Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 1779 (PAT)

Madhu Kumari v. State of Bihar

2007-11-14

body2007
ORDER Heard. 2. The petition seeks quashing of the FIR of Buxar Town P.S. Case No. 49 of 2005 (Annexure-1). The above noted FIR has been lodged by Sub-Judge-II, Buxar in the light of his order dated 7.2.2005 passed in Title Suit No. 262 of 1995. 3. It appears that a suit was filed by the present petitioner and subsequently a petition under order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC was filed indicating as if the claim of the petitioner had been admitted by the Regional Deputy Director Education, Patna, Division, Patna. The letter of R.D.D. Education, Patna Division was dated 26.11.2001 and it bore the signature of Sri Khuaza Gulam Rasul when the prayer for decreeing the suit on admission was placed before the learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar. The Additional Government Pleader appearing for the Government and the R.D.D.E. pointed out that the signature appearing on the abovenoted petition dated 26.11.2001 was not in reality that of Sri Khuaza Gulam Rasul, rather it was forged and farbricated. The learned Sub-Judge-II drew up an order, as indicated above, on 7.2.2005 suspecting that the signature as submitted by the learned Government Pleader might be forged and fabricated and filed the FIR for investigation of the allegations. The order dated 7.2.2005 in the light of which the FIR (Annexure-1) was registered has been annexed as Annexure-5 to the present petition. 4. The ground for quashing of the prosecution initiated through Annexure-1 is that the forgery having been committed in or in connection with the proceedings in a court it was completely erroneous on the part of the learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar to lodge an FIR without holding an enquiry under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. The learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar was hearing a particular point in title suit no. 262 of 1995 and was considering the allegations of the defendant made against the plaintiff that is the present petitioner that she had forged and fabricated document and that the same had been utilized as evidence for decreeing the suit on admission and in that view of the matter the learned Sub-Judge-II ought to have held an enquiry and then could have filed a complaint himself. 5. I have gone through the order dated 7.2.2005 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar in Title Suit No. 262 of 2005. 5. I have gone through the order dated 7.2.2005 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar in Title Suit No. 262 of 2005. It hardly requires to be noted down that Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. applies equally to a proceeding pending before a Civil Court. This is very much clear by the very heading Section 340 bears and further from Sub-Section (4) of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. which indicates that the meaning of the word "court" has to be the same as in Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 195(3) Cr.P.C. indicates that the term 'court' falling in sub-section 1 (b) means a civil, revenue or criminal court and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of the section. A court of Sub-Judge is a civil court. Thus, the learned Sub-Judge has necessarily to be presumed to act on an allegation of using a forged document in or in relation to a proceedings pending in a court. If the learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar would have considered this aspect of the matter and the relevant provisions of Section 340 read with 195 of the Cr.P.C., then he ought not have proceeded in the manner as he did. A court has to be vigilant and has to cut-short all the attempts of utilizing its forum for committing offences which could be serious like that of forging a document and utilizing it in proceeding pending before it. This is the reason that while filing a complaint the court has necessarily to mention in its order that it was expedient for the ends of justice as also for eradicating the commission of such offences further in future that it ought to file a complaint. The learned Sub-Judge may find that by virtue of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. there is a complete bar in taking the cognizance of any such offence as he appeared suspecting committed before him, unless a complaint had been filed by the court itself. 6. The Presiding Judge is not a person, he is something except his personal self. The learned Sub-Judge may find that by virtue of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. there is a complete bar in taking the cognizance of any such offence as he appeared suspecting committed before him, unless a complaint had been filed by the court itself. 6. The Presiding Judge is not a person, he is something except his personal self. If he acts as per his personal feelings, if he reacts personally or if he takes a matter at his personal level or takes such matters like the present one as personally caused to him then he is not sitting as a court. He has to be dispassionate, vigilant but indifferent personally and respectful to the law and procedure prescribed to deal with such situations. Courts have dignity, authority and they command respect. These all come to courts through the Presiding Judges. No offence could be an offence personally to him, it could be to the Court. If covered by Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., the offences are in respect of the judicial proceedings which might be pending before a Court. Thus, the court is a bit different from a Judge and is never the person that the Judge is. 7. The learned Sub-Judge-II, Buxar took the matter as if it were personally to him and went out of his court room to the police station through his letter for initiating a criminal proceedings by getting a first information report drawn up. He ought to have avoided it. 8. Having regard to the above facts and circumstances of the case as detailed above, I find that the initiation of the prosecution through Annexure-1 was a complete abuse of the court's process of Sub-Judge-II, Buxar and it appears not supportable under law. The enquiry envisaged under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. could have given a forum to the petitioner for presenting his side of the matter and, might be, that the prosecution could not have been lodged. This appears the inherent injustice inflicted upon the petitioner. The prosecution as such is quashed.