Judgment :- This Court on 03.12.1997 made the following order. “The substantial question of law which arises for decision in this second appeal is whether Ex.A-5 is an arbitration agreement as contemplated under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act and enforceable under Section 17 of the said Act. The second appeal is, therefore, admitted. Notice.” 2. Heard Sri M.N. Narasimha Reddy, learned counsel representing the appellant and Smt. Vasireddy Vijaya, learned counsel who is appointed as Amicus curiae, to assist the court since none represents the respondent. 3. Sri M.N. Narasimha Reddy, learned counsel representing the appellant had pointed out to the substantial question of law on the strength of which the second appeal was admitted and further had taken this court through the findings recorded by the court of first instance and also the appellate court and Sections 33 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and would maintain that the finding recorded by the appellate court that the agreement in question was not enforced by way of specific performance, and hence, the relief cannot be granted on the strength of such agreement, cannot be a sustainable finding. The learned counsel also would submit that though an attempt was made to attack the validity of Ex.A-5 as such the same being not in serious dispute, it can be taken that Ex.A-5 was duly proved. The learned counsel also had referred to the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 2, P.W.3 being the mediator and P.W.2 who had identified the signature of other mediator, since other mediator being no more. The learned counsel also would contend that this mediation agreement came into existence only by volition and consent of the parties, and that being so, the parties cannot dispute on the terms agreed upon, and hence, on the strength of the said agreement, the appellant is entitled to succeed. 4. Smt. Vasireddy Vijaya, learned Amicus curiae, had taken this court through Ex.A-5 and would contend that it is not a genuine document and even if it is to be taken that the said agreement had been proved in accordance with law, the same would not confer any right as such to claim any relief. The learned counsel also would submit that though the court is empowered to compare the signatures, the same was not done and the genuineness or otherwise of the signatures in Ex.A-5 had not been properly gone into. The learned counsel also would submit that though the court is empowered to compare the signatures, the same was not done and the genuineness or otherwise of the signatures in Ex.A-5 had not been properly gone into. The counsel also while further elaborating her submissions had taken this Court through several findings which had been recorded and also had referred to the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and also the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Ultimately, the counsel would conclude that unless and until the procedure under the provisions of the relevant Act had been followed, the question of granting the relief in favour of the plaintiff on the strength of such document would not arise. 5. The substantial question of law already had been referred to supra. The appellant herein as plaintiff instituted the suit O.S.No.403 of 1987 on the file of the Munsif Magistrate, Jammalamadugu, praying for declaration of title to the open space marked as AGFE in the plaint plan and to deliver possession of the open space marked as AGFE to the plaintiff and to direct the defendant by way of mandatory injunction to remove the slabs along AG, FG, FE line and to close the door in MN wall and if he fails to do so, the same to be done through process of court with the costs of the defendant and to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendant from releasing dye water into open space marked as ABCDE and for costs. 6. The claim of the appellant-plaintiff was resisted by respondent-defendant and on the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties having settled the issues, the Court of first instance recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 7, D.Ws.1 to 4, marked Exs.A-1 to A-7, Exs.B-1 to B-10 and also Exs.C-1 to C-4 and Ex.X1 and ultimately came to the conclusion that appellant-plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed for and decreed the suit, but, however, directing the parties to bear their own costs. Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful defendant carried the matter by way of appeal A.S.No.6 of 1990 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Proddatur, and the learned judge allowed the appeal partly modifying the decree and judgment of the court of first instance. Aggrieved by the said modification made by the appellate court, the plaintiff had approached this court by way of this second appeal. 7. Aggrieved by the said modification made by the appellate court, the plaintiff had approached this court by way of this second appeal. 7. The respective pleadings of the parties are as hereunder. It was pleaded in the plaint that the suit site marked as ABCDE originally belongs to Yerasi Venkatareddy and Obulareddy and they were in possession and enjoyment of the same. The father of the plaintiff purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 01.12.1951 and took possession of the same and was in enjoyment of the same with absolute rights. In the partition held in the year 1973, the said ABCDE site fell to the share of the plaintiff, and thus, the plaintiff became absolute owner of the said site. It is also stated that the house marked as LMNO originally belongs to Sipala Pedda Balaiah, Krishnamma and Sipala Narappa and they sold the same to the defendant and the other house shown in the plan situate towards east of the house of the defendant also originally belongs to Sipala Balaiah, Krishnamma and Sipala Narappa and that they sold the same to different persons. There were spouts to the house of the defendant on the northern side and also to the other houses. It is further submitted that in between the open space ABCDE and the house of defendant some space was left out for letting out rainwater. While so, during the absence of the plaintiff, the defendant high handedly opened a door way towards north in MN wall and planted slabs along MEF, FG and GAN line with a small gate in GF line towards north and put up Zinc sheet varandah and began to use the same for dyeing yarn and releasing dye water into the open space marked as ABCDE. The defendant had no right to do so and when the plaintiff questioned the highhandedness of the defendant and asked him for removal of slabs and for closing the door in MN wall, the defendant conveyed panchayat and in the panchayat elders decided to permit the defendant to use it for a period of five years i.e., from 7.7.82 to 7.7.1987 and an agreement was also executed by the defendant on 7.7.1982 in favour of the plaintiff and the son of the defendant namely Badiginchala Chinna Krishnaiah also attested the same, as per which the defendant had to remove the slabs, varapaku and close the door on or before 7.7.87. It is further stated that when the plaintiff informed to the defendant to remove the slabs and other things placed on the northern side by 7.7.87, the defendant refused to do so and failed to abide by the conditions of the agreement entered into on 7.7.82. The plaintiff got issued a notice directing the defendant to remove all the slabs and to close the door, and the defendant having received the notice got issued a reply with all false allegations denying the right of the plaintiff. 8. I.A.No.90 of 1990 was filed to add the sentence “power of attorney of the plaintiff” and the application was allowed and the amendment was carried out. The respondent herein, the defendant in the suit, filed written statement denying the allegations and it was pleaded that the plaint plan is not correct. It was also pleaded that in the plaint plan the measurements of the site marked as ‘ABCD’ were not given and there was sandu rastha running from north to south and takes turn towards west and again turns to south and leads to Ramula temple. After that rastha there was one house belonging to Badiginchala Krishnamma, and all such features were not noted in the plaint plan. The house of the defendant and other adjacent houses on east were not properly located in the plaint plan. The defendant was not aware of the registered sale deed dated 01.12.1951 said to have been executed in favour of the plaintiff by Erasi Venkata Reddy and Obulareddy. The house of the defendant and other adjacent houses on east were not properly located in the plaint plan. The defendant was not aware of the registered sale deed dated 01.12.1951 said to have been executed in favour of the plaintiff by Erasi Venkata Reddy and Obulareddy. It is also stated that on the south of the said open space, there was rastha running east-west to have facility to the house of defendant and others situated to the east of defendant’s house and the father of the defendant purchased the house along with open space on its north, under a registered sale deed dated 4.8.1937 and the door way in the northern wall of the defendant was not opened in 1982. It is there in existence since more than 30 years and the defendant was having space of 2 yards north-south on the northern side of his house. The sandu rastha leading Ramula temple was in existence since times immemorial and to have facility of access to the rastha, the said door way was opened in the northern wall of the defendant’s open space. There were spouts on the terrace of defendant towards north for letting out rainwater. Besides the said doorway, there were two more windows in the northern wall of the defendant towards north. The Zinc sheet varandah put up on the northern side of the defendant’s house was in the open space of his site only and it was not an encroachment. The dye water was not being let out into plaintiff’s site. The defendant did not know about the panchayat said to have been taken place on 7.7.1982 and he never participated in the mediation. The defendant never permitted to use the Zinc sheet varandah for five years from 7.7.1982 to 7.7.1987. The defendant was not a party to the said agreement and the alleged agreement was got up one. It is also stated that the defendant was not aware under what circumstances his son Chinna Krishnaiah signed in the said agreement and even his signature might have been forged on the agreement. 9. An additional written statement also was filed to the effect that P.W.1 was not the power of attorney holder of P.W.7, the plaintiff, and hence the suit is not maintainable. 10. The plaintiff also filed rejoinder denying the contentions raised in the additional written statement. 11. 9. An additional written statement also was filed to the effect that P.W.1 was not the power of attorney holder of P.W.7, the plaintiff, and hence the suit is not maintainable. 10. The plaintiff also filed rejoinder denying the contentions raised in the additional written statement. 11. On the strength of these pleadings, the following issues and additional issues had been settled. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title to open space marked as AGEF in the plaint and possession? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mandatory injunction as prayed for? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from releasing dye water into open space marked as ABCDEF? 4. To what relief? Additional Issue: 1. Whether P.W.1 is the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff to file the suit? 12. As already referred to supra, the evidence was recorded and on the strength of the oral and documentary evidence the suit was decreed and the same was partly reversed in the appeal A.S.No.6 of 1990 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Proddatur. The appellate court at para 10 framed the following point for consideration. “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title, permanent injunction, mandatory injunction and possession as prayed for in the suit.” P.W.5 is the second commissioner who had visited the suit locality and submitted his report, which was marked as Ex.C-4 and this was relied upon to show the dismantling of the dyeing operation. 13. The main controversy is in relation to Ex.A-5. It is the case of the appellant-plaintiff that since respondent-defendant opened a doorway in MN wall and when the appellant-plaintiff asked him to close down the door, the defendant executed Ex.A-5 agreement agreeing to close the door after 5 years. But, however, the defendant had not chosen to do so. 14. The oral evidence available on record had been dealt with at length. Though an attempt was made to attack the genuineness or validity of the agreement Ex.A-5 in the light of the evidence available on record P.Ws.2, 3 and also other evidence the document as such cannot be disbelieved. The other oral evidence P.W.1 B.C. Subbarayudu, the power of attorney and P.W.7-B. Pedda Subbarayudu also had been appreciated and the evidence of P.Ws.4, 5 and 6 also had been dealt with. The other oral evidence P.W.1 B.C. Subbarayudu, the power of attorney and P.W.7-B. Pedda Subbarayudu also had been appreciated and the evidence of P.Ws.4, 5 and 6 also had been dealt with. As against this evidence, the evidence of D.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 4 is available on record. Commissioner’s plan and report had been marked as Exs.C-2 and C-3; Ex.C-4 is the additional commissioner’s report Ex.X-1 is the application form for ration card. Apart from Exs.A-5, A-6 and A-7 the notice and reply notice also had been marked. Ex.A-1 is the registered power of attorney executed by B. Pedda Subbarayudu P.W.7 in favour of D.C. Subbarayudu, P.W.1. Ex.A-2 is the plaint plan, Ex.A-3 is the registered sale deed and Ex.A-4 is the partition deed. Strong reliance was placed on Ex.A-5, the agreement between the parties dated 7.7.1982. Apart from the evidence of D.Ws.1 to 4, Ex.B-1 the registration copy of the sale deed dated 4.9.1939, Ex.B-2 the certified copy of the death extract, Ex.B-3 the voters list and Ex.B-4 the relevant entry, Exs.B-5 and B-6 the relevant serial numbers in Ex.B-3, Ex.B-7 the voters list; Ex.B-8 serial No.11 in Ex.B-7; Ex.B-9 serial No.44; Ex.B-10 serial No.739 in the said Ex.B-7. 15. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter in short referred to as ‘the Act’ for the purpose of convenience) dealing with arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application reads as hereunder. “Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application:- Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determine shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits; Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.” Section 17 of the Act dealing with judgment in terms of award reads as hereunder. “Judgment in terms of award:- Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for consideration or set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground as it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. (“Provided that where an award pending in the court at the commencement of the Arbitration (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990 or an award filed in the court, thereafter does not contain reasons therefore as required by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 the court shall not proceed to pronounce the judgment according to the award, but shall remit the award to the arbitrators or the umpire for giving reasons therefore as required by the said proviso and thereupon the arbitrators or umpire shall, within thirty days from the date of remittance of the award to them by the court give reasons for the award and file the same in the court: Provided further that on the application of the arbitrators or the umpire and for reasons to be recorded in writing, it shall be competent for the court, to extend the period of thirty days aforesaid for a further period not exceeding fifteen days: Provided also that where an award pending in the court as aforesaid does not contain any reasons and there is no possibility to remit the award to the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators or umpire due to their incapacity, negligence, refusal to act or death, the court shall set aside the award and direct the parties to initiate fresh arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Section 2 of the Act deals with definitions and Section 2 (a) specifies that in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context; “Arbitration agreement” means a written agreement to submit present or future difference to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not; Section 8 of the Act deals with power of court to appoint arbitrator or umpire. Several other provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and also the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, also had been pointed out. These elaborate submissions made by the counsel need not detain by this Court any longer since it is not in serious controversy. 16. There was some agreement entered into between the parties. But, however, the agreement was not taken to its logical end. Whether on the strength of such agreement the relief prayed for by the appellant-plaintiff as such can be granted, is the only question, which had been argued in elaboration. It is needless to say that the appellant-plaintiff who had approached the court may have to establish his right to get such reliefs. Unless and until Ex.A-5 had been taken to its logical end, on the strength of such document the relief of declaration prayed for and the consequential reliefs cannot be granted. This was the view expressed by the appellate court. All other factual details, which had been recorded in elaboration by the appellate court, need not be repeated again. Hence, in view of the same, the findings recorded by the appellate court that on the strength of Ex.A-5 as such the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled to the relief cannot be found fault. Except this question the counsel on record made no other submissions. 17. In the light of the findings recorded above, the second appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.