Judgment Ghanshyam Prasad, J. 1. The sole appellant, Diwali Mahto has preferred this appeal against the conviction and sentence dated 28th January, 1988 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 658 of 1985 by which the sole appellant has been convicted under Sections 302/201 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. This appellant has been tried along with three other accused persons for the offences under Sections 328, 302, 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code. However, except this appellant other three accused persons have been acquitted and this appellant has also been acquitted of the charges under Sec. 328 of the Indian Penal Code for administering poison. 3. The informant Sadho Mahto PW 7 is the father-in-law of the appellant Diwali Mahto. The marriage of the appellant took place with the victim Munni Devi in the month of July 1981 and a son was also born out of their wedlock. The other accused persons who have been acquitted are father and brothers of the appellant. 4. Prosecution story as unfolded in fard beyan (Ext 1) is that on 7.8.1984 the appellant Diwali Mahto came to the house of the informant and asked for Rs. 10,000/- but the informant expressed his inability to pay. Again on 8.9.1984 the appellant sent his wife Munni Devi to bring the money from her father who on refusal to pay told that in case money would not be paid she might be killed by her husband and his family members. On the next day the appellant himself came to the informant and again demanded money and the informant again expressed his inability, upon which he became furious and threatened to teach lesson to him within a week. The informant called several villagers including Rajendra Prasad Mahto (PW 4), Ram Kripal Sao (PW 3) and others before whom also the appellant gave threatening to the informant. 5. Further case of the prosecution is that on the same day the informant, on the insistence of the appellant he sent the victim along with him. The informant called several villagers including Rajendra Prasad Mahto (PW 4), Ram Kripal Sao (PW 3) and others before whom also the appellant gave threatening to the informant. 5. Further case of the prosecution is that on the same day the informant, on the insistence of the appellant he sent the victim along with him. On 15.9.1984 at 12 Noon one Ram Chandra Mahto came and informed the informant that in the night of 14th September this appellant along with his father and brothers killed his daughter Munni Devi by administering poison and threw her dead body in Sone River. The informant on the same day went to the house of appellant where she met with Ram Chandra Mahto father of the appellant who told that the victim died of cholera and she had already been cremated. However, he did not disclose the place of cremation and threatened with dire consequences if any information would be given to the police. 6. On the basis of fard beyan lodged by the PW 7 Sadho Mahto, concerned police registered case against four persons under above sections and ultimately after investigation submitted charge sheet. However, at the request of accused persons the learned Magistrate also ordered for further investigation. The police after further investigation submitted report (Ext A) stating that the victim died as a result of illness. 7. In support its case the prosecution examined altogether 7 witnesses including the informant as PW 7 Sadho Mahto, mother of the victim as PW 6 Lalti Devi, and I.O. as PW 8 Brajesh Kumar Das. 8. The defence of the accused persons including this appellant is that the entire prosecution case is false and baseless. No money was ever demanded by the appellant from his father-in-law. In fact, the deceased died of cholera in course of treatment and her dead body was cremated in presence of the informant and others. In support of the defence they have examined three witnesses including the DW 1 Rajeshwar Mahto a villager, DW 2 Dr. Manohar Lal Gupta under whom the victim was treated and DW 3 Bal Govind Prasad who conducted further investigation. Some document has also been brought on the record which are exhibit A to C/2. In support of the defence they have examined three witnesses including the DW 1 Rajeshwar Mahto a villager, DW 2 Dr. Manohar Lal Gupta under whom the victim was treated and DW 3 Bal Govind Prasad who conducted further investigation. Some document has also been brought on the record which are exhibit A to C/2. Ext A is the report of the S. I. of the police (DW 3), Ext B is the Medical Prescriptions, Ext C is the death Certificate of the victim, Ext - C/1 is the certificate of Ward Commissioner and C/2 is the report given by the villagers regarding the cremation of the victim on Kurji Ghat. 9. In course of argument learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the judgment in question on several grounds. It has been submitted that the learned lower court has not properly appreciated oral or documentary evidences adduced by the parties and has convicted the appellant mere on suspicion and conjectures. The circumstances relied upon by the learned lower Court are not sufficient to establish the story of murder of the victim and clinch the issue of murder by the appellant. It has further been submitted that most of the circumstances mentioned in the judgment are imaginary and not supported by any legal evidence and are also not sufficient to exclude every hypothesis except the one proved. It is further submitted that there are sufficient materials on the record to show that the victim died natural death as a result of cholera in course of treatment. 10. The admitted position is that the victim Munni Devi was the wife of the appellant and she died in the house of the appellant. However, there is no direct evidence of murder of Munni Devi. The case is based on circumstantial evidences. The learned lower court in paragraph 7 of the judgment has set out certain circumstances for proof of charge of murder against the appellant which are as follows: (i) Accused Diwali Mahto was married to Munni Devi the daughter of the informant and the accused a few days prior to the death of Munni Devi, had demanded Rs. 10,000/- from the informant. (ii) On failure of the above demand, the accused Dewali Mahto had threatened the informant with dire consequences within a week. 10,000/- from the informant. (ii) On failure of the above demand, the accused Dewali Mahto had threatened the informant with dire consequences within a week. (iii) The dying declaration of the deceased Munni Devi before her father that if he would not pay the above amount, she would be killed by her husband and his family members. (iv) Munni Devi died in the house of the accused persons on 14.9.1984 and no information to that effect was given by the accused to the informant. (v) The informant went to the house of the accused on 15.9.1984 to inquire about his daughter, but though the accused pleaded that Munni Devi died of cholera and was cremated on 14.9.1984 in the night, they did not disclose where she was cremated and they also threatened the informant not to go to the policed station. (vi) The accused had fled away from their house when the I. O. visited their place. (vii) The plea of the accused persons that Munni Devi died of Cholera and was cremated at Kurji burning ghat is false. 11. The well settled law is that in a case based on circumstantial evidence there must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to have any reasonable ground for the conclusion of consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all probability the act must have been done by the accused. Proof of one or some of the facts cannot be decisive to prove the guilt of the accused. Here I would like to refer a decision of the Apex Court The State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. I.B.S. Pd. Rao. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, the law with regard to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence has been laid down which is as follows: In regard to the question of the effect and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, it is now settled law that before conviction based solely on such evidence can be sustained, it must be such as to be conclusive of the guilt of the accused and must be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. But this does not mean that before the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must meet any and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, however extravagant and fanciful it might be. But this does not mean that before the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must meet any and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, however extravagant and fanciful it might be. Before an accused can contend that a particular hypothesis pointing to his innocence has remained unexcluded by the facts proved against him, the Court must be satisfied that the suggested hypothesis is reasonable and not far-fetched. Further, it is not necessary that every one of the proved facts must in itself by decisive of the complicity of the accused or point conclusively to his guilt. It may be that a particular fact relied upon by the prosecution may not be decisive in itself, and yet if that fact, along with other facts which have been proved, tends to strengthen the conclusion of his guilt, it is relevant and has to be considered. In other words, when deciding the question of sufficiency, what the Court has to consider is the total commulative effect of all the proved facts each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt, and if the combined effect of all those facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that may one or more of those facts by itself is not decisive. 12. Judging from the angle of law laid down in the above decision of the Apex Court it appears to me that the circumstances referred above coupled with the defence story are not sufficient to prove even the murder of the victim and too by the appellant. Mere death of the victim in the house of the appellant who is husband is not sufficient to prove the commission of murder. It must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that death was not natural rather it was the result of crime. In this case in fard beyan (Ext 1) it has been mentioned that the victim died as a result of poising but the same has not been proved by the prosecution as a result the lower court has acquitted the appellant and others from the charges framed under Sec. 328 IPC. 13. Apart from suspicion and conjectures there is no evidence on the record to show that the victim was murdered. 13. Apart from suspicion and conjectures there is no evidence on the record to show that the victim was murdered. All witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are mainly on the point of demand of Rs. 10,000/- by the appellant from the informant and giving threat to the informant. Even if both the circumstances are admitted to be true, in my opinion, it would not lead to any conclusive inference with regard to murder of the victim. This is not the case of dowry death where Sec. 113B of the Evidence Act would come to play any role for drawing inference. In course of investigation the police also did not recover any incriminating article from the possession of the appellant or his house to show that the victim was actually murdered. PW 8 is the I.O. of the case. 14. In paragraph 7 of the judgment the court below has enumerated 7 circumstances. So far circumstances 1 and II are concerned, almost all material witnesses have supported this fact. I see no reason to disbelieve the evidences of the witnesses on that point. However, so far circumstance No. III is concerned the court below has wrongly mentioned it as a dying declaration. On this point there are two witnesses; who are PW 6 and 7, mother and father of the deceased. PW 6 has stated that her daughter told that if no money is paid, the accused would kill her. However, PW 7 has not stated about killing. He has stated that she told that if money would be paid, the accused would throw her out. Apart from it, conduct of the above two witnesses itself would throw serious doubt about such statement of the deceased. In spite of such threat they themselves did Vidagri of their daughter on the very next day. 15. So far other circumstances i.e. 4, 5 and 6 are concerned those are of no consequences. On the other hand it would go to show that defence story is not after thought. Even on 15.9.1988 it was disclosed to the informant that the victim died of cholera. Circumstance No. 7 is not a circumstance to be taken into account for proof of the prosecution case. Failure to prove the defence story does not enhance the case of the prosecution in any manner. Even on 15.9.1988 it was disclosed to the informant that the victim died of cholera. Circumstance No. 7 is not a circumstance to be taken into account for proof of the prosecution case. Failure to prove the defence story does not enhance the case of the prosecution in any manner. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt independent of the defence story. 16. Thus from the above discussion it is quite clear that the circumstances are neither complete nor sufficient to prove the murder of the victim. They would only throw suspicion upon the appellant regarding commission of murder of his wife. It is well settle law that suspicion how so strong does not take place of proof. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Varkey Joseph V/s. State of Kerala has reiterated this principle vide para 12 of the judgment in following words: Suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between may be true and must be true and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. We have already seen that the prosecution not only not proved its case but palpably produced false evidence and the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the appellant let alone beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant and he alone committed the offence. We had already allowed the appeal and acquitted him by our order dated April 12, 1993 and set the appellant at liberty which we have little doubt that it was carried out by date. The appeal is allowed and the appellant stands acquitted of the offence under Sec. 302 IPC. 17. So far the defence version is concerned I find that it has brought sufficient material/evidence on the record to show that the victim died due to cholera. Exhibit C is the original death certificate issued by the municipality. In that certificate it has been mentioned that Munni Devi died of cholera. Exhibit C/1 is the certificate granted by the Ward Commissioner of the municipality to show that the victim died due to illness while she was being shifted to PMCH. Ext B is the prescription dated 12.9.1984 issued by the Dr. Manohar Lal Gupta (DW 2). In that certificate it has been mentioned that Munni Devi died of cholera. Exhibit C/1 is the certificate granted by the Ward Commissioner of the municipality to show that the victim died due to illness while she was being shifted to PMCH. Ext B is the prescription dated 12.9.1984 issued by the Dr. Manohar Lal Gupta (DW 2). He has not only proved prescription but has also stated on oath that the victim was treated by him for loose motion etc. He has further stated that he referred her to PMCH for further treatment but she died in the way. 18. The last important document is the Ext A which is the further investigation report of the police submitted by DW 3 Bal Govind Prasad, the Inspector of the concerned police station. He made further investigation on the order of the Court and found that the victim actually died due to illness in course of treatment and was cremated at kurji Ghat. 19. From the above discussions of the evidences of the prosecution as well as the defence, it is quite clear that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Apparently the court below has not properly appreciated the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties. The judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the court below is not sustainable in the eye of law and is fit to be set aside. 20. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds. Shyam Kishore Sharma, J. 21 I agree