Erode District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Velayuthasamy Rice Mill
2007-01-18
V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : V. Ramasubramanian, J. The respondents 1 and 2 availed a loan of Rs.9,00,000/- from the petitioner Bank in the year 1994. According to the petitioner Bank the respondents 1 and 2 promptly paid the interest upto the year 2000. Thereafter, there was on outstanding and the petitioner raised arbitration in ARC.No.78 of 2001-2002. On 19. 2001, an award was passed by the Arbitrator directing the respondents 1 and 2 to pay a sum of Rs.11,23,700.50 together with interest at 21% p.a. from 19. 2001 till the date of realization. 2. Challenging the said award, the respondents 1 and 2 filed an appeal before the Principal District Court, Erode (Special Tribunal for Co-operative cases) in C.M.A.No.88 of 2001. By an order dated 24. 2005, the said appeal was allowed in part and the award of the arbitrator was modified to the limited extent of reducing the rate of interest from 21% to 6% payable with effect from 19. 2001 on the award amount of Rs.11,23,700.50. Challenging the said order of the appellate tribunal, the petitioner-Bank has filed the present writ petition. 3. I have heard Ms. G. Thilakavathy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. V. Manokaran, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. V. Arun, learned Government Advocate for the 3rd respondent. 4. The grievance of the petitioner-Bank is actually two fold, viz. a) that the contractual rate of interest ought not to have been reduced by the appellate Tribunal and b) that at any rate, the Tribunal ought not to have reduced the rate of interest upto the date of the award passed by the Arbitrator. 5. Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 opposed the writ petition first on the ground of maintainability, by relying upon the Judgment of this Court in The Special Deputy Collector (Stamps) v. Chemicals and Plastics Limited 2004 1 L.W. 788. In the said case which arose out of the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act, this Court held that the revision petition filed by the Special Deputy Collector against the order the Principal Sub Judge (appellate authority under the Act) was not maintainable on the ground that the Special Deputy Collector (Stamp) had exercised quasi-judicial function under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act.
But I am unable to agree with the said submission of the learned-counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2. In the judgment relied upon by him, the revision petitioner was the Special Deputy Collector (Stamp), who acted as a quasi-judicial authority under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act. But, in this case, the Arbitrator who acted as the quasi-judicial authority did not file the present writ petition. On the other hand, one of the parties to the arbitration namely the petitioner Bank had filed the present writ petition. The petitioner Bank is a person aggrieved against the order of the Co-operative appellate Tribunal, since, the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrator in favour of the petitioner had been reduced by the appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner Bank is maintainable in law. .6. Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that the Court had discretionary power to award interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of the decree despite the contractual rate of interest being incorporated in the agreements. The learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in N.M. Veerappa v. Canara Bank and Others AIR 1998 SC 1101 : (1998) 2 SCC 317 , which was also followed by the Division Bench off this Court in A.S. Ramakrishnan v. Bank of Baroda, Madurai 2001 (1) CTC 662 : (2001) 1 MLJ 665 . 7. On a perusal of the aforesaid Judgments of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court, it is clear that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to restrict the rate of interest to 6% p.a. from the date of the plaint or the date of the award is not actually curtailed by any prohibition in the contract. The appellate Tribunal has actually exercised such discretion in reducing the rate of interest. Therefore, it cannot he found fault with. .8. Ms. G. Thilakavathy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even if the Civil Court had jurisdiction to reduce the rate of interest, the reduction in the rate of interest could be restricted only to the total amount payable as on the date of the award.
Therefore, it cannot he found fault with. .8. Ms. G. Thilakavathy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even if the Civil Court had jurisdiction to reduce the rate of interest, the reduction in the rate of interest could be restricted only to the total amount payable as on the date of the award. The amount payable as on the date of the presentation of the plaint or the date of raising the dispute could be different from the amount payable as on the date of the award. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the interest at the rate of 6% p.a. awarded by the appellate Tribunal has to be calculated on the principal amount plus the interest worked out upto the date of the order of the Tribunal. But such an interpretation does not arise out of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The order of the appellate Tribunal actually merges with the award passed by the Arbitrator. Therefore, the modification of the decree by the appellate Tribunal to the original award of the Arbitrator would actually take effect from the date of the award. It is true that the principal amount as on the date of the plaint alone cannot be taken into account, but the principal plus interest upto the date of the decree has to be taken into account for the purpose of calculating interest from the date of decree. That has actually been done in this case. In other words, the principal amount payable as on the date of the raising the dispute was Rs.10,66,309/-. On the date of the award viz., 19. 2001, the Arbitrator passed an award for a sum of Rs.11,23.700.50, calculating interest upto the date of the award. Therefore, the Arbitrator directed further future interest only on the amount payable as on the date of the award and that is actually replaced by the modified order passed by the appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the order of the appellate Tribunal does not call for any interference. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 submitted that respondents 1 and 2 would make payment of the amount as ordered by the appellate Tribunal within a period of three weeks. Recording the undertaking the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Writ petition dismissed.