JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma. J. (Oral)- This regular second appeal raises the following substantial question of law: “Whether jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred when a statute statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a matter of appeal?” 2. The plaintiff respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Municipal Committee from recovering the house tax @ 3726/- (Rs. Three thousand seven hundred and twenty six only) annually for the years 1977 to 1981 regarding the building No. 4468 on the ground that the plaintiffs are owner of the building in question and the annual rental value of the same was assessed as Rs.720/- (Rs. Seven hundred and twenty only). The Municipal Committee then assessed the annual value of the building in question as Rs.27600/- (Rs. Twenty seven thousand and six hundred only) annually for the year 1977 against law and facts and thereon assessed the house tax @ Rs.3726/- (Rs. Three thousand. seven hundred and twenty six only). It was claimed that the assessment of the said annual rental value of Rs.27600/- (Rs. Twenty seven thousand and six hundred only) for the building in question was illegal, void, arbitrary, without authority and against the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, and the Punjab Municipal Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 3. The appellant defendant filed written statement and took a plea that the suit was not competent as no notice under Section 49 of the Act was given to the defendant before filing the suit. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit was also challenged and it was also pleaded that the plaintiff respondents were estopped by their own act and conduct from challenging the assessment in question. The assessment of the rental value was defended on the plea that no objection against the said assessment was filed and claimed that the suit was liable to be dismissed with special costs. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court pleased to frame the following issues: 1. Whether the assessment of house tax for the year 1977 78 to 80-81 made by the defendant Committee is illegal, arbitrary and ineffective ? OPP 2. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD 3. Whether the suit is not competent without notice under Section 49 of the Punjab Municipal Act ? OPD 4.
Whether the assessment of house tax for the year 1977 78 to 80-81 made by the defendant Committee is illegal, arbitrary and ineffective ? OPP 2. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD 3. Whether the suit is not competent without notice under Section 49 of the Punjab Municipal Act ? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct ? OPD 5. Relief. 5. Issues No.1 & 2 were taken together and it was held that the assessment was illegal and arbitrary as the Municipal Committee has failed to follow the settled law and provisions of the Act and in view of this finding, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that as the tax/enhancement thereof was not permitted under the Act, therefore, no bar can be imposed against the party to approach the Civil Court. It was held that provisions of Section 84 of the Act were merely confined to those acts which are within the powers of the authorities and the bar mentioned did not apply to the assessment which was not done in accordance with law. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld and the suit was decreed. The appeal against the said order also failed. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was rejected by relying upon the judgment of this Court in the Case of Municipal Committee Ladwa Vs. Daryat Lal and others 1982 Shimla Law Journal 362 wherein this Court has been pleased to lay down that where tax is imposed without following the due procedure laid down under the law and the assessee has not exhausted remedies under Sections 84 to 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, suit for permanent injunction was competent before the Civil Court and in view of this, finding recorded by the learned trial Court was affirmed by the learned lower appellate Court. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N.D.M.C. Vs. Satish Chand (deceased) by LR Ram Chand (2004-1) P.L.R. 257 to contend that the finding of the learned Courts below on issue No.2 cannot be sustained as the statute provides a special remedy of appeal against the order of assessment and imposition of tax and in view of this the jurisdiction of the civil court stands barred. Para Nos.
Satish Chand (deceased) by LR Ram Chand (2004-1) P.L.R. 257 to contend that the finding of the learned Courts below on issue No.2 cannot be sustained as the statute provides a special remedy of appeal against the order of assessment and imposition of tax and in view of this the jurisdiction of the civil court stands barred. Para Nos. 6 & 9 of the said judgment read as under :- “6. It will be noticed from the provisions contained in Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a bar to file a civil suit may be express or implied. An express bar is where a Statute itself contains a provision that the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred e.g., the bar contained in Section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. An implied bar may arise when a Statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal as contained in the Punjab Municipal Act which is the subject matter of the present case. Section 86 of the Act restrains a party from challenging assessment and levy of tax in any manner other than as provided under the Act. A provision like this is the implied bar envisaged in section 9 C.P.C. against filing a civil suit. In Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (dead) by LRs V. Union of India, [A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 752] this court observed: “Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right not pre-existing, in commonlaw, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created into flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts’ jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the Statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the Civil Court’s jurisdiction then both the Common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving upon an element of election to the persons of inherence. To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered in Dhulabhai’s case.” 9.
To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered in Dhulabhai’s case.” 9. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sobha Singh & Sons (P) Ltd. V. New Delhi Municipal Committee, [34 (1988)Delhi Law Times 91] had an occasion to consider the question of maintainability of a civil suit challenging the assessment and levy of property tax by the NDMC. Sections 84 and 86 of the Act came in for consideration. It was held that the provisions of appeal contained in section 84(1) of the Act provided a complete remedy to a party aggrieved against the, assessment and levy of tax. Section 86 provides that the remedy of appeal is the only remedy to a party to challenge assessment for purposes of property tax. No other remedy was available to a party in such circumstances. It follows that the remedy of civil suit is barred.” 7. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the substantial question of law has to be answered in favour of the appellant. Consequently, it is held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit filed by the plaintiff respondents to challenge the assessment or imposition of house tax in view of the availability of remedy for appeal as provided under the statute. Consequently this appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are set aside. ------------------------