1. One Mehar Shamus died leaving behind two sons namely Mehar Fateh Mohammad and Abdullah who inherited his estate measuring 57 kanals and 9 marlas of Shamlat land in village Nand Marg Tehsil Kulgam situate under survey No. 445/441. Abdullah died issueless with the result that whole estate went to Mehar Fateh Mohammad who passed away leaving behind two sons namely Mehar Noor Jamal and Jamal-ud-din of whom Jamal-ud-din is alive and Mehar Noor Jamal has passed away leaving behind six sons, the petitioners and respondents 1 to 3, who are locked in litigation over inheritance rights regarding aforementioned land with petitioners and respondents 2 and 3 claiming shares out of the same. 2. The litigation appears to have commenced on 14.6.2006 with presentation of plaint by petitioners herein before the court of Munsiff, Damhal-Hanjipore wherein respondents 2 and 3 filed their written statement agreeing with petitioners in so far as their claim to the extent of their respective share as descendants of deceased Noor Jamal is concerned while as first respondent instead of filing a written statement filed an application on 8.7.2006 seeking rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that it was barred under the provisions of Land Revenue Act and court had no jurisdiction to act in the matter. This application appears to have been objected to by petitioners herein but was, however, allowed by learned Munsiff after hearing the parties with an observation that the suit land being prohibited Shamilat, the court lacked jurisdiction to try or entertain the suit in terms of the bar under section 139 (14) of Land Revenue Act (hereinafter to be called as "the Act"). No decree was, however, drawn in accordance with the judgment. 3. Aggrieved thereby the petitioners challenge the same through this revision petition on the ground that it has been passed in violation of law and facts governing the matter without application of mind and in total disregard of the revenue entries existing regarding land under reference. During course of submissions the petitioners counsel while reiterating the contents of revision petition with reference to annexures on record, has contended that the land not being prohibited Shamilat, the bar created under section 139 of the Act was not attracted thereto which renders the impugned order bad. During course of submissions the petitioners counsel while reiterating the contents of revision petition with reference to annexures on record, has contended that the land not being prohibited Shamilat, the bar created under section 139 of the Act was not attracted thereto which renders the impugned order bad. In response counsel for other side while taking an objection to maintainability of the revision petition as being directed against an appealable judgment has also stated that in given circumstances of the case the impugned order of rejection of plaint was well founded in law. During course of submissions both the counsel have quoted reported judgments to support their respective contentions which if necessary would be discussed in due course. 4. I have heard learned counsel and considered the matter. Before coming to merits, it would be appropriate to consider the objection taken by respondents counsel regarding maintainability of revision petition on the ground that in terms of sub-section (2) of section 115 CPC under revisional power this court cannot modify or reverse an order against which appeal lies either to this or any other subordinate court and the order of rejection being a decree in terms of section 2(2) CPC is appealable as under Or. 41 CPC so the bar on maintainability of revision petition as created by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 115 CPC would come into play rendering the revision petition not maintainable. Sub-sec. (2) thereof which creates a bar on entertainment of revision petition against appealable orders/decrees has been grafted into the Code vide amendment of 1983 and incidentally till 1997 there has been a sort of divergence of opinion in this court regarding maintainability of revision petitions even after the-aforesaid amendment which, however, appears to have been set at rest though a little loosely by a Division Bench of this court in case "State of J&K v. Gh. Rasool" reported as AIR 1998 J&K 73 wherein while addressing the question one of the Honble Judges on Bench ( (G.D.Sharma J.) has cautiously opined that the constitutional power of superintendence over subordinate civil Court vested in this court under sec. 104 of the State Constitution which in terms of the law declared by Supreme Court is a basic feature, encompass both the administrative as well as well as judicial side. The other Honble Judge on the Bench (Nazki J.) has, however, expressly struck down. 104 of the State Constitution which in terms of the law declared by Supreme Court is a basic feature, encompass both the administrative as well as well as judicial side. The other Honble Judge on the Bench (Nazki J.) has, however, expressly struck down. Sub-Section (2) of Section 115 CPC as being ultra vires the Constitution for the aforesaid reason. In view of the said judgment the controversy raised is not capably of being discussed further at this level. Accordingly the objection taken to maintainability of revision petition on both counts cannot sustain. 5. That brings me to the merits of conflicting contentions advanced at bar. Perusal of the subordinate file reveals that petitioners instituted a suit before trial court for declaration of their right to the extent of one half in the estate mentioned hereinbefore along with possession and injunction against respondent to restrain them from raising construction in the land as being co-owned by them and petitioners. While respondents 2 and 3 agreed with them in their written statement as already said the first respondent raised an objection to maintainability of plaint on the ground that it being barred under section 139 of the Act was liable to be rejected which found favour with learned trial Judge who rejected the plaint in terms of Or. VII Rule 11 CPC with an observation that in view of the aforesaid bar the court had no jurisdiction to act in the matter and rejected the plaint. Before coming to the nature and scope of bar created under section 139 of the Act, it would be appropriate to consider the impugned order of trial court in its own terms. 6. As it is the operative portion of the impugned order comprises of two facets, first, that the plaint suffered the bar under sec. 139 of the Act and second, that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the suit which cumulatively resulted in rejection of the plaint. This in my opinion involves a slight conflict for the reason that a bar on trial of the suit and the lack of jurisdiction on part of the court are two different concepts attended by two different streams of procedure to be followed in terms of Or. VII Rule 10 and Or. This in my opinion involves a slight conflict for the reason that a bar on trial of the suit and the lack of jurisdiction on part of the court are two different concepts attended by two different streams of procedure to be followed in terms of Or. VII Rule 10 and Or. VII Rule 11 CPC distinctly, while in case of lack of jurisdiction the requisite step to be taken by trial court is return of plaint for presentation before the proper forum and not its rejection because rejection by itself infers assumption of jurisdiction which would run in conflict with the opinion regarding lack of it. On the contrary while rejecting the plaint in view of the legal bar existing on trial thereof, the court as a matter of fact acts in exercise of jurisdiction to try the suit. This element in a way brings the impugned order into self conflicting form, which cannot be lost sight of. 7. That said let me consider the bar stated to be created on trial of the suit under section 139 of the Act. Section 139 caption as "exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts" provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in a matter which the Revenue Officer is empowered there under to dispose of or take cognizance thereof and a Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any of the matters mentioned therein including the claim of any person for declaring ownership or any right in respect of grazing land and other prohibited Shamilat land. Thus on the lace of it in order to attract bar created under aforesaid Section, three essentials must exist in the matter. First, that the plaintiff before the civil court seeks a declaration of his right or other interest in land, second, that the land is prohibited Shamilat and thirdly that the nature of interest claimed is triable by a Revenue Officer under the Land Revenue Act. From perusal of impugned order it appears that learned trial Judge was impressed by respondents contention that land under reference in the instant matter was prohibited Shamilat in respect of which he lacked jurisdiction/the bar create, under section 139 of the Act operated. From perusal of impugned order it appears that learned trial Judge was impressed by respondents contention that land under reference in the instant matter was prohibited Shamilat in respect of which he lacked jurisdiction/the bar create, under section 139 of the Act operated. The impugned order, however, does not contain anything to suggest that before returning a finding the learned trial Judge tried to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding nature of the land which is simply recorded as Shamilat in the revenue record appended with the file which in other words suggests that the impugned order actually rests on a mere presumption and not a definite finding regarding nature of the land and consequence thereof if any under the Land Revenue Act or any other statute. It would perhaps have been proper for learned trial Judge to have asked the first respondent to file his written statement in the matter and then if necessary reduce the relevant pleas regarding nature of land into triable issues and only after recording definite finding thereupon pass an appropriate order including lack of jurisdiction or bar under any Statute. That being so, I feel on this count also the trial courts order does not rest on the sound basis. 8. In the result accordingly the revision petition is disposed of by remanding the matter back to trial Judge for reconsidering the whole matter after securing the written statement from first respondent in accordance with the observations made hereinabove. Till he recommences proceedings thereupon status quo as existing in the matter shall prevail subject to further orders as may be passed by learned trial Judge. As a consequence of this order all the ancillary application which have been dismissed by the learned trial Judge alter rejection of the plaint shall stand reviewed for their lawful disposal by the trial Judge before whom the parties through their counsel are directed to appear on 29.09.2007.