Aggrieved by the orders dated 31st August, 1999, Annexure-vii to the writ petition and 2nd September, 1999, Annexure-ix to the writ petition, whereby the petitioner has been denied promotion on the post of middle management Grade- II in Gorakhpur Regional Gramin Bank, Head Office, Sakh Anubhag, Mohaddipur, Gorakhpur, hereinafter referred to as bank, the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the said orders and has also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to open the sealed cover result adopted in the year 1997 and to consider his case for promotion in accordance therewith. The petitioner has also challenged the validity of Circular dated 28th March, 1998, Annexure-viii to the writ petition. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present dispute as stated in the writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as an officer in the Bank on 21st December, 1981 and was confirmed on the said post in the year 1983. The aforesaid Bank was established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976 (Act No. 21 of 1976), hereinafter referred to as the Act. In exercise of power under Section 30 of the Act, regulations have been framed governing conditions of service of staffs of the Bank titled as "gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulation, 1980", (hereinafter referred to as 1980 Regulation ). In the year 1991 when the petitioner was posted as Branch Manager at Gajpur Branch, District Gorakhpur, a charge- sheet dated 18th December, 1991 was served upon him alongwith forwarding letter dated 7th January, 1992. The petitioner submitted his reply to the aforesaid charge- sheet. Thereafter disciplinary enquiry was set up by the Bank. The enquiry officer submitted his report holding petitioner guilty of charge No. 3 while exonerating him in respect of charges No. 1, 2 and 4. The disciplinary authority agreed with the report of enquiry officer in respect to its findings on charges No. 3 and 4 but disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of charges No. 1 and 2 and recording his disagreement issued show-cause notice dated 31st March, 1998 to the petitioner giving him an opportunity to submit his reply. The disciplinary authority agreed with the report of enquiry officer in respect to its findings on charges No. 3 and 4 but disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of charges No. 1 and 2 and recording his disagreement issued show-cause notice dated 31st March, 1998 to the petitioner giving him an opportunity to submit his reply. The petitioner submitted his reply on 4th May, 1998 and thereafter disciplinary authority i. e. Chairman of the Bank vide order dated 29th August, 1998 imposed punishment of stoppage of annual increment for three years and 50 per cent of recovery of the sanctioned loan amount in case Bank failed to recover the same from the person concerned. Aggrieved by order dated 29th August, 1998, the petitioner filed appeal under Regulation 31 of 1980 Regulations, whereupon the appellate authority i. e. Board of Directors vide order dated 16th December, 1998 modified order of punishment and the amount of recovery was reduced from 50 per cent to Rs 5,000/ -. During the period when the aforesaid enquiry was pending, the petitioner was considered for promotion in the year 1997 for middle management Grade-II by the departmental selection committee, which kept its recommendations regarding petitioner in sealed cover in accordance with Rules of the Bank. After finalisation of the proceeding, the petitioner requested the authorities to open the sealed cover, whereupon by letter dated 31st August, 1999 he has been informed that the recommendation of the selection committee stands infructuous in the light of Bank Circular dated 28th March, 1998, since final order of punishment was passed against the petitioner. Again a departmental promotion committee held in September, 1999. It is submitted that the petitioner has been denied consideration for promotion in 1999 in view of conditions contained in Circular dated 28th March, 1998 as communicated by the Banks letter dated 2nd September, 1999. 3. Sri P. S. Baghel, learned Counsel for the petitioner assails Banks Circular dated 28th March, 1998 and order dated 31st March, 1998 contended that Circular dated 28th March, 1998 cannot be allowed to operate retrospectively and therefore, his sealed cover result of 1997 cannot be dealt with by the aforesaid Circular. 3. Sri P. S. Baghel, learned Counsel for the petitioner assails Banks Circular dated 28th March, 1998 and order dated 31st March, 1998 contended that Circular dated 28th March, 1998 cannot be allowed to operate retrospectively and therefore, his sealed cover result of 1997 cannot be dealt with by the aforesaid Circular. He contended that once a person has been punished by imposing certain punishment provided under Regulation 30 of 1980 Regulation, he cannot be made to suffer twice in the matter of promotion on the higher post on the basis of the aforesaid punishment since it amounts to double jeopardy, which is illegal. He further contended that in any case the Circular in question is arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore, cannot be allowed to operate against the interest of the petitioner. In regard to order dated 2nd September, 1999, whereby he has been denied right for consideration promotion in the selection held in September, 1999, he contended that the punishment imposed upon the staff of the Bank cannot be treated to be an ineligibility for promotion since the eligibility for promotion is prescribed under Regional Rural Bank (Appointment and Promotion of Officers and Other Employees) Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 1988 Rules ). The eligibility for promotion is prescribed in second Schedule item No. 7 of 1988 Rules, which is being supplemented by certain conditions provided in the said executive order. Therefore Circular dated 28th March, 1998 in so far as it makes the penalty imposed upon the petitioner as an ineligibility is ultra virus of the said Rule, since the provisions of a Statute cannot be altered and supplemented by executive order. 4. Sri Yashwant Verma, learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that in the matter of sealed cover procedure, if the disciplinary proceedings has culminated in punishment, it is always just and valid for the employer to deny promotion to the concern employee considering punishment imposed upon him. It cannot be said to be double jeopardy as has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner. It cannot be said to be double jeopardy as has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner. He further contended that since stoppage of increment for three years is a punishment imposed upon the petitioner, during the period he would be undergoing said punishment, he could not have been considered to be eligible for promotion, therefore, the petitioner has rightly been held to be ineligible and the Circular dated 28th March, 1998 is only clarificatory in nature, cannot be said to be in any manner inconsistent or ultra virus of the Rules as has been contended by the petitioner. He has also placed reliance on the Apex Court judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. K. V. Jankiraman & Ors. , 1991 (4) SCC 109 . 5. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused records. 6. The first question is whether the petitioner could have been denied right to ask the employer to open sealed cover pursuant to the Circular dated 28th March, 1998. The right of the petitioner to insist upon the employer to consider him for promotion and to open sealed cover will materialise only after finalisation of the disciplinary proceeding. Prior to the issuance of Circular dated 28th March, 1998, it appears that the existing provision of the Bank did not allow even the application of sealed cover procedure to the staff of the Bank against whom the disciplinary enquiry was pending. In this regard, a decision was taken by the Bank in the Board of Directors meeting dated 28th April, 1995 wherein it resolved to adopt sealed cover procedure, which was followed in the year 1997 and the petitioner was considered for promotion to the post of middle management Grade-II since a departmental enquiry was pending against him at that time. It is not disputed that on the date when the Circular dated 28th March, 1998 was issued, enquiry was still pending. The final order of punishment was issued on 31st August, 1999. The Circular dated 28th March, 1998 provides for the consequences which have to be observed when a departmental enquiry has culminated in a final order of punishment or exoneration, as the case may be. Therefore, it cannot be said to be a Circular having been acted upon retrospectively by the respondents. In the case of petitioner the departmental enquiry was pending when the Circular was issued. Therefore, it cannot be said to be a Circular having been acted upon retrospectively by the respondents. In the case of petitioner the departmental enquiry was pending when the Circular was issued. After final order dated 31st August, 1999, the same has been dealt with in accordance with the provision as was existing at that time. Therefore we are of the view that the Circular dated 28th March, 1998 has rightly been applied by the Bank in the case of the petitioner. 7. Now coming to the second aspect of the matter whether the impugned Circular in so far as it directs that cases where employee/staff has been punished, the sealed cover shall not be opened, but would become infructuous and would be consigned to record is illegal, arbitrary or inconsistent to Regulation 30, we find that the issue is no more res-integra and has been considered in the case of K. V. Janakiraman (supra ). The Apex Court also considered similar provision. Para 3 (iii) of the office memorandum dated 30th January, 1982, provided as under : "if any penalty is imposed on the officer as a result of the disciplinary proceeding or if he is found guilty in the Court proceedings against him, the findings in the sealed cover/covers shall not be acted upon. The officers case for promotion may be considered in the usual manner by the next D. P. C. , which meets in the normal course after the conclusion of the disciplinary/court proceedings. " 8. Under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the provision pertaining to punishment was also pari-materia with Regulation 30 of 1980 Regulations. The Tribunal declared para 3 (iii) of the office memorandum dated 30th January, 1982 illegal and arbitrary, as it amounts to double jeopardy and is against the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Reversing the view taken by the Tribunal, the Apex Court in para 29 of the judgment in the case of K. V. Janakiraman (supra) held as under : " (29) According to us, the Tribunal has erred in holding that when an officer is found guilty in the discharge of his duties, an imposition of penalty is all that is necessary to improve his conduct and to enforce discipline and ensure purity in the administration. In the first instance, the penalty short of dismissal will vary from reduction in rank to censure. In the first instance, the penalty short of dismissal will vary from reduction in rank to censure. We are sure that the Tribunal has not intended that the promotion should be given to the officer from the original date even when the penalty imparted is of reduction in rank. On principle, for the same reasons, the officer cannot be rewarded by promotion as a matter of course even if the penalty is other than that of the reduction in rank. An employee has no right to promotion. He has only a right to be considered for promotion. The promotion to a post and more so, to a selection post, depends upon several circumstances. To qualify for promotion, the least that is expected of an employee is to have an unblemished record. That is the minimum expected to ensure a clean and efficient administration and to protect the public interests. An employee found guilty of a misconduct cannot be placed on par with the other employees and his case has to be treated differently. There is, therefore, no discrimination when in the matter of promotion, he is treated differently. The least that is expected of any administration is that it does not reward an employee with promotion retrospectively from a date when for his conduct before that date he is penalised in praesenti. When an employee is held guilty and penalised and is, therefore, not promoted at least till the date on which he is penalised, he cannot be said to have been subjected to a further penalty on that account. A denial of promotion in such circumstances is not a penalty but a necessary consequence of his conduct. In fact, while considering an employee for promotion his whole record has to be taken into consideration and if a promotion committee takes the penalties imposed upon the employee into consideration and denies him the promotion, such denial is not illegal and unjustified. If, further, the promoting authority can take into consideration the penalty or penalties awarded to an employee in the past while considering his promotion and deny him promotion on that ground, it will be irrational to hold that it cannot take the penalty into consideration when it is imposed at a latter date because of the pendency of the proceedings, although it is for conduct prior to the date of authority considers the promotion. For these reasons, we are of the view that the Tribunal is not right in striking down the said portion of the second sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum. We, therefore, set aside the said findings of the Tribunal. " 9. The entire argument raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner stands answered by the Apex Court in the case of K. V. Janakiraman (supra), therefore, in our view it cannot be said that either Circular dated 28th March, 1998 or the order dated 31st August, 1999 is illegal or erroneous in any manner. The petitioner has been punished as a result of departmental enquiry and in view thereof he cannot be held to be entitled to command the respondents to open the sealed cover. 10. Now coming to the last question as to whether during the period the petitioner is undergoing punishment, can he be deprived of his right of consideration for promotion on the ground that he is not eligible for promotion, though no such condition is prescribed under 1988 Regulation, in our view, this submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner also cannot be accepted. The qualification and eligibility provided under second Schedule of 1988 Regulation do not cover all kinds of situation, for example if an officer is under suspension, he cannot be considered for promotion even though he fulfils the requisite qualification and eligibility prescribed under 1988 Regulation. It not disputed that promotion on the post of middle management Grade-II is on the basis of selection. As a result of disciplinary enquiry, the officer has been found guilty of certain charges and undergoing punishment. Whether such an officer can be held to be entitled for consideration for promotion or not is not an eventuality contemplated or covered by 1988 Regulation and where there is a gap in the Rules, the executive orders can make provision to cover such situations. It is well-settled that the executive orders cannot supplement the Statutory provision, but supplant the same where certain aspects have not been dealt with in the Statutory provision. In our view the situation to which Circular dated 28th March, 1998 is applicable is not one which is covered by 1988 Regulation. Therefore the Circular dated 28th March, 1998 cannot be said to be ultra vires of 1988 Regulation. 11. In our view the situation to which Circular dated 28th March, 1998 is applicable is not one which is covered by 1988 Regulation. Therefore the Circular dated 28th March, 1998 cannot be said to be ultra vires of 1988 Regulation. 11. In the result, we do not find any force in this writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .