Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. Present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 6.1.2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gurgaon dismissing an application filed by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) for rejection of the plaint. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction to challenge the order passed under Section 14-B of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (for short the Act) imposing damages for non- payment of contribution in time for the period from June, 1993 to January, 2001. 3. Besides contesting the suit on merit an application was moved for rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code on the plea that the suit as framed was not competent and was liable to be rejected. It was pleaded in the application that the suit was barred under sub-section (D) Order 7-1 as any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to sub-section (3), or sub-section (4), of Section 1, or Section 3, or sub- section (i) of Section 7-A, or Section 7-B (except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section (5) or Section 7-C, or Section 14-B of the Act, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. It was also pleaded that when a specific remedy is available to the plaintiff the suit was not maintainable and therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected. It was also pleaded that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit as the plaintiff-respondent had a remedy of appeal before the Tribunal under Section 7(i) of the Act. Provisions of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act were also invoked. Said application was contested on the plea that if the authorities acted against the statute or did not follow procedure prescribed by law/statute then the civil Court has every jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 4. Provisions of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act were also invoked. Said application was contested on the plea that if the authorities acted against the statute or did not follow procedure prescribed by law/statute then the civil Court has every jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 4. Learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, if it does not show any cause of action or the plaintiff has not paid the proper court-fee or the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been specifically barred. However, no such provisions were shown which barred the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Resultantly, the application was dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of NDMC v. Satish Chand (deceased) by LRs Ram Chand, 2003(4) RCR(Civil) 373 : 2003(10) Supreme Court Cases 38 contended that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was impliedly barred as remedy of appeal was provided under the statute itself against an order passed under Section 14-B of the Act which was challenged by the plaintiff-respondent. The Honble Supreme Court in NDMC v. Satish Chand (supra) has been pleased to lay down as under :- "Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 gives a wide jurisdiction to the civil Courts to try all suits of civil nature "excepting suits of which their statute itself contains a provision that the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred." An implied bar may arise when a statute provides a special remedy to an aggrieved party like a right of appeal as contained in the Punjab Municipal Act. Section 84 of the Act provides a complete remedy to a party aggrieved by the assessment and levy of tax. Section 86 provides that the remedy of appeal is the only remedy available to a party to challenge the assessment and restrains a party from taking recourse to any other mode. A provision like this is the implied bar envisaged in Section 9 CPC against filing a civil suit. Besides, the position in law has been well settled by the Supreme Court in various decisions. Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 bar the jurisdiction of the civil Court, where the grievance relates to the assessment or the principle of assessment by necessary implication." 6. Besides, the position in law has been well settled by the Supreme Court in various decisions. Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 bar the jurisdiction of the civil Court, where the grievance relates to the assessment or the principle of assessment by necessary implication." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further made a reference to Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act to contend that as equally efficacious relief can be obtained by the plaintiff by filing statutory appeal, therefore, suit for injunction as framed was not competent. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that learned trial Court failed to notice that besides the reasons observed in the order the plaint can also be rejected when from the statement made in the plaint the suit seems to be barred by any law. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, was that in view of vesting of jurisdiction in the Special Tribunal constituted under the Act filing of suit would be deemed to be impliedly barred. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2006(3) RCR(Civil) 491 : 2007(4) RAJ 607 (SC). The law relating to the jurisdiction has been discussed in the said judgment as under :- "15. The law relating to jurisdiction has been the subject-matter of various decisions. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, 1985(4) SCC 10 it was, inter alia, held as follows :- "8. The principles bearing on the question as to when exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction can be inferred have been indicated in several judicial pronouncements but we need refer to only two decisions. In Secretary of State v. Mask and Company, AIR 1940 PC 105, the Privy Council at page 236 of the Report has observed thus : It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., 1968(3) SCR 662, Hidayathullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, on an analysis of the various decisions cited before the Court expressing diverse views, culled out as many as 7 propositions; out of them the first two which are material for our purposes are these : (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provisions, however, do not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, in examination of the Scheme of the Particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. xxx xxx xxx 14. Thirdly, having regard to the principles stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai case it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Courts jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Courts jurisdiction. Now take the case of an applicant who has applied for ryotwari patta under Section 11 staking his claim thereto on the basis of his long and uninterrupted possession of the ryoti land but the Settlement Officer on materials before him is not satisfied that the land in question is ryoti land; in that case he will refuse the patta to the applicant. But can he, even after the refusal of the patta, protect the applicants long and uninterrupted possession against the Government interference ? Obviously, he cannot, for it lies within his power and jurisdiction merely to grant or refuse to grant the patta on the basis of materials placed before him. But such a person even after the refusal of the ryotwari patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Governments interference otherwise than in due course of law and surely before granting such relief the Civil Court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the land if the same is put in issue. In other words since the Settlement Officer has no power to do what Civil Court would normally do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of Civil Courts jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officers order under Section 64-C of the Act." 16. In Richpal Singh and others v. Dalip, 1987 RRR 598 : 1987(4) SCC 410, it was held as under :- "12. It is well settled that ouster of jurisdiction of civil Courts should not be inferred easily. It must be clearly provided for and established." 17. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on 1979(2) All ER 1016. Para 15 of the State of Tamil Nadus case (supra) deals with question relating to jurisdiction. These cases deal with cases where there was no exclusion of any other remedy. 18. It must be clearly provided for and established." 17. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on 1979(2) All ER 1016. Para 15 of the State of Tamil Nadus case (supra) deals with question relating to jurisdiction. These cases deal with cases where there was no exclusion of any other remedy. 18. The principles culled out from various decisions of this Court are that even when the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal, the Civil Courts jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Section 26(1)(d) on the other hand specifically excludes jurisdiction of the Civil Court so far as matters which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, Collector or Prescribed Authority. The entitlement, choice of land and the allotment are matters which are to be dealt with specifically by the authorities under the Act. Additionally, Section 18 provides a forum to ventilate the grievance under the Act in respect of several matters. This is a case of exclusion of the remedy in certain contingencies. It is not a case where the controversy cannot be resolved by the forum provided under the Act. Further in case of any grievance the validity of the order could have been questioned before the forum provided. That has not been done and on the other hand, the suit was filed after about nine years. Above being the position, the appeal is without merit and is dismissed. No costs." This judgment does not support the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. Rather in the said case also jurisdiction of the civil Court was held to be barred because of statutory remedy provided under the statute. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent thereafter placed reliance on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Vinod Kumar and others, 1986 PLJ 161 to contend that civil Court jurisdiction to entertain any case against an order passed by Tribunal of special jurisdiction in violation of the provisions of the statute or principles of natural justice, cannot be treated to be barred as the order of the Tribunal would be a nullity. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent also cannot be accepted as he has not chosen to challenge the order of recovery passed by the authorities under the Act by filing appeal before the special Tribunal constituted under the Act. Once the jurisdiction is given to a special tribunal then the remedy of the civil Court is to be held to be impliedly barred. It is only in case of tribunals not acting in accordance with law or acting in violation of the statute that an order can be challenged as a nullity before the civil Court, as was held in the case of State of Haryana v. Vinod Kumar and others (supra). However, in the present case the plaintiff instead of choosing remedy provided under the statute has chosen to maintain the present suit which would be deemed to be barred in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of NDMC v. Satish Chand (deceased) by LRs Ram Chand (supra). Even otherwise, in view of the provisions of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred under law and, therefore, was liable to be rejected. Consequently, this revision is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the plaint filed by the plaintiff-respondent is ordered to be rejected.