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2007 DIGILAW 18 (HP)

COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION NHPC v. KHEWA RAM

2007-01-09

DEEPAK GUPTA

body2007
JUDGEMENT Deepak Gupta, J:- The following questions of law arise for determination in this order: - "1. Whether an award under the Land Acquisition Act passed in favour of a dead person is nullity? 2. Whether in a Reference Petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 where there are more than one petitioners and one of them dies, whether the petition abates as a whole or only qua the deceased? 2. A petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is bound to be determined by the court even in the absence of the petitioner. Previously there was some divergence of opinion on this aspect of the matter and whereas some courts held that proceedings under Section 18 of the Act being a reference, must be answered by the court even in the absence of the petitioners, some courts were of the view that it was not incumbent upon the court to decide an award just because references has been made to it, it was held that the claimant was just like a plaintiff and if the claimant, despite notice, did not appear, the court was not bound to decide the matter. Keeping in view the divergence in the views of the various courts, this question was referred to a Division Bench of this court by the then the Chief Justice. The question raised was whether Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings before a court on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Division Bench of this court in Bachhittar Singh and other Vs. the Collector Land Acquisition, Talwara Township 1982 SLC 90 held that Order 22 of the Code was applicable and the relevant discussion on this aspect of the matter is as follows:- "17. We do not agree with the view that once a reference has been made the court is bound to give an award. The scheme of the Act is that the Collector makes an award which is an offer to the claimant whose land has been acquired. If the offer is accepted the matter ends. But if the claimant does not accept the offer, he has a right to have the compensation judiciously determined. The scheme of the Act is that the Collector makes an award which is an offer to the claimant whose land has been acquired. If the offer is accepted the matter ends. But if the claimant does not accept the offer, he has a right to have the compensation judiciously determined. Or this he has to make an application under Section 18 of the Act asking the Collector to make a reference to the court. In this application he is required to state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. The Collector is required to give the. necessary information mentioned in Section 19 of the Act to the court while making a reference. Once the reference is registered by the court it is required to serve a notice on the applicant and others. In other words, proceedings start before the court when it takes cognizance of the reference by registering it. Since the applicant has raised objections to the award made by the Collector, it is but natural that he should support his objections. But in case the applicant disappears from the scene, what should the court do? Under Section 26 of the Act the court, while making its award, is required each amount. In the absence of the applicant the court cannot justify the amount awarded by the Collector on the ground that applicant is no more interested in supporting the objections raised by him. In these circumstances relevant provisions of the Code, which are not inconsistent with the Act, can be made applicable because of Section 53 of the Act. There is nothing in the Act which militates against the legal representatives of the deceased applicant being required to be brought on record so that the proceedings can continue. The provisions of Order 22, in our judgment, are applicable to the proceedings on reference under the Act." 3. The second issue which was determined in the case was that the limitation does not apply. It would be pertinent to mention that this court has consistently been taking the view that the provisions of Order 22 are applicable to proceedings under Section 18 of the Act. 4. As far as ordinary civil litigation is concerned, the view of this court has consistently been that when a decree is passed for or against a dead person, the said decree is a nullity. 4. As far as ordinary civil litigation is concerned, the view of this court has consistently been that when a decree is passed for or against a dead person, the said decree is a nullity. It has also been the consistent view of this court that only the court which was seized of the matter when the party died can look into the question whether the proceedings have abated or not the whether there are sufficient grounds to set aside the abatement. In this behalf reference may be made to Jagan Nath and others vs. Smt. Ishwari Devi 1988 (2) SLC 273; Tulsi Ram and others Vs. Smt. Krishni Devi and others 2000(2) SLC 172 and Sher Singh and others Vs. Raghu Ram and others 1981 SLC 25. 5. The proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act are, however, quite different from ordinary civil proceedings. The view take in Bachhittar Singh and others Vs. The Collector Land Acquisition, Talwara Township, 1982 SLC 90 was based mainly on the premise that the reference court is not bound to make an award in the absence of the claimant. This view is no longer good law in view of the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Khazan Singh (Dead) by Lrs Vs. Union of India (2002)2 SCC 242 wherein the Apex Court held as follows:- "7. The provisions above subsumed would thus make it clear that the civil court has to pass an award in ahswer to the reference made by the Collector under Section 18 of the Act. If any party to whom notice has been served by the civil court did not participate in the inquiry it would only be at his risk because an award would be passed perhaps to the detriment of the party concerned. But non-participation of any party would not confer jurisdiction on the civil court to dismiss the reference for default." 6. A perusal of this judgment clearly shows that the court is bound to pass an award on a reference made under Section 18 of the Act. It cannot dismiss the award in default by applying the provisions of Order 9 or Order 17 of the Code. This judgment has been followed by a Single Judge of this court in Thakur Dass Vs. It cannot dismiss the award in default by applying the provisions of Order 9 or Order 17 of the Code. This judgment has been followed by a Single Judge of this court in Thakur Dass Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and others, Latest HLJ 2003 (HP) 13 wherein the learned Single Judge has made the following observations:- 7. The order dated 5.9.2002 impugned before this court cannot sustain on legal ground as the District Judge ought not to have dismissed the reference application for default and he was under legal obligation to decide the reference application on merits in the absence of either party." 7. It is, therefore, beyond the pale of controversy that as the law now stands, the reference court under the provisions of the Act is bound to decide the reference petition even in the absence of the claimant. 8. Another aspect which has to be kept in mind while considering cases under the Land Acquisition Act is that the provisions of the said Act must be construed in a manner so as to do substantial justice between persons whose lands are forcibly taken over by the State Government. In fact, the legislature being alive to this situation inserted Section 28-A by Amendment Act 68 of 1994 in the Land Acquisition Act. This section reads as follows:- 28-A Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under .Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, subsection (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basic of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court; Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written applicant to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18." 9. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRs and other Vs. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) Dead) by LRs and others (2003) 3 SCC 272 has dealt with the question as to whether the provisions of Order 22 of the Code are applicable to the proceedings under the Act and in which manner they should be applied. In the case before the Apex Court a large number of proprietors had joined together and filed appeals in the High Court. Some of the appellants in these RFAs died and no steps were taken to bring their legal representatives on record. Thereafter the respondents in the appeals filed applications that the appeal be dismissed as having abated for failure to bring on record legal representatives. It was at this stage that applications were filed to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased. The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and held the appeals as having abated in toto. It would be pertinent to mention that in fact one of the respondents in the High Court was stated to have died during the reference proceedings itself. The Apex Court made the following observations:- "21. The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and held the appeals as having abated in toto. It would be pertinent to mention that in fact one of the respondents in the High Court was stated to have died during the reference proceedings itself. The Apex Court made the following observations:- "21. It is not necessary to consider individually all the decisions rendered by Benches of two and three learned Judges, brought to our notice, wherein uniformly this Court has held- (a) In case of "joint and indivisible decree", "joint and in severable or inseparable decree", the abatement of proceedings in relation to one or more of the appellant(s) or respondent(s) on account of omission or lapse and failure to bring on record his or their legal representatives in time would prove fatal to the entire appeal and require to be dismissed in toto, as otherwise inconsistent or contradictory decrees would result and proper reliefs could not be granted, conflicting with the one which had already become final with respect to the same subject-matter vis-a-vis the others;(b) the question as to whether the court can deal with an appeal after it abates against one or the other would depend upon the facts of each case and no exhaustive statement or analysis could be made about all such circumstances wherein it would be would not be possible to proceed with the appeal, despite abatement, partially; (c) existence of a joint right as distinguished from tenancy-in-common alone is not the criterion but the joint character of the decree, dehors the relationship of the parties inter se and the frame of the appeal, will take colour from the nature of the decree challenged; (d) where the dispute between two groups of parties centred around claims or was based on grounds common relating to the respective groups litigating as distinct groups or bodies- the issue involved for consideration in sub class of cases would be one and indivisible; and (e) when the issues involved in more than one appeal dealt with as a group or batch of appeals, are common and identical in all such cases, abatement of one or the other of the connected appeals due to the death of one or more of the parties and failure to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased parties, would result in the abatement of all appeals. 25. 25. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel on either side. The consideration by the High Court seems to be too superficial on the basis of certain abstract principles without particular reference to the nature and character of the proceedings, the nature of claims and rights of parties, the statutory obligations cast on the courts dealing with a reference under Sections 30/31 originating from an award under Section 11 of the Act and the source as well as origin of rights of the claimants. The Land Acquisition Collector empowered under the Act to pass the award was not only obliged to, among other things, determine the total compensation to be allowed for the land but also apportion the said compensation among all the persons interested in the land depending upon their respective interests proportionately, whether they have appeared or not before him. If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Land Acquisition Collector is obliged to refer such dispute to the decision of the court. If the amount could not be disbursed at his level due to any one or the other reasons set out in Section 31, the amount has to be deposited in the court to which normally a reference would be submitted. The claim of each one was in respect of his distinct, definite and separate share and their respective rights are not interdependent but independent. Among themselves there is no conflicting or overlapping interest and the grant of relief to one has no adverse impact on the other(s). The mere fact that there was no division by metes and bounds on state of ground is no reason to treat it to be a joint right-indivisible in nature to be asserted or vindicated only by all of them joining together in the same proceedings, in one capacity or the other. As a matter of fact, separate claims seem to have been filed by them, before the Reference Court in respect of their own respective share. As a matter of fact, separate claims seem to have been filed by them, before the Reference Court in respect of their own respective share. Even if they have engaged a common counsel or even if they have filed one claim in respect of their specified separate share, it could not have the effect of altering the nature of their claim or the character of their right so as to make it an indivisible joint right. Though the Reference Court has decided all such claims together, having regard to the similarity or identical nature of issues arising for consideration of the claims, in substance and reality the proceedings must be considered in law to be of multifarious claims disposed -of in a consolidated manner resulting in as many number of awards of the Reference Court as there were claimants before it. There was no community of interest between them and that each one of them in vindicating their individuals rights was not obliged to implead the other claimants of their shares in one common action/proceeding an the orders/judgment though passed in a consolidated manner, in law, amounts to as many orders or judgments as there were claimants and, by no reason, can it be branded to be a joint and inseparable one. Similarity of the claims cannot be a justification in law to treat them as a single and indivisible claim for any or all purposes and such a thing cannot be legitimately done without sacrificing the substance to the form. The claim on behalf of the respondents that the compensation awarded is of a lump sum, though shares are divided, is belied by the scheme underlying Sections 11, 18, 30 and 31 of the Act, cannot be countenanced as of any merit. Against the award of the Reference Court in this case, it was possible and permissible in law for every one of the appellants to file an appeal of his own separately in respect of his share without any need or obligation to implead every other of the claimants like him, as party-respondent or as co-appellant, because there is no conflicting interest or claims amongst them inter se. As such, the alleged and apprehended fear about possible inconsistent or conflicting decrees resulting therefrom if the appeals are proceeded with and disposed of on merits has no basis in law nor is well founded on the facts and circumstances of these cases. Even if the appellants succeed on merits, dehors the fate of the deceased appellants the decree passed cannot either be said to become ineffective or render incapable of successful execution. To surmise even then a contradictory decree coming into existence is neither logical nor reasonable nor acceptable by courts of law. Otherwise, it would amount to applying the principle of vicarious liability to penalize someone for no fault of his and denial of ones own right for the mere default or refusal of the other (s) to join or contest likewise before the court. The fact that at a given point of time all of them joined in one proceedings because one court in the hierarchy has chosen to club or combine all their individual and separate claims for the purpose of consideration on account of the similarity of the nature of their claims or that for the sake of convenience they joined together for asserting their respective, distinct and independent claims or rights is no ground to destroy their individual right to seek remedies in respect of their respective claims. In cases of this nature, there is every possibility of one or the other among them subsequently reconciling themselves to their fate and settle with their opponents or becoming averse to pursue the legal battle for every so many reasons, as in the case on hand due disinterestedness, indifference or lethargy and, therefore, the attitude, approach and resolve of one or the other should not become a disabling or disqualifying factor for others to vindicate their own individual rights without getting eclipsed or marred by the action or inaction of the others. Consequently, the fact that about 37 out of the total number of interested persons, like the appellants, were not parties before the High Court or this Court, does not, in any manner, affect or deprive the appellants to have their claims, duly and properly considered and adjudicated in accordance with law, on merits. 26. Consequently, the fact that about 37 out of the total number of interested persons, like the appellants, were not parties before the High Court or this Court, does not, in any manner, affect or deprive the appellants to have their claims, duly and properly considered and adjudicated in accordance with law, on merits. 26. Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws. Procedure has always been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not mant to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice. A careful reading of the provisions contained in Order 22 CPC as well as the subsequent amendments thereto would lend credit and support to the view that they were devised to ensure their continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard the further progress of the proceedings and thereby non-suit the others similarly placed as long as their distinct and independent rights to property or any claim remain intact and not lost forever due to the death of one or the other in the proceedings. The provisions contained in Order 22 are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. The fact that the Khata was said to be joint is of no relevance, as long as each one of them had their own independent, distinct and separate shares in the property as found separately indicated in the jamabandi itself of the shares of each of them distinctly. We are also of the view that the High Court should have, on the very perception it had on the question of abatement, allowed the applications for impleadment even dehors the cause for the delay in filing the applications keeping in view the serious manner in which it would otherwise jeopardize an effective adjudication on merits, the rights of the other remaining appellants for no fault of theirs. Interests of justice would have been better served had the High Court adopted a positive and constructive approach then merely scuttled the whole process to foreclose an adjudication of the claims of others on merits. Interests of justice would have been better served had the High Court adopted a positive and constructive approach then merely scuttled the whole process to foreclose an adjudication of the claims of others on merits. The rejection by the High Court of the applications to set aside abatement, condonation and bringing on record the legal representatives does not appear, on the peculiar nature of the case, to be a just or reasonable exercise of the Courts power or in conformity with the avowed object of the court to do real, effective and substantial justice. Viewed in the light of the fact that each of the appellants had an independent and distinct right of his own not interdependent upon one or the other of the appellants, the dismissal of the appeals by the High Court in their entirety does not constitute a sound, reasonable or just and proper exercise of its powers. Even if it has to be viewed that the had a common interest, then the interests of justice would require the remaining other appellants being allowed to pursue the appeals for the benefit of those others, who are not before the Court also and not stultify the proceedings as a whole and non-suit the other as well. 30. The question, therefore, as to when a proceeding before the court becomes or is rendered impossible or possible to be proceeded with, after it had partially abated on account of the death of one or the other party on either side has been always considered to depend upon the fact as to whether the decree obtained is a joint decree or a severable one and that in case of a joint and in severable decree if the appeal abated against one or the other, the same cannot be proceeded with further for or against the remaining parties as well. If-otherwise, the decree is a joint and several or separable one, being in substance and reality a combination of many decrees, there can be no impediment for the proceedings being proceeded with among or against those remaining parties other than the deceased. If-otherwise, the decree is a joint and several or separable one, being in substance and reality a combination of many decrees, there can be no impediment for the proceedings being proceeded with among or against those remaining parties other than the deceased. As observed in Nathu Ram case itself, the Code does not itself provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents even where, as against one such it has abated but it is only the courts which have held that in certain circumstances the appeal also would abate against a correspondent as a result of abatement against the deceased respondent. The same would be the position of an appeal vis-a-vis the appellants, as in the other cases. Order 22 Rule 4 also was considered not to provide for abatement of the appeal(s) against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent and it was specifically observed therein that to say that the appeals against them also abated in certain circumstances is not a correct statement. It was held that the appeals against such other respondents cannot be proceeded against and, therefore, had to be dismissed, in P certain circumstances. 31. But, in our view also, as to what those circumstances are to be, cannot be exhaustively enumerated and no hard-and-fast rule for invariable application can be devised. With the march and progress of law, the new horizons explored and modalities discerned and the fact that the procedural laws must be liberally construed to really serve as handmaid, make it workable and advance the ends of justice, technical objections which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and deny substantial and effective justice should be strictly viewed for being discouraged, except where the mandate of law inevitably necessitates it. Consequently, having regard to the nature of the proceedings under the Act and the purpose of reference proceedings and the appeal therefrom, the courts should adopt a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of the delay as well as the considerations which should weigh in adjudging the nature of the decree i.e. whether it is joint and in severable or joint and severable or separable. The fact that the Reference Court has chosen to pass a decree jointly in the matters before us is and should be no ground by itself to construe the decree to be joint and inseparable. The fact that the Reference Court has chosen to pass a decree jointly in the matters before us is and should be no ground by itself to construe the decree to be joint and inseparable. At times, as in the cases on hand, the court for its convenience might have combined the claims for joint consideration on account of similar nature of the issues in all such cases and for that reason the parties should not be penalized, for no fault of theirs. Actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of court shall prejudice no one) is the maxim of law, which comes into play in such situations. A number of people, more for the sake of convenience, may be counseled to join together to ventilate, all their separate bus similar nature of claims of all such others being rejected merely because one or the other of such claims by one or more of the parties abated on account of death and consequent omission to bring on record the legal heirs of the deceased party. At times, one or the other parties (sic-parties) on either side in a litigation involving several claims or more than one, pertaining to their individual rights may settle among themselves the dispute to the extent their share or proportion of rights is concerned and may drop out of contest, bringing even the proceedings to a conclusion so far as they are concerned. If all such moves are allowed to boomerang adversely on the rights of the remaining parties "even to contest and have their claims adjudicated on merits, it would be a travesty of administration of justice itself. 34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold: (1) Wherever the plaintiffs or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and for the purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and in severable decree. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. (2) Whenever different and distinct claims or more than one are sought to be vindicated in one single proceedings, as the one now before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with together by the courts concerned and a single judgment or decree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees. (3) The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining together or more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable one. (4) The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible and enforcement of the other." 10. From a perusal of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, it is apparent that the Apex Court has impliedly held that the provisions of Order 22 are applicable to Land Acquisition matters also. From a perusal of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, it is apparent that the Apex Court has impliedly held that the provisions of Order 22 are applicable to Land Acquisition matters also. However, a careful reading of the judgment also clearly shows that where more than one person have joined together in filing a reference petition under Section 18 or in filing an appeal under Section 54, the mere fact that one of the said persons dies will not lend to the abatement of the appeal. The Apex Court in no uncertain terms held that the right of each owner, tr\, fact of each co-owner is an individual right entitling him to file a separate reference petition. It has been held that the fact that partition by metes and bounds has not taken place between the co-owners is not a ground to hold that the right of all the claimants is a joint and inseverable right to be asserted or vindicated only by all of them joining together in the same proceedings. As a matter of convenience, it normally happens that a number of co-owners and some times separate owners join together in filing reference petition(s) and appeals since the Land Acquisition Collector normally passes a common award and even the District Judge also passes a common award. It is normally observed in land acquisition cases where the land of many claimants is acquired that common evidence is led by the claimants. The various reference petitions under Section 18 of the Act are normally consolidated and tried together. One cannot loose sight of this aspect of the matter while deciding this question. The observations made in Kalras case supra have also to be read in conjunction with the observations of the Apex Court in Khazan Singhs case wherein the Apex Court held that it is a statutory duty cast upon the court to decide the reference petition even in the absence of the claimant. On a conjoint reading of both the judgments Apex Court it can safely be laid down that an award in favour of a dead person under the Land Acquisition Act is not a nullity. In my view, the mere fact that one of the owners dies during the pendency of the petition will not result in the abatement of the entire proceedings. 11. In my view, the mere fact that one of the owners dies during the pendency of the petition will not result in the abatement of the entire proceedings. 11. While taking the aforesaid view, I am fortified by the observations of the Apex Court in Kalras case in para 26 above wherein the Apex Court has clearly laid down that laws and procedures are meant to effectively regulate, help and further the cause of doing substantial and real justice between the parties and should not be used as a means of denying the substantial rights of the citizens. The aforesaid findings have began rendered in the context of the Land Acquisition Act only wherein normally the acquiring authority is the State or some other authority and the citizens right to property is affected. In such an eventuality the mere fact that the death of one of the owners of land takes place and steps are not taken in time to bring on record the legal representatives should not be used as a means to deny the rights of other co-owners, co-shares or the separate owners of land acquired by a common notification. The owners may have as a matter of convenience joined together in filing the appeal. The only exception is in the case of a sole claimant where his land is acquired by a separate notification rot involving any other owner. Even in such case the award passed in favour at the owner would not be a nullity, but in case the owner or the acquiring authority challenges the award then the question of abatement will have to be decided by the reference court. 12. In conclusion, the legal position can be summarized as follows:- 1. That a duty is cast upon the reference court to decide a reference petition even if the claimant does not appear. 2. If the claimant does not appear despite notice, he does so at his own risk and the court can answer the reference in the absence of the evidence led by the claimant. 3. A situation may arise where the claimant absents himself after leading evidence. In such a situation, the court is bound to decide the reference petition, on the basis of the evidence led before it. 13. The question that next arises is as to what happens if the claimant has died during the proceedings. 3. A situation may arise where the claimant absents himself after leading evidence. In such a situation, the court is bound to decide the reference petition, on the basis of the evidence led before it. 13. The question that next arises is as to what happens if the claimant has died during the proceedings. This can also happen under various circumstances, some of which the being dealt with hereunder:- (a) In case there is only one claimant in an isolated case of land acquisition and the claimant dies, then obviously if the court is unaware about the death of the claimant, it will proceed to decide the reference on the material placed on record before it. In such a case, if either the legal representatives of the claimant or the acquiring authority files an appeal, then the award of the District Judge will have to be set aside and the reference proceedings deemed to have been abated. The questions whether abatement should be set aside and whether the delay, if any, should be condoned, are questions to be decided by the District Judge alone and not by the appellate court. (a) However even in the aforesaid»situation, the award cannot be said to be a nullity since the reference court is bound by law to answer the reference. In case none of the parties is aggrieved, the legal representatives can execute the award in accordance with law. (b) In cases where there are more than one claimants and each is owner of a separate share, then the death of one of the claimants can never render the award to be a nullity. The award is answered in favour of all the claimants. Therefore, in an appeal filed either by the claimants or by the acquiring authority, the legal representatives of the deceased-claimant can be brought on record even during the course of the appeal and it is not necessary to refer the matter back to the reference court. (c) Where there are more than one petitions and they are decided by a common award and the sole claimant in one of the petitions has died during the pendency of the reference proceedings, the entire award cannot be termed a nullity. (c) Where there are more than one petitions and they are decided by a common award and the sole claimant in one of the petitions has died during the pendency of the reference proceedings, the entire award cannot be termed a nullity. Since the award is a common award based on common evidence led by all the parties, the legal representatives of the deceased can be brought on record during the pendency of the appeal also. (d). In cases (c) and (d) above, the abatement, if any, will be qua the deceased and the entire proceedings will not abate. In both these cases the legal representatives can be brought on record even during the pendency of the appeal. 14. The questions raised are answered in the aforesaid terms. The cases may now be listed before the appropriate Benches.