JUDGMENT: 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal. 2. The plaintiff had instituted a suit for recovery of Second Appeal no.152 of 1996. Rs.20,000/-, which came to be decreed. The defendant preferred appeal which was allowed and the suit was dismissed. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as plaintiff and defendant. 3. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as under - Plaintiff and defendant know each other since long. Defendant wanted to purchase agriculture land at village Selu (Bu.). He, therefore, was to pay some money to his vendor. The defendant had an apprehension that if he does not pay money to the vendor, the contract may come to an end. He, therefore, made a request to the plaintiff to lend him Rs.20,000/-. The plaintiff lent Rs.20,000/- to the defendant considering his plight. On 5/9/1991, the defendant executed a hand loan receipt (Usanwar chit) in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded the said money back. The defendant failed to pay the same. It is alleged that no interest was agreed to be paid on the sum lent. On 5/3/1994, defendant met the plaintiff and assured that he should pay back the amount soon but he did not. Hence, the suit came to be filed. 4. The defendant filed a written statement denying all contentions raised by the plaintiff. He denied that he had taken any hand loan from the plaintiff. On the other hand, it is his contention that the plaintiff and some of their friends used to run a chit fund scheme. The plaintiff used to collect the money from all members of the said chit fund and in order that members should be under pressure, the plaintiff used to take the signatures of all members on blank stamp papers. The plaintiff had taken such signatures of many other persons including Vijaykumar, Mustafa, Deepak, Balaji, Syd.Ahmad, Syd.Kadar and B.M.Tagadpallewar. The defendant has never taken money from the plaintiff. He submits that the suit is barred by limitation. The defendant alternatively contends that the plaintiff is a money lender and he does not hold a licence and as such the suit instituted by him is liable to be dismissed. 5. On these pleadings, the learned judge of the trial court found that the plaintiff had lent Rs.20,000/- to the defendant as hand loan. He was not a money lender. The suit was not barred by limitation. 5. On these pleadings, the learned judge of the trial court found that the plaintiff had lent Rs.20,000/- to the defendant as hand loan. He was not a money lender. The suit was not barred by limitation. Holding so, he decreed the suit. Since the suit came to be decreed, the defendant instituted an appeal. Learned Additional District Judge disagreeing with the findings recorded by the trial court, dismissed the suit. He found that the suit was barred by limitation. He also found that there was a money lending transaction and the plaintiff does not hold the licence and the suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Being aggrieved by dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff has instituted the second appeal. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant. The appeal was admitted by Mr.Kulkarni,J. with the following order. Having heard the learned advocates appearing on both the sides on a notice before admission, it appears that a substantial question of law arises as to the validity of the document in question, which is the basis of the suit, the question of limitation, the issue regarding the transaction being hit by the provisions of the Money Lenders Act, and lastly the finding regarding interest and damages. Having regard to the process of reasoning employed by the appellate court in negativing the claim of the plaintiff and further having regard to the fact that the defendant had not set up any plea regarding his unfamiliarity with Marathi language, the appeal deserves to be admitted for final hearing. The substantial question be confined to the points mentioned above. . Admit. From what is stated in the order, the substantial questions of law that can be culled out are as follows - i) Whether the suit could be said to be filed within limitation? ii) Whether the transaction in suit could be said to be money lending without licence? 7. The trial court has found that the suit was filed within limitation and is not money lending transaction. As said earlier, the appellate court has reversed both the findings. This is, therefore, not a case of concurrent findings of fact. 8. This takes me to consider the first question of limitation. The hand loan receipt (Exh.28) is dated 5/9/1991. 7. The trial court has found that the suit was filed within limitation and is not money lending transaction. As said earlier, the appellate court has reversed both the findings. This is, therefore, not a case of concurrent findings of fact. 8. This takes me to consider the first question of limitation. The hand loan receipt (Exh.28) is dated 5/9/1991. The limitation for recovery of the loan under the law of limitation is three years from the date amount was lent. The suit is filed on 5/9/1994. The learned counsel for the defendant submits that the suit should have been filed on 4th of September, 1994 and the same having bee filed on 5th of September, 1994 is now barred by limitation. The argument has no force. Section 12 of the Limitation Act says that the day from which the period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. If, therefore, the day on which receipt is executed i.e. 5th of September is excluded then the time will have to be reckoned from 6th and would end on 5th. The suit is filed on 5th September, 1994. It is, therefore, rightly held by the trial court to be filed within limitation. The learned Additional District Judge did not consider the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and wrongly reversed that finding of the trial court. The finding of the trial court in this regard has to be restored. 9. Shri Vyavahare, Advocate for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the learned Judge of the trial court had rightly found that the transaction is not of money lending but was merely a hand loan. Learned counsel further submitted that the document in question is a Usanwar Chit i.e. hand loan receipt and there is no reference of payment of interest in it and therefore is not a Promissory Note. He also contended that there is no promise to pay in this receipt and therefore in no case it is a document which falls within the definition of promissory note. He submitted that since it does not fall within the definition of promissory note, it does not fall under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also. He further contended that since this is not a loan on promissory note, it is not covered by definition of loan in Bombay Money Lenders Act. He submitted that since it does not fall within the definition of promissory note, it does not fall under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also. He further contended that since this is not a loan on promissory note, it is not covered by definition of loan in Bombay Money Lenders Act. He relied on a decision of the court reported in 1987 Mh.L.J.1032 (Fulchand Champalal Jain ..vs. Punjaru Shankar Patil and ors. ). The case at hand cannot be said to be covered by the ratio of the said decision. The reason is that, in the instant case there is clear promise to pay. Translated, recital is to the following effect. .This day, I have received Rs.20,000/- which you have given as hand loan. I shall repay it without interest. Thus, it is clear that this is not merely a receipt but there is a clear promise to pay the amount taken without interest. Since there is a clear promise to repay, it must follow that the instrument falls in the definition of promissory note. It must, therefore, necessarily fall within the definition of loan in Bombay Money Lenders Act. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted further that still this transaction cannot be treated as money lending transaction for there must always be repetition and continuity of such transaction. He contended that the defendant had examined one witness only, who says about such other transaction with him. He, therefore, submits that there is neither continuity nor repetition of such transaction. He relied on a decision of this court reported in 1994 Mh.L.J.380 (Nandram Kaniram and ors. ..vs.. N.B.Rahatekar) in which His Lordship observes as follows - 7. This takes me to the last point over which there was considerable debate before me. Now, whether or not, an individual is carrying on business of money-lending is essentially a question of fact. The final court of fact has recorded a finding of fact in favour of the plaintiff. I see no reason to interfere with the same in second appeal. Here is a professional carrying on profession in a city like Pune. He must have had savings from the professional income. It would be natural for him to invest the same in a manner by which he can derive maximum return. I see no reason to interfere with the same in second appeal. Here is a professional carrying on profession in a city like Pune. He must have had savings from the professional income. It would be natural for him to invest the same in a manner by which he can derive maximum return. If he has chosen to advance his savings on interest to reputed and known traders through a Hundi Dalal on few occasions, it cannot be said that he was a professional money-lender. Money-lending business always imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity. These elements have been held to be absent in the instant case and I see no perversity in reaching that conclusion. Neither law, nor equity is in favour of the defendant who is trying to delay and defeat the just claim and avoiding his solemn liability to honour his commitment. The last point is also therefore without any substance. Mr.C.S.Kaptan, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand contended that there is, in fact, enough evidence on record to hold this to be a money lending transaction and there is a finding of fact of appellate court which cannot be lightly interfered by this court in the second appeal. The plaintiff's own admission in crossexamination would go to show repetition as well as continuity. PW 1 Mohanlal admits that he lent money to Deepak, Ramesh, Shyam, Syd.Ahmad and Apparao besides defendant. Thus, he has lent money to six persons. Not only he admits this but he admits having instituted civil suit and criminal proceedings against these persons for non-payment of the amount. The number of persons to whom the money is lent, and the institution of civil and criminal proceedings clearly indicates that this is a case of money lending without licence. It is difficult to digest that any person would lend money to so many persons without earning anything on it. The learned judge of the first appellate court rightly found that the plaintiff carries on money lending without licence. It is difficult to digest that any person would lend money to so many persons without earning anything on it. The learned judge of the first appellate court rightly found that the plaintiff carries on money lending without licence. In a decision reported in 1976 Mh.L.J. Note No.10 this court observed as follows- .Prima facie it could be said that whenever there is an advance on a pronote interest is chargeable in view of section 80, Negotiable Instruments Act and as such it would come within the purview of the definition of 'loan' in section 2(9) Bombay Money lenders Act though a debatable position could have arisen if no interest in fact was charged. But where the plaintiff in fact charges interest in the guise of damages, the fact that it synchronises with a rate of interest is not without significance. Plaintiff advanced money to defendant ion a promote which was silent as to interest but plaintiff claimed as damages an amount which was equivalent to interest at 9 p.c. p.a. Damages were claimed on the allegation that it was for user and the loss occasioned in case the amount was invested somewhere in business. Plaintiff had entered into similar transaction with others. Held, that as the damages were looked upon on par with investment it was nothing but charging interest in the guise of damages and that therefore the transaction was one of loan and that as the Plaintiff had other similar transaction he was a 'moneylender' within the Bombay Moneylenders Act. . In this suit also there was no agreement about interest but in suit the Plaintiff had claimed the interest by way of damages at the rate of Rs.1.50% per annum. Thus, the ratio of the above decision can be squarely applied to the case at hand. The learned judge of the appellate court rightly dismissed the suit. There is no merit in the appeal. There is no reason to disturb the finding of fact. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly and the appeal is dismissed. JUDGE. chute