JUDGMENT : PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. 1. This is second round of litigation in the High Court. Whether Petitioners' possession over the disputed premises stands regualrised u/s 14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as amended on 5th of July, 1976, is the sole question involved in the present writ petition. Background Facts of the Case: 2. Premises No. 1/4 Nawabganj, Jageshwar Temple Road, Kanpur which consists of two rooms and one chabutra and was being used by the Petitioners' father namely Shri Laxminarain Gupta (who died during the pendency of the proceeding and the Petitioners have been substituted in his place) for non-residential purposes. Shri Laxmi Narain Gupta came in occupation of the said premises indisputably without any allotment order in the year 1968 on the monthly rent of Rs. 110. 3. One Baikunth Narain applied for allotment of the said accommodation on the ground that the said accommodation is vacant in the eyes of law as Laxmi Narain Gupta is in its occupation without there being an allotment order in his favour. On October 28, 1970, the premises in question was declared vacant by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer u/s 7A of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'old Act') and was subsequently on 2.11.1970 allotted to Baikunth Narain. Subsequent thereto the District Magistrate did pass an order u/s 7A (2) of the old Act directing eviction of Laxmi Narain Gupta. Suit No. of 1971 was instituted by Laxmi Narain Gupta in the Court of First Additional Munsif, Kanpur challenging his eviction order passed u/s 7A of the old Act on the ground that the premises in question is post 1951 construction and as such provisions of old Act are not applicable and obtained an injunction order restraining Baikunth Narain to evict Laxmi Narain Gupta. The suit, after contest, was ultimately dismissed on 31st of March, 1975 which was challenged by Laxmi Narain Gupta in Appeal No. 1747 of 1975. The appeal was also dismissed on December 12, 1977. Injunction order was also granted by the appellate court and it remained in operation till the final decision of the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal the allottee Baikunth Narain expired on 17th of August, 1975. The appeal was also dismissed on December 12, 1977. Injunction order was also granted by the appellate court and it remained in operation till the final decision of the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal the allottee Baikunth Narain expired on 17th of August, 1975. The civil court found that the building in question is a construction prior to the year 1951 and thus provision of old Act were applicable and Laxmi Narain Gupta could not get benefit of Section 14 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act). 4. After dismissal of the appeal by the civil court, the landlord Ram Kishore Shukla (who has also died and whose heirs are the Respondents No. 2 to 6 herein) filed an application for release of the disputed accommodation. Laxmi Narain Gupta also applied for regularisation of his possession as tenant u/s 14 of the new Act as amended on 5th of July, 1976. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by the order dated October 13, 1982, rejected the application of Laxmi Narain Gupta for regularisation of possession on the ground that his objections were already rejected on 23rd of April, 1971 and notice for eviction u/s 7A (2) of old Act was issued earlier. The contention of Laxmi Narain Gupta that Section 14 was amended on 5th of July, 1976 and Baikunth Narain having expired before that date, i.e. on 17th of August, 1975, his possession is liable to be regualrised, was rejected on the ground that ad interim order continued up to December 12, 1977. He was of the view that on 5th of July, 1976 when Section 14 of new Act was amended proceedings for his eviction was pending. After rejecting claim for regularisation, the disputed accommodation was released in favour of the landlord who bona fidely required it to establish his younger son in the business. 5. He was of the view that on 5th of July, 1976 when Section 14 of new Act was amended proceedings for his eviction was pending. After rejecting claim for regularisation, the disputed accommodation was released in favour of the landlord who bona fidely required it to establish his younger son in the business. 5. The above order was subject-matter of challenge in Rent Revision No. 327 of 1982 by Laxmi Narain Gupta before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur who by its judgment and order dated 24th of January, 1983 allowed the revision and restored the matter back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to re-examine the case afresh and give a satisfactory finding on the question: Whether the Petitioner has been in occupation of the accommodation in question as a tenant with the consent of the landlord on relevant date, i.e. 5th of July, 1976. 6. This order was further challenged by the landlord in Writ Petition No. 4752 of 1983, before this Court. The writ petition was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 19th of April, 1988. This was the first round of litigation upto the High Court. 7. After remand the prescribed authority by the impugned order dated 14th of June, 1993 recorded a categorical finding that Laxmi Narain Gupta was not in occupation of the disputed premises with the consent of the landlord as tenant on 5th of July, 1976, when Section 14 of new Act was amended. 8. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Shri S. N. Verma, the learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Sharad Malviya for contesting Respondents. Rival Contentions: 9. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that there is voluminous evidence on record to show that Laxmi Narain Gupta and after his death his heirs, i.e., the Petitioners are in occupation of the disputed premises with the consent of the landlord. Baikunth Narain has died on 17th of August, 1975 and Section 14 of new Act was amended subsequently on 5th of July, 1976. No proceeding for eviction of Laxmi Narain Gupta was pending on the date of commencement of Section 14 as amended and as such the occupation of the Petitioners stood regularised by operation of law u/s 14 thereof. 10. Reliance was placed on the various rent receipts annexed alongwith the writ petition in support of the above argument. No proceeding for eviction of Laxmi Narain Gupta was pending on the date of commencement of Section 14 as amended and as such the occupation of the Petitioners stood regularised by operation of law u/s 14 thereof. 10. Reliance was placed on the various rent receipts annexed alongwith the writ petition in support of the above argument. A reference was also made to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent landlord wherein genuineness of the rent receipts having not been disputed. Particular reference was made to para 10 of the counter-affidavit of Brij Kishore Shukla, wherein it is not disputed that Laxmi Narain Gupta was inducted in 1968 as tenant by Ram Kishore Shukla. 11. In response, Shri S. N. Verma, the learned senior counsel for the Respondents submits that indisputably notices for eviction were issued u/s 7A (2) of the old Act against father of the Petitioners and as such the proceedings for eviction were pending on the date of commencement of amended Section 14 of new Act. In Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1977 injunction order was operative even after the death of Baikunth Narain and it came to an end only on 12th of December, 1977, when the appeal was itself dismissed on merits. The submission is that but for the injunction order passed in civil suit and the appeal, Laxmi Narain Gupta, the father of the Petitioners would have been evicted. The dismissal of the suit and appeal brought the vacation of the injunction orders. It follows that the eviction proceedings were pending against Petitioners' father irrespective of the fact that allottee Baikunth Narain died on 17th of August, 1975, during the pendency of the appeal. Discussion: 12. The point mooted in the present writ petition is whether u/s 14 as amended on 5th of July, 1976 of the new Act, the occupation of the Petitioners stood regualrised. 13. At this stage it is necessary to consider the Section 14 of new Act unamended as well as after amendment. 14. The unamended Section 14 of new Act reads as follows: 14. 13. At this stage it is necessary to consider the Section 14 of new Act unamended as well as after amendment. 14. The unamended Section 14 of new Act reads as follows: 14. Regularisation of occupation of Existing Tenants.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any general order may under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the old Act, any tenant in occupation of a building with consent of landlord immediately before commencement of this Act, not being a person against whom proceedings u/s 7A of the old Act are pending immediately before such commencement, shall be deemed in authorized occupation of such building. 15. The aforesaid section was substituted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 w.e.f. 5th of July, 1976. In its amended form, it reads as follows: 14. Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2A) or a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any Court or authority on the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such building. 16. Before proceeding further it may also be placed on record that it was admitted by the learned Counsel for the parties that question of regularisation of Petitioner's possession under original Section 14 of the new Act stands concluded finally against Petitioners in view of the findings recorded by the civil court in Civil Suit No. 223 of 1971 as well as in Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1975. Even this Court in its judgment delivered in writ petition, dated 19th of April, 1988 has held in this regard as follows: Therefore, the only finding which became final between the parties was that on 5th of July, 1972 when the Act came into existence and in view of Section 14 of the Act (as it then existed), Laxmi Narain Gupta could not get benefit of Section 14 of the Act. This finding would definitely operate as res judicata between the parties, who was also a party in the said suit, and Laxmi Narain. 17. This finding would definitely operate as res judicata between the parties, who was also a party in the said suit, and Laxmi Narain. 17. In this very judgments the High Court affirmed the remand order passed by the appellate court to determine as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case on 5th of July, 1976 when Section 14 of new Act was amended and the allottee Baikunth Narain having died on 17th of August, 1975, the Petitioners herein are entitled for regularisation of their tenancy under the amended Section 14 of the Act. The appellate court in its judgment has posed the following question for determination by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer while passing the remand order: Whether the Petitioner has been tenant of landlord opp. party and if so whether he is in occupation with his consent or without his consent. 18. The unamended Section 14 came into force w.e.f. 15th of July, 1972. This section protects a tenant inducted by a landlord in defiance of general order u/s 7 (2) of the old Act. The object and purpose of the enactment of Section 14 is to regualrise the occupation of existing tenant, i.e., the tenant who was in occupation on 15th of July, 1972 with the consent of landlord against whom proceeding u/s 7A of the old Act were not pending, i.e., on 15th of July, 1972. The section does not extend its benefit to a person who has been inducted in defiance of an allotment order. This on the plain reading of unamended Section 14 is apparent. The changes which have been brought in Section 14 after amendment are as follows: 1. "Cut off date of occupation has been shifted from 15th of July, 1972 to 5th of July, 1976, i.e., the date on which Section 14 was amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 ; 2. Amended section also applies to any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2A of the new Act) ; 3. It applies to only such person not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any Court or authority, on 5th of July, 1976, i.e., the date of commencement of amended section. 19. Amended section also applies to any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2A of the new Act) ; 3. It applies to only such person not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any Court or authority, on 5th of July, 1976, i.e., the date of commencement of amended section. 19. Reverting to the facts of the case first thing in order to ascertain the applicability of Section 14 is to determine whether Laxmi Narain Gupta, the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners was as an "occupant as tenant" on 5th of July, 1976. 20. The second question whether such occupation of Laxmi Narain Gupta was with the consent of landlord on 5th of July, 1976. 21. And thirdly, whether any suit or proceeding for eviction was pending before any Court or authority against the Petitioners on 5th of July, 1976. 22. Taking the first question first as to whether Laxmi Narain Gupta was in "occupation" of the disputed premises as a "tenant". The contention of the Petitioners is that, admittedly, Laxmi Narain Gupta was in occupation of disputed premises on 5th of July, 1976 and he continued to be so during his life time and after his death, the Petitioners are in occupation thereof, presently. Great reliance has been placed on documentary evidences such as registration of the business with the Sales Tax Department which is being carried on from the disputed premises, the consumption of electricity evidenced by the bills, payment of rent etc. Rather the occupation of the Petitioners is admitted to the Respondent landlords. There appears no dispute with regard to the actual occupation of the Petitioners over the disputed property. But that is not the end of the matter. A person may be in occupation of a property in different capacities such as owner, lessee, mortgagee etc.. What is relevant for the purposes of Section 14 of new Act is that occupation of the person should be as a "tenant". One of the ingredients of Section 14 of new Act is that the person claiming regularisation of his occupation should be in occupants of the property as a "tenant". It necessarily excludes occupations other than "tenant" in "occupation", which means: Occupation. - "to take possession of, occupy, employ". The Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) defines 'occupation' at page 82 thus: Occupation- Possession ; control ; tenure ; use. It necessarily excludes occupations other than "tenant" in "occupation", which means: Occupation. - "to take possession of, occupy, employ". The Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) defines 'occupation' at page 82 thus: Occupation- Possession ; control ; tenure ; use. In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 67) at page 74 occupation' has been mentioned thus: the word may be employed as referring to the act or process of occupying, the state of being occupied, occupy, or tenure. 23. The Apex Court has clearly pointed out that 'possession' or 'occupation' may take various forms and it was expressly held that even keeping the household effects by the owner is an act of occupation. Tenant.-Tenant is a word which standing by itself denotes in law one who holds the land or building by any kind of title. 24. The above interpretation is in consonance with the aims and objects of Section 14 of the new Act and it also advances the cause of justice. The fallacy in the Petitioners' contention is that it proceeds ignoring the effect of the order dated 28.10.1970 declaring the accommodation in question as vacant under the old Act. The legal effect of the said order declaring the accommodation in question as vacant is that in the eyes of law the said accommodation is not in occupation of any body and is open for release/ allotment. That is how an order declaring vacancy is understood under the Rent Control Legislature. The statutory effect of the order declaring vacancy has to be given effect and its effect cannot be diminished, reduced or nullified by act of the parties. So long as the vacancy order remains, the accommodation in question remains vacant in the eyes of law and even if landlord accepts a person other than a person in whose favour an allotment order has been passed, the order declaring vacancy shall remain in operation and will come to an end when the allottee takes the possession. Otherwise, an unscrupulous landlord can very easily frustrate an order declaring vacancy by agreeing to let out to a third person. If such a course is allowed to be permitted, the very purpose of allotment proceedings would be frustrated. Otherwise, an unscrupulous landlord can very easily frustrate an order declaring vacancy by agreeing to let out to a third person. If such a course is allowed to be permitted, the very purpose of allotment proceedings would be frustrated. Keeping in view of the above legal position, the Petitioners may have been and as a matter of fact are in occupation of the disputed premises but their occupation over the disputed accommodation is not of a tenant in occupation. At this stage reliance was placed upon a judgment of this Court in Dr. (Mrs.) Gyanthapa v. District Judge, Allahabad 1978 AWC 820 . On a close reading of the aforesaid judgment it is apt that the controversy involved therein was totally different and the said ruling is distinguishable on facts. It was held therein that reading the words "a tenant in occupation of building", clearly shows that the person claiming benefit must be in actual physical enjoyment of the building. Involved therein was the meaning of word "occupation". It was held that the word "occupation" means a person should exercise control over the property. The question whether occupation of every kind not necessarily of a tenant in occupation is equivalent to occupation of a tenant was not involved even remotely. The point which I am trying to bring home is that occupation must be in the capacity of a tenant and not otherwise. This Court is of the view that complexion of the present case is completely different in view of the fact that accommodation in question was already declared vacant and as a matter of fact, indisputably it was allotted to one Baikunth Narain by the order dated 28.10.1970 and notice for eviction for Laxmi Narain was issued u/s 7A (2) of the old Act. 25. Section 7A of the old Act has four Sub-sections. Sub-section (1) provides that if a person is in occupation of an accommodation and the District Magistrate believes or has reason to believe that such a person is in occupation in contravention to Section 7 (2) of the old Act he may call upon the person in occupation to show cause why he should not be evicted therefrom. Under Sub-section (2), the District Magistrate, being not satisfied with the reply of such occupant, may pass an order directing him to vacate the premises within a specified period. Under Sub-section (2), the District Magistrate, being not satisfied with the reply of such occupant, may pass an order directing him to vacate the premises within a specified period. Sub-section (3) provides that if the person fails to vacate the disputed accommodation within time specified by the District Magistrate, the District Magistrate may evict such person by use of force and also put the person entitled for occupation u/s 7 (2) of the old Act. From the mechanism provided u/s 7A of the Act it is crystal clear that it deals with such occupants who are unauthorised one and the District Magistrate shall evict such unauthorised occupants. 26. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, it is not in dispute that the proceedings were taken against Laxmi Narain Gupta for eviction under aforesaid Section 7A. To save himself from such eviction proceedings, Laxmi Narain Gupta instituted Civil Suit No. 923 of 1971 and obtained injunction order. True, Laxmi Narain Gupta could not be evicted due to injunction order passed by civil court and the injunction order was ultimately discharged. 27. The effect of dismissal of the civil suit and consequent discharge of interim injunction order is that the proceedings u/s 7A which were pending against the Petitioners have been revived. In other words, the proceedings for eviction was in dormant stage and have been revived automatically after the discharge of the injunction order. 28. It, thus, follows that occupation of the Petitioners was not that of a tenant in occupation of the premises in question. 29. Now, coming to the second question regarding consent of landlord, argument of the Petitioners is that admittedly, the landlords have received the rent. Therefore, the consent of the landlord regarding their occupation is there. The Petitioners according to them are in occupation of the disputed premises with the consent of the landlord, is the submission of the Petitioners in brief. Reliance has been placed on rent receipts, the genuineness of which are not questioned even in the present writ petition by the landlords. Reliance has been placed in this regard on Prakash Chand Jain v. Jai Narain Ravindra Kumar 1984 (2) ARC 24, wherein it has been held that the consent envisaged u/s 14 means in all cases need not be express. It is equally good and effective where it can be inferred by necessary implication. Reliance has been placed in this regard on Prakash Chand Jain v. Jai Narain Ravindra Kumar 1984 (2) ARC 24, wherein it has been held that the consent envisaged u/s 14 means in all cases need not be express. It is equally good and effective where it can be inferred by necessary implication. Further reliance was placed on G. C. Bhattacharya v. State of U. P. 1986 (1) ARC 499, wherein it has been held that acceptance of rent by landlord from the tenant signifies his consent within the meaning of Section 14 of the new Act. In this case it was found that the building in question was covered by the old Act and no proceeding against the person who claimed benefit of Section 14 of the new Act u/s 7A of the old Act was pending immediately before the commencement of new Act. The landlord had applied for release on June 23, 1975, i.e., after the commencement of new Act. In this situation it was held that acceptance of rent by landlord from the tenant signifies his consent. It is crystal clear that the facts of the case on hand is distinguishable as admittedly the proceedings u/s 7A of the old Act were pending against the Petitioners on the relevant date. Moreover, the point of consent has been more elaborately dealt with in Kishori and Anr. v. District Judge, Banda, 1981 ARC 194. This Court has held that the word 'consent' has been used u/s 14 of the Act. Payment of rent does not amount to consent if accepted by the landlord after 5th of July, 1976. The consent envisaged u/s 14 has to be prior to 5th of July, 1976 i.e., prior to the commencement of the amended Section 14. 30. Before drawing a presumption of consent as envisaged u/s 14 of the Act, from the acceptance of the rent the background facts of the case be kept in mind. The Petitioners or the predecessors were in occupation of the disputed accommodation and he continued in occupation in the strength of the interim injunction order obtained from the civil court. The parties were on litigating terms even before the commencement of the original Section 14. In the civil suit the landlord was also made party as one of the Defendants and the interim injunction order staying ejectment was obtained. The parties were on litigating terms even before the commencement of the original Section 14. In the civil suit the landlord was also made party as one of the Defendants and the interim injunction order staying ejectment was obtained. In this fact situation the acceptance of the rent, by no stretch of imagination would amount the giving of consent either express or implied. The consent means a free consent. "Consent" in law means meeting of two minds. In the case in hand, there was no question of meeting of two minds, i.e., mind of Laxmi Narain Gupta and that of the landlord because of the pendency of the litigation before the civil court wherein the landlord Pt. Ram Kishore Shukla was impleaded as Defendant No. 2 and the injunction was sought for and granted against him also. On the facts and circumstances of the case, inference of consent on the part of the landlord as required u/s 14 cannot be drawn even if certain payments were made to and have been accepted by the landlord. The acceptance of such payments was nothing except payment of amount towards the damages for the use and occupation of premises in question tendered by or on behalf of unauthorised occupant. 31. Now, coming to the third question is with regard to the pendency of any suit or proceedings for eviction against the Petitioners on the relevant date, i.e., 5th of July, 1976. 32. This question may be examined from two angles. Emphasis is laid by the learned senior counsel for the landlord on the word "pending". In legal parlance word "pending" has acquired a definite meaning. The word "is pending" in Section 14 are significant. Reference was made to the Black's Dictionary wherein word "pending" means- began not concluded. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition a legal proceeding is pending as soon as it commenced and until it is concluded, i.e., so long as the Court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue or to be dealt therein. 33. The above definition of word "pending" found approval of the Supreme Court in Asgarali Nazarali Singaporawalla Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 503 and in Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and Another Vs. 33. The above definition of word "pending" found approval of the Supreme Court in Asgarali Nazarali Singaporawalla Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 503 and in Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and Another Vs. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1971 SC 1120 wherein it was held that the word "pending" will ordinarily mean that the matter is not concluded and the Court which has cognizance of it can make an order on the matter. The test is whether any proceedings can be taken in the case before the Court or the Tribunal where it is said to be pending. The answer is that until the case is concluded it is pending. Applying the test as prescribed by the Apex Court in the aforesaid two decisions it is obvious that the orders passed by the District Magistrate u/s 7A of the old Act for eviction of Laxmi Narain Gupta and allotment order was pending on 5th of July, 1976 when the amended Section 14 was inserted. The argument of the Petitioners is that before commencement of the amended Section 14 of the new Act, the allottee Baikunth Narain having expired on 17th of August, 1975, the allotment order has come to an end on the death of Baikunth Narain ipso facto, has not merit. The said argument ignores two facts that injunction order was operative and the same remained in operation till 12th December, 1977. On 5th of July, 1976, when amended Section 14 was introduced, due to injunction order passed in Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1975, the landlord as well as Baikunth Narain were injuncted not to evict the Petitioner from the disputed premises. Secondly, the eviction proceedings and the orders issued under Sections 7A (2) and 7A (3) under the old Act directing the eviction of Laxmi Narain Gupta revived as soon as the injunction order was vacated on 12th of December, 1977. The eviction orders were in a dormant state due to injunction order and revived subsequently as soon as the injunction order stood vacated on 12th of December, 1977. The eviction orders under Sections 7A (2) and 7A (3) of the old Act ipso facto after discharge of the injunction order have revived. The eviction orders were in a dormant state due to injunction order and revived subsequently as soon as the injunction order stood vacated on 12th of December, 1977. The eviction orders under Sections 7A (2) and 7A (3) of the old Act ipso facto after discharge of the injunction order have revived. The eviction order issued under Sections 7A (2) and 7A (3) of the old Act having not been exhausted as they were not executed, the death of Baikunth Narain in the meantime is of little consequence. The reason is simple. u/s 7A the direction given by the District Magistrate was to evict the unauthorised occupant namely Laxmi Narain Gupta with a further direction to landlord to induct the allottee as tenant. In other words, it was in two parts. 34. The Apex Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, AIR 1992 SC 1439 has held that "while considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the appellate authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the appellate authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the appellate authority after the quashing of the order of the appellate authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority because inspite of the said order, the order of the appellate authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991, by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority dated January 7, 1991, does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated January 7, 1991, and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the appellate authority. 35. The upshot of the above discussion is that Laxmi Narain Gupta was a person against whom proceedings for eviction was pending before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 5th of July, 1976, the date of commencement of the amended Section 14 of the new Act. 36. In nutshell it is held that the occupation of the Petitioners or their father was not of a tenant in occupation, secondly, occupation was not with consent of the landlord and thirdly against him execution proceedings for eviction was pending on 5th of July, 1976. In other words, the Petitioners have failed to fulfil the essential ingredients of Section 14 of the amended section and as such the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the impugned order holding that the Petitioners are not entitled, for the above reasons the benefit of amended Section 14 does not suffer from any error of law or fact. 37. The Apex Court in Jaspal Singh v. Additional District Judge 1985 (1) ARC 1 (SC), has held that in order to attract Section 14 as it stood after amendment a person who is claiming benefit thereunder has to prove that he was a licensee or a tenant with the consent of landlord on 5th of July, 1976, when the amended Section came into force. It was held that as the release application was filed by the landlord against a person seeking benefit of Section 14 was pending on the relevant date, it cannot be said that the person was in occupation of the disputed premises with the consent of the landlord. 38. Before saying omega to the case one factor which may also be taken into consideration is that basically under the amended Section 14 the cut off date of occupation has been changed from 15th of July, 1972 to 5th of July, 1976, and in other respects so far as a tenant is concerned, broadly there is no change. In the first round of litigation it was held by the High Court, as noted above that the Petitioners are not entitled for regularisation under the unamended Section 14 as the said plea is barred by res judicata. The Petitioners are claiming their occupation since year 1968. In this fact situation, there has been no change with regard to the nature of occupation of the Petitioners and they continued to be in occupation since the year 1968, this Court is of the opinion that the benefit of amended Section 14 cannot be extended to the Petitioners in any case inasmuch as amended Section 14 is meant for such tenants who came in occupation after 15th of July, 1972, and were in occupation on 5th of July, 1976. The gamut of the period covered under amended Section 14 is the period subsequent to 15th of July, 1972, and not prior to it. 39. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the writ petition. 40. It may be placed on record that indisputably the Petitioners did not tender any amount towards the damages for use and occupation of the premises in question since January, 1984. They tendered a banker's cheque on 21.5.2007 for Rs. 31,460 covering the period January, 1984 to December 2007, as per the direction of this Court. The Petitioners are enjoying the occupation of the disputed premises in view of the unconditional stay order passed by this Court on 8th of July, 1993, i.e., for the last about 14 years on payment of Rs. 110 per month for using two rooms and one chabutra for commercial purpose. The Petitioners are enjoying the occupation of the disputed premises in view of the unconditional stay order passed by this Court on 8th of July, 1993, i.e., for the last about 14 years on payment of Rs. 110 per month for using two rooms and one chabutra for commercial purpose. While dismissing the writ petition, it is desirable that the Respondents be compensated suitably to some extent and as held by the Apex Court in the case of Salem Bar Association, costs incurred in the litigation be awarded: In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 2005 SC 3353 the Apex Court has observed that u/s 35B of Code of CPC an order may be made requiring the defaulting party to pay to other party such costs as would, in the opinion of the Court, be reasonably sufficient to reimburse the other party in respect of the expenses incurred by him in attending the Court on that date, and payment of such costs, on the date next following the date of such order, shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit or the defence. It is observed that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded on the unsuccessful party. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs. It has been further held that when Section 35(2) provides for cost to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party except in those cases where the Court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons thereof. The costs have to be actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost besides the payment of the Court fee, typing, etc. 41. It is well established that an act of Court shall prejudice no man. The maxim is "actus curiae neminem gravabit". This maxim "is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for administration of law", said Cresswell J., in Freeman v. Tranah 12 CB 406 42. In U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. 41. It is well established that an act of Court shall prejudice no man. The maxim is "actus curiae neminem gravabit". This maxim "is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for administration of law", said Cresswell J., in Freeman v. Tranah 12 CB 406 42. In U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Imtiaz Hussain, AIR 2006 SC 649 the Supreme Court has held as follows: 9........................ This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law, the other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey and Others Vs. Tarapada Dey and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2195 Gursharan Singh and others etc. Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and others, AIR 1996 SC 1175 and Mohammod Gazi v. State of M. P. and Ors. 2000 (4) SCC 342 ............ 43. The Supreme Court has also held that where a stay order was obtained by a party in a proceeding and ultimately the said proceeding is terminated against such person, the person is bound to restitute the benefit and advantages taken by him under the stay order. The unfair advantage taken by a Petitioner due to stay order, advantage is liable to be neutralized. In the present case, the Petitioner has been in occupation of the disputed accommodation on account of stay order passed by this Court on payment of paltry sum as damages (even that amount was not actually paid) which was agreed in the year 1968. Since 1968 the prices of immovable properties have increased manifold, therefore, there is justification for asking the Petitioner to pay something more to adjust equities between the parties. 44. In this regard, reference can be made to South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. and Others, AIR 2003 SC 4482 . 28. Since 1968 the prices of immovable properties have increased manifold, therefore, there is justification for asking the Petitioner to pay something more to adjust equities between the parties. 44. In this regard, reference can be made to South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. and Others, AIR 2003 SC 4482 . 28. "That no one shall suffer by an act of the Court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the Court ; the 'act of the Court' embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the Court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the Court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court ; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the Court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the Court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the Court would act in conjunction with what is the real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the Court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the Court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the Courts, persuading the Court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the Court withholding the release of money had remained in operation. 45. Also taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 damages is payable for the period during which stay order remained in operation, i.e., since 8th of July, 1993. The Petitioners were required to pay the rent/damages at the rate of Rs. 110 since the year 1968, as agreed rent. They have paid it upto the year 1983 and stopped thereafter and paid it when this Court at the time of hearing of the writ petition made it clear to them that unless the damages as admitted by them is paid first, the writ petition will not be heard on merits. Even the admitted damages for the last about 24 years was withheld by the Petitioners. Taking into consideration the ground realities of life and the fact that prices of immovable properties have sky-rocketed also the fact that the Petitioners are using the disputed premises for commercial purposes, i.e., as they have installed oil expellers, at a moderate estimate the damages would not be less than Rs. 610, that is agreed rent of Rs. 110 plus Rs. 500 in respect of the two rooms (shops) plus one chabutra. The damages at the rate of Rs. 500 over and above Rs. 610, that is agreed rent of Rs. 110 plus Rs. 500 in respect of the two rooms (shops) plus one chabutra. The damages at the rate of Rs. 500 over and above Rs. 110 per month since year 1994 to June 2007, the total period comes about 14 years six months and thus, it comes to Rs. 87,000. In addition to the above, the Petitioners are also liable to pay the cost of litigation. The interest of justice, thus, would be served by awarding a sum of Rs. 95,000 (Rupees ninety five thousands only) in all. The said amount shall be payable by the Petitioners to the contesting Respondent landlords within a period of one month failing which the said amount shall be recoverable by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, as arrears of land revenue, who shall recover the said amount of rupees ninety five thousands from the Petitioners and shall pay to the landlords. Time to vacate the disputed premises by 31st of July 2007, is granted failing which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar shall evict the Petitioners by use of force, if necessary in accordance with law, forthwith. If the Petitioners continued to remain in occupation of the disputed premises beyond the period granted by this Court they shall be liable to pay the damages at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per month till the date of actual delivery of the possession to the contesting Respondents. 46. The premises in question stands released in favour of the landlords as it was already released by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer earlier also. The writ petition is dismissed with the direction to the Petitioners to pay a sum of rupees ninety five thousands inclusive of damages and costs.