajendra came home. At that time accused no.1 came and inflicted a knife blow on the abdomen of Urmila. She fell down. The roof consisted of corrugated tin sheets. They also found debris. So deceased Urmila and PW -9 Malanbai started quarrelling with the appellant, his wife and mother. There was exchange of words. At that time PW-9 Gajendra came home. At that time accused no.1 came and inflicted a knife blow on the abdomen of Urmila. She fell down. PW9 Gajendra went for help, but appellant inflicted some more knife blows on PW-6 Gajendra. Neighbour PW-8 Abasaheb Thorat and others intervened. It is also alleged that original accused no.2 Dwarkabai had held PW-9 Malanbai and original accused no.3 Sushilabai gave a blow with axe to J'W-9 Malanbai, but she avoided the blow and had an injury on the check. 4. Thereafter injured PW-6 Gajendra, his wife Urmila and PW-9 Malanbai were taken to Dharur. However, doctor was not available there and, therefore, the injured were taken to Ambajogai by PW -1 Prakash Shingare who is maternal cousin of PW-6 Gajendra. On way to Ambajogai, Urmila had succumbed to the injuries. PW-6 Gajendra told as to how incident happened to PW-1 Prakash Shingare and PW-I Prakash Shingare lodged complaint at the police station as above. Thereafter crime was registered. Police came to the spot and drew spot panchanama. Inquest on the dead body was performed. Dead body was sent for postmortem which was performed by PW-2 Dr. Tapase. Dr. Chausalkar (PW-3) examined PW-6 Gajendra and treated him. There is no medical evidence regarding PW-9 Malanbai. Police arrested the appellant. He produced the knife used in the incident. The clothes of deceased Urmila and PW-6 Gajendra were attached. The attached articles were sent to the Chemical Analyser. Police recorded statements of witnesses. 8. It is argued before us that at the time of evidence, PW-6 Gajendra and PW-9 Malanbai stated that on the day of incident they worked with deceased Urmila in the field. There was thrashing of Sunflowers. In the evening Urmila and Malanbai came home. They found that parapet wall of the common wall supporting the roof was removed. So they questioned the accused. There was verbal quarrel between PW-9 Malanbai and Urmila on one hand and the appellant his mother and wife on the other. At that time PW-6 Gajendra came home. At that time appellant gave knife blow to Urmila, as a result, Urmila sustained stab injury in her abdomen and she fell down. So they questioned the accused. There was verbal quarrel between PW-9 Malanbai and Urmila on one hand and the appellant his mother and wife on the other. At that time PW-6 Gajendra came home. At that time appellant gave knife blow to Urmila, as a result, Urmila sustained stab injury in her abdomen and she fell down. PW-6 Gajendra went to her rescue, but appellant attacked PW-6 Gajendra with knife and caused him injuries. At that time PW-9 Malanbi was also held by Dwarkabai the wife of the appellant and axe blow was given to PW-9 Malanbai by Sushilabai the mother of the accused. PW-9 Malanbai tried to dodge the blow, but she sustained injury on her cheek. PW -8 Abasaheb Thorat supported the said evidence. 6. PW-1 Prakash Shingare who is maternal cousin of PW-6 Gajendra stated that at Dharur he learnt that PW-6 Gajendra, his wife and mother were injured, so he came at the hospital but doctor was not there at the Public Health Centre, Dharur. Therefore, he arranged for a vehicle for taking the injured to Ambajogai and while they were proceeding to Ambajogai Urmila expired. He further stated that on the basis of information given by PW-6 Gajendra he lodged complaint which is proved at Exh.22. As per complaint, the appellant had attacked PW-6 Gajendra with knife and when the appellant was inflicting injuries on PW-6 Gajendra his wife Urmila intervened and the appellant gave blow with knife on her abdomen, as a result she fell down and then people intervened. 7. It is argued before us by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri Kaldate that the complaint lodged by PW-I Prakash Shingare was on the basis of information given to him by PW-6 Gajendra Thorat. He had not himself seen the incident. Perhaps there may be some mistake in understanding the sequence of incident and, therefore, in the complaint it is stated that first PW-6 Gajendra was attacked and Urmila went to intervene and was injured; though as per eyewitnesses, namely PW-6 Gajendra, PW-8 Abasaheb Thorat and PW-9 Malanbai the appellant first gave blow with knife on the abdomen of Urmila and then gave knife blows to PW-6 Gajendra who had gone to help Urmila. 8. 8. In our considered opinion, it is possible that on seeing that husband is being attacked with knife, Urmila might have intervened to save him and thus there may be first blow on Urmila or it may happen that after some blows were given to PW-6 Gajendra. Urmila might have intervened and she was injured. In the melee there could be some error of observation. But we are more inclined to accept the explanation given by the Additional Public Prosecutor Shri. Kaldate that it is mere error in communication or understanding. 9. It is argued before us that appellant's mother and wife who were other accused before the Trial Court are acquitted. Similarly the appellant is also acquitted of offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. So the appellant is acquitted for causing injuries to PW-9 Malanbai and we need not consider that part. 10. It is also argued before us that absolutely there was no intention of appellant to cause death of Urmila and merely because she suddenly intervened Vo/hen quarrel was going on between the appellant and PW-6 Gajendra, she was injured and, therefore, it cannot be a murder. In other words. Shri Dhorde, advocate for the appellant argued that there is nothing on record to show that appellant had even intention to cause death of PW-6 Gajendra. According to him at the most appellant wanted to cause him hurt with knife and merely because Urmila intervened suddenly, she got fatal injury. Under the circumstances offence under Section 302 or Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code are not made out and conviction of the appellant to that extent should be set aside. 11. If it is proved that appellant had intention of causing death of PW-6 Gajendra in that case in view of Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code the appellant would be guilty of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly. in case appellant had intention of causing death of Urmila offence would be under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Even if appellant had intention of causing injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death to either of them, he would be guilty under Section 302 and Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. Similarly. in case appellant had intention of causing death of Urmila offence would be under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Even if appellant had intention of causing injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death to either of them, he would be guilty under Section 302 and Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. Shri. Dhorde advocate for the appellant also argued that there is nothing on record to show that there was any previous quarrel, dispute or enmity between the appellant on one hand and the family of PW-6 Gajendra on the other. The incident had taken place due to sudden provocation and quarrel. He argued that when prosecution witnesses stated that when PW-8 Malanbai and Urmila went to question the accused about removing the parapet wall of the common wall, accused gave abuses, but it could not be one way affair. There must be exchange of abuses. He also stated that no blood stains were found on the spot at the time of incident and, therefore, perhaps PW -6 Gajendra and his mother and wife might have entered house of the accused. However, there is no such evidence nor there is any suggestion on the part of the accused to that effect. The defence of the accused is of total denial. We cannot accept a new story put forth for defence of accused for which there is no foundation in the evidence, at least by way of suggestion or possibility. 13. PW-2 Dr. Tapase has performed postmortem examination on dead body of Urmila on 4.6.2002. He found spindle shaped stab wound over the left lumbar region 2 and 1/2 cm. x 1 and 1/2 cm. cavity deep oblique 3 cm. left to Umblicure and 4 cm. above left iliac arrest. Both angles of wound acute and both edges were sharp and reddish. The external injury was antemortcm. On internal examination he found that external injury mentioned above was extending forward, upwards and left to right involving greater momentum, the corresponding vessels of stomach were also injured. He came across spindle shaped stab wound to greater momentum of size 3 cm. x 2 cm. into through and through involving corresponding vessels. The margins of injuries were sharp and both angles were cute. The peritoneum cavity contained 1500 cc. fluid blood. He came across spindle shaped stab wound to greater momentum of size 3 cm. x 2 cm. into through and through involving corresponding vessels. The margins of injuries were sharp and both angles were cute. The peritoneum cavity contained 1500 cc. fluid blood. The doctor further stated that he noticed two stab wounds of size 3 cm. x 1 cm. into cavity, deep to the middle 1/3rd part and anterior superior surface of the stomach near the greater curvature. Another injury was of size 2 cm. x 1 cm into cavity deep. The margins of the injuries were sharp and both angles acute reddish involving corresponding vessels. He found stomach almost empty. According to the doctor, the cause of death of victim was hemorrhage shock due to stab injury. The doctor stated that it was possible with knife attached in this case. The injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Thus he explained that there was one external injury but more internal injuries. So it is clear that after knife was thrust into the body there was movement of it which caused extensive damage and two internal injuries. There is nothing in cross-examination to disbelieve the doctor's evidence. The description of internal and external injuries clearly shows that the injury was very deep. 14. Dr. Vandana Chausalkar (PW-3) was Medical Officer in the Government Hospital, Ambajogai and she examined PW-6 Gajendra and found following injuries. "1. Incised penetrating injury on right scapular region of 1.5 cm. x 2 cm. x 2 cm. 2. Incised penetrating injury on left post axillary area at the level of 9th rib of size 1.5 cm. x I cm. x 2 cm. 3. Incised penetrating injury on left mid axillary area at the level of 8th rib of size 1.5 cm. x I cm. x 2 cm. 4. Incised injury at inter scapular area of size 2 cm. x 1 cm. 5. Incised wound at the abdomen on its left side of Umbilicus of size 2 cm. x 1 cm. x 1 cm." 15. Dr. Chousalkar stated that injuries were caused within 24 hours and injuries were caused to post axillary and middle axillary area at the level of 8th and 9th rib were grievous in nature. Rest of the injuries were simple in nature. She proved certificate Exh.27. x 1 cm. x 1 cm." 15. Dr. Chousalkar stated that injuries were caused within 24 hours and injuries were caused to post axillary and middle axillary area at the level of 8th and 9th rib were grievous in nature. Rest of the injuries were simple in nature. She proved certificate Exh.27. According to the doctor, knife article 10 attached in this case was sufficient to cause the incised wound. It may be noted that all 5 injuries are incised wounds, 2 on chest, one in abdomen and 2 on scapular area. 16. There is also evidence of PW-7 Ashok Jagtap who was panch on attachment of clothes of the deceased and PW-6 Gajendra and the accused. Those clothes were attached under panchanamas Exhs.34 to 36, respectively. This witness further stated that appellant Deepak showed willingness to produce knife and accordingly memorandum Exh.37 was prepared. According to accused he had kept knife in the house of his brother Chandrahas which was in dilapidated condition. Accused thereafter led police and panch as to the dilapidated house of Chandrahas. Appellant accused Deepak entered the house and panch and police followed him and accused produced one knife which was attached under panchanama Exh.37/1. It is article 10. This article was identified by eye-witnesses as the same article used in crime. 17. The report of the Chemical Analyser is produced on record and it clearly shows that the knife article 10 sent to chemical analysis bore blood stains of 'A' and 'B' groups, which are the groups of blood found on the clothes of deceased Urmila and PW-6 Gajendra. Here we may refer to the report of the Chemical Analyser Exh.44 and the forwarding letter sent by the Investigating Officer to the Chemical Analyser Exh.43. Thus it is established that the knife attached in this matter is used in the crime. Exh.43 and discovery panchanama Exh.37 show that the blade of the knife is 12 fingers in length and its handle was 6 fingers in length. The upper portion of the blade has angular shape. A glance at the knife article 10 clearly shows that it is not an ordinary knife used in kitchen. It is also not a pen knife. It is necessarily something like dagger used only as weapon. 18. The upper portion of the blade has angular shape. A glance at the knife article 10 clearly shows that it is not an ordinary knife used in kitchen. It is also not a pen knife. It is necessarily something like dagger used only as weapon. 18. PW -4 Vilas Giri is panch on inquest, PW-5 Bhagwan Landge is panch on spot panch an am a and PW-10 P.S.I. Akolkar has investigated the matter. 19. It is argued before us that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of Urmila. It is also argued that there was no intention to cause death of even Gajendra. 20. If we consider the incident as described by three eye-witnesses, it is clear that when PW-6 Gajendra, his mother PW-9 Malanbai and wife Urmila had gone to their field behind their back the parapet wall over the common wall which was supporting roof was removed and, therefore, deceased Urmila and PW-9 Malanbai went to question the appellant, his wife and mother. Appellant started abusing. PW-6 Gajendra thereafter came and on seeing him the accused came with knife and the incident had taken place. It may be noted that as many as 5 incised wounds are caused to PW-6 Gajendra and one injury as described above was caused on Urmila. Absolutely there was no reason for appellant to take knife and assault Urmila or Gajendra. There is nothing on record even by way suggestion to show that Urmila, Gajendra or his mother have done anything to provoke the appellant. As stated earlier, when there was quarrel we can assume that there might be exchange of abuses, but such verbal abuses cannot be said to be a 'fight' as contemplated in Exception 4 of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It is not case of the accused that PW-6 Gajendra had attacked on him or there was any scuffle. 21. Intention of a person can be gathered from circumstances and the acts of a person. In deciding intention of accused the Court may consider the nature of weapon used, the part of the body of the victim chosen by accused for attack, the number of blows administered, force used by assailant, etc. In this case, user of knife was not justified. The knife used is a deadly weapon like dagger and not an agricultural implement or household knife. In this case, user of knife was not justified. The knife used is a deadly weapon like dagger and not an agricultural implement or household knife. This is not a case where accused used some instrument/article easily available at hand and used it in heat of anger. It is not the case that PW-6 Gajendra was armed with any weapon. PW-6 Gajendra, deceased Urmila and PW-9 Malanbai were unarmed persons. Merely because they abused for removal of parapet wall, there was no reason to get so angry so as to inflict injuries with knife. It may be noted that the injuries to deceased Urmila was on a vital part and internally spindle shaped injury was caused. Out of injuries to PW-6 Gajendra, one injury was on post axillary area of 9th rib and another was on left mid axillary area of 8th rib. Both these injuries were stated to be grievous by Dr. Chausalkar. One injury was stated to be in the abdomen on left side and two injuries were on scapular region. All were incised wounds. So fatal parts of the body at the level of chest and abdomen were aimed. It is not that one or two blows were given. As many as 6 blows were given. If we have to accept the theory in First Information Report that after giving blows to PW-6 Gajendra. Urmila intervened and she sustained stab injury in that case we will have to assume that even after five blows to PW-6 Gajendra, accused had not calmed down, but he wanted to inflict some more blows on PW-6 Gajendra. If we are to accept the statement on oath that first Urmila was injured and when PW-6 Gajendra went to help her, he was inflicted five injuries. In either case the intention is clearly to cause death of PW-6 Gajendra. Here number of blows given and the parts of the body on which those were given, the weapon used become relevant. In either case the intention is clearly to cause death of PW-6 Gajendra. Here number of blows given and the parts of the body on which those were given, the weapon used become relevant. Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code clearly lays down thus, if a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause. In other words, there is no escape from conclusion that the appellant intended to cause death of PW-6 Gajendra. Even assuming that he did not intend to cause injury to Urmila, who suddenly intervened, still under Section 30 I of the Indian Penal Code for death of Urmila he would be guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 22. In this case, it can be said that there was some premeditation, in as much as the appellant used knife which was not an ordinary kitchen knife or pen knife. He was armed with a weapon when PW-6 Gajendra came and as per prosecution case the appellant took out said knife from his pocket. The manner in which the injuries were inflicted on Urmila, particularly internal injuries shows that blow given was clearly with intention to cause her death. In our considered opinion, the present case falls under both clauses Firstly and Thirdly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It does not fall under Exceptions First or Fourth. 23. In the case of Jaspal Singh, AIR 1986 SC 683 it is observed that the nature of the offence docs not depend merely on the location of the injury caused by the accused. The intention of the person causing the injury must be gathered from a careful examination of all the facts and circumstances of each given case. 23. In the case of Jaspal Singh, AIR 1986 SC 683 it is observed that the nature of the offence docs not depend merely on the location of the injury caused by the accused. The intention of the person causing the injury must be gathered from a careful examination of all the facts and circumstances of each given case. In that case the appellant had intended to cause injury to fatal parts of the deceased and had administered a stab wound on the back side of the chest of the deceased and when the deceased's brother tried to intervene, the appellant inflicted two stab wounds on him also in the same manner, which, however, did not prove fatal, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 307 were maintained. 24. In the case of Jagrup Singh Vs. The State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 , so far as clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, following law is laid down in para 7 : "7. The ingredients of Clause Thirdly of S.300 of the Code were brought out by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1958 SCR 1495 at p.1503 : 2007 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 33 : ( AIR 1958 SC 465 AT P.467) in his terse language: "To put it shortly. the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S:300. "3rdly". First, it must establish. quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended, Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words: (at p.468) The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence of the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become lucus classicus. The test laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra) for the applicability of Clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under Clause Thirdly of S.300 of the Code, culpable homicide is murder if both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted." 25, It is argued before us that there was no previous enmity or dispute and as such there was no reason for the appellant Deepak to have intention to cause death of Urmila or his cousin Gajendra, who was his neighbour and, therefore, Clause Firstly will not be applicable. Even assuming for a moment that it is so, Clause Thirdly is clearly applicable. There is nothing beyond the injury and the fact is that the appellant inflicted it. The only possible inference is that the appellant intended to inflict it. It is not proved or even suggested that the appellant intended to cause some other injury, but due to accident or for some other reason Urmila sustained injury on her abdomen. 26, In this case there are no circumstances to warrant conclusion other than that the appellant had intention to inflict same injury which deceased Urmila sustained. Merely because there was no previous enmity or dispute would not be sufficient. When a person is short tampered and has become very angry he loses control over his discretion. Moreover a person may be secretly nursing an old insult or hurt and same may come out at such occasion, Others may not know or remember it. 27, In this case, if it is accepted that the first blow was given to Urmila and then the blows were given to PW-6 Gajendra, in that case intention of causing death was very obvious, Even in case it is held that Urmila intervened when she saw appellant giving blows to her husband Gajendra, then inference is already five blows were given to Gajendra and the appellant -was not satisfied with them and he was going to inflict some more blows. 28, We may consider the cases cited by the learned advocate Shri. Dhorde for the appellant. The first case is Sukumar Roy Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 2006 SC 3406 . In that case, during altercation between accused and deceased accused Phani struck Prafulla on his head with lathi and the accused Sukumar hit Prafulla with a bhali which pierced the abdomen of Prafulla. There was no other injury. So that was a case of one blow with stick by onc person and another accused giving blow with Bhali. and. therefore, intention to kill or cause injury as is likely to cause death was held not proved and conviction was under Section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code. 29. In the case of Dharam and Others Vs. State of Haryana, 2007 CRI.L.J. 791 : [2007 ALL SCR 335], the fatal injury was not inflicted with intention to cause death. There were two spear blows. 29. In the case of Dharam and Others Vs. State of Haryana, 2007 CRI.L.J. 791 : [2007 ALL SCR 335], the fatal injury was not inflicted with intention to cause death. There were two spear blows. As observed in para 16, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was held that fatal injury was not inflicted with the intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death of the deceased and, therefore, conviction was brought to Section 304, Part-II of the Indian Penal Code but that was in the peculiar facts of that case. 30. In Sukhbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 1168 , the time span between quarrel and fight was only few minutes. There was no previous enmity. Blows were repeated after deceased had fallen down and became helpless. In that case there was provocation and case was also covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellants were punished under Section 304, Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 31. In the case of jagpati Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 1360 , the injuries were inflicted in a sudden quarrel. There was no intention to cause particular injury. Two weapons which were blunt, i.e. a ringed stick and an ordinary stick, were used. 32. In the case of Kashinath Baban Palkar Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1996(1) B.Cr.C. 154, it was observed that when there is failure to prove place of offence, testimony of witnesses could not be accepted. That was the conclusion drawn in the facts and circumstances of that case by the Division Bench of this Court. 33. We may refer to some more cases which lay down law on the subject. In the case of Babubhai Ranchodbhai Patel and another Vs, State of Gujarat, 1994 Cri.L.J. 2099, the Supreme Court held that though there was sudden quarrel and accused inflicted knife injury on spinal region of the deceased, the injury penetrated through right lobe of liver which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was held that injury was not caused during grappling between accused and deceased but in straight attack by accused on deceased. Even though case is of sudden quarrel, mere 'knowledge' cannot be attributed to accused. It was held that injury was not caused during grappling between accused and deceased but in straight attack by accused on deceased. Even though case is of sudden quarrel, mere 'knowledge' cannot be attributed to accused. Accused in the circumstances clearly intended to cause the injury and was convicted under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. 34. It may be noted that for bringing the case under Exception 4 of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, there must be a 'fight' and 'fight' does not mean mere verbal exchange of words. The word "fight" conveys something more than verbal quarrel. It postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged. It takes at least two to make a fight like in affray. A fight is combat between two or more persons with or without weapons. The word "fight" occurring in Section 300, Explanation I postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged between the parties. Here we may refer to following observations from para 6 in the case of Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade Y s, State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 133 . "The circumstances of the case disclose that no right of private defence, either of person or of property, had ever accrued to the appellant. The deceased was unarmed. Exception 2 can have no application. It is true that some of the conditions for the applicability of Exception 4 to S.300 exist here, but not all. The quarrel had broken out suddenly, but there was no sudden fight, between the deceased and the appellant. 'Fight' postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged. The deceased was unarmed. He did not cause any injury to the appellant or his companions. Furthermore, no less than three fatal injuries were inflicted by the appellant with an axe, which is a formidable weapon on the unarmed victim. Appellant is therefore, not entitled to the benefit of Exception 4, either." In para II of Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak Vs, State of Gujarat, (2003)9 SCC 322 : [2003 ALL MR (Cri) 1780 (S.C.), it is observed that a "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. A fight sudden I y takes place for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. Same law is reiterated in para 10 of Thankachan and another Vs. State of Kerala (2007 AIR SCW 7153 : 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 3598 (S.C.). A fight sudden I y takes place for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. Same law is reiterated in para 10 of Thankachan and another Vs. State of Kerala (2007 AIR SCW 7153 : 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 3598 (S.C.). 35. In the case of Virsa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : [2007 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 33], it is observed in para II as follows : "II. In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for, if he does not know that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on common sense; the kind of enquiry that "twelve good men and true" could readily appreciate and understand." 36. So considering the totality of the circumstances, in out considered view, the appellant has committed an offence of murder in causing death of Urmila and he also attempted to murder PW-6 Gajendra. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 37. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.