JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—This is a tenant’s petition. It arises out of a release application filed under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) by Ramesh Kumar Kwatra, respondent No. 2 herein, in respect of property No. 25/10, situate at Chhipi Tola, Rakabganj, Agra. The tenanted accommodation consists of seven rooms, three verandah, one courtyard and a big entrance gate situate on the ground floor of the aforesaid building No. 25/10. The said accommodation is admittedly being used by the tenants for godown purposes and it was let out some time in the year 1900 at the rent of Rs. 169.50 paise per month. The release application was filed on the pleas inter alia that the disputed accommodation of the ground floor is needed by the landlord for opening a hotel. It was further stated that the building in question is ideal for opening a hotel business as there are other hotels nearby. It was also pleaded that except the petitioner, there is one more tenant who has agreed to vacate the disputed accommodation. The landlord pleaded that earlier he was doing cloth business, but he has been total failure in the said business and, therefore, he has closed it down and will start hotel business in the disputed accommodation after making necessary alteration, construction and renovation in the building in question. The landlord also pleaded that he has got five rooms, one kitchen, one verandah, latrine, bathroom and one big open entrance in his possession on the first floor of the building. The terrace on the road side is over the shops. The building in question is situate on main Chhipitola road. The said road goes from Agra Fort Railway Station to Agra Cantt. Railway Station. U.P. Roadways Bus Stand is at a stone throw distance from it. There are other hotels, such as, Devika Hotel, Ajanta Lodge, Calcutta Hotel, Hotel Tilak Raj nearby and surrounding the building in question. Buddhist Tourist Hotel and Agra Hotel are on the back of the building in question. 2. The said release application was contested mainly on the ground that the premises in question is not suitable for hotel business as it is situate on a side road. Buddhist Tourist Hotel and Agra Hotel are on the back of the building in question. 2. The said release application was contested mainly on the ground that the premises in question is not suitable for hotel business as it is situate on a side road. There is no proper ventilation and provision for sunlight and air in the rooms which are being used as a godown. Bath room and latrine are also not in sufficient numbers. The landlord has not filed any sanctioned map or plan for renovating the disputed building as hotel, therefore, his need is not bona fide and genuine. The plea that the landlord has suffered losses in the cloth business was denied and it was stated that the landlord is carrying on a shoe manufacturing business and dealing in the shoes in the name and style of M/s Foot and Fit Shoes. 3. The release application was numbered as P.A. Case No. 19 of 1981. The parties filed their affidavits in support of their respective cases. Oral deposition of the landlord Ramesh Kumar Kwatra was also recorded. He was cross-examined by the tenants. On behalf of the tenants, Angan Lal, one of the partners of the petitioner No. 1 firm offered himself in the witness box. His statement was recorded and he was permitted to be cross-examined by the landlord. The Prescribed Authority by its judgment and order dated 19.2.1992 rejected the release application on the findings that the need of the landlord is not bona fide and genuine. Principally it was found that the building in question is not suitable for hotel business because of its structure and location. The said judgment was challenged in appeal, being RCMA No. 212 of 1992 which came up for consideration before Vth Additional District Judge, Agra. The appeal, thus, filed by the landlord was allowed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Agra by its judgment dated 11.3.1998. The tenants have challenged the impugned order passed by the Court below in the present writ petition. 4. Heard Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned Senior Advocate along with Sri Satish Mandhyan for the contesting respondent landlord. 5. The tenants have challenged the impugned order passed by the Court below in the present writ petition. 4. Heard Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned Senior Advocate along with Sri Satish Mandhyan for the contesting respondent landlord. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of the writ petition, urged the following points : (1) The appellate Court has not specifically reversed the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority on the question of suitability of the tenanted accommodation for hotel business and also the financial incapacity of the landlord to convert the building in question into a hotel. (2) The first floor of the disputed house No. 25/10 was not vacated by the landlord. The need of the landlord stands satisfied by converting the first floor of the disputed house No. 25/10 by using it as a hotel. (3) The appellate Court was under a legal obligation to consider the plea of the tenants for part release of the tenanted accommodation. No other point was pressed by Sri Ramendra Asthana, Advocate. 6. In response, Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned Senior Advocate for the landlord-respondent submits that the petitioners-tenants have got number of properties in their possession. During the pendency of the appeal before the Court below, they have constructed a godown of 15 x 25 which was earlier in occupation of one Dr. Awadhesh Sharma, being property No. 29/103 as a tenant who vacated it. The newly constructed godown is just opposite to the present godown which is subject matter of the writ petition. The petitioners-tenants have got two hotels, being property No. 25/13 Chhipitola, namely, Hotel Indraprasth and Varun Hotel and six shops therein. Besides the above, a copy of the assessment list for the assessment year 1981-86 issued by the Municipal Corporation was filed before the Prescribed Authority which shows that the tenants have got several premises, such as 29/98, 25/13, 30/129, 29/248, 29/252, 30/135, 28/108 and 30/127. All these properties are recorded in the name of the petitioners as owners. Besides these properties, they have also got property No. 7 popularly known as Tal and is situate just opposite to the property in question and which is a two storey building. All these properties are recorded in the name of the petitioners as owners. Besides these properties, they have also got property No. 7 popularly known as Tal and is situate just opposite to the property in question and which is a two storey building. His submission, in nut shell, is that the findings recorded by the appellate Court are based on relevant consideration and in view of the fact that the petitioners-tenants are very rich persons and have got various commercial properties in the shape of godown, shops and hotels, the present writ petition should be dismissed with heavy costs payable to the landlord as the petitioners have abused process of the Court and have obtained the stay order just to deprive the landlord to have occupation of the disputed accommodation as the said property is fetching practically no rent. 7. I have given careful consideration to the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Taking the first point first, the submission is that the appellate Court, without considering the findings recorded by the prescribed Authority, has wrongly reverssed it, the submission is that it was found by the Prescribed Authority that the present accommodation in question is not suitable for opening a hotel business therein, the appellate Court should not have interfered with the said finding of the Prescribed Authority. Elaborating the argument, Sri Asthana submits that the said building is not situate on a main road, but is situate on Chhipitola road which is a side road and is in the shape of a narrow road/Gali and the situation of the building is such that it is not likely to attract the customers or the tourists. The said argument of the petitioners’ counsel has no merit and deserves outright rejection. It is an acknowledged legal position that a landlord is the best judge of his requirements. He has a complete freedom in the matter and neither a tenant nor the Court concerned can dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. It is for the landlord to decide the business which he wants to carry on. He has a complete freedom in the matter and neither a tenant nor the Court concerned can dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. It is for the landlord to decide the business which he wants to carry on. Unsolicited advice given by a tenant that such and such business will not be beneficial for a landlord has got no relevance with regard to the question of bona fide need. In Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the apex Court has made the following observation: “The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.” 9. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 353 , it has been held that the rent Controller should not proceed on the assumption that the landlord’s requirement is not bona fide. When the landlord shows a prima facie case a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide is liable to be drawn. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 10. It has been held in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 , that convenience and safety of landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While considering the totality of circumstance, the Court may keep in view the profession and vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, habits and social background wherefrom they come. If a landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself tightly into lesser premises protecting the tenant’s occupancy. 11. If a landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself tightly into lesser premises protecting the tenant’s occupancy. 11. In M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singhal, 2001 (1) ARC 382, the apex Court has followed its judgment pronounced in Shiv Sarup Gupta’s case. 12. Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Company, (2000) 1 SCC 679 , is an authority for the proposition that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or commercial purpose and has complete freedom in the matter. In this authority the apex Court has relied upon its earlier judgment in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 . 13. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 , the apex Court with a reference to the provision of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, on the question of bona fide need, after surveying its earlier pronouncements, has held that the requirement of a major son and a coparcener in a joint Hindu family intending to start a business is the requirement of the landlord himself as was held in B. Balaiah v. Chandoor Lachaiah, AIR 1965 AP 435 . The words “for his own use” must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. It has been further held that while casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaning approach guided by the realities of life. 14. In view of the above discussions, it is not open for the petitioners to contend that the building in question is not suitable for opening a hotel business therein. Even otherwise also, there is no merit in the said plea. On careful examination of evidence on record, it is established beyond doubt that the building in question is situate at such place which cannot be said to be unfit for opening a hotel business in a City like Agra which is a tourist place and attracts good numbers of local and foreign tourists on account of world wide famous Taj Mahal and other historical monuments. The tenant, Angan Lal in his oral deposition, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, has accepted that there are many hotels on the main road which is connected by Chhipitola road. The tenant, Angan Lal in his oral deposition, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, has accepted that there are many hotels on the main road which is connected by Chhipitola road. He further admits in cross-examination that on the crossing of Chhipitola and on the other side, there is a road known as Oliya road and a hotel is there on Oliya road. He admits that in a building adjoining to the landlord’s building No. 25/7 Indraprasth Hotel has come into existence which belongs to Kanchan Lal and Roop Kishore who are his nephews. Adjoining Indraprasth Hotel, Hotel Varun is also there which also belong to his two nephews. He also admits that he has got a godown behind Oliya road. The statement of Angan Lal itself is sufficient to reject the theory as propounded by the tenants that the situation of the building in question is not suitable for opening a hotel business therein. There is no illegality in the judgment of the appellate Court in holding that the building in question is suitably situated for opening a hotel business. 15. The next argument that the landlord has got no financial capacity to convert the present building into a hotel has no merit and is liable to be rejected. It appears that no such plea was raised before the Court below nor in the written statement. However, the said plea will not detain this Court any longer. 16. The apex Court though in a slightly different context, with reference to a cognate Act, namely, Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, has made the following observation in S. Venugopal v. A. Karruppusami and another, (2006) 4 SCC 507 , which is appropriate in the present case : “...........Raising funds for erecting a structure in a commercial center is not at all difficult when a large number of builders, financiers as well as banks are willing to advance funds to erect new structures in commercial area......” 17. There has been sea-change in the social and economic condition of the country in the last few decades due to permission granted to foreign banks to make investment in this country and inviting the foreigners to make investment in India, by the Central Government. There has been sea-change in the social and economic condition of the country in the last few decades due to permission granted to foreign banks to make investment in this country and inviting the foreigners to make investment in India, by the Central Government. A judicial note can be taken of the fact that presently loan can be easily arranged for raising construction by a land-owner from the banks on soft terms and conditions. 18. Then, it was urged that the landlord has got vacant possession of the first floor of the building in question, being house No. 25.10 It is the case of the landlord that the first floor in the present form cannot be utilized as hotel. It requires necessary alteration, construction, amendment and modernisation. In this view of the matter, the fact that the landlord has got vacant possession of the first floor of house No. 25/10, his need stands satisfied has to be considered in the background of the fact that the landlord requires the entire building for converting it into a hotel. Indisputably, the ground floor, which is in possession of the tenants, is being used as a godown. The building in question appears to be old construction as it was taken on rent in the year 1900. More than a century has gone and unless the landlord gets possession of the ground floor also, no useful purpose is going to be served. The bona fide need of the landlord continues to exist. The alteration etc. cannot take place on the first floor without having the possession of the ground floor. 19. It may be placed on record that the learned counsel for the petitioners did not urge even a single word disputing the bona fide requirement of the landlord as found by the appellate Court. Even before the appellate Court, as is clear from its judgment, it was not challenged before it that the old cloth business of the landlord has almost been closed. In this regard the following observation made by the appellate Court is relevant: “Atah Patrawali Mey Uplabdh Sakshya Se Yah Bakhuvi Sunishchit Ho Jata Hai Ki Landlord Appealarthi Ka Kapare Ka Vyavasaya Lagbhag Samapt Ho Chuka Hai Aur Is Bindu par appeal ke tark ke dauran bhi vipakshi ke vidwan adhiwakta dwara bahut mahatwapurn pratiwad nahi kiya gaya hai. In this regard the following observation made by the appellate Court is relevant: “Atah Patrawali Mey Uplabdh Sakshya Se Yah Bakhuvi Sunishchit Ho Jata Hai Ki Landlord Appealarthi Ka Kapare Ka Vyavasaya Lagbhag Samapt Ho Chuka Hai Aur Is Bindu par appeal ke tark ke dauran bhi vipakshi ke vidwan adhiwakta dwara bahut mahatwapurn pratiwad nahi kiya gaya hai. Atah appealarthi kapare ka vyavasay me lipt nahi hai aur usane vivadit parisar me hotel vyavasay ki sadbhawi aawashyakta batai hai jiska mulyankan aage kiya jawega...” 20. It was also found by the appellate Court that the other son of the landlord, Amit Kwatra has passed Intermediate Examination in the year 1995. His date of birth is 15.8.1976. He is sitting idle and doing nothing and is presently unemployed and unengaged. The contention of the petitioners-tenants is that “he is engaged along with his father in shoes business” has been rightly repelled by the appellate Court on the ground that the said shoes business is being run by other son of the landlord, Navin at Amar Market. In this regard, necessary documents, such as, Sales tax assessments were produced by the landlord. The appellate Court has rightly believed the landlord’s case that except the disputed accommodation, he has no other commercial accommodation. The said finding recorded by the appellate Court was not challenged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The appellate Court has ultimately found that the need of the landlord is bona fide and genuine and his younger son Amit Kwatra, who has passed Intermediate Examination, is unemployed. The observation of the apex Court in the case of Joginder Pal (supra), already reproduced above, is apposite in this regard. 21. Lastly, it was urged that the appellate Court has committed illegality in not considering the fact that the landlord’s need would be adequately met by releasing a part of the disputed accommodation and leaving the remaining accommodation with the tenants who are of such a long standing. 22. The appellate Court has considered the extent of accommodation available to the petitioner No. 1 which is a partnership concern and to its partners, the other petitioners. The appellate Court has found that the petitioners do possess the following properties. The Court below has found proved that the tenants have got number of other commercial properties which belong to them. The appellate Court has considered the extent of accommodation available to the petitioner No. 1 which is a partnership concern and to its partners, the other petitioners. The appellate Court has found that the petitioners do possess the following properties. The Court below has found proved that the tenants have got number of other commercial properties which belong to them. It was not argued even for a second that its findings in this regard in any manner are illegal or perverse. The said portion of the judgment of the Court below was not referred or placed during the course of the argument by the petitioners learned counsel. 1. Property No. 29/98, 25/13, 30/129, 29/248, 29/252, 30/135, 28/108 and 30/127 as owners. 2. Property No. 7 which is known as Tal and is situate just opposite the property in dispute. 3. Two hotels, namely, Hotel Indraprasth and Varun Hotel and six shops therein situate in property No. 25/13 at Chhipitola which is just opposite to property No. 25/10, presently in suit. 4. Property No. 29/103 at Chhipitola wherein earlier Dr. Awadhesh Sharma was tenant who vacated it and a godown of 15’x25 has been constructed and its main door is just opposite to the property in question. 23. In this regard, in reply to the affidavit filed by the landlord only this much could be submitted that the aforesaid property will not have any impact as these properties are owned by the partners of M/s Net Ram & Sons. Personal properties of the partners cannot be taken into consideration while comparing the need of a partnership firm which is a tenant. The said plea has been rightly repelled by the Court below on the ground that the property in the individual name of the partners can be taken into consideration while considering the question of hardship wherein the first petitioner’s firm which consists of such partners is a tenant. The partnership firm is compendium of names of the partners to carry on the business of firm. 24. The appellate Court has found that the tenants have got huge properties not only on the date of filing of the release application but subsequent thereto. They have acquired other properties during the pendency of the appeal. The partnership firm is compendium of names of the partners to carry on the business of firm. 24. The appellate Court has found that the tenants have got huge properties not only on the date of filing of the release application but subsequent thereto. They have acquired other properties during the pendency of the appeal. It is a different thing that such acquisitions have been made either in the names of the partners of the firm or in the name of sons of the partners. I see no good ground to differ with the judgment of the appellate Court on this point. The appellate Court has examined this aspect from different angles and has found that even if the property possessed by Hori Lal is excluded, the other partner namely Angan Lal has got sufficient number of properties and he would not suffer any loss or injury if the disputed accommodation is released in favour of the landlord. The appellate Court has rightly taken into consideration the financial condition of the tenants. It has been found by it that the tenants are well to do persons and the said fact is proved from their Income Tax return filed along with their affidavit dated 17.4.1997 (paper No. 41C). 25. The petitioners have not even whispered in the writ petition that they are not moneyed or rich persons and the finding recorded by the appellate Court in this regard is in any manner vitiated or perverse. The writ petition is completely silent on this score. In this view of the matter, even if the appellate Court has not considered the question of part of release of the tenanted accommodation, on this score I find no illegality in the order of the appellate Court. The petitioners-tenants are well off persons and they have got huge properties. The landlord, on the other hand, has suffered losses in his cloth business which has been ultimately closed down. He has got a young unemployed major son, Amit Kwatra to whom the landlord has to establish in life. The concept of part release has been introduced with a view that in a given case Court may adjust the equities between the parties on the principle ‘Live and Let Live’. Necessarily in such cases it is found that the landlord and tenant both can be adjusted looking to their requirements of the premises in suit. The concept of part release has been introduced with a view that in a given case Court may adjust the equities between the parties on the principle ‘Live and Let Live’. Necessarily in such cases it is found that the landlord and tenant both can be adjusted looking to their requirements of the premises in suit. But, this principle will not be attracted in a given case when it is found that an unscrupulous tenant who does not at all need it, is maintaining its occupation as it is causing him practically no financial burden by way of rent etc., as is the case presently here. 26. The contention of the landlord that the disputed accommodation was sublet by the tenants and earlier it was allowed to be occupied by one Narendra Kumar and the goods of M/s Awadh Furniture Mart are being stored in the accommodation in question cannot be lightly overlooked. The tenants have come out with an explanation that Narendra Kumar was its employee, but admittedly no document showing his employment with the petitioners was filed. Similarly, an attempt was made that M/s Awadh Furniture Mart is their sister concern, but in the absence of any convincing material on record, the said plea does not deserve acceptance. Even if the plea of part release was not considered by the appellate Court, presumably it was not pleaded before it. I have given careful consideration to the said plea and I am of the definite opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the said plea is meritless. 27. The object of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, like other Rent Control Legislation, is to prevent an unscrupulous landlord to seek eviction of a bona fide tenant. If a tenant is unnecessarily occupying a controlled building because of its very low rent and the landlord is being deprived of his right to earn the livelihood, there is no justification in such circumstance not to release the entire tenanted accommodation. Numerous properties possessed by the tenants have already been detailed above and there is no justification, even for a moment, for permitting such tenants to vacate the tenanted accommodation partially. Rent Control Legislation has been enacted for such tenants who are not in a position to bargain and not for affluent tenants where the landlord is not in a position to bargain because of his bad financial condition. Rent Control Legislation has been enacted for such tenants who are not in a position to bargain and not for affluent tenants where the landlord is not in a position to bargain because of his bad financial condition. In view of the above discussions, there is no merit in any of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 28. Before saying omega to the case, it may be noted that the tenanted accommodation admittedly consists of seven rooms, three verandah court-yard and a big entrance gate on the ground floor of building No. 25/10, Chhipitola, Agra. The said accommodation was let out, according to the tenants, in the year 1900 and is presently fetching rent of Rs. 169.50 paise per month. More than 26 years have passed away when the release application was filed. The petitioners, by filing the present writ petition, have obtained an unconditional stay order on 17.4.1998 and they are continuing to enjoy the stay order. The landlord, thus, has been deprived of possession of the tenanted accommodation for the last more than nine years on account of the stay order dated 17.4.1998. 29. It is well established that an act of Court shall prejudice no man. The maxim is “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. This maxim “is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for administration of law”, said Cresswell J. in Freeman v. Tranah (12 C.B. 406). 30. In M/s. U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Imtiaz Hussain, JT 2005 (10) SC 496, the Supreme Court has held as follows : “9...........This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law, the other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia—the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, JT 1987 (3) SC 555 : 1987 (4) SCC 398 ; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, JT 1996 (1) SC 647 : 1996 (2) SCC 459 and Mohammad Gazi v. State of M.P. and others, JT 2000 (4) SC 55 : 2000 (4) SCC 342 ......” 31. The Supreme Court has also held that where a stay order was obtained by a party in a proceeding and ultimately the said proceeding is terminated against such person, the person is bound to restitute the benefit and advantages taken by him under the stay order. The unfair advantage taken by a petitioner due to stay order, advantage is liable to be neutralized. In the present case, the petitioners have been in occupation of the disputed accommodation on account of stay order passed by this Court on payment of paltry sum as damages which was agreed in the year 1900. Since 1900 the prices of immovable properties have increased manifold, therefore, there is justification for asking the petitioners to pay something more to adjust equities between the parties. 32. In this regard, reference can be made to South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M.P. and others, (2003) 8 SCC 648 (Para 28) : AIR 2003 SC 4482 . “28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the Court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the Court; the act of the Court embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the Court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the Court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the Court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the Court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the Court would act in conjunction with what is the real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the Court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the Court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the Courts, persuading the Court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigants would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the Court withholding the release of money had remained in operation.” 33. Also taking into consideration the law laid down by the apex Court in the case of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 , damages is payable for the period during which stay order remained in operation. 34. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the extent of accommodation and its location and also that the tenants are very rich persons and they own huge commercial and other properties and the price index, it is desirable that the petitioners be directed to pay at least a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per month towards damages in addition to the rent amounting to Rs. 169.50 paise for the period they have enjoyed the stay order to compensate the landlord to a very limited extent. The damages at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- has been fixed taking into consideration that the present prevalent rental value of such a huge construction will not be less than its five times. It has also been taken into consideration that the release application was filed way back in the year 1980 and the petitioners have enjoyed the said accommodation for almost 18 years on payment of Rs. 169.50 paise which is virtually no rent. The above damages have been fixed taking into consideration the ground realities of life and making a pragmatic approach in such matters. The petitioners are liable to pay the damages since April 1998 upto August, 2007 unless they vacate it earlier. They shall be liable to pay the damages for the aforesaid period at the rate of Rs. The above damages have been fixed taking into consideration the ground realities of life and making a pragmatic approach in such matters. The petitioners are liable to pay the damages since April 1998 upto August, 2007 unless they vacate it earlier. They shall be liable to pay the damages for the aforesaid period at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- besides the agreed rent by way of Bank Draft drawn in favour of Ramesh Kumar Kwatra, the landlord-respondent No. 2 herein, and the said Bank Draft shall be sent by registered post to Ramesh Kumar Kwatra or it may be presented before the Prescribed Authority for payment to the landlord on or before the Prescribed Authority for payment to the landlord on or before 31.8.2007 or till the date of actual vacation whichever is earlier. It is made clear that if the petitioners fail to pay the damages, as directed above, within the period stipulated above, they shall be liable to pay simple interest also at the rate of 10% per annum on the aforesaid amount till the date of actual payment w.e.f. 31.8.2007. 35. Time upto 31.8.2007 is granted to the petitioners to vacate the disputed accommodation, on the condition that they will file an undertaking on affidavit before the Prescribed Authority on or before 20.7.2007 to the effect that they shall vacate the disputed premises on or before 31.8.2007 and will hand over its vacant peaceful possession without creating any third party interest to the landlord and also the damages, as awarded above. 36. In case of failure to file the undertaking or to pay the damages, as directed above, it shall be open to the District Magistrate to recover the aforesaid damages as arrears of land revenue and the petitioners shall be liable to pay the same individually as well as collectively. The petitioners shall be liable to pay damages @ Rs. 15,000/- per month from 1.9.2007 onwards till the date of actual delivery of possession to the landlord. 37. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand only). ————