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2007 DIGILAW 172 (KAR)

GURUSIDDAWWA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

2007-03-13

D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR

body2007
ORDER However enlarged a meaning and interpretation is given to Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act'), I am still unable to comprehend with the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Gulbarga, in its proceedings No. LRM-TNC-212-75-75, dated 30-7-2002, vide Annexure-C, granting occupancy rights to the third respondent who had filed Form 7 against petitioners, who are daughters of his elder brother in respect of the lands which were owned by the father of the applicant and the petitioners' grandfather one by name Irappa Jevargi. 2. It is in such circumstances, the third respondent claimed the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, i.e., as a deemed tenant as he was in possession and cultivation of the subject lands. It is not in dispute that at the relevant time the petitioners' father was no more alive and that the petitioners were married with the help of the third respondent himself by the mother of the third respondent and the third respondent was the only male member of the family. The claim of tenancy rights by a sole surviving male member in respect of the lands owned by the joint family against female members is opposed to all objects and intents of the Act and by no stretch of imagination can be considered to be a bona fide or tenable claim. 3. It is no doubt that the parties were before the Civil Court in a suit filed by the petitioners seeking to get out of the clutches of the third respondent praying for a declaration that the third respondent should be relieved from their guardianship and also prayed for release of the lands in their favour but this suit it appears was not prosecuted diligently. Be that as it may, ultimately, the impugned order of the Land Tribunal dated 30-7-2002 is one which cannot be said to be an order that can be passed in terms of Section 48-A of the Act. 4. The Land Tribunal in fact has passed the order in the third round. In the first round the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of the third respondent against which petitioners had come to this Court and the matter was remanded. In the second round the Land Tribunal noticed the relationship between the parties and rejected the claim. 4. The Land Tribunal in fact has passed the order in the third round. In the first round the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of the third respondent against which petitioners had come to this Court and the matter was remanded. In the second round the Land Tribunal noticed the relationship between the parties and rejected the claim. Thereafter the third respondent had approached this Court and the matter was again remanded to the Land Tribunal and in the third round the present order has been passed. 5. The Land Tribunal has gone about by discussing the scope of Section 4 and concluded that none of the exceptions mentioned in Section 4 being applicable to the present situation, and as the third respondent was in possession and cultivation it is inevitable he should be taken as a deemed tenant under Section 4 of the Act. 6. I have heard Sri Lakshmeesha, learned Counsel appearing for Sri Manikappa Patil for the petitioner, Sri Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State and the Land Tribunal, Gulbarga. 7. While the provisions of Section 4 is examined and tests are applied individually as to whether the third respondent was the member of the owner's family or was looking after the land as a hired labourer or one appointed to supervise the land on behalf of the members of the owner's family or a mortgagee in possession and the Tribunal has answered each of these questions in the negative and therefore proceeded to conclude that the third respondent is a deemed tenant, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the third respondent was the only sole male member in the family even at the time when the application was filed. 8. Section 4 of the Act reads as: “4. 8. Section 4 of the Act reads as: “4. Persons to be deemed tenants.-A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not.- (a) a member of the owner's family; or (b) a servant or a hired labourer on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of owner's family; or (c) a mortgagee in possession: Provided that if upon an application made by the owner within one year from the appointed day (x x x).- (i) the Tribunal declares that such person is not a tenant and its decision is not reversed on appeal; or (ii) the Tribunal refuses to make such declaration but its decision is reversed on appeal. Such person shall not be deemed to be a tenant". 9. Though Sri Chandrasekhar relied on and drew my attention to a partition deed said to have been effected between the third respondent and his mother Smt. Annemma, it is not a partition in the eye of law as it is an arrangement of convenience and not one giving any share to any other member and other male member who had left behind his daughters being not at all included in the so-called partition. The third respondent was virtually in the position of care taker of the properties of the family if not the kartha and in fact had to a considerable extent discharged the responsibilities of performing the marriages of the petitioners. It is rather ironic that such a person should have turned around and resorted to the filling of an application in Form 7 and the Tribunal proceeded to act upon such an application to confer occupancy rights in his favour. 10. As the matter is within the family, it is for the petitioners and the third respondent who is their uncle to resolve the matter amongst themselves in an amicable manner, rather than to resort to further litigation. The order passed by the Land Tribunal cannot be sustained in law and the Form 7 in the first instance being not tenable and not one which could have been allowed by the Land Tribunal and accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the Land Tribunal cannot be sustained in law and the Form 7 in the first instance being not tenable and not one which could have been allowed by the Land Tribunal and accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Land Tribunal is quashed. The application of the third respondent in Form 7 stands rejected. Rule made absolute.