JUDGMENT 1. - Instant petition has been filed assailing order dated 11.06.99, whereby Judicial Magistrate, Kishangarh (Ajmer) has discharged respondent No. 1 (accused) of offence U/s. 203, Municipalities Act, 1958 ('the Act') in Cr. Case- 371/94, which has been upheld by Addl. Sess. Judge Kishangarh, vide order dated 11.07.01 in Cr. Rev. Pet.-12/99. 2. Municipal Board (petitioner) filed criminal complaint U/s. 265 of the Act on 20.08.94 against respondent No. 1 for offence U/s. 203 of the Act inter-alia alleging that respondent No. 1 encroached upon common passage of way No. 1428 connecting Chainpuria & Indira Nagar on 15.07.94 while the land belongs to the petitioner. On the said complaint, after almost five years, service has affected and that the deceased on pre-charge evidence. After taking note of the fact that period of sentence which could be imposed while convicting the accused U/s. 203 of the Act is three years and that trial could not have effectively commenced for sufficient long time, therefore, keeping in view decision of Apex Court in Common Cause-a Registered Society v. Union of India, 1996 (4) SCC 33 : 1996 (6) SCC 75 , discharged respondent No. 1 (accused) vide judgment dated 11.06.99 which was upheld by Court of Revision vide order dated 11.07.01 while dismissing revision petition preferred by petitioner. Hence this petition. 3. Main thrust of contentions advanced by Counsel for petitioner is that once complaint was filed within one month of the date on which encroachment was made by respondent No. 1 on the public way, merely because time was consumed for taking cognizance against the accused, such delay in no manner can be attributed to complainant; in such circumstances, order of discharge passed by learned Magistrate is not legally sustained whereas U/s. 468, Cr.PC. limitation commences not from taking of cognizance but it relates on which date complaint was filed. In support, Counsel placed reliance on recent decision of Apex Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra S. Mohanty, AIR 2007 SCW 4998 . 4. limitation commences not from taking of cognizance but it relates on which date complaint was filed. In support, Counsel placed reliance on recent decision of Apex Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra S. Mohanty, AIR 2007 SCW 4998 . 4. Counsel for respondent No. 1 on the other hand submits that there cannot be any dispute with respect to period of limitation provided in section 468, Cr.RC., which certainly commences from filing of the complaint and not from taking of cognizance but only contends that earlier decisions in Common Cause v. Union of India and Rajdev Sharma v. State of Bihar, 1998 (7) SCC 507 & 604 : AIR 1998 SC 3281 were re-considered by Apex Court in later decision in R Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 535 : 2002 (4) SCC 578 while specifically observing that those cases in which accused has been discharged on the basis of decisions in Common Cause v. Union of India and Rajdev Sharma v. State of Bihar (supra) their cases should not be re-opened in view of later judgment of Apex Court and the case cannot now be re-opened calling him to face trial particularly when instant accused stood discharged way back in 1999 under order impugned much before judgments in P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (supra). 5. I have considered rival contentions of both the parties and with assistance examined material on record. Learned Magistrate has in fact discharged respondent No. 1 not on the premise that the complaint was barred by limitation U/s. 468, Cr.PC. but the fact which prevailed upon him was that after filing of complaint way back on 20.08.94 but no effective proceedings could have taken place even for last five years and matter remained at the stage of pre-charge evidence and maximum punishment if found to be awarded is three years and taking note of decision of Apex Court in Common Cause v. Union of India (supra) considered it proper to discharge respondent No. 1 under order impugned-certainly reference of delay has been made in taking cognizance, as well. Court of revision has also dismissed revision petition for same reason that since after five years, matter remained at the stage of pre-charge evidence and no, purpose would be served for prosecuting respondent No. 1 (accused) any further in the facts of instant case. 6. Court of revision has also dismissed revision petition for same reason that since after five years, matter remained at the stage of pre-charge evidence and no, purpose would be served for prosecuting respondent No. 1 (accused) any further in the facts of instant case. 6. As regards question about limitation, it does not require further consideration in view of the fact that Apex Court in Japani Sahoo v. State of Bihar (supra) clearly observed that limitation commences from the date of filing complaint and not from the date of taking cognizance and thus it remains no more res Integra for further examination about limitation U/s. 468, Cr.PC. 7. In instant case, respondent No. 1 (accused) was discharged on the basis of decision of Apex Court in Common Cause v. Union of India (supra) which certainly has been considered in later judgment in P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (supra) but in para 34, Apex Court specifically observed ad infra : "34. And lastly, it is clarified that this decision shall not be a ground for reopening a case or proceeding by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of 'Common Cause' and 'Raj devo Sharma' cases and which has already achieved finality and reopen the trial against the accused herein." 8. In view of what has been observed (supra), accused who have been discharged on the basis of decision in Common Cause v. Union of India (supra), their case should not be re-opened at later stage. In instant case, respondent No. 1 was discharged by trial Magistrate vide order dated 11.06.99 against which revision petition was also dismissed vide order dated 11.07.2001 much prior to the decision in P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (supra). This court finds substance in submission made by Counsel for respondent No. 1 (accused) that his case cannot now be re-opened particularly when he stood discharged under order impugned. 9. Consequently, misc. petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Record be sent back forthwith to court below.Petition Dismissed. *******