Judgment Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat: 1. The Petitioner invokes revisional jurisdiction of this Court, under Section 397, Cr.P.C. against the order dated 12.03.2007 of the Court of Special Judge (CBI), New Delhi in RC No.AC-2/2003A-0003. The court dealt with an application moved by him, while hearing arguments on charge. The CBI, in its charge sheet, alleged that she was guilty of committing offences under section 120-B read with Section 420 IPC and Section 13 (1) (d) read with section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. That the brief facts necessary to decide the controversy in these proceedings, are narrated below. The Petitioner is an officer of Indian Administrative Services, 1972 batch. She joined the office of New Delhi Municipal Council (hereinafter referred to as the “NDMC”) as its Chairperson. Her rank was Additional Secretary, which is above the rank of Joint Secretary. She functioned as Chairman, NDMC from 01.11.2002 to 30.03.2003. On 09.07.2003, a first information report (FIR) being RC No. AC-2/2003A-0003 was registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under Section 120-B read with section 420 Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 13 (1) (d) read with section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner was named at Serial No.1 in the list of the accused, along with other officials of NDMC. 3. The allegations against the petitioner in the said FIR were that while she was posted as Chairperson, NDMC, she along with other persons entered into a conspiracy whereby. She and other public servants, by abusing their official position had sought to cause favour to Shri K.L. Bhatia and Smt. Prem Lata Bhatia (co-accused) by allowing their claim for regularizing unauthorized structures and also by issuing a lodging house license to them. While the investigation was in its preliminary stages, Parliament, by Act No. 45 of 2003 i.e the Central Vigilance Commission Act, of 2003 (hereafter “CVC Act”) made amendments inter alia to Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereafter “1946 Act”) by introducing provisions including Section 6A. While the investigation was in its preliminary stages, Parliament, by Act No. 45 of 2003 i.e the Central Vigilance Commission Act, of 2003 (hereafter “CVC Act”) made amendments inter alia to Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereafter “1946 Act”) by introducing provisions including Section 6A. The said provision reads as follows: “Section 6A : Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation: .(1) the Delhi Special Police Establishment shall not conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) except with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegation relates to - .(a) the employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above; and .(b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under Central Act, Government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government. .(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no such approval shall be necessary for arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any gratification other that legal remuneration referred to in clause © of the Explanation to section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988)”. 4. Section 6A of the 1946 Act was inserted in 2003 and came into force on 11.09.2003. Prior to bringing into force this provision, the Central Government had issued an administrative direction, (referred to as “the Single Directive”). The same was in the following terms: “4.7 (3) (i) in regard to any person who is or has been a decision making level officer (joint Secretary or equivalent or above in the Central Government or such Officers as are or have been on deputation to a public sector undertaking officers of the reserve Bank of India of the level equivalent to joint Secretary or above in the central Government, Executive Directors and above of the SEBI and Chairman & Manaigng Director and Executive Directors and such of the Bank officers who are one level below the Boiard of Nationalised Banks), there should be prior sanction of the Secretary of the Ministry/Department concerned before SPE takes up any enquiry (PE or RC), including ordering search inh respect of them. Without such sanction, no enquiry shall be initiated by the SPE. Without such sanction, no enquiry shall be initiated by the SPE. (ii) All cases referred to the administrative Ministries/Departments by CBI for obtaining necessary prior sanction as aforesaid, except those pertaining to any officer of the rank of Secretary or Principal Secretary, should be disposed of by them preferably within a period of two months of the receipt of such a reference. In respect of the officers of the rank of Secretary or Principal Secretary to Government, such references should be made by the Director, CBI to the Cabinet Secretary for consideration of a Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary as its Chairman and the Law Secretary and the Secretary (Personnel) as its members. The Committee should dispose of all such reference preferably within two months from the date of receipt of such a reference by the Cabinet Secretary. (iii) When there is any difference of opinion between the Director, CBI and the Secretary of the Administrative Ministry/Department in respect of an officer up to the rank of Additional Secretary or equibalent, the matter shall be referred by CBI to Secretary (Personnel) for placement before the Committee referred to in Clause (ii) above. Such a matter should be considered and disposed of by the Committee preferably within two months from the date of receipt of such a reference by Secretary (Personnel). (iv) In regard to any person who is or has been Cabinet Secretary, before SPE takes any step of the kind mentioned in (i) above the case should be submitted to the Prime Minister for orders.” 5. The Single Directive was considered by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain – vs-Union of India 1998(1) SCC 226 . The Court set aside the single directive, in para 58 of the decision. In a later decision, in Union of India Vs. Prakash P. Hinduja 2003 (6) SCC 195 the Supreme Court held that the directions in Vineet Narayans case were not meant to create or confer additional rights to an accused. Investigation in the Petitioners case continued from 09.07.2003 till 30.06.2006, when Charge-sheet No.3 was prepared and filed before the Special Judge, New Delhi. 6. The case was listed for arguments on charge on 25.01.2007, before the Special Judge. The prosecution concluded its arguments; the matter was placed for arguments on behalf of the accused persons on 26.02.2007. Investigation in the Petitioners case continued from 09.07.2003 till 30.06.2006, when Charge-sheet No.3 was prepared and filed before the Special Judge, New Delhi. 6. The case was listed for arguments on charge on 25.01.2007, before the Special Judge. The prosecution concluded its arguments; the matter was placed for arguments on behalf of the accused persons on 26.02.2007. On the latter date, i.e 26.02.2007, during the course of arguments by the counsel for the Petitioner it was contended that Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 was applicable and the mandatory approval from the Central Government had not been obtained. Hence, the petitioner was entitled to be discharged. In order to support this contention, an application was also moved on which the CBI was directed to file a reply. The case was kept for consideration on 12.03.2007. 7. On 12.03.2007, the Special Judge, New Delhi after considering Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 dismissed the Petitioner’s application as meritless. The relevant findings on this score are as follows: “It is thus clear that it is the date of the initiation of the inquiry which is the relevant date which in this case was 09.07.2003 i.e. The date of the registration of the FIR on which date provisions of Section 6 A DSPE Act were not in existence. The arguments of Ld. Defence counsel that these provisions have retrospective operation, in my view, is a misconceived argument, it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statue is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. AIR 1951 SC 128 is relied upon. The rule in general is applicable where the object of the stature is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impari existing obligations. Unless there are words in the stature sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, “it is deemed to be prospective only nova constituio futuris formam impnere debet non praeteritis. Unless there are words in the stature sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, “it is deemed to be prospective only nova constituio futuris formam impnere debet non praeteritis. In the words of Lord Branesburg “provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.” In my view, the insertion of Section 6 A of the DSPE Act having regard to the language of the Section and the object discernible thereto could not have a retrospective operation; it has created a vested right in the favour of the accused and categorically states that the Delhi Special Police Establishment is not empowered to conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 except6 with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegations relates to the employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above. In my view, in view of the language used, object indicated, nature of the rights affected and the circumstances under which this provision has been inserted, the intention of the legislature could not have been that this provision would have a retrospective operation. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that in this case FIR having been registered on 09.07.2003 when Section 6A of the DSPE ct was not in existence, the inquiry or investigation conducted against the present applicant did not require the prior approval of the competent authority as the provisions of Section 6 of DSPE Act was not in existence at that point of time. Application is devoid of any merit. The same is dismissed.” 8. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel urged that a consideration of the materials filed along with police report under Section 173 (2) Cr. P.C. including the list of documents and the statements of witnesses, showed that most of the investigation had been carried out after 11.09.2003 including sanctions applied for and sought under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 197 of the Cr. P.C. were granted after 11th September, 2003. Counsel submitted that according to the records available to the Ld. P.C. were granted after 11th September, 2003. Counsel submitted that according to the records available to the Ld. Special Judge, New Delhi, at no point of time was any attempt made to seek approval of the Central Government under Section 6A of the 1946 Act, till filing of the Charge-sheet or even thereafter for conducting investigation against the petitioner. These constituted fatal infirmities in the process, and the court could not have taken cognizance and acted upon the charge sheet filed before it. .9. Counsel referred to the definition of “investigation” defined in Section 2(h) of the Cr. P.C. to include all the proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence, by, inter alia, a police officer. Investigation is therefore a continuing process, which is initiated when Section 154 Cr. P.C is invoked with the registration of an FIR and culminates in the filing of a police report under section 173 (2) (i) of the Cr5. P.C. Section 173 (2) (i) of the Cr. P.C. states that : ....." As soon as [the investigation] is completed, the officer in charge of a police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government..." .It was therefore argued that investigation by its nature is not a single action or act but a series of actions by the investigating officer in the gathering of information. In the present case, according to the police report, a substantial portion of the investigation was conducted after the coming into force of Section 6A of the DSPE Act on 11.09.2003. Therefore, it was obligatory for the authorities to have obtained approval of the CVC under that provision. .10. During the course of proceeding, the court pointed out that Section 27 of the CVC Act sought to save action taken before the coming into force of the Act. Counsel were asked to address the court on the impact of that provision on pending investigations and proceedings. Section 27 reads as follows: "27 Repeal and saving (1) The Government of India in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III dated the 4th April, 1999 as amended vide Resolution of even number, dated the 13th August, 2002 is hereby repealed. .(2). Section 27 reads as follows: "27 Repeal and saving (1) The Government of India in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III dated the 4th April, 1999 as amended vide Resolution of even number, dated the 13th August, 2002 is hereby repealed. .(2). Notwithstanding such repeal and the cesser of operation of the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1999 (Ord. 4 of 1999) anything done or any action taken under the said Resolution and the said Ordinance including the appointments made and other actions taken or anything done or any action take or any appointment made under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) as amended by the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been made or done or taken under this Act or the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 as if the amendments made in those Acts by this Act were in force at all material times". 11. It was urged that a savings clause using the phrase anything done should protect the act done and the legal consequences flowing therefore, as held in Hasan Nurani Malak Vs. S.M. Ismail, Asst. Charity Commissioner, reported as AIR 1967 SC 1742 , where the Supreme Court held that the object of a saving clause using the phrase anything duly done is to save what has been previously done under the statute repealed. The result of such a saving clause is that the pre -existing law continues to govern the thing done before a particular date from which the repeal of such pre-existing law takes effect. The term "things done" [is] comprehensive enough to take in not only the things done but also the effect of the legal consequences flowing there-from. It was further contended that what stands protected is a right acquired or accrued and not the mere hope or expectation of a right: Director of Public Works & Anr. Vs. Ho Po Sang & Ors. 1961 (2) All ER 721, M.S. Shivananda Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 149 were relied upon. The Act of recording of information under section 154 of the Cr. P.C. and the consequences thereof could be said to be the investigation, which ensues after the FIR is registered. Vs. Ho Po Sang & Ors. 1961 (2) All ER 721, M.S. Shivananda Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 149 were relied upon. The Act of recording of information under section 154 of the Cr. P.C. and the consequences thereof could be said to be the investigation, which ensues after the FIR is registered. However the word conduct means to carry out or continue an act. 12. Mr Luthra submitted that use of the term conduct in Section 6A, as distinct from the phrases "initiate any inquiry/investigation" or "register any FIR”. All pending investigations were be subject to the requirement of section 6A of the DSPE Act as brought into force on 11.09.2003. Thus even if a right to investigate the alleged offences had accrued to the investigating agency, after registering the FIR prior to 11.09.2003 and when Section 6A of the DSPE Act came into force, the same would not continue beyond the introduction of Section 6A of the DSPE Act in the absence of the CBI securing mandatory permission from the Central Government to continue to investigate the matter. 13. Learned counsel submitted that the legislative intent behind Section 6A of the 1946 Act is to protect honest public servants from undue persecution and harassment from mala fide and unwarranted investigations, as decisions made by a senior officer can only be evaluated by another senior decision making authority. The Policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause. The decision in S.K. Zutshi Vs. Bimal Debnath, (2004) 8 SCC 31 was cited in support. It was urged that Section 6A has to be viewed not merely as a procedural safeguard, but as enacting a substantive right. 14. Mr. Luthra submitted that although the general rule is that a statute should be construed to be prospective, that does not apply if there is a clear intention that new provisions are to be applied to past events. In particular, curative and disqualifying provisions such as Section 6A of the 1946 Act are to be interpreted retrospectively to extend the protection so provided. He cited Vijay Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr, (2006) 6 SCC 289 in support. In particular, curative and disqualifying provisions such as Section 6A of the 1946 Act are to be interpreted retrospectively to extend the protection so provided. He cited Vijay Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr, (2006) 6 SCC 289 in support. Counsel submitted that even an exemption statute must be construed having regard to the object and purport which the same seeks to achieve; reliance was placed on Government of India Vs. Indian Tobacco Association, (2005) 7 SCC 396 . 15. Counsel contended that even if Section 6A of the 1946 Act is considered to be only a procedural right, and hence applied prospectively, the use of the word conduct in section 6A of the 1946 Act implies that it applied to all ongoing investigations conducted after 11.09.2003, even if they were initiated prior to the coming into force of the CVC Act, so long as they continued after the introduction of Section 6A. Thus assuming that Section 6A is not retrospective, it would be retroactive in light of the use of the phrase conduct any inquiry or investigation" and hence would apply to all existing and pending investigations. He relied on the decision in R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead, by LRs) & Ors. Vs. Padmini Chandrashekharan (Dead, by LRs. (1995) 2 SCC 630 . In the present case investigation was still at the initial stage and the police report under Section 173 Cr. P.C. was filed much later after 11.09.2003. .16. Mr. R. M. Tewari, learned counsel for CBI, contended that there was no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order, rejecting the application of the petitioner. Counsel contended that while Vineet Narains case, resulted in setting aside the single directive, it was followed in the CVC Ordinance (No.15 of 1998). That ordinance contained a provision similar to Section 6-A. However, there was no such provision in the later Ordinances of 1999 nor in Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III. Thus at the time of registration of FIR, RC No.AC2 2003A/ 0003 no requirement similar to Section 6A of the 1946 Act (as introduced on 11.09.2003) had to be complied with. Therefore, on a composite and harmonious construction of Section 6-A and Section 27 of the CVC Act, there was no bar or impediment in continuing with investigation and later filing the charge sheet. 17. In this case, undisputedly the FIR was lodged before enactment of the CVC Act. Therefore, on a composite and harmonious construction of Section 6-A and Section 27 of the CVC Act, there was no bar or impediment in continuing with investigation and later filing the charge sheet. 17. In this case, undisputedly the FIR was lodged before enactment of the CVC Act. Investigation commenced subsequently, in July 2003. The charge sheet was filed before the trial court on 30.6.2006. Again, undisputedly no approval was secured under Section 6A of the 1946 Act. The question is whether the omission to do so, constituted a fatal infirmity, disempowering the court from proceeding further in the matter. .18. Before discussing the effect of Section 6-A upon the FIR in question, and succeeding proceedings, it would be useful to notice some decisions of the Supreme Court, on the issue. In Nani Gopal Mitra –vs-State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 1636 , the court had to deal with the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act No. 40 of 1964) which repealed sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The previous provision had enacted a presumption against an accused, in given circumstances. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that Section 5(3) of the Act was repealed by Parliament while the appeal was pending in the High Court and the presumption enacted in s. 5(3) of the Act was not available to the prosecuting authorities after the repeal of the sub-section on December 18, 1964. The argument was that the High Court could not invoke the presumption contained in s. 5(3) of the Act, while considering the case against the appellant. The court repelled the contention, in the following terms: “We are unable to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant as correct. It is true that as a general rule alterations in the, form of procedure are retrospective in character unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. In James Gardner v. Edward A. Lucas ((1878) III App. Cass. 582 at p. 603), Lord Blackburn stated : "Now the general rule, not merely of England and Scotland, but, I believe, of every civilized nation, is expressed in the maxim, Noya constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non prateritis -prima facie, any new law that is made affects future transactions, not past ones. Cass. 582 at p. 603), Lord Blackburn stated : "Now the general rule, not merely of England and Scotland, but, I believe, of every civilized nation, is expressed in the maxim, Noya constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non prateritis -prima facie, any new law that is made affects future transactions, not past ones. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the subject-matter of an Act might be such that, though there were not any express words to shew it, might be retrospective. For instance, I think it is perfectly settled that if the Legislature intended to frame a new procedure, that instead of proceeding in this form or that, you should proceed in another and a different way; clearly there bygone transactions are to be sued for and enforced according to the new form of procedure. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. Then, again, I think that where alterations are made in matters of evidence, certainly upon the reason of the thing, and I think upon the authorities also, those are retrospective, whether civil or criminal." In the King v. Chandra Dharma ((1905) 2 K.B. 335), Lord Alverstone C.J. observed as follows : "The rule is clearly established that, apart from any special circumstances appearing on the face of the statute in question, statutes which make alterations in procedure are retrospective. It has been held that a statute shortening the time within which proceedings can be taken is retrospective (The Ydun, 1899 p. 236.), and it seems to me that it is impossible to give any good reason why a statute extending the time within which proceedings may be taken should not also be held to be retrospective. If the case could have been brought within the principle that unless the language is clear a statute ought not to be construed so as to create new disabilities or obligations, or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time when the Act came into force, Mr. Compton Smith would have been entitled to succeed; but when no new disability or obligation has been created by the statute, but it only alters the time within which proceedings may be taken, it may be held to apply to offenses completed before the statute was passed. Compton Smith would have been entitled to succeed; but when no new disability or obligation has been created by the statute, but it only alters the time within which proceedings may be taken, it may be held to apply to offenses completed before the statute was passed. That is the case here." It is therefore clear that as a general rule the amended law relating to procedure operates retrospectively. But there is another equally important principle, viz. that a statute should not be, so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force -(See In re a Debtor ((1936) 1 ch. 237) and In re Vernazza ((1960) A.C. 965). The same principle is embodied in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act.” 19. The next decision is of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Jayanthilal Amrathlal –vs-Union of India AIR 1971 SC 1193 , where the effect of Section 116 (1) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, which repealed and replaced an Ordinance, and enacted a saving clause, was considered. It was held that: “In order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put an end to by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities. The absence of saving clause in a new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the question -see State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh ( (1955) 1 SCR 893 : AIR 1955 SC 84 : 1955 SCJ 25) and T. S. Baliah v. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Madras. ( (1969) 3 SCR 65 : 72 ITR 787 : AIR 1969 SC 701 : (1969) 1 SCJ 890).” 20. The above decision was followed recently in S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd –vs-Union of India 2006 (2) SCC 760. It was held that: “It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The above decision was followed recently in S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd –vs-Union of India 2006 (2) SCC 760. It was held that: “It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. (Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay ( 1951 SCR 228 : AIR 1951 SC 128 : 1951 Cri LJ 860)). But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. In the words of Lord Blanesburgh : "provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment" (Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT (AIR 1927 PC 242 : 54 IA 421), AIR p. 244).” 21. In M. S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., 1980(1) SCC 149 the Supreme Court had revisited the issue, and held as under : "In considering the effect of an expiration of a temporary Act, it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. It certainly requires very clear and unmistakable language in a subsequent Act of the legislature to revive or re-create an expired right. If, however, the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was created has expired. In order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed Ordinance have been put to an end by the Act, the line of enquiry would be not whether, in the words of Mukherjea, J. in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, 1955(1) SCR 893 , the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities under the repealed Ordinance but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Another line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation. Another line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation. It is settled both on principle and authority, that the mere right existing under the repealed Ordinance, to take advantage of the provisions of the repealed Ordinance, is not a right accrued. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act was not intended to preserve abstract rights conferred by the repealed Ordinance. The legislature had the competence to so restructure the Ordinance as to meet the exigencies of the situation obtaining after the taking over of the contract carriage services. It could re-enact the Ordinance according to its original terms, or amend or alter its revisions." 22. In the judgment reported as State of Punjab –vs-Harnek Singh 2002 (3) SCC 481 , the court dealt with repeal of Section 5-A of the erstwhile Prevention of Corruption Act. A contention similar to the one raised by the petitioner here was rejected. While doing so, it also relied upon another previous decision: “In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Subodh Kumar Dutta (1997 AIR SCW 746 : AIR 1997 SC 869 : 1997 Cri LJ 1173 : (1997) 10 SCC 567 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 876) the cognizance of the offence had been taken by the Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Special Courts Act. After cognizance had been taken, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 came to be repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 w.e.f. 9-9-1988. The accused filed a criminal revision petition in the High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings in the case pending against him before the Special Court in which the principal ground raised was the violation of fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial. During the arguments the accused was permitted to raise a plea that the Special Court, trying the bribery case, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as that court had not been constituted pursuant to Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which had repealed the 1947 Act. Taking note of Section 26 of the 1988 Act, the Single Judge of the High Court opined that the cognizance taken by the Special Court on 9-7-1988 under the 1947 Act was not saved and thus quashed the proceedings. Taking note of Section 26 of the 1988 Act, the Single Judge of the High Court opined that the cognizance taken by the Special Court on 9-7-1988 under the 1947 Act was not saved and thus quashed the proceedings. Interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act, this Court held that a bare look at the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 30 shows that anything done or any action taken or purported to have been taken under or in pursuance of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 shall be deemed to have been taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In view of this specific provision, the cognizance of the offence taken by the Special Court stood saved.” 23. In the Chapter "Saving of rights acquired", in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G. P. Singh, the author has stated that the effect of clauses (c) to (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is, among others, to prevent the obliteration of a statute in spite of its repeal to keep intact rights acquired or accrued and liabilities incurred during its operation and permit continuance or institution of any legal proceedings or recourse to any remedy which may have been available before the repeal for enforcement of such rights and liabilities. The author has also stated that the privilege to get an extension of a license under an enactment is not an accrued right and no application can be filed after the repeal of the enactment for renewal of the licence. Similarly, in Legislation and Interpretation, (by Jagdish Swarup) the author states that the power to take advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed as a right, but the question is whether it is a "right accrued". A mere right (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in the members of the community or any of them to take advantage of an amendment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed a "right accrued". 24. In the present case, the single directive, set aside by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain’s case, was sought to be reinstated in an Ordinance brought into force on 25-8-1998, through clause 8 (d). That ordinance lapsed and was replaced by a second CVC Ordinance, with effect from 27-10-1998. 24. In the present case, the single directive, set aside by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain’s case, was sought to be reinstated in an Ordinance brought into force on 25-8-1998, through clause 8 (d). That ordinance lapsed and was replaced by a second CVC Ordinance, with effect from 27-10-1998. This omitted the provision requiring previous clearance, in terms of the clause 8 of the lapsed ordinance. The second Ordinance lapsed and was replaced by Ordinance 4 of 1999; that too was in identical terms with the second CVC Ordinance – it did not require mandatory previous approval. This requirement of previous approval was set out in a resolution, i.e the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III dated the 4th April, 1999. That resolution was amended by Resolution dated the 13th August, 2002. 25. The net effect of the discussion in the preceding paragraph is that after the setting aside, through judicial declaration in Vineet Narain’s case, the “single directive” an attempt to reinstate it, as a legal requirement was made briefly, through the first ordinance in 1998. That ordinance lapsed, and was succeeded by two later Ordinances, the last one being No. 4 of 1999. Neither, significantly, contained any provision similar to Section 6A. Thus, there was no pre-existing impediment to investigation into offences against the class of persons, mentioned in Section 6-A. Nor was there a corresponding legal right, since the legality of an administrative fiat of that kind had been authoritatively negated, in Vineet Narain. In this context, what survived then, prior to enactment of Section 6-A with effect from 11-9-2003, were contents of resolutions made in 1999 and 2002. 26. There is nothing in Section 6-A to facially suggest that it applied to pending investigations. While on the context, one may visualize three situations, when the CVC Act was brought into force; they are: .(i) Lodging of FIR, conclusion of investigations and filing of charge sheet, all completed as on the said date, i.e 11-9-2003; .(ii) Lodging of FIR and commencement of investigation, without filing of charge sheet, as on the relevant date; (iii) Neither FIR nor any other step being taken. The terms of Section 6-A suggest that it applies in the last situation, outlined in (iii) above. Significantly, this provision did not replace or re-enact a previous, similar condition. The terms of Section 6-A suggest that it applies in the last situation, outlined in (iii) above. Significantly, this provision did not replace or re-enact a previous, similar condition. It was introduced for the first time through the Act. Briefly, of course, it was enacted in the first Ordinance of 1998. Yet, it was omitted in the succeeding two Ordinances. Moreover, Section 27 (2), of the CVC Act, only adverts to the contents of Ordinance 4 of 1999, which did not oblige previous approval in terms of Section 6A or any similar statutory condition. Therefore, it was lawful for CBI to conduct investigation (defined widely, under Section 2(h) of the Criminal Procedure Code) without such an approval. 27. There is another way of looking at the question. If legislative intention were to subject pending investigative processes and interdict them to the rigors of Section 6A, it would have been manifested in clearer terms. The construction suggested by the petitioner not only runs counter to this intention, discernable textually, but imports retrospective effect to a new liability in respect of a procedure, which was lawful, when done, without following it. As far as the interpretation suggested to Section 27(2) of the CVC Act is concerned, I find it difficult to subscribe to the argument of the petitioner. That is, plain and simple a savings clause, and has to be construed in its terms; it cannot be interpreted to discover an involved retrospectivity to a new provision, casting liabilities or duties, at a time when such liability or duty did not exist, merely to invalidate action that was legal when performed. Parliament would, if it had intended such result, not spoken so inelegantly, through a savings clause. Legislative action-the CVC Act and its savings clause being no exception-are usually aimed at creating rights and liabilities, which operate from the time of their enforcement, and in future, and are not meant to invalidate past legal transactions. This is of course subject to explicit intention to the contrary. 28. Before parting, it is necessary to deal with a decision of this court, rendered in the context of Section 6-A. In Dr. R.R. Kishore –vs-CBI (Crl Rev Petition No. 366/2006, decided on 5-10-2006) the application of Section 6-A of the 1946 Act was considered. The court examined Vineet Narain’s case as well as impact of the CVC Act. 28. Before parting, it is necessary to deal with a decision of this court, rendered in the context of Section 6-A. In Dr. R.R. Kishore –vs-CBI (Crl Rev Petition No. 366/2006, decided on 5-10-2006) the application of Section 6-A of the 1946 Act was considered. The court examined Vineet Narain’s case as well as impact of the CVC Act. However, the court there was concerned with a case arising out of a first information report dated 16-12-2004 and investigation carried out without approval under Section 6-A. The decision is therefore, not apposite. Moreover, the impact of Section 27 of the CVC Act was not considered in that decision. 29. For the above reasons, I find no infirmity or illegality in the reasoning of the learned special judge, in the impugned order. This petition therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order on costs.