S. U. KHAN, J. At the time of hearing no one appeared on behalf of respondents hence, only the arguments of learned Counsel for the appellants were heard. 2. This is a Second Appeal under Section 100 C. P. C. In the memo of appeal substantial questions of law were not stated as required by Section 100, C. P. C. Appeal was admitted on 24-9-1980 by the following order : "admit. Issue notice on substantial questions of law as stated in ground Nos. 1 and 2. " Ground Nos. 1 and 2 are quoted below : (1) Because the Courts below have not recorded a finding as to when the contract of tenancy had taken place in between the appellant and respondent No. 1, it acted illegally restraining the appellant from executing the decree for possession which he obtained in Suit No. 125 of 1971. (2) Because there being no allotment order in favour of respondent No. 1 and as such his occupation is unauthorised under Section 13 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and is liable for ejectmnet and the contrary view of the Courts below is patently erroneous in law. 3. Thereafter, on separate sheet of paper learned Counsel for the appellant stated the following four substantial questions of law : Substantial Question of Law (1) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in decreeing the suit by shifting the onus on the appellant in place of Jungeet Singh respondent on whom the onus was to prove his case? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court could have decreed the suit irrespective of fact brought on record that the proceedings for eviction and possession of the shop under Order XXI, Rule 97 was pending and the suit was barred by Section 47 of C. P. C. ? (3) Whether the suit of permanent injunction was maintainable on the basis of illegal possession specially in absence of any allotment order from the District Magistrate under U. P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 then in force or Section 16 of the Act No. 13 of 1972? (4) Whether the suit could have been decreed on the basis of unauthorised occupation in shop on the alleged contract, not enforceable, being void under Section 23 of the Contract Act? 4. (4) Whether the suit could have been decreed on the basis of unauthorised occupation in shop on the alleged contract, not enforceable, being void under Section 23 of the Contract Act? 4. The facts of the case are that original defendant appellant Raghunath Prasad filed suit for eviction against original respondent No. 2 Sri Deen Dayal Parmar since deceased and survived by legal representatives being Suit No. 125 of 1971. The suit was decreed on the basis of compromise on 25-8- 1971. Thereafter, plaintiff of the said suit, i. e. , appellant filed execution application also impleading therein Sri Jangjeet Singh respondent No. 1 in this appeal. 5. Thereafter, Jangjeet Singh filed O. S No. 319 of 1971 against owner landlord Raghunath Prasad and Deen Dayal Parmar giving rise to the instant second appeal. In the plaint of the suit giving rise to the instant second appeal it was stated that initially Deen Dayal was the tenant of the shop in dispute who vacated the same and thereafter Raghunath Prasad gave possession of the shop in dispute to Jangjeet Singh as tenant however, Raghunath Prasad owner landlord told him (Jangjeet Singh) that under law it was necessary to get the shop allotted in favour of Jangjeet Singh which could be quite troublesome hence, rent receipts were continued to be issued in the name of Deen Dayal. It was further stated that Jangjeet agreed to that arrangement willingly and thereafter Jangjeet continued to pay the rent to the owner landlord, however, he came to know that Raghunath Prasad had colluded with Deen Dayal and filed Suit No. 125 of 1971 against Deen Dayal and got the same decreed through compromise on 25-8- 1971. The main grievance of the plaintiff Jangjeet Singh was that he could not be evicted in execution of the decree passed in Suit No. 125 of 1971. The actual relief claimed in the suit was for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining Raghunath Prasad from forcibly evicting the plaintiff Jangjeet. 6. The trial Court/iiird Additional Munsif, Mathura held that the relationship of tenant and landlord in between plaintiff Jangjeet and defendant Raghunath Prasad was not proved. The trial Court specifically held that the rent receipts which were filed were for the period from 1962 to 1965 and after 1965 no receipt had been filed. 6. The trial Court/iiird Additional Munsif, Mathura held that the relationship of tenant and landlord in between plaintiff Jangjeet and defendant Raghunath Prasad was not proved. The trial Court specifically held that the rent receipts which were filed were for the period from 1962 to 1965 and after 1965 no receipt had been filed. In the receipts, it was shown that Deen Dayal was the tenant and the rent was paid through Jangjeet Singh. The suit was ultimately dismissed on 10-3-1977. Against the said judgment and decree plaintiff Jangjeet Singh filed Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1977. Civil Judge, Mathura through judgment and decree dated 25-4-1980, allowed the appeal, set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff appellant for permanent injunction restraining the defendant respondent from forcibly ejecting the plaintiff appellant from shop No. 1/290 otherwise than in due course of law. The said judgment of the appellate Court has been challenged through this second appeal. 7. Trial Court had further held that Raghunath Prasad had filed application under Order XXI, Rule 97, C. P. C. in respect of execution of his decree which he obtained in Suit No. 125 of 1971 and the plaintiff (Jangjeet) instead of filing objections in the said application and contesting the said proceedings had filed suit in question which was not permissible. 8. I propose to decide the second appeal on substantial question of law at serial No. 2 and 4 (supra) contained in the separate sheet of paper which was supplied by the learned Counsel for the appellant after filing of the appeal. The date of filing of the said sheet is not clear. The said questions are again quoted below : (2) Whether the lower appellate Court should have decreed the suit irrespective of the fact brought on record that the proceedings for eviction and possession of the shop under Order XXI Rule 97 was pending and suit was barred by Section 47 of C. P. C. ? (4) Whether the suit could have been decreed on the basis of unauthorised occupation of shop on the alleged contract, not enforcible, being void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. 9. (4) Whether the suit could have been decreed on the basis of unauthorised occupation of shop on the alleged contract, not enforcible, being void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. 9. Supreme Court in AIR 2002 SC 3083 , Tanzeem-E-Sufia v. Bibi Halima, in paragraph No. 14 has held as follows : "we find that in the case in hand the appellant is claiming its independent right over the property and asserts possession thereof. Order XXI, Rule 101 clearly provides that all questions relating to right, title or interest in property relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be dealt with the application and not by a separate suit. The High Court, therefore, erred in refusing to hear the appellant, on the ground that it has already filed a suit for declaration of its title and for declaration that the decree passed in title suit No. 8 of 1983 is not binding on it. The provision contained under Order XXI, Rule 101, C. P. C. seems to have escaped notice of the High Court while passing the order. We would also like to observe that reasoning given by the execution Court while rejecting the application of the appellant as indicated in the order of the High Court, that the remedy of the appellant would only lie by moving an application under Order XXI, Rule 99, C. P. C. is also erroneous as in case of Brahamdeo Chaudhary (supra), it has been held that it should not be insisted that possession be delivered first and the objector may later on move that Court under Order XXI, Rule 99 C. P. C. . " 10. Order XXI, Rule 101 C. P. C is quoted below : "101. Question to be determined.- All questions (including questions relating to title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application, and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. " 11. In view of the aforesaid provision and authority of Supreme Court suit was not maintainable. 12. " 11. In view of the aforesaid provision and authority of Supreme Court suit was not maintainable. 12. In Biswantah Poddar v. Archana Poddar & Anr. , AIR 2001 SC 2849 , it has been held that if sub- tenancy is created without previous consent of the landlord then impleadment of sub tenant in the suit for eviction against main tenant is not necessary and the decree for eviction passed against chief tenant is executable and sub tenant cannot raise the objection that decree in between landlord and chief tenant was obtained by fraud or collusion. 13. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust & Anr. , 1998 (1) JCLR 886 (SC) : AIR 1998 SC 1754 , it has been held that "a third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. 14. In Ashan Devi & Anr. v. Phulwasi Devi & Ors. , 2003 AIR SCW 6458, it has been held that in execution of decree of specific performance of contract and for delivery of possession third party claiming to be in possession of vacant land under registered sale deed can file objections under Order XXI, Rule 91 C. P. C. 15. In Shreenath & Anr. v. Rajesh & Ors. , 1998 AIR SCW 1619, it has been held that both under old law as well as the present law the right of a tenant or any person claiming right on his own in the property, in case he resists the execution and application under Order XXI, Rule 97, is filed then such right of third party shall be decided by the Executing Court itself. 16. In AIR 2001 SC 2552 , Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University & Ors. , it has been held that when any person claiming independent right obstructs the attempt by the decree holder to dispossess him form the suit property the executing Court is competent to consider all the questions raised by the said person against execution of decree and pass appropriate orders. 17. Accordingly I hold that suit was not maintainable in view of Section 47, Order XXI, Rule 97 and 101, C. P. C. 18. 17. Accordingly I hold that suit was not maintainable in view of Section 47, Order XXI, Rule 97 and 101, C. P. C. 18. As far as second substantial question of law is concerned in this regard it is important to note that the plaintiff himself pleated that in order to avoid the restriction on letting created by U. P. Rent Control Act he and the original owner entered into compromise to the effect that rent receipts would be issued in favour of Deen Dayal who according to the plaintiff was previous tenant and had vacated the shop. No one can be permitted to assert and take advantage of an illegal agreement. Such agreements by virtue of Section 23 of Contract Act are not enforceable. The plaintiff boldly asserted that he entered into an arrangement with the defendant against the provisions of U. P. Rent Control Act and in order to avoid the application of the said provisions and he wants to take benefit of this arrangement. This virtually amounted to premium on illegality. 19. Normally illegality of an agreement or contract is set up by the defendant. Here plaintiff himself was bold enough to assert illegal agreement and claimed benefit of the same. Such relief cannot be granted by the Court of law. 20. Accordingly I hold that the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court is patently erroneous in law and is liable to be set-aside. 21. In view of my above findings there is no need to pass any order on the application filed by appellant under Order XLI, Rule 27 C. P. C. 22. Accordingly, Second Appeal is allowed. Judgment and order passed by the appellate Court is set- aside. Judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff is restored. Second appeal allowed. .