JUDGMENT PRADIP MOHANTY, J. — The petitioner was appointed as a sub-staff in Basta Branch of the Bank of India in the year 1973. FIR was lodged against him by the Branch Manager, Balasore Branch and he was placed under suspension. Ultimately, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner under Sections 468/490/420 IPC in G.R. Case No.1049 of 1982 and he faced trial before the learned JMFC, Balasore. The learned Magistrate by order dated 26.08.1987, found the petitioner guilty of the offence under Section 468 IPC and sentenced him to undergo R.I. or three years. After passing of the order of conviction, the petitioner was dismissed from service. Against the order of his conviction, the petitioner filed an appeal. By order dated 14.03.1989 passed by the Addl.Sessions Judge, Balasore, the appeal was allowed and the petitioner was acquitted of the above charge. Thereafter, on 31.07.1989 charge-sheet-cum-suspension order was served upon the petitioner placing him under suspension with effect from 12.11.1982. By the said order, the earlier order of dismissal of the petitioner from service was withdrawn and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. The disciplinary authority, by order dated 11.05.1991 imposed punishment of dismissal from service upon the petitioner vide Annexure-2. Against that order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before opposite party No.3, who by his order dated 28.04.1995 vide Annexure-3 modified the order of dismissal to an order of termination from service. This writ petition has been filed against the aforesaid order passed by the appellate authority. 2. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner having been acquitted by the Addl.Sessions Judge, issuance of charge-sheet on the self-same facts, initiation of a departmental proceeding and termination of service are bad in law and not tenable in the eye of law. In this connection, he relied upon the decision in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & another, 2006 AIR SCW 2709. On the other hand, Mr. Dora, learned counsel for opposite party No.2, vehemently con¬tended that an order of removal from service emanating from a departmental proceeding can very well be passed even after ac¬quittal in a criminal case. To buttress the aforesaid contention, he relied upon the decision in South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Swapan Kumar Mitra & others, 2006 (1) Supreme 697 . 3. To buttress the aforesaid contention, he relied upon the decision in South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Swapan Kumar Mitra & others, 2006 (1) Supreme 697 . 3. Admitted case of the parties is that the FIR was lodged and charge sheet was filed against the petitioner. After his con¬viction in the criminal case, he was dismissed from service. Subsequently, after the appeal filed by the petitioner was al¬lowed, the dismissal order was withdrawn. But a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and he was placed under suspension. The departmental proceeding ended in dismissal of the petitioner from service. 4. This Court perused the pleadings of the parties as well as the documents and decisions relied upon by them. In the case of G.M. Tank (supra), the apex Court has held that where a de¬partmental proceeding and a criminal case against a person are based on identical and similar set of facts and the criminal Court has honourably acquitted the said person, findings to the contrary recorded in the departmental proceeding are unfair and oppressive. In such a case, the order of the disciplinary author¬ity is liable to be set aside. The facts of that case are identi¬cal to the facts of the instant case. Here, the petitioner has been acquitted by a judicial pronouncement. Therefore, it would be unjust and unfair to record a contrary finding in the depart¬mental proceeding on the self-same facts. It is also to be noted here that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular hearing by the appellate Court and after careful scrutiny of the evidence on record. Coming to the decision relied upon by the opposite parties, the facts of that case are totally different from those of the present case. In that case, both the criminal case and the departmental proceeding were initiated simultaneous¬ly. But in the instant case, after the appellate authority passed the order of acquittal, the departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, which was after a long lapse of seven years from the date of occurrence. There was no bar to initiate a departmental proceeding against the petitioner during pendency of the trial or after his conviction by the trial Court. But that was not done by the disciplinary authority. There was no bar to initiate a departmental proceeding against the petitioner during pendency of the trial or after his conviction by the trial Court. But that was not done by the disciplinary authority. It was only after the acquittal of the petitioner by the appellate Court that the order for initiation of the departmental proceeding was passed though it is the settled principle of law that both the criminal case and the departmental proceeding can be continued simultaneously. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Prafulla Chandra Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, Vol.74 (1992) CLT 704(SC), that initiation of proceeding after a long gap is undesirable and otherwise unfair. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the present case. 5. In view of the above, this writ petition is allowed and the orders under Annexures-2 and 3 are hereby quashed and the opposite parties are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith. The petitioner shall be deemed to be continu¬ing in service. However, he shall be paid 40% of the back wages i.e., for the period from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement with all consequential benefits. The exercise shall be completed within two months from today. There shall be no order as to costs. P. K. TRIPATHY, J. I agree. Petition allowed.