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2007 DIGILAW 1730 (PNJ)

Karam Nath v. Gurbux Singh Juneja (Dead) Through His L. Rs.

2007-09-21

SATISH KUMAR MITTAL

body2007
Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. The landlord has filed this revision petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act) for setting aside the order dated 10.04.1990 passed by the Appellate Authority, whereby while reversing the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller, the ejectment application filed by the landlord on the ground that the Respondent-tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises continuously for a period of four months without any reasonable cause, has been dismissed. 2. In the present case, the demised premises is a shop situated at Nawanshahr. It was let out to the Respondent-tenant in the year 1978 at a monthly rent of Rs. 310/-. The tenant started the business of cloth in the said shop. On 25.03.1987, the petitioner filed an ejectment application against the Respondent-tenant and sought his ejectment from the demised premises on two grounds, i.e., that the tenant had not paid rent w.e.f. 01.06.1985 along with house tax; and secondly that the shop was lying closed since 03.05.1986, thus, the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises continuously for a period of four months without reasonable cause. It was also mentioned in the application that there was no electricity consumption since the premises were lying closed and the officials of the Electricity Department had made a report regarding locking of the premises. 3. After notice, the Respondent-tenant appeared and contested the above-said ejectment application. On the first date of hearing, he tendered the claimed arrears of rent along with interest and cost, which were subsequently found to be valid. Regarding closure of the shop, he had taken the pleas that the shop was not lying closed and he had not ceased to occupy the same. It was pleaded that he was not keeping good health and even if there was no consumption of electricity, then it was due to his ill health. 4. After taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties, the Rent Controller allowed the ejectment application on the ground that the Respondent-tenant ceased to occupy the demised premises without any reasonable cause. Regarding non-payment of rent, it was held that the tenant had paid the entire claimed rent on the first date of hearing which was held to be valid. Regarding non-payment of rent, it was held that the tenant had paid the entire claimed rent on the first date of hearing which was held to be valid. While coming to the conclusion that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises without reasonable cause, the Rent Controller relied upon the evidence led by the landlord to prove that the shop was lying closed from August, 1986 to June, 1987 and during that period, no electricity was consumed. This fact has been proved by AW9-Darshan Singh Hira, an official of the Punjab State Electricity Board, who had deposed that from August, 1986 to June, 1987, the shop in question was lying closed. He has proved the report of the Meter Reader Ex.AW9/1, which shows that the shop in question was lying closed from August, 1986 to June, 1987. This witness has further proved the certified copies of the proceedings, i.e., Ex.AW9/3 and Ex.AW9/4 showing that an order of disconnection of the electric connection was passed due to non- payment of the electricity charges. It has also been proved that during the aforesaid period, no electricity was consumed by the consumer (respondent herein). The Rent Controller has also relied upon the testimony of AW4- Chamkaur Singh, AW7-Sohan Lal and AW8-Charanjit Kumar, who have deposed that they had been seeing the shop in question lying closed. He has also relied upon the photographs Ex.AW8/4 to Ex. AW8/6, which show that the shop in question was lying closed whereas the adjoining shops were open. AW8 has also deposed that he had visited the shop during working hours during the relevant period, but the same was always found closed. The witnesses examined by the tenant, i.e. RW2-Joginder Singh and RW3-Puran Singh were not believed because Joginder Singh had earlier appeared as a witness for the Respondent-tenant in some other cases and Puran Singhs son was working with the Respondent-tenant. The stand of the tenant that due to his disease, he used to come to the shop late and some time he used to leave the shop early, and for that disease he did not use the electricity, was not believed because he had not produced any evidence to show that during the said period he had conducted some business in the shop in question. Even he did not produce any cash memos, purchase memos, sale memos or any account books showing that during the said period some business was carried out by him. 5. On appeal, the Appellate Authority set aside the aforesaid order of the Rent Controller and dismissed the ejectment application while holding that mere non-consumption of electricity cannot lead to the conclusion that the tenant had ceased to occupy the shop in question. It has been held that in this case because of his ill health, the tenant had become irregular in the conduct of his business in the demised shop. Merely because the Meter Reader had reported that the shop was lying closed when he went for recording the meter reading and the fact that no electricity was consumed during the period, would not itself be sufficient to draw the inference that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised shop. It has been found that the evidence of the Respondent-tenant corroborated by his two witnesses proves that the Respondent had become irregular in the conduct of his business in the demised shop because of his ill health and, therefore, the evidence of the petitioner- landlord and his witnesses to the effect that they had seen the disputed shop lying closed during the relevant period does not lead to inevitable conclusion that the tenant had abandoned the business or had ceased to occupy the demised shop. Against the said ejectment order, the instant revision petition has been filed by the petitioner landlord. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner by leading the sufficient and reliable evidence, has proved on record that the demised shop was lying closed from 03.05.1986. During that period, no business was carried out by the Respondent-tenant. No electricity was consumed during the said period, though as per the requirement in the cloth business, the electricity is required. He further submitted that once the landlord was leading positive evidence and has established that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised shop for a period of at least four months immediately prior to the filing of the ejectment application, then it was for the tenant to prove that he had ceased to occupy the demised premises due to some reasonable cause. If the tenant does not prove any reasonable cause, then he is liable to be ejected. If the tenant does not prove any reasonable cause, then he is liable to be ejected. Learned counsel submitted that in this case in the written statement the Respondent-tenant had taken the stand that he had not ceased to occupy the shop in question but to his ill health, there was less consumption of electricity. While appearing, in the witness box, he stated that he had developed some Chambal disease on his left leg and due to the said disease, some time he used to come in the shop late and some time he used to leave the shop early. He had also stated that due to the death of his granddaughter Poonam he did not attend the shop for some period. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the reasons given by the Respondent-tenant were not accepted by the Rent Controller because no evidence was led to prove that he used to sit in the shop even for a lesser period. Though this explanation was not pleaded in the written statement but even the stand taken by the Respondent-tenant was not found to be correct. It was found that the granddaughter of the Respondent had died in February, 1987 whereas the shop in question alleged to have remained closed from August, 1986 to March, 1987. Learned counsel submitted that the Appellate Authority without properly appreciating the evidence led by the parties and without meeting the reasonings given by the Rent Controller, has reversed the findings in an illegal and arbitrary manner, and dismissed the ejectment application while coming to the wrong conclusion that the evidence led by the landlord is not sufficient to establish that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised shop. Learned counsel further submitted that the Appellate Authority has also not met the reasonings given by the Rent Controller regarding non-production of the cash memos and account books in order to show that some business was carried out in the demised shop everyday even for a smaller period. Learned counsel further submitted that the Appellate Authority has also not met the reasonings given by the Rent Controller regarding non-production of the cash memos and account books in order to show that some business was carried out in the demised shop everyday even for a smaller period. Learned counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority has drawn a wrong conclusion while relying upon the statement of the Respondent-tenant and his two witnesses and then coming to the conclusion that due to the Chambal disease, the Respondent-tenant used to come late in the shop at 11.00 AM and used to close it at about 4.00/5.00 PM, therefore, he was not required to use the electricity during that period, even for carrying out the business of cloth. Learned counsel submitted that the statement of the Respondent-tenant to this effect cannot be believed because it has been established by the positive evidence that during the disputed period, the demised premises was lying closed throughout the day. Therefore, the explanation given by the tenant that he used to sit in the shop from 11.00 AM to 4.00/5.00 PM cannot be believed. Thus, the learned counsel submits that the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, Shri Amit Aggarwal, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that to get a tenant evicted under Section 13(2)(v) of the Act, onus lies on the landlord to prove that the tenant had ceased to occupy the shop continuously for a period of four months without any reasonable cause, and merely on account of non-consumption of electricity and non-production of account books, no adverse inference could have been drawn, particularly when the tenant is a petty shopkeeper. He submitted that in the instant case the landlord has failed to discharge the onus lies on him and from the evidence led by him, it cannot be said that he has proved that the Respondent-tenant had ceased to occupy the shop in question. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Geeta Bhalla and others v. Krishan Kumar (dead) through Lrs., 2006(2) RCR(Rent) 379. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Geeta Bhalla and others v. Krishan Kumar (dead) through Lrs., 2006(2) RCR(Rent) 379. Learned counsel further submitted that in the instant case the Appellate Authority has rightly come to the conclusion that due to his ill health, the Respondent-tenant became irregular in the conduct of his business and merely on that account if on some occasions the shop was lying closed, it cannot be said that he had ceased to occupy the shop. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority does not require any interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court which could have been exercised only in case where the findings recorded by the Courts below are totally perverse or against the evidence available on the record. 8. After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case, in my opinion, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is not sustainable. Section 13(2)(v) of the Act provides a ground to the landlord to get his tenant ejected on the plea that the tenant had ceased to occupy the rented premises for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. The Supreme Court in M/s. Babu Ram Gopal and others v. Mathra Dass, 1990(2) RCR(Rent) 66 : AIR 1990 SC 879 has observed that the reason of including clause (v) in Section 13(2) of the Act is to ensure that the buildings, which are scarce in number specially in the towns, necessitating rent control legislation, do not remain unused at the instance of tenants who do not actually need them. A tenant who is in possession of a building in the legal sense only cannot be said to be in occupation thereof for the purpose of Section 13(2)(v), otherwise a question of his eviction as envisaged in that section would not arise. The section, by making provisions for his ejectment, assumes that he is in possession, but, still includes cessation of occupation as one of the grounds. The clause, therefore, has to be interpreted in this background and it must take colour from the context. 9. It is well settled that the initial burden or onus of establishing the above ground of ejectment is always upon the landlord by producing cogent material evidence. The clause, therefore, has to be interpreted in this background and it must take colour from the context. 9. It is well settled that the initial burden or onus of establishing the above ground of ejectment is always upon the landlord by producing cogent material evidence. The landlord has to prove by leading positive evidence that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised premises for a period of at least four months immediately prior to the filing of the ejectment application. Once it is so established by the landlord then it is for the tenant to prove that he ceased to occupy the demised premises due to some reasonable cause, as has been held by this court in Nirmal Singh v. Mohd. Bashir, 2004(2) RCR(Rent) 297 : 2004(3) PLR 532 and Virender Singh v. Mahabir Singh, 2005(2) RCR(Rent) 534. However, where the tenant denies that he has not ceased to occupy the demised premises for a period of four months, as required under the Act, then the question of proving the reasonableness does not arise. 10. In the instant case, the landlord has taken a definite stand in the ejectment application that the rented shop was lying closed since 03.05.1986. No electricity was being consumed and the tenant had ceased to occupy the same for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, therefore, he was liable to be ejected. The tenant in his written statement had denied that he had ceased to occupy the demised shop. However, he had explained that due to his ill health there was less consumption of electricity. He had not taken a stand in the written statement that due to some disease, he did not attend the shop on some occasions or he used to come late in the shop and leave early from the shop. He had also not taken the stand that due to the sudden demise of his granddaughter, the shop remained closed for some time. In order to prove that the demised shop was lying closed since 03.05.1986, the landlord has led sufficient and cogent evidence which has been discussed in detail by the Rent Controller in his order. It has been proved on record by the report of the Meter Reader Ex.AW9/1 that the demised shop was found closed every time as and when the Meter Reader went for recording the reading of the Meter. It has been proved on record by the report of the Meter Reader Ex.AW9/1 that the demised shop was found closed every time as and when the Meter Reader went for recording the reading of the Meter. It has also been proved on record by the documentary evidence that during the aforesaid period, there was no consumption of electricity. This fact has been accepted by the Respondent-tenant as well as the Appellate Authority. It has also been proved that the electricity connection of the Respondent-tenant was ordered to be disconnected due to non-payment of the electricity charges. But subsequently the said order was not implemented as the electricity charges were deposited. The landlord has not only proved the factum of closure of the shop during the disputed period by examining AW9-Darshan Singh Hira, an official of the Punjab State Electricity Board, who had deposed that from August, 1986 to June, 1987, the shop in question was lying closed, but he has also examined AW4-Chamkaur Singh, AW7-Sohan Lal and AW8-Charanjit Kumar, who have deposed that they had been seeing the shop in question lying closed. The landlord has also relied upon the photographs Ex.AW8/4 to Ex.AW8/6, which show that the shop in question was lying closed whereas the adjoining shops were open. These positive evidence clearly establish the fact that during the period from August, 1986 to June, 1987, the shop in question was lying closed due to some unreasonable cause. In order to discharge his onus, the tenant had examined himself as RW1 besides examining RW2-Joginder Singh and RW3-Puran Singh. RW1 had taken the stand which was not taken by him in the written statement that due to the Chambal disease, he used to open the shop at about 10.00 or 11.00 AM and close the same at about 4.00 or 5.00 PM. But this part of his statement cannot be accepted in view of the positive evidence led by the landlord that during the period from August, 1986 to June, 1987, the shop in question was lying closed. Further it has come on record that the Meter Reader of the Electricity Department visited the shop in question on several times but the same was always found closed. If the Respondent-tenant used to sit in the shop from 11.00 AM to 4.00/5.00 PM, the said report could not have been made. Further it has come on record that the Meter Reader of the Electricity Department visited the shop in question on several times but the same was always found closed. If the Respondent-tenant used to sit in the shop from 11.00 AM to 4.00/5.00 PM, the said report could not have been made. Further the stand taken by the Responent-tenant is not supported by any positive evidence which he could have led by producing the cash memos and his account books showing the sale and purchase of the cloth during the said period. In my opinion, the Rent Controller has rightly drawn adverse inference against the Respondent-tenant for non-production of those documents which he could have easily proved if he was carrying any business in the shop in question. Though non-consumption of electricity itself is not sufficient to establish the fact that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises, but it is one of the factors that could have been taken into consideration for coming to the said conclusion in addition to the other evidence available on the record. In the instant case also, the Rent Controller has not come to the conclusion that the tenant had ceased to occupy the demised shop only on the basis of non-consumption of electricity. He has taken the said fact as one of the factors while coming to the said conclusion. In my opinion, the observation of the Appellate Authority that the Respondent-tenant being a small cloth merchant did not require any electricity for carrying out his business during the day time, is merely a conjecture. In the instant case, the Respondent-tenant has not led any evidence to show that any business was carried out in the premises in dispute. In support of his plea, he had examined two witnesses, i.e., RW2-Joginder Singh and RW3-Puran Singh. RW2- Joginder Singh had earlier appeared as a witness for the Respondent-tenant in some other cases and the son of RW3-Puran Singh was found working in the shop of the Respondent-tenant. Both these witnesses were not found to be trustworthy and reliable by the Rent Controller. Therefore, in my opinion, the Rent Controller has rightly come to the conclusion that the tenant had ceased to occupy the shop from August, 1986 to June, 1987 without any reasonable cause. 11. Both these witnesses were not found to be trustworthy and reliable by the Rent Controller. Therefore, in my opinion, the Rent Controller has rightly come to the conclusion that the tenant had ceased to occupy the shop from August, 1986 to June, 1987 without any reasonable cause. 11. The contention raised by the counsel for the Respondent-tenant on the basis of the observation made by the Appellate Authority in para 22 of its order that some cloth of the tenant may be lying in the shop in question during the disputed period, therefore, it should be taken that the tenant had not ceased to occupy the shop in question, cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. Babu Ram Gopals case (supra). Section 13(2)(v) of the Act, by making provisions for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he used to occupy the premises continuously for a period of four months, assumes that he is in possession, but, still includes cessation of occupation as one of the grounds. Therefore, if a tenant stops the business which he is carrying on in the shop and closes the premises continuously for a period of four months without a reasonable cause, he will be liable to be evicted. Merely because some clothes of the Respondent-tenant were lying in the shop, it cannot be presumed that he had not ceased to occupy the shop, though the same is lying closed. Thus, in my opinion, the Appellate Authority has reversed the well reasoned order of the Rent Controller without there being any impropriety or illegality in the order of the Rent Controller. Hence, this petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.04.1990 passed by the Appellate Authority is set aside and the order dated 27.01.1989 passed by the Rent Controller is restored.