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Rajasthan High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 1809 (RAJ)

G. B. Reddy : G. v. Reddy VS State of Rajasthan

2007-09-21

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2007
JUDGMENT 1. These town petitions are inter-related in the factual matrix. Therefore, they are being deciding by this common judgment. However, as the orders challenged in these two petitions are different, the cases will be dealt with separately within this common judgment. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 860/19981. The town of Sawai Madhopur in Rajasthan has the Ranthambore National Park, which is famous world wide as a tiger sanctuary. The National Park, at times, gives rise to differences, controversies and even feuds between the officers of the Forest Department and the judicial officers posted at Sawai Madhopur. Both these cases are outcome of the ego hassles between the two branches, the Executive and the Judiciary. To say the least, this unfortunate incident should have never occurred between the two branches. For, the two branches are supposed to uphold the law and not to abuse the process of law or of the Court in order to settle personal scores. 2. The petitioners, who are the officers of the Forest Department have challenged the order dated 21.5.1998 passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST - Prevention of Atrocities Cases), Sawai Madhopur, whereby the Special Judge has taken cognizance for offence punishable under Section 3 of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989, ('the SC/ST Act' for short), under Sections 147, 341, 379, 363, 342, 504/149 of Indian Penal Code ('The IPC' for short), under Sections 27, 28, 30, 31, 32 & 33 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 ('the Wildlife Act', for short) and for offence under Sections 74 and 75 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1994 (sic 1988'?) ('the MV Act', for short). 3. According to the petitioners, since they are forest officers, they are legally bound to protect the wildlife existing in the National Park, they are equally bound to follow the rule sand regulations prescribed for the wildlife. However, the then presiding Judge of the Special Judge (SC/ST - Prevention of Atrocities Cases), Sawai Madhopur, Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain, made unreasonable demands upon the petitioners about taking his guests into the National Park and for other favours. Since these demands were legally unjustified, the petitioners were unable to fulfil the same. Therefore, a certain animosity developed between the presiding officer, Mr. Jain and the petitioners. 4. Suddenly, on 19.3.1998, one Shri Banwari Nayak directly lodged a criminal complaint in the Court of Special Judge (SC/ST) presided by Mr. Since these demands were legally unjustified, the petitioners were unable to fulfil the same. Therefore, a certain animosity developed between the presiding officer, Mr. Jain and the petitioners. 4. Suddenly, on 19.3.1998, one Shri Banwari Nayak directly lodged a criminal complaint in the Court of Special Judge (SC/ST) presided by Mr. Jain According to the complaint on 18.3.1998, the complainant had gone, alongwith the two other friends, in a jeep, bearing registration No. RJ 25 P-0405, to the Ganesh Temple situated in the National Park. While he was returning from the temple, about 9:00 AM, the horn of his jeep got stuck and started blaring. Since the jeep was making a loud noise, an officer of the Forest Department, namely Gaffar, the petitioner No.7, stopped the jeep and mis-behaved with the complainant. When the complainant tried to explain the reason for the horn blaring itself, allegedly Gaffar addressed him with regard to his low caste status. Gaffar tried to pull him out of the jeep, but the complainant and his driver, Puni Ram Meena, managed to escape from Gaffar's clutches. The complainant further alleged that as he was coming down the hill, he was suddenly surrounded by officers of the Forest Department. The officer took the complainant and his friends to Jogi Mahal - a building situated within the National Park. At the Jogi Mahal, the petitioners verbally abused him and forced him to. sign on blank papers. They also addressed him with regard to his low caste status. He further claimed that the forest officers stole Rs. 300/- from him and about Rs. 1,000/- from his driver, Puni Ram Meena. The forest officers told the complainant that by blowing the horn, he was not only disturbing the wildlife, but also was sending signals to the poachers, who had become a menace in the National Park. Therefore, he was indulging in illegal activities in the National Park. The complainant further alleged that they were detained in the Jogi Mahal till ten o'clock at night. According to the complainant, Jogi Mahal is being used as hotel. However, as the Jogi Mahal is within the National Park, it cannot be used as a hotel. At the Jogi Mahal, there is well, which has a diesel engine, which was also making lot of noise. According to the complainant, Jogi Mahal is being used as hotel. However, as the Jogi Mahal is within the National Park, it cannot be used as a hotel. At the Jogi Mahal, there is well, which has a diesel engine, which was also making lot of noise. When the complainant told the forest officers that the diesel engine is making more noise than the horn of his jeep, the officers further abused him. The complainant and the driver of the jeep begged for mercy. He further alleged that the forest officers usually take their family members and guests in diesel jeep, whereas the public is prohibited from doing so. Moreover, according to him, a tiger was injured who was given drugs by the Forest Department and was later shot dead by them. He further alleged that a panther had died in the forest. Therefore, the petitioners had violated Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Wild Animals and Birds Protection Rules, 1951 and has also violated Sections 32 and 51 of the Wildlife Act. Lastly, he alleged that before setting him free on 19.3.1978 (sic 1998'?), the petitioners forced him to sign blank pieces of papers. They threatened him that in case he were to report this incident to anyone, they would use these blank papers against him. According to him, the petitioners are high ranking officers, therefore, even the police does not take any action against them. Therefore, he claimed that he had filed the present complaint before the Court. Being members of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Community and being oppressed by the petitioners, he filed the complainant before the Special Judge SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Cases. Lastly, according to the complainant, the petitioners had not only committed offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act, but also committed offences under Sections 147, 149, 323, 341, 504, 363, 342 of the IPC. 5. After receiving the said complaint, the learned Judge, vide order dated 20.3.1998, directed the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur to hold an inquiry under Section 202(l) of Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code' for short). 6. The learned Magistrate submitted his report on 20.5.1998. According to the said report, the petitioners had committed offences under Sections 147, 148, 323, 341, 451, 504, 362 and 342 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of SC/ST Act. 6. The learned Magistrate submitted his report on 20.5.1998. According to the said report, the petitioners had committed offences under Sections 147, 148, 323, 341, 451, 504, 362 and 342 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of SC/ST Act. However, vide order dated 21.5.1998, the learned Judge took cognizance of not only offence under the provisions of SC/ST and provisions of Indian Penal Code as mentioned above, but also proceeded to take cognizance under Sections 27, 28, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the Wildlife Act and under Sections 74 and 75 of the MV Act. Hence, this petition before this Court. 7. Mr. Vivek R. Bajwa, learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised a plethora of contentions before this Court : firstly, according to the Chapter-XV of the Code, a criminal complaint can be lodged only before a Magistrate and not directly before a Sessions Court. However, in the present case, the complaint was lodged directly before the Special Court. As the Special Court is equivalent to a Sessions Court, therefore, the criminal complaint lodged by the respondent No.2 could not have been submitted directly before the Special Court. According to the learned counsel, the complaint has been filed in fact, at the behest of Mr. Ajay Jain, the then Special Judge. Secondly, although the learned Judge had directed the learned Magistrate to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 (1) of the Code, however, the learned Judge does not have the jurisdiction under Section 202(1) of the Code to direct such an inquiry. Thirdly, according to Section 193 of the Code, a Sessions Court cannot take cognizance of an offence until and unless the case has been committed by a Magistrate to the Sessions Court. However, in the present case, the learned Judge has taken cognizance without the case being committed to his Court. Therefore, the impugned cognizance order is in violation of Section 193 of the Code. Fourthly, except under certain circumstances, Section 55 of the Wildlife Act prohibits a Court from taking cognizance. The complainant is not covered under the circumstances mentioned in Section 55 of Wildlife Act. Therefore, the cognizance of offence under the Wildlife Act is illegal. Fifthly, although no allegations were made fcr any offence committed under the Motor Vehicles Act, yet cognizance for Sections 74 and 75 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has been taken by the learned judge. The complainant is not covered under the circumstances mentioned in Section 55 of Wildlife Act. Therefore, the cognizance of offence under the Wildlife Act is illegal. Fifthly, although no allegations were made fcr any offence committed under the Motor Vehicles Act, yet cognizance for Sections 74 and 75 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has been taken by the learned judge. Sections 74 and 75 of the MV Act are neither penal in nature, nor even relevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Thus, the cognizance order clearly reveals non-application of mind on the part of the learned Judge. Sixthly, the facts narrated in the complaint clearly reveal that the case was restricted within the ambit of Section 3 of the SC/ST Act and within certain provisions of IPC. But, in his zeal, the learned Judge has widened the scope of include offences under the Wildlife Act and under the MV Act. Lastly, all these factors clearly prove that the complaint is highly motivated; and it has been done at the instance of Mr. Jain in order to involve the petitioners in a criminal case. In order to buttress his contentions, learned counsel has relied upon the cases of Gangula Ashok & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT) 2000 (1) SCC 379 , Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala UT) 2003 (9) SC 89 , (3) M.A. Kuttappan v. E. Krishnan Nayanar (JT 2004 (3) SC 7 , (4) Moly v. State of Kerala (JT) 2004 (4) SC 1 and lastly (5) Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, AIR 2003 SC 2612 . 8. On the other hand, Mr. Ratnu, the learned counsel for the complainant, has vehemently argued that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code is a limited one The inherent powers of the Court cannot be utilised to throttle a criminal case at the initial stage. If the allegations made in the complaint make out a prima facie case against the petitioners for having committed certain offences, then the learned Court is justified in taking cognizance of offence. Moreover, according to case of (6) Bhura Lal & Ors. v. State & Ors. ( 1999 (2) RLR 1 ) , the Special Court has been established under Section 14 of the SC/ST Act and it can directly take cognizance without the committal proceeding under Section 193 of the Code. Moreover, according to case of (6) Bhura Lal & Ors. v. State & Ors. ( 1999 (2) RLR 1 ) , the Special Court has been established under Section 14 of the SC/ST Act and it can directly take cognizance without the committal proceeding under Section 193 of the Code. Thus, the learned Judge was justified in taking the cognizance against the petitioners. He has, thus, supported the impugned order. In order to buttress his contentions, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of (7) CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava (AIR 2006 SC 2783) and (8) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji & Ors. ( AIR 2001 SC 3372 ) . 9. The learned Public Prosecutor has echoed the arguments of Mr. Ratnu. 10. We have heard both the learned counsels, have examined the record, have perused the impugned order and have considered the case law cited at the Bar. Section 482 of the Code is as under:- "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to present abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." Section 482 of the Code does not bestow any new power upon the High Court. It merely recognizes and preserves powers which are inherently present in the High Court. It, thus, merely states the obvious by way of abundant caution. The powers under this section are to be utilised for three purposes, namely, to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court, or to secure the ends of justice. Undoubtedly, the power is a vast one. Thus, the more vast the power, the more sparingly to be utilized. However, merely because a power is to be used sparingly, it does not mean that it is not be used at all. In appropriate cases, the power should be used keeping in mind the three broad purposes of the power. In the case of (9) State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992 Supp. I SC 335) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had delineated the conditions under which the power can be exercised. In appropriate cases, the power should be used keeping in mind the three broad purposes of the power. In the case of (9) State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992 Supp. I SC 335) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had delineated the conditions under which the power can be exercised. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that the conditions laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) are merely illustrative and not exhaustive in nature. Keeping these principles in mind, this Court has to consider the issue whether cognizance order should be quashed and set aside or not. 11. While dealing with the legality of the cognizance order, this Court has to consider certain issues : (i) Whether the Court had jurisdiction to take the cognizance of the offence, or not? (ii) Whether there is any legal bar or impediment to the taking of such cognizance by the Court? (iii) Whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are prima facie made out, or not? (iv) Whether the case is motivated by ulterior motives, or amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and of the law, or not? 12. Needless to say, the Code is self-contained one. Chapter-II of the Code demarcates the constitution of Criminal Courts and Offices. Section 6 of the Code defines the Criminal Courts into the Court of Session, the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and, in any metropolitan area, the metropolitan Magistrate, the Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class and the Executive Magistrates. Section 9 deals with the Courts of Session and states that "the State Government shall establish a Court of Session for every sessions division". Section 11 of the Code, on the other hand, constitutes the courts of Judicial Magistrates. Thus, the Code makes a clear distinction between the Sessions Court and the Magisterial Court. Hence, there is a distinction between the Sessions Judge and a Judicial Magistrate. 13. Chapter XV deals with "complaints to Magistrates". The title of the chapter clearly reveals that criminal complaints are to be made only to the Magistrates and not to any other Court. Thus, the Code makes a clear distinction between the Sessions Court and the Magisterial Court. Hence, there is a distinction between the Sessions Judge and a Judicial Magistrate. 13. Chapter XV deals with "complaints to Magistrates". The title of the chapter clearly reveals that criminal complaints are to be made only to the Magistrates and not to any other Court. Section 200 of the Code is as under : "Examination of complainant - A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate : Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court had made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192 : Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them. Section 202, dealing with postponement of issues of process, is as under: "(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, [and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction,] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding : Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made, (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under Section 200. (c)In an inquiry under sub-section (1) the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If any investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant. Section 204 deals with the issue of process and is as under "(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be:- (a) a summon-case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the deceased, or (b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if, thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provision of Section 87." 14. A bare perusal of these provisions clearly reveals firstly, a complaint lies only to a Magistrate. Secondly, the power to examine the complainant is vested only in a Magistrate and not in any other Court. Thirdly, the power to direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person as the Magistrate may think proper, is also vested with a Magistrate and with no other Court. Fourthly, the power to issue a process is also vested in a Magisterial Court and in none else. 15. Thirdly, the power to direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person as the Magistrate may think proper, is also vested with a Magistrate and with no other Court. Fourthly, the power to issue a process is also vested in a Magisterial Court and in none else. 15. Moreover, according to Section 190 of the Code, only a Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance upon receiving a complaint of facts, which constitutes such offence, or upon a police report of such facts, or upon information received from any other person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. Furthermore, Section 193 places a bar on the power of the Court of Session to take cognizance in the following words : "Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a'Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code." 16. In the light of these relevant provisions, the complaint could not be filed directly before the Special Court. For, the Special Court is nothing but a Court of Session. Moreover, the learned Judge could not have directed the learned Magistrate to hold an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code. Furthermore, the Special Court, being a Sessions Court, could not take cognizance of an offence until and unless the case was committed by a Magistrate. 17. In the case of Bhura Lal & Ors. (supra), a Full Bench of this Court did hold that notwithstanding Section 193 of the Code, a Special Court, established under the SC/ST Act, can directly take cognizance of offences under the said Act. But, the said case stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gangula Ashok & Anr. (supra), The Apex Court has observed as under : The Court of Session is specified to conduct a trial and no other court can conduct the trial of offences under the Act. But, the said case stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gangula Ashok & Anr. (supra), The Apex Court has observed as under : The Court of Session is specified to conduct a trial and no other court can conduct the trial of offences under the Act. The particular Court of Session, even after being specified as a Special Court, would continue to be essentially a Court of Session and designation of it as a Special Court would not denude it of its character or even powers as a Court of Session. The trial in such a court can be conducted only in the manner provided a Chapter XVIII of the Code which contains a fascisulus of provisions for "Trial before a Court of Session. Unless it is positively and specifically provided differently no Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence directly, without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate. Neither in the Code nor in the Act there is any provision whatsoever, not even by implication, that the specified Court of Session (Special Court) can take cognizance of the offence under the Act as a court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate." 18. The said pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been followed, subsequently, in the cases of Vidyadharan (supra), M.A. Kuttappan (supra) and Moly & Anr. (supra). Considering the consistent judicial thinking as expressed by the Apex Court, the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhura Lal & Ors. are impliedly over-ruled. Therefore, the case of Bhura Lal & Ors. (supra) does not come to the rescue of the complainant, the respondent No.2. 19. In the light of the relevant provisions of the Code and in the light of the case law discussed above, this Court finds force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the criminal complaint filed by the respondent No.2 directly before the Special Court was not maintainable. Moreover, the learned Judge could not have taken the cognizance of offence either under the SC/ST Act or under the Indian Penal Code in light of Section 193 of the Code. Therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable. 20. Moreover, the learned Judge could not have taken the cognizance of offence either under the SC/ST Act or under the Indian Penal Code in light of Section 193 of the Code. Therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable. 20. Section 55 of the Wildlife Act is as under : "Cognizance of offences.-No Court shall take Cognizance of any offence against this Act on the complaint of any person other than:- (a) the Director of Wild Life Preservation or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government; or (b) the Chief Wild Life Warden, or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government; or (c) any person who has given notice of not less than sixty days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint, to the Central Government or the State Government or the officer authorised as aforesaid." 21. The said provision, thus, contains a bar against the power of the Court to take cognizance for offences under the-Wildlife Act. According to this provision, the complaint has to be filed either by the Director of Wildlife Preservation, or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government, or the Chief Wildlife Warden, or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government. According to sub-clause (c) an individual can also file a complaint, provided he sends a notice of not less than sixty days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint to the Central Government, or the State Government, or the authorised officer as aforementioned. Thus, an individual prior to making a complaint has to first inform the Central Government or the State Government or the Director of Wildlife Preservation or any other officer authorised by the Central Government or the Chief Wildlife Warden or any other officer authorised by the State Government. In case, the requirement of this section is not fulfilled, the Court is prevented from taking cognizance of any offence under Wildlife Act. 22. Admittedly, the complaint has neither been filed by the Director of Wildlife Preservation, nor by the Chief Wildlife Warden. Admittedly, the complaint has been filed by a private individual. In case, the requirement of this section is not fulfilled, the Court is prevented from taking cognizance of any offence under Wildlife Act. 22. Admittedly, the complaint has neither been filed by the Director of Wildlife Preservation, nor by the Chief Wildlife Warden. Admittedly, the complaint has been filed by a private individual. However, in the complaint, there is no indication that the complainant had sent a notice to the Central Government, or the State Government, or the Director of Wildlife, or the Chief Wildlife Warden about the alleged offences or about his intention to file the complaint. Hence, the requirement of sub-clause (c) has not been fulfilled by the complainant. In the absence of fulfilling the requirement of Section 55, the learned Judge could not have taken the cognizance of offences under the Wildlife Act. Yet, notwithstanding the requirement of Section 55, the learned Judge has proceeded to take cognizance of offences under the Wildlife Act. Hence, the impugned cognizance is in violation of Section 55 of the Wildlife Act. The same is unsustainable. 23. Yet, notwithstanding the requirement of Section 55, the learned Judge has proceeded to take cognizance of offences under the Wildlife Act. Hence, the impugned cognizance is in violation of Section 55 of the Wildlife Act. The same is unsustainable. 23. Surprisingly, in an unprecedented zeal, the learned Judge claims to have taken cognizance of offences under Sections 28, 30, 31, 33 of the Wildlife Act But, Section 28 is as under "Grant of Permit.-(1) The Chief Wild Life Warden may, on application, grant to any person a permit to enter or reside in a sanctuary for all or any of the following purposes, namely: (a) investigation or study or wild life and purposes ancillary or incidental thereto; (b) photography; (c) scientific research; (d) tourism; (e) transaction of lawful business with any person residing in the sanctuary." (2) A permit to enter or reside in a sanctuary shall be issued subject to such conditions and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed." Section 30 is as under : "Causing fire prohibited-No person shall set fire to a sanctuary, or kindle any fire, or leave any fire burning in a sanctuary, in such manner as to endanger such sanctuary." Section 31 is as under : "Prohibition of entry into sanctuary with weapon.-No person shall enter a sanctuary with any weapon except with the previous permission in writing of the Chief Wild Life Warden or the authorised officer." Section 32 is as under : "Ban on use of injurious substances.-No person shall use, in a sanctuary chemicals, explosives or any other substances which may cause injury to, or endanger, any wild life in such sanctuary. Section 33 is as under : "Control of sanctuaries-The Chief Wild Life Warden shall be the authority who shall control, manage and maintain all sanctuaries and for that purpose, within the limit of any sanctuary:- (a) may construct such roads, bridges, buildings, fences or barrier gates, and carry out such other work as he may consider necessary for the purposes of such sanctuary; (b) shall take such steps as will ensure the security of wild animals in the sanctuary and the preservation of the sanctuary and wild animals therein; (c) may take such measures, in the interest; of wild life, as he may consider necessary for the improvement of any habitat; (d) may regulate, control or prohibit, in keeping with the interests of wild life, the grazing or movement of [live- stock]". 24. A bare perusal of these provisions clearly reveals that these provisions do not create any penal offences. In fact, while some provisions bestow powers on the competent authority, others prohibit certain activities in the sanctuary. Section 28 deals with power of the Chief Wildlife Warden to grant to any person a permit to enter or reside in sanctuary for certain purposes. Section 30 prohibits persons from setting fire or from leaving any fire burning in a sanctuary. Section 31, on the other hand, prohibits a person from entering with any weapon except with the previous permission, in writing, of the Chief Wildlife Warden or the authorised officer. Section 32 places a ban for using chemicals, explosives or any other substances which may cause injury to, or endanger, any wild life in such sanctuary.. Obviously, none of these provisions are penal in nature.' Yet, the learned Judge has taken cognizance of all these provisions as though they are penal in nature. Unfortunately, the learned judge has not been even bothered to read the provisions of law. Thus, the impugned orders seems to have been passed in a hot haste, in a zeal to involve the petitioners in a criminal trial. This is unfortunate as a judicial officer of senior rank of a Sessions Judge is expected to read the relevant provisions of law before passing any judicial order. Moreover, the judicial power cannot be used and are never to be used for private vendetta. The complaint did not contain any allegations about the violation of Sections 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the Wildlife Act. Moreover, the judicial power cannot be used and are never to be used for private vendetta. The complaint did not contain any allegations about the violation of Sections 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the Wildlife Act. But surprisingly, the learned Judge has taken cognizance of these provisions. 25. Further Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the power of the Regional Transport Authority to grant contract carriage permit to any person. Section 75 of the Motor Vehicle Act deals with scheme for running of motor cabs. The said section empowers the Central Government to make a scheme for the purpose of regulating the running of motor cabs or motor cycles to persons desiring to drive either by themselves or through drivers, motor cabs or motor cycles for their own use and for matters connected therewith. Again obviously, neither of these provisions are penal in nature. In fact, all these provisions merely empower the Regional Transport Authority and the Central Government to carry out certain functions. Yet, shockingly the learned Judge has taken cognizance for offences under Sections 74 and 75 of the MV Act, 1988. 26. The allegations clearly reveal that the criminal complaint was filed directly before the Special Court. The criminal complaint not only dealt with the particular incident involving the complainant, but also dealt with allegations of death of partner, the running of hotel within the National Park and running of a diesel engine therein. Instead of being a complaint about a particular incident, the criminal complaint seems to have been filed almost like a public interest litigation. Without considering the jurisdiction vested in the Court, the learned Judge had sent the complaint for further investigation under Section 202(1) of the Code - a power not even vested in him. After receiving the report, the learned Judge, while turning a blind eye to the relevant and obvious legal provisions, took cognizance of offences. The learned Judge being a judicial officer of some experience, ignored the existence of Section 193 of the Code and the existence of Section 55 of the Wildlife Act. The impugned order is ipso facto in violation of Section 193 of the Code and Section 55 of the Wildlife Protection Act. The learned Judge being a judicial officer of some experience, ignored the existence of Section 193 of the Code and the existence of Section 55 of the Wildlife Act. The impugned order is ipso facto in violation of Section 193 of the Code and Section 55 of the Wildlife Protection Act. As stated above, the Government Judge has taken cognizance of even those provisions which are not penal in nature, but in fact merely empower the competent authorities under the Wildlife Act and under the MV Act to carry out certain functions. It is hardly believable that a judicial officer would ignore the express provisions of the law, unless he is driven by misplaced motive of wrecking personal vendetta on the petitioners. Therefore, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed with ulterior motive finds force. Even otherwise, considering the obvious illegalities committed by the learned Judge, the impugned order dated 21.3.1998 is unsustainable. 27. For the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed and the order dated 21.3.1998 is quashed and set aside. S.B. CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NO. 1154/9828. The second petition is an off-shoot of the first petition. In the second petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 27.6.1998 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur, whereby the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for offences under Sections 143, 186, 188, 228, 323, 353, 385, 394, read with Sections 120-B and 504 of Indian Penal Code ('the IPC', for short), against the petitioners. 29. On 20.5.1998, the High Court issued a transfer list of judicial officers. the list contained the name of Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain, Special Judge SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sawai Madhopur. The said list was also published in a local Hindi newspaper, namely, "Rajasthan Patrika", which has a wide circulation in Sawai Madhopur. Thus, obviously on 21.5.1998, Mr. Jain knew the fact that he has been transferred by the High Court. Yet, on 26.5.1998, in the evening, after sunset, Mr. Jain entered into the National Park. He was stopped by the petitioners. According to the petitioners, Mr. Jain was traveling in an private vehicle after sunset, when the Park was closed for visitors. He was accompanied not only by his own relatives, but also by women and children. When, Mr. Yet, on 26.5.1998, in the evening, after sunset, Mr. Jain entered into the National Park. He was stopped by the petitioners. According to the petitioners, Mr. Jain was traveling in an private vehicle after sunset, when the Park was closed for visitors. He was accompanied not only by his own relatives, but also by women and children. When, Mr. Jain was asked as to the purpose of his visit; he claimed, he was there to inspect the site, where a panther was killed and cremated. According to the petitioners, this was a rather clever explanation as they were not informed by Mr. Jain about his proposed inspection in the National Park. Moreover, the inspection was being done by Mr. Jain in a private vehicle and that too accompanied by women and children. Since Mr. Jain had entered the Park after the Park was closed, and without taking prior permission of the concerned authority, the petitioners registered a FIR, FIR No. 296-62 dated 26.5.1998 for offences under the Wildlife Act. According to the petitioners, they have already moved papers before the Government for obtaining the requisite sanction for prosecuting Mr. Jain under the Wildlife Act. 30. Finding himself in a bind, Mr. Jain wrote a letter, dated 27.5.1998, to the then District and Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur, wherein he alleged that he had taken cognizance against the Forest Officers of the Forest Department in a complaint filed by Banwari Nayak. He further claimed that he had recorded his intention, on order-sheet dated 21.5.1998, to carry out the site inspection of the place where a panther had been killed and cremated. He also claimed that on 26.5.1998, he had informed the Regional Forest Officer, Mr. Sailendra Yadav, of his intention to carry out the site inspection. He further claimed that he had sought permission from the District and Sessions Judge to carry out the said inspection on 26.5.1998. The permission was granted. On 26.5.1998, about 5:30 PM, the complainant, Mr. Banwari Nayak came with a jeep, bearing registration No. RJ-25-T-0104 alongwith driver, Basheer, and alongwith women and children, Mr. Jain also alleged that he had placed the number plate of his official car on the jeep. About 6:30 PM, the said jeep reached at the gate of the National Park. On 26.5.1998, about 5:30 PM, the complainant, Mr. Banwari Nayak came with a jeep, bearing registration No. RJ-25-T-0104 alongwith driver, Basheer, and alongwith women and children, Mr. Jain also alleged that he had placed the number plate of his official car on the jeep. About 6:30 PM, the said jeep reached at the gate of the National Park. There, he was met by two or three Forest Officers and they told him that they were deputed for the purpose of site inspection. They further pointed out to Mr. Jain that as the number plate was making noise, therefore, it should be removed. Upon their advice, he removed the number plate from the jeep. According to him, although he was taken around in the jungle for about an hour, but he could not reach and could not locate the site where the panther was allegedly cremated. Thereafter the Forest Officers left him at a place known as Lakarwa Chowki, which is situated in the National Park itself. Mr. Jain also claimed that after five to seven minutes, two or three Forest Officers came and asked him the purpose of his visit. He informed the purpose in writing to them. But, as the night was falling, Mr. Jain decided to drive the vehicle himself. While he was crossing near the Jogi Mahal, suddenly he was surrounded by thirty to forty persons, who were officers of the Forest Department. He further alleged that these persons not only misbehaved with him, but also took his papers away and snatched the camera, which was being carried by Mr. Rakesh Kumar. Although he tried to explain the purpsoe of his visit, though he tried to convince the petitioners that his entry in the National Park was legally valid, the petitioners allegedly continued to misbehave with him. While the children were taken away, Mr. Ajay claimed that he and other persons were subjected to misbehavior and threats. According to him, he and his companions were not released till the morning of 27.5.1998. 31. This letter was sent by the District and Sessions Judge, for further inquiry and necessary action, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur. In turn, the Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the said letter to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. On 1.6.1998, the learned A.C.J.M. registered the said letter as a criminal complaint. On 2.6.1998, the learned A.C.J.M. recorded the statement of the complainant, Mr. In turn, the Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the said letter to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. On 1.6.1998, the learned A.C.J.M. registered the said letter as a criminal complaint. On 2.6.1998, the learned A.C.J.M. recorded the statement of the complainant, Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain and his witnesses. Finally on 27.6.1998, the learned A.C.J.M. took the cognizance against the petitioners for the aforementioned offences. Hence this petition before this Court. 32. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised the following contentions before his Court : firstly, Mr. Jain has invented the story of site inspection as an after-thought in order to save his skin from being caught in the National Park with his relatives, women and children and also from entering the National Park when the Park was closed. The falsity of this plea is obvious from the fact that when Banwari Nayak had submitted his criminal complaint, Mr. Jain, as the Special Judge, had directed the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to inquire into the said complaint. During the course of inquiry, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had visited the site and have taken certain photographs, which were submitted by him in his report dated 20.5.1998. Since the site was already inspected, there was no need for a further inspection by Mr. Jain. Secondly, although the complaint submitted by Mr. Banwari Nayak did not disclose the date of the death of the panther, allegedly the panther was killed and cremated on 12.2.1998. Yet, after a lapse of three and half months i.e., on 26.5.1998, Mr. Jain claims that he went for site inspection of the spot where the panther was killed and cremated. Thirdly, curiously the inspection was being carried out after the night had started falling and that too while carrying women and children. Fourthly, the said inspection was not in accordance with Section 310 of the Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code' for short). The inspection under the said provision can be made only after evidence has been recorded during the course of a trial. However, the trial had yet to begin in the instant case. Fifthly, the order sheet dated 26.5.1998 has been interpolated as an insertion has been made in a different ink and different handwriting stating that "Mr. Yadav is informed that I shall carry out an inspection at 6:30 PM. He should be present and ready'. However, the trial had yet to begin in the instant case. Fifthly, the order sheet dated 26.5.1998 has been interpolated as an insertion has been made in a different ink and different handwriting stating that "Mr. Yadav is informed that I shall carry out an inspection at 6:30 PM. He should be present and ready'. In order to prove the said interpolation, the said order-sheet was placed before this Court. The learned counsel further pointed out that the said order-sheet was examined by the Vigilance Registrar of this Court, when certain complaints were received against Mr. Jain. Sixthly, the cognizance has been taken against the petitioners in violation of Section 197 of the Code as no sanction order has been passed for the prosecution of the petitioners, who happen to be public servant. According to the counsel, the petitioners were duty-bound to intercept a jeep which was found within the National Park, after the National Park was closed to the public at large. Thus, the petitioners' alleged action was in furtherance of their official duty. In fact, in furtherance of their official duty, the petitioners had lodged a FIR for offences under the Wildlife Act against Mr. Jain. Therefore, in light of Section 197, the learned Magistrate could not have taken any cognizance without the existence of sanction by the Government. Seventhly, Mr. Jain, the Special Judge, at the relevant time, was of the rank of a- Sessions Judge. Therefore, there was no need for him to seek alleged prior permission from the Sessions Judge to carry out the inspection. Eightly, the complainant had neither filed a FIR before the Police, nor filed a criminal complaint before the concerned Court. In fact, he had merely written a letter to the Sessions Judge, which has been treated, subsequently, as a criminal complaint. In case, any incident had taken place, as alleged by the complainant, in the course of normal human nature, he should have filed either a FIR or a criminal complaint. It seems that the letter was written by Mr. Jain merely to protect himself from the FIR lodged by the petitioners against him for offence under the Wildlife Act. Therefore, the letter written by him was merely to create evidence in order to protect his own interest. Ninthly, in case, Mr. It seems that the letter was written by Mr. Jain merely to protect himself from the FIR lodged by the petitioners against him for offence under the Wildlife Act. Therefore, the letter written by him was merely to create evidence in order to protect his own interest. Ninthly, in case, Mr. Jain was really carrying out a site inspection and in case he was obstructed from doing so, he could have easily issued a contempt notice against the petitioners. But, he has failed to do so. Lastly, the ingredients of the offences under Sections 186, 188, 228, 353, 385, 394 and 504 Indian Penal Code are non-existent. 33. On the other hand, Mr. Ratnu the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, has argued that under Section 27 of the Wildlife Act, no permission is needed for a public servant to enter into the National Park Therefore the complainant did not seek any prior permission to enter into the sanctuary after sunset. Secondly, there is sufficient evidence in the statement of the witnesses to make out a prima facie case against the petitioners. Thirdly, that once a prima facie case is made out, the Magistrate has no option but to take cognizance of the offence. Fourthly, that a legitimate trial should not' be scuttled while invoking the power under Section 482, as the power has to be used sparingly. 34. The learned Public Prosecutor has again echoed the arguments of Mr. Ratnu and has supported the impugned order.35. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties, have perused the impugned order and have been examined the record including the order-sheet dated 26.5.1998, which has been produced before this Court. 36. Section 310 of the Code is as under : 310. Local inspection - (1) Any judge or Magistrate may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings, after due notice to the parties, visit and inspect any place in which an offence is alleged to have been committed, or any other place which it is in his opinion necessary to view for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence given at such inquiry or trial, and shall without unnecessary delay record a memorandum of any relevant facts, observed at such inspection. (2) Such memorandum shall form part of the record of the case and if the prosecutor, complainant or accused or any other party to the case, so desires, a copy of the memorandum shall be furnished to him free of cost. " 37. A bare perusal of Section 310 of the Code clearly reveals that any Judge or Magistrate is empowered to visit and inspect any place, in which offence is alleged to have been committed or any other place which in his opinion is necessary to view of the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence. Such a legal inspection can be carried out at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The legal inspection is to be carried out after giving due notice to the parties about the inspection proposed. Without any unnecessary delay, a memorandum needs to be recorded of the relevant facts observed during such inspection. Such a memorandum is to form part of the Court record. A copy of such inspection has to be given to the prosecutor, the complainant or the accused, as desired. The inspection can be carried out at the stage of inquiry itself. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the inspection could not be carried out until and unless the trial had began is, thus, without any merit. 38. However, in the instant case, the propriety of carrying out the legal inspection is doubtful. Firstly, even prior to the alleged local inspection by Mr. jain, the learned A.C.J.M. had already carried out the inspection of the site in accordance with the order dated 20.3.1998. Since the inspection was already carried out by the learned A.C.J.M., since his report was already available in the record, this Court fails to understand why a second inspection needed to be carried out? Secondly, the said inspection was carried out by Mr. Jain after his transfer order, which had already been published. According to the statements of Mr. Ravindra Singh Hada, Mr. Jain had already informed him that it would not be possible for him to carry out the local inspection as he has already been transferred. Thus, obviously on 22.5.1998, Mr. Jain was well aware of the fact that he has been transferred. Although Mr. According to the statements of Mr. Ravindra Singh Hada, Mr. Jain had already informed him that it would not be possible for him to carry out the local inspection as he has already been transferred. Thus, obviously on 22.5.1998, Mr. Jain was well aware of the fact that he has been transferred. Although Mr. Jain was not prevented from carrying out the inspection on the ground of his transfer, but propriety demanded that he should have refrained from doing so specially when the relationship between him and the petitioners was far from being cordial. For, not only justice should be done, but it must appear to be done. In the present case, when the relationship between Mr. Jain and the Forest Officers was strained. Mr. Jain should have refrained from entering into any controversy by carrying out an unnecessary site inspection. Thirdly, a bare perusal of the order sheet dated 26.5.1998 clearly reveals that the lines stating that "Mr. Yadav has been informed that I shall carry out a site inspection at 6:30 PM. He should be present and ready.", have been written in a different ink and in different hand writing. Thus, the veracity of this order-sheet itself becomes doubtful. Fourthly, if a local inspection was to be carried out by a Judge or a Magistrate, it is rather surprising that the concei'hed Judge would travel in a private jeep, that too with children and women and that too after sunset. This Court fails to understand as to how a local inspection can be carried out, when the night is about to fall, and the local inspection is to be carried out in a dense forest. The timing of the inspection, the accompaniment of children and women alongwith the concerned Judge makes a mockery of the entire concept of a local inspection. In case, a local inspection were to be made, it should have been done during the day time, that too in the company of the counsels of the concerned parties and alongwith other staff of the Court. Local inspections are not meant for picnicking in the National Park. Fifthly, neither the memorandum of the local inspection is available on record, nor is there evidence to show that the place where the panther was cremated was ever located. Thus, the entire story about carrying out a local inspection under Section 310 becomes extremely doubtful. 39. Local inspections are not meant for picnicking in the National Park. Fifthly, neither the memorandum of the local inspection is available on record, nor is there evidence to show that the place where the panther was cremated was ever located. Thus, the entire story about carrying out a local inspection under Section 310 becomes extremely doubtful. 39. Section 197 of the Code reads as under "197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.-(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction:- (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government. (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government : [Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted.] (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the expression "State Government" were substituted. [(3A)] Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no Court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a Court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the Court to take cognizance thereon.] (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held." 40. The said section places an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance against a public officer, until and unless, sanction has been granted by the concerned Government.41. The ambit and scope of Section 197 has attracted the attention of the Apex Court for the last five decades. In the case of (10) Prakash Singh Badal & Ors. v. State of Punjab and Haryana & Ors. [ (2007) 1 SCC 1 ] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 35 of the Report has observed as under:- "The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. The question is not as the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked it must be shown that the official concerned was accused as an offence alleged to have been committed 'y him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule .... This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case." 42. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule .... This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case." 42. In the case of Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar [ (2006) 1 SCC 557 ] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down a test to see if the impugned action falls within the parameters of official duty or not as "Whether omission or neglect to do that act would have brought on the charge of dereliction of his official duty or not." 43. In the present case, the petitioners discovered a jeep travelling through the National Park, after the park was closed for the public; they were duty bound to intercept the jeep and to ask the occupiers of the jeep, the reasons for their presence in the National Park. Thus, the petitioners were carrying out their official duties in stopping the complainant and his companions. Since their actions emanate from the public duty, before they can be prosecuted a sanction from the concerned authority is a sine qua non. However, despite the lack of sanction, the cognizance order has been passed. Hence, the impugned order is unsustainable. 44. As stated above, the story of carrying out a local inspection seems doubtful. The ingredients of offence under Sections 186 and 353 are conspicuously missing in this case. For, once it is held that Mr. Jain was not on a local inspection, it is difficult to hold that he was discharging any public duty. As far as the offence under Section 228 if concerned. Mr. Jain was not carrying out judicial proceeding, when he was intercepted by the petitioners. Thus, the offence under Section 228 are not made out. 45. In the case of State of Haryana & ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335) , one of the conditions enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court where the power under Section 482 can be exercised is when the case is initiated by ulterior motives for wrecking personal vengeance on the accused. The facts given above demonstrates that the letter written by Mr. Jain was impelled by ulterior motives. The small skirmish between Mr. The facts given above demonstrates that the letter written by Mr. Jain was impelled by ulterior motives. The small skirmish between Mr. Jain and the Forest Officers reached a crescendo. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in invoking its inherent power to quash the impugned order. 46. Moreover, in the present petition filed before this Court, vide order dated 3.11.1998, this Court was pleased to grant an interim stay in favour of the petitioners. Therefore, the criminal proceedings before the trial Court had come to a grinding halt. During the pendency of these petitions, the judicial Officer, Mr. Jain has been removed from service by the High Court. Thus, the controversy between the Judicial Officer and the petitioners has died a natural death. No fruitful purpose would be served by digging up old graves and by resurrecting old forgotten feuds. 47. A bare perusal of the facts narrated in the first petition was well as in the second petition clearly reveal that a tug of war was going on between the Forest Officers and Mr. Jain. Initially, the Forest Officers could not satisfy the demands made by the Judicial Officer. Therefore, animosity grew between the two. Subsequently, a complaint, almost in the nature of public interest litigation, was suddenly filed before Mr. Jain. Despite, the bar contained in the law, in spite of the lack of evidence, Mr. Jain took cognizance against the petitioners vide order dated 21.5.1998. Since the petitioners were out manoeurved by the Judicial Officer, when they found Mr. Jain was within the National Park and that too after the Park was closed for public, they slammed a FIR against him for offences, under the Wildlife Act. In retaliation, Mr. Jain wrote a letter to then District Judge alleging interference, in his official duty and about other offences under the provisions of Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. The learned A.C.J.M. as part of the fraternity of the Judicial Officers, took cognizance against the petitioners. Thus, the facts reveal that Forest Officers and Mr. Jain were engaged in skirmishes, trying to out do their opponents. However, criminal law cannot be used as a sword to smite any person. Criminal law is meant to be used as a shield to protect one's interest life and liberty. Thus, the petitioners and Mr. Jain have engaged in blatant misuse of the judicial process and of the Court. 48. However, criminal law cannot be used as a sword to smite any person. Criminal law is meant to be used as a shield to protect one's interest life and liberty. Thus, the petitioners and Mr. Jain have engaged in blatant misuse of the judicial process and of the Court. 48. For these reasons, this petition is also allowed and the impugned order dated 27.6.1998 is quashed and set aside.Petitions allowed. *******