JUDGMENT Hon’ble Umeshwar Pandey, J.—Heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned Counsel for the revisionist and Sri Arvind Kumar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the respondent. Since both agree for final disposal of the revision, it is being disposed of as such. 2. The judgment dated 18.10.2006 is under challenge by the tenant in the present revision petition given under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. 3. On the basis of a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act (Annexure-2) dated 25.7.2001, the plaintiff respondent sought to determine the tenancy of the petitioner revisionist in respect of disputed premises. There is no denial of the service of the notice. The suit was contested by the revisionist tenant taking several grounds and also inter-alia pleading that the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act in the present context should be given to it and that no damages at a higher rate than the rate of agreed rent is to be awarded. The Court below while deciding the controversies as placed before it by the respective parties happened to find that the revisionist tenant was in some arrears of payment of rent and no benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act could be made permissible to it. Accordingly, it found the suit for the relief of eviction of the defendant revisionist as wholly justified. The Court also held that the suit for recovery of aforesaid arrears of rent including the damages at enhanced rate than that of the agreed rent i.e. Rs. 4,000/- per month should also be made permissible to the landlord plaintiff. Accordingly, the present decree has been passed. 4. Learned Counsel for the revisionist-tenant contends that in the first place the tenant was not in arrears of rent even for shortest period and that the benefit, as permissible under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, was wrongly refused to it by the Court below. Learned Counsel further submitted that the rate at which the damages has been granted i.e. Rs. 4,000/- per month, was not at all permissible under law and it should be, if at all possible for grant of any damages, only @ agreed rent i.e. Rs. 2,500/- per month. 5. Learned Counsel further submitted that the rate at which the damages has been granted i.e. Rs. 4,000/- per month, was not at all permissible under law and it should be, if at all possible for grant of any damages, only @ agreed rent i.e. Rs. 2,500/- per month. 5. In reply to the aforesaid submission, Sri A.K. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the landlord-opposite party, almost conceded to the fact that in the present matter the damages should have been awarded at the agreed rate of rent (Rs. 2,500/- per month) and in that context the Court may pass suitable orders. 6. In reply to the first contention of the revisionist, it has been submitted from the side of the landlord that even though it may be taken for granted that payment of rent was up to date and complete, the ground for passing the decree for eviction was still available to the Court. The notice given under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act stipulates three grounds including the one which refers to the tenant being in arrears of payment of rent. Therefore, to say that if the payment of rent was up to date on the date of notice or on the date of filing of the suit, the benefit as available to a tenant under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act may not be of much consequence to it. It was specifically stated in that notice by the landlord that he did not want to keep and continue the tenant Corporation in the disputed premises and the tenancy stood terminated on the expiry of the statutory period from the date of service of the same. Thus, Sri Srivastava stresses that without attracting the benefit of Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act, the suit could be decreed only in the light of the aforesaid averments made in the notice given to the tenant. 7. In the aforesaid context, the provision of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is very specific on the point that the ‘lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days’ notice’. 7. In the aforesaid context, the provision of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is very specific on the point that the ‘lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days’ notice’. From the aforesaid clause of the Section itself, it is abundantly clear that the lease so created, as was done in the present case, is nothing but a lease from month to month and it could be terminated at the instance of either of the parties i.e. landlord or the tenant by a notice of fifteen days. It is not required for such notice to be given making out one or the other excuse for determination of the tenancy. The lease period of the premises continues only from month to month and in between if either of the parties to the lease prefers to terminate it, he has not to express any ground in the notice for such termination. Mere statement regarding intention for non-continuance of tenancy is sufficient for such a notice. The statement, as given in paragraph-5 of the aforesaid notice (Annexure-2) appears to have been rightly referred to by the learned Counsel for the landlord-opposite party, which in no ambiguous words states that the landlord did not want the tenant to further continue as such in the premises rather he did not want to keep the revisionist as his tenant and after the expiry of the period of 30 days from the service of the said notice, the cause of action for the eviction of the tenant was available to him. Therefore, even if it is to be accepted that the revisionist was not in arrears of payment of rent still its eviction from the premises was made legally permissible after 30 days of the service of the notice. 8. Sri Manish Goyal, learned Counsel appearing for the revisionist, has cited the case law of R.S. Lala Praduman Kumar v. Virendra Goyal, AIR 1969 SC 1349 . In this case the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the scope of Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act as to which extent it should be interpreted for according the benefit to the tenant from his impending eviction after the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. In this case the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the scope of Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act as to which extent it should be interpreted for according the benefit to the tenant from his impending eviction after the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. It has been propounded by the apex Court in the said judgment that the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture for non-payment of rent may be exercised by the Court after the tenant in a suit of ejectment at the hearing of the suit pays or deposits arrears of rent together with interest thereon and full cost of the suit in terms of the aforesaid Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act but an appeal being a rehearing of the suit, in appropriate case it is open to the appellate Court at the hearing of the appeal to relieve the tenant in default against forfeiture. It has been provided that passing of a decree in ejectment suit against tenant by the Court of first instance does not take away the jurisdiction of the appellate Court to grant equitable relief. This case law does not deal on the point we presently have at hand. In fact, the landlord has not taken the grounds of forfeiture of the tenancy and ejectment of the tenant specifically on the ground of his being in arrears of payment of rent. The two grounds, which are specific in the notice, are that the tenant was using the premises for the purpose inconsistent than the purpose for which it was taken and also that the landlord did not want to keep the revisionist tenant any more as such and the tenancy would stand terminated on the expiry of 30 days’ period from the date of service of notice. Therefore, to accord benefit of Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act in the present case, appears to be highly uncalled for. The other two case laws, which have been referred to by Sri Goyal being Surjeet Singh v. Addl. District Judge, Haridwar and others, 1994 A.W.C. 17 and Dr. A.S. Raj v. District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1982 ALJ 1200, are also appearing to be hardly of any assistance to the tenant revisionist in the present case. The other two case laws, which have been referred to by Sri Goyal being Surjeet Singh v. Addl. District Judge, Haridwar and others, 1994 A.W.C. 17 and Dr. A.S. Raj v. District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1982 ALJ 1200, are also appearing to be hardly of any assistance to the tenant revisionist in the present case. The case of Surjeet Singh (supra) deals with the same aspect of the matter, which was dealt with by the apex Court in R.S. Lala Praduman Kumar’s case (supra) whereas the case of A.S. Raj (supra) deals with altogether a different point in the context of Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act. In this case, what has been propounded as ratio of the judgment, is that in a suit for eviction after simple notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, it is enough to claim the ejectment on the basis of forfeiture under Clause (g) of Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act even though, the ground of that Clause has not been specifically taken in the said notice. It has been further held that ‘once the notice had been served terminating the tenancy simplicitor, there is no legal impediment for the lessor in instituting the suit on the plea of Section 111 (g)’. Thus, the Lucknow Bench of this Court observed that no second notice is required to the lessee specially mentioning the ground of forfeiture occasioned by denial of title. This case law is being altogether on a different point does not help the revisionist’s case but in other way it appears to be helpful to the case of the present landlord-opposite party. 9. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I personally feel that the impugned decree of eviction, which has been passed by the Court below against the revisionist, is wholly sound and it cannot be interfered with in the present revision of the tenant. It is however, in the light of the statement of the learned Counsel of the landlord, held that the decree awarding the damages @ Rs. 4,000/- per month should be modified and the tenant can be asked to make the payment of such damages only @ Rs. 2,500/- per month, which is the admitted agreed rent between the parties. 10. In result, the present revision fails but the decree is modified to the extent, as stated above. 4,000/- per month should be modified and the tenant can be asked to make the payment of such damages only @ Rs. 2,500/- per month, which is the admitted agreed rent between the parties. 10. In result, the present revision fails but the decree is modified to the extent, as stated above. It is also provided that the revisionist would be given a breathing period of five months from today to find out an alternative for vacating the premises in question in compliance to the decree passed against it. In case, there is failure on the part of the revisionist in vacating the disputed premises within the stipulated period, it would become automatically liable for payment of damages @ Rs. 4,000/- per month. ———