JUDGMENT Per ANJANI KUMAR and SUDHIR AGARW AL, JJ. This writ petition is directed against the order of dismissal dated October 21, 1994 passed by respondent No. 1 and the appellate order dated April 4, 1995 passed by Deputy Managing Director (Appeals & Review). 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner was appointed as Cashier in State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) in 1963 and was further promoted in the cadre of officer in the Bank. He was issued a charge-sheet dated May 5, 1992 (Annexure to the writ petition) containing five charges of lack of devotion and diligence to duty, acting in a manner unbecoming of a Bank official, highly prejudicial to the Banks interest, violation of Rule 32(4), and, misuse of his position as Officiating Branch Manager. Another charge-sheet dated May 10, 1993 containing a single charge was served upon him. The petitioner replied both the charge-sheets. After holding departmental inquiry in respect of both the charge-sheets, enquiry officer submitted his report, where after the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal vide order dated October 21, 1994 and the petitioners appeal against the said order was dismissed. 3. Sri V.C. Mishra, senior advocate, assisted by Sri Vivek Mishra, contended that on the face of it the charges levelled against the petitioner which have been found proved are not so serious as to warrant penalty of dismissal and, therefore, punishment imposed upon the petitioner is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance upon Apex Courts judgment in State Bank of India (. and others v. T.J. Paul, AIR 1999 SC 1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 739 : 1999-II-LLJ-154 and Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others v. P. C. Kakkar, AIR 2003 SC 1571 : (2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003II-LLJ-181. He contended that since there was no allegation of loss or profit resulted on account of any alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner, thhrefore, the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner is illegal and does not commensurate to the gravity of charges. He further contended that punishment and appellate orders are non-speaking orders and therefore liable to be set aside. The order of respondent No.3 is also said to be violative of Rule 51(2) of the Disciplinary Rules. He further contended that punishment and appellate orders are non-speaking orders and therefore liable to be set aside. The order of respondent No.3 is also said to be violative of Rule 51(2) of the Disciplinary Rules. It is contended that in respect of the same charges another person was also issued a charge sheet but he was retained in service while the petitioner has been dismissed. Therefore, punishment is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Lastly it is contended that before imposing proposed punishment of dismissal, the petitioner was entitled to a show cause notice but no such opportunity has been given to the petitioner. Therefore, punishment and appellate orders are vitiated in law. 4. On behalf of the Bank a counter-affidavit has been filed stating that departmental inquiry was conducted against the petitioner wherein the Inquiry Officer submitted his report after giving due opportunity to the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer in respect to charge sheet dated May 5, 1992 held charges No.1, 4 and 5 fully proved, charge No.3 partly proved and charge No.2 not proved. Similarly, qua charge-sheet dated May 10, 1993 he recorded his finding holding the entire charge proved against the petitioner. Based on the findings of the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner and appeal of the petitioner against the punishment order has also been rejected by the appellate authority after considering his appeal by a detailed and well reasoned order. Since the petitioner has shown serious lapses in performing his duties as Bank Officer, the lapses are such as do not warrant any interference attracting any lesser penalty. Even otherwise, on the question of quantum of: punishment, it cannot be said that discretion exercised by punishing authority is per se arbitrary. Respondents have also filed copies of inquiry report as Annexure I and 2 to the counter-affidavit. A supplementary counter 1 affidavit has also been filed by the Bank stating that the petitioner was placed under suspension on July 2, 1993 followed by dismissal vide order dated October 21, 1994. Further his appeal was rejected by the appellate authority: vide order dated April 4, 1995 where against he also preferred a review petition which has also been rejected by order dated November 22, 1996, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure SCA-6 to the supplementary counter-affidavit. Further his appeal was rejected by the appellate authority: vide order dated April 4, 1995 where against he also preferred a review petition which has also been rejected by order dated November 22, 1996, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure SCA-6 to the supplementary counter-affidavit. It is also said that there were two other employees, namely, B.S. Takola and Ranvir Singh who were working as Assistant and were also charge sheeted and punished with dismissal. However, on appeals preferred by the said officials, the appellate authority in the matter of both, Sri B.S. Takola and Sri Ranvir Singh, has reduced punishment to stoppage of five increments. 5. The petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating his stand taken in the writ petition and has further contended that delay in disposal of his review petition has caused irreparable loss to the petitioner and has vitiated ~ the entire process. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is no doubt true that on the basis of inquiry report, before imposing a punishment requirement of second show cause notice does not exist in the rules but where inquiry has been conducted by a person other than disciplinary authority and he has submitted his report against the delinquent~ employee, before accepting or taking action on the basis of such inquiry report, it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to supply a copy of inquiry report to the delinquent employee and to give him an opportunity to submit his comments and only thereafter an order could have been passed. The said procedure, admittedly, has not been followed in the case in hand. Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B, Karunakar and others AIR 1994 SC 1074 : (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1994-I-LLJ-162. Considering this aspect of the matter has held as under:- "Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officers report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employees right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employees right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officers report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice." 7. However, in Para 30(v) of the judgment the Apex Court considered the effect of non-furnishing of enquiry report, before imposing punishment and held as under:- "30(V) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The, answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice." 8. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice." 8. The Apex Court has also held that mere non-furnishing of enquiry report itself will not vitiate the order of punishment and in such matter the Court should direct the employer to furnish an enquiry report to delinquent employee and he will be given opportunity to show as to whether non- furnishing of a copy of report has prejudiced him or not and if It is found that the same has caused some prejudice to the delinquent employee/punishment order would be set aside and not otherwise. In the case in hand copy of enquiry report was made available to the petitioner by annexing with counter affidavit. The copy of the counter affidavit was served on learned counsel for the petitioner on August 19, 1996. Thereafter he tiled rejoinder affidavit sworn on September 1, 1996. Perusal of entire rejoinder affidavit would show that there is not even a whisper that non-submission of enquiry report has caused any prejudice to the petitioner or that findings recorded by the enquiry officer can be said to be perverse. In the circumstances we do not find any justification to interfere with the order of punishment merely on the ground that the same was passed without furnishing a copy of enquiry report upon the petitioner. 9. Now coming to the question as to whether punishment imposed upon the petitioner does not commensurate to the charges levelled against him and whether in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India this Court should interfere in respect of quantum of punishment. The scope of judicial review in the matter of punishment is extremely restricted. 9. Now coming to the question as to whether punishment imposed upon the petitioner does not commensurate to the charges levelled against him and whether in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India this Court should interfere in respect of quantum of punishment. The scope of judicial review in the matter of punishment is extremely restricted. Unless it could be shown that punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee is such as to shock the conscious of the Court or that no person of ordinary prudence would come to such conclusion and it is ex facie arbitrary, the Court will not interfere, In State of Gujarat v. Anand Acharya alias Bharat Kumar Sadhu, Civil Appeal No. 897 of 2006 decided on December 22, 2006 the Apex Court has held:- "The well-settled proposition of law that a Court sitting in judicial review against quantum of punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion of penalty is not in dispute. However, in the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscious of the Court, then the Court appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 10. The charges contained in charge-sheet dated May 5, 1992, which have been found fully proved against the petitioner, are as under:- "1. On September 8, 1989 while officiating as Branch Manager he issued token No. 20 on withdrawal for Rs. 14,700 to Shri Khachermal, alleged depositor (S.B. AIC No. 10/2452) without verifying the genuineness of the depositors signatures and also, did not authenticate the token No. 20 on the voucher. 4. On March 9, 1990 he denied having posted the withdrawal for Rs. 20,000 but on March 12, 1990. when interrogated by investigation officer, he admitted in writing of having posted it. Reasons for posting the withdrawal himself have not been explained. 5. He did not scrutinise and ensure safe press of the vouchers of previous dates (October: 19, 1989, October 17, 1989, October 24, 1989 etc.). All fraudulent S.B. withdrawal of Rs. 18,200 (Ale No. 985 of Sri Noor Mohd. Dated October 19, 1989) Rs. 20,000 (S.B. Ale No. 1658 of Sri Shyam Lal dated 1 October 17, 1989) Rs. 5. He did not scrutinise and ensure safe press of the vouchers of previous dates (October: 19, 1989, October 17, 1989, October 24, 1989 etc.). All fraudulent S.B. withdrawal of Rs. 18,200 (Ale No. 985 of Sri Noor Mohd. Dated October 19, 1989) Rs. 20,000 (S.B. Ale No. 1658 of Sri Shyam Lal dated 1 October 17, 1989) Rs. 21,000 and Rs, 11,000 (S.B. AIC Nov 1299 of Sri Ram Kishore dated October 24, 1989), allegedly passed by him are missing at the Branch. Incidentally he was officiating as Branch. Manager on these dates." 11. Similarly the sole charge levelled against the petitioner vide charge-sheet dated May 19, 1993 which has been found proved 21 reads as under:- "1. On January 12, 1983, two treasury challans for Rs. 2305 and 3905 appearing at serial Nos. 42 and 43 in the Cashiers Receipt Scroll and Government Credit Scroll (provincial) respectively deposited by Sri Sadhu Singh were replaced with two challans purported to have been deposited by Sri Satya Parkash, after two or three days of the deposit. He also destroyed all the copies of the challans deposited by Sri Sadhu Singh. He induced the then Cashier Sri Seoraj Singh, by giving distorted facts of the receipts, to initial these challans (pertaining to Shri Satya Parkash)." 12. In banking operations the said charge cannot be said to be of technical nature. Even otherwise it is the satisfaction of the competent authority and once it is found that the misconduct on the part of the employee concerned is proved and he deserves a major punishment of dismissal, unless it is found that discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority is shocking to the conscious of the Court, no interference in judicial review is required. So far as other employees are concerned, they did not exercise the same position in power as the petitioner was exercising and therefore responsibility of the petitioner was different than those in respect to whom punishment of deduction of five increments has been imposed by the appellate authority. Therefore, the plea of discrimination in the matter of punishment also does not sustain since the said employees were working in different capacity than the petitioner. It is evident that Sri Ramvir Singh was a clerical staff working as a clerk and sub-accountant while Sri B.S. Takola was also working as clerk-cum-cashier. Therefore, the plea of discrimination in the matter of punishment also does not sustain since the said employees were working in different capacity than the petitioner. It is evident that Sri Ramvir Singh was a clerical staff working as a clerk and sub-accountant while Sri B.S. Takola was also working as clerk-cum-cashier. But the petitioner during the relevant period was working as Officiating Branch Manager, therefore, his duties and responsibilities were different than the said two employees. The two judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in our view, instead of helping him, support the view we have taken herein above. In P.J Paul (supra) the punishment imposed upon the employee concerned was found to be a punishment which was not permissible in the rules. Therefore, the Apex Court while setting aside the said punishment, relegated the matter to the competent authority to decide afresh according to rules. It is not so in the case in hand that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is not permissible in rules. Similarly in PC. Kakkar (supra) the Apex Court noticing a more sincere kind of responsibility to duties to a Bank Officer in para 14 of the judgment has observed as under 2003-II-LLJ-181 at p. 187:- "13. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are, inseparable from the functioning of every officer/ employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik. It is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond ones authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not: casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court." 13. Acting beyond ones authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not: casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court." 13. Considering in the light of observation made by the Apex Court in Para 14 of the judgment in PC. Kakkar (supra) we find that in the present case the charges, which, have been found proved against the petitioner, satisfy the requirement that he failed to discharge his duties which is in the interest of the bank and therefore- punishment of dismissal cannot be said to be arbitrary and illegal. 14. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed without any, order as to costs.