JUDGMENT By the Court.—These writ petitions filed by Sri Satya Narain Singh, petitioner are connected and since the pleadings are complete, on the request of the learned Counsel for the parties, the matter has been heard and is being decided finally at this stage under the Rules of the Court by this common judgment. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to these writ petitions are that petitioner Satya Narain Singh was working as Instructor and Motor Mechanic, who had proceeded on leave from 14th January, 1974. Initially he was sanctioned earned leave on an average pay for 31 days from January 14, 1974 to February 13, 1974 and further medical leave on full pay for 61 days from February 14, 1974 to April 15, 1974. From April 16, 1974 to August 13, 1974 the petitioner submitted a leave application alongwith medical certificate though it was not countersigned by the Chief Medical Officer. It appears that the said leave was not sanctioned and he was required to submit proper application. On and after August 14, 1974 the petitioner remained absent without their being any application for leave and consequently the appointing authority treating his absence being unauthorised and illegal, passed an order of termination on 30.12.1978. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner approached the U.P. Public Services Tribunal (hereinafter referred as Tribunal/by filing a claim petition No. 142/T/V80 of 1980 renumbered as 418/79 of 1979 which was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 8.12.1981. Thereafter he preferred a Writ Petition No. 524 of 1982 challenging the order of Tribunal as well as the order of termination. The said writ petition was allowed by this Court vide judgment dated 12.4.1989 and the following order was passed : “The petitioner has claimed the reliefs in this case. The first relief is for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the termination order dated December 30, 1978 contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition and the judgment of the Tribunal dated December 8, 1981 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition). The second relief is for the grant of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner his entire salary from January 12, 1974. So far as the first relief is concerned it can be granted outright in view of the conclusions reached above. The second relief is for the grant of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner his entire salary from January 12, 1974. So far as the first relief is concerned it can be granted outright in view of the conclusions reached above. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has fairly stated that no order can be passed with regard to the second relief at this stage in view of the fact that when the termination order is quashed, it will be open to the respondents to hold an inquiry and give an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed termination and the matter of pay, confirmation and other service conditions will be subject to the result of that inquiry. It may also be mentioned that the petitioner has not claimed any relief with regard to the matter of recovery of Rs. 4,554.79 P. and nothing has been urged regarding the same. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the termination order dated December 30, 1978 contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition and the order of the Tribunal dated December 8, 1981 contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition, are hereby quashed. It is clarified that it will be open to the respondents to hold proper inquiry after giving opportunity to the petitioner to show cause in respect of the proposed termination order and take appropriate decision regarding termination of services of the petitioner or otherwise and the matter of pay etc. will be subject to the result of that inquiry.” 3. Pursuant to the judgment dated 12.4.1989, Director, Training and Employment, U.P. passed an order dated 18.2.1990 reinstating the petitioner and posted him in Industrial Training Institute, Muzaffarnagar and also communicated him that a departmental enquiry shall be conducted against him with respect to his unauthorised absence etc. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner and ultimately after departmental enquiry a report was submitted on 21.2.1992 wherein the enquiry officer held that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from April 16, 1974 to December 30, 1978 and therefore he was not entitled for any salary for the aforesaid period. He also held that the petitioner is also guilty of causing loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 4,584.79 P. and therefore the said amount is liable to be recovered from him. He also held that the petitioner is also guilty of causing loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 4,584.79 P. and therefore the said amount is liable to be recovered from him. A notice dated 13.10.1995 was issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why his services be not terminated and applying the principles of ‘no work no pay ‘ he should not be paid any salary for the period from 16.4.1974 to 30.12.1978 and 31.12.1978 to 6.3.1990 and the aforesaid period should also not be taken into account for the purpose of increments in salary and Rs. 4,584.79 P. be recovered from him. The petitioner submitted his reply on 29.11.1995. Thereafter the punishing authority i.e. Additional Director (Administration) passed order dated 9.2.1996 in term of the show cause notice. In the meantime, it appears that the petitioner filed a claim petition No. 248 of 1991 before the Tribunal seeking a mandamus directing the respondents to pay him salary since 1974 till 1990. The aforesaid claim petition was decided by the Tribunal vide order dated 1.3.1995 observing that : ^^mijksDr foospuk ds vk/kkj ij ;g funsZk fn;s tkrs gSa fd funskd lsok;kstu Lo;a vkjksi&i= vuqeksfnr djus ds ckn vkSj lsok fu;eksa ds tkudkj vf/kdkjh dh fu;qfDr tk¡p vf/kdkjh ds :i esa djds ifukesUV ,.M vihy :Yl Qkj lcvkfMZusV lfoZlst ds izkfo/kkuksa ds vUrxZr tSlk Åij Li"V fd;k x;k gS tk¡p vk[;k nsaxs ftlls dkj.k crkvksa uksfVl nsus ds ckn funskd viuk fu.kZ; nsaxsA mHk; i{k viuk&viuk okn O;; Lo;a ogu djsaxsA** 4. Being aggrieved by the order dated 1.3.1995 passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner has preferred the Writ Petition No. 3530 (S/S) of 1995 by seeking following reliefs : “A. To issue writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment and order passed by opposite party No. 2 dated 1st March, 1995 as contained in Annexure 1 to this writ petition. B. To issue writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to make payment of petitioner’s arrears of pay from 1.8.1972 to 13.4.1974, Medical leave on full and half pay from 14.4.1974 to 29.12.1978, full pay during litigation period of the case from 30.12.1978 to 6.3.1990 on quashing of impugned termination order dated 30.12.1978 on 12.4.1989 by this Hon’ble Court and other benefits during pendency of the case such as yearly increments, confirmation, earned leave and promotion to senior scale of pay etc. C. To issue writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to make payment of salaries during litigation period. D. To issue any other writ or order which this Hon’ble Court deems just and proper in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice. E. To award the cost of the writ petition to the petitioner from the opposite parties.” 5. Further aggrieved by the order dated 9.2.1996, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 5054 (S/S) of 1996 which was dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 20.10.1997 on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of approaching the Tribunal against the order dated 9.2.1996. Thereafter he preferred a claim petition No. 2596 of 1997 before the Tribunal challenging the order dated 9.2.1996 and seeking further direction to refund Rs. 4,584.79 P. which had been recovered from him pursuant to the order dated 9.2.1996. This claim petition has been partly allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 22.4.2002 quashing the order dated 9.2.1996 in so far as it imposes punishment of recovery of Rs. 4,584.79 p. observing further that with respect to the aforesaid recovery, the respondents are at liberty to take a fresh decision after holding an enquiry in accordance with law and thereafter shall also take decision as to whether the aforesaid amount of Rs. 4,589.79 P. recovered from the petitioner should be allowed to be refunded to him or not. Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 22.4.2002, the petitioner has filed Writ Petition No. 1320 (S/B) of 2002 praying for the following reliefs : “(i) issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment and order passed by opposite party No. 1 dated 22.4.2002 as contained in Annexure 1 to this writ petition. Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 22.4.2002, the petitioner has filed Writ Petition No. 1320 (S/B) of 2002 praying for the following reliefs : “(i) issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment and order passed by opposite party No. 1 dated 22.4.2002 as contained in Annexure 1 to this writ petition. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari quashing the impugned office order dated 9.2.1996 passed by the opposite party No. 3 as contained in Annexure 2 to this writ petition. (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to pay the unpaid salary of petitioner since 16.4.1974 to 29.12.1978 with all the admissible benefits, allowance and yearly increments. (iv) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to make payment of the salaries during the litigation period and after this period which are consequential benefits since 30.12.1978 to 6.3.1990 and onwards upto 30.6.2001, the date of retirement of petitioner on superannuation. (v) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay interest at least @ 18% per annum on every half yearly accumulation of aforesaid period arrears salary since 16.4.1974. (vi) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay monthly pension of the petitioner since 1.7.2001 till upto date on his revised last pay drawn alongwith interest @ 18% till the payment by the respondents. (vii) issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (viii) Award the costs of this petition.” 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that though it is admitted by the tribunal in both the orders that no disciplinary proceedings were conducted against him in accordance with law yet it has not allowed salary for the period from 16.4.1974 to 30.12.1978 and 30.12.1978 to 6.3.1990 which is absolutely illegal and in violation of Articles 14, 16 and 21 read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that once the Tribunal found that the inquiry proceedings were not conducted correctly and adequate opportunity of defence was not provided to the petitioner, there was no occasion for the Tribunal not to set aside the entire order dated 9.2.1996 and confine it to grant a relief only to the extent of penalty of recovery of Rs. 4,584.79 P. He contended that the petitioner was throughout ready to work but as a result of illegal order of termination dated 30.12.1978 was denied opportunity to work therefore principle of no work no pay’ would have no application in the case in hand and the Tribunal has erred in law in failing to consider this aspect of the matter. 7. On the contrary, learned Standing Counsel submits that here is a case where initially on account of unauthorised and illegal absence of the petitioner the department intended to impose punishment and consequently he was terminated. When the order of termination was set aside by this Court with the liberty to the department to proceed afresh in accordance with law, the authorities proceeded and held an inquiry in accordance with UP. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. With respect to unauthorised absence of the petitioner, no punishment as such under the Disciplinary Rules has been imposed. On the contrary the said period is not regularised under the leave Rules. The petitioner is not entitled for any payment for the period he remained unauthorisedly absent and from 31st December, 1978 till 6.3.1990. Though the order of termination dated 31.12.1978 was set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 12.4.1989 but the facts remains that the same followed in unauthorised and illegal absence and therefore, it cannot be said that he was ready and willing to work during the period of absence. Hence principle of “no work no pay” would has rightly been applied by the authorities and it warrants no interference. 8. In support he placed reliance on State of Haryana and others v. O.P. Gupta etc., AIR 1996 SC 2936 and Virendra Kumar, General Manager, Northern Railways, New Delhi v. Avinash Chandra Chadha and others, AIR 1991 SC 958 . Hence principle of “no work no pay” would has rightly been applied by the authorities and it warrants no interference. 8. In support he placed reliance on State of Haryana and others v. O.P. Gupta etc., AIR 1996 SC 2936 and Virendra Kumar, General Manager, Northern Railways, New Delhi v. Avinash Chandra Chadha and others, AIR 1991 SC 958 . He further contended that the decision of authorities not to regularise unauthorised absence of the petitioner by granting any leave to the petitioner in facts resulted making the said period dies-non and therefore, the petitioner would not be entitled for any benefit of said period . Besides, the said period would also no qualify for the purpose of retiral benefits etc. Since it is not a punishment as such under U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, even if the punishment of recovery has been found to be illegal, it cannot be said that the authorities have committed any error and the judgment of the Tribunal therefore needs no interference at this stage. 9. We have heard rival submissions of the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the record. 10. It is admitted by learned Counsel for the parties that during the pendency of this matter, petitioner has also attained the age of superannuation on 30.6.2001. 11. For the purpose of appreciation of rival submissions the issue can be considered in two parts; one, the period of 16.4.1978 to 30.12.1978 i.e. during the period the petitioner was absent and no leave was sanctioned for the said period, and, secondly, from 31st December, 1978 to 6.3.1990 during which period petitioner remained out of service pursuant to the order of termination dated 31.12.1978 which ultimately was set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 12.4.1989. 12. Coming to the first part of the issue, we found from the record that admittedly for the period from 16.4.1974 to 13.8.1974 petitioner submitted an application for leave but despite the fact that he was required to furnish medical certificate duly counter signed by the Chief Medical Officer, he failed to furnish the same. Besides, instead of assuming charge of his post after expiry of the aforesaid period, he still continued to remain absent from 14.8.1974 and onwards. 13. Besides, instead of assuming charge of his post after expiry of the aforesaid period, he still continued to remain absent from 14.8.1974 and onwards. 13. Subsidiary Rule 96 (i.e. Leave Rules) is as under : “96(a) Where the leave is for a period of one month or less and the incapacity is not due to definite injury, the authority competent to sanction leave many, at its discretion, secure a second medical opinion by requesting the civil surgeon to have the applicant physically examined. Should it decide to do so, it must arrange for the second medical examination to be made on the earliest possible date after the date on which the first medical opinion was given. (b) In the case of illness necessitating leave beyond one month and in all cases of definite injury the sanctioning authority should, except in cases covered by Clause (c) of this rule, obtain a second medical opinion from the (authorised medical attendant) and should, for this purpose, arrange for the second medical examination to be made on the earliest possible date after the date on which the first medical opinion was given. The sanctioning authority may relax the provisions of this rule, provided it refers each case for such relaxation to the authorised medical attendant) and the latter consider it desirable that relaxation should be given either on account of distance or the nature of illness. (c) If the applicant for leave is a female and a second medical opinion is considered necessary whether the leave exceeds one month or not, the civil surgeon should be requested to obtain this whenever possible from a medical woman in Government employment. If this is not possible he himself should give this second medical opinion in cases where full examination by him is permitted by the applicant. In cases where this is not permitted, the authority competent to sanction leave may obtain a second medical opinion from a private registered female practitioner. Should such a particular not be available, he may dispense with a second medical opinion. (d) In all cases in which a second medical opinion is obtained, it will be the duty of the person giving that opinion to express an opinion both as regards the facts of the illness and as regards the necessity for the amount of leave recommended. (d) In all cases in which a second medical opinion is obtained, it will be the duty of the person giving that opinion to express an opinion both as regards the facts of the illness and as regards the necessity for the amount of leave recommended. In the case of a male applicant the civil surgeon may require the applicant to appear either before himself or before a Medical Officer nominated by him. The civil surgeon, or, in case where a second medical opinion is obtained from a private registered female practitioner under Clause(c) above the authority competent to sanction leave, will arrange for the medical examination to take place at the applicant’s residence if this course is necessary on account of the nature of the applicant’s illness.” 14. When an employee is absent for the period for more than 30 days on medical ground, a medical certificate is required to be submitted duly countersigned by the Chief Medical Officer. The authority, therefore had rightly asked the petitioner to submit medical certificate duly countersigned by the Chief Medical Officer. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner complied with the said requirement and submitted a proper application duly supported with requisite document. Further there is nothing on record to show that any leave application was submitted by the petitioner for the period from 14.8.1974 and onwards. In our view, this fact is evident from the record that he continued to remain absent unauthorisedly till the appointing authority passed order of termination dated 31st December, 1978. In this view of the matter, the decision of the authorities treating the said period as unauthorised absent and holding that the petitioner is not entitled for any salary for this period cannot be said to be erroneous and illegal in any manner and therefore in our view, the petitioner is not entitled for payment of salary for the said period. The decision to this effect impugned in these petitions has to be sustained accordingly. 15. Now coming to the second part of the issue, it is true that during the period subsequent to 31.12.1978, since the petitioner was terminated by order dated 31.12.1978, therefore, there was no occasion for him either to work with the department or to submit his joining. 15. Now coming to the second part of the issue, it is true that during the period subsequent to 31.12.1978, since the petitioner was terminated by order dated 31.12.1978, therefore, there was no occasion for him either to work with the department or to submit his joining. The aforesaid order of termination was set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 12.4.1989 with the liberty to the respondents to hold an enquiry afresh and question of payment of salary for the said period was made subject to the aforesaid enquiry. It appears that subsequently the enquiry was conducted and pursuant thereto, a punishment for recovery of Rs. 4584.79P was imposed upon the petitioner besides refusing salary to the petitioner from 31.12.1978 to 6.4.1990 by applying principle of ‘no work no pay’. Since the Tribunal has set aside the aforesaid order of punishment to the extent it imposes penalty of recovery upon the petitioner observing that the disciplinary proceedings was not consistent with the principles of natural justice, in our view, the decision for payment of salary for the period from 31.12.1978 to 6.4.1990 would have to be taken afresh by the authorities concerned in case they hold an enquiry afresh as directed by the Tribunal and thereafter they will have to pass order accordingly. This Court in its judgment dated 12.4.1989 has categorically made it clear that the matter of pay etc. of the petitioner for the period he remained out of job pursuant to termination order which was quashed by the Court, will be subject to the result of the enquiry which was allowed to be conducted by this Court. Therefore, in our view if the respondents could not impart any different consideration then what has been remained by this Court by its earlier judgment which has attained finality between the parties. Whether the principle of no work no pay’ would have application in the matter in hand and what are the relevant circumstances where the said principle can be applied, may also be considered in a little detail as hereunder. 16. The question of application of principles of ‘no work no pay’ has been considered time and again by this Court and the Apex Court and it is not more res integra but still it has resulted in frequent litigation before this Court. 16. The question of application of principles of ‘no work no pay’ has been considered time and again by this Court and the Apex Court and it is not more res integra but still it has resulted in frequent litigation before this Court. A retrospect of various authorities of apex Court and in this Court show a revolutionary change in the approach dealing with the said issue. A Government servant unlike private employment once appointed is governed by the status and the rules and regulations governing his conditions of service. Though the Government service start with a contract but once appointed it is a matter of status. Various rules and regulations have been framed under Article 309 (proviso) of the Constitution of India dealing with the terms and conditions of the Government employees. Though in the case in hand the appellant is a teacher but it is not disputed that his salary is paid from State Exchequer as the institution where he was working is a recognised and aided institution and in respect to the matter where separate rules and regulations have not been framed with regard to the payment of salary etc., similar provisions applicable to the Government employees are applicable to such teachers also. In the matter of private employment an employee earn wages by rendering service to the employer and in case of no work he is not entitled for any wages unless specifically provided under contract or any law governing such contract. It is open to such an employer to enter into a contract carving out certain exceptions where the employee may be entitled for wages even for certain period where no duty is discharged. In the cases where the employee is governed by various labour welfare legislations, payment of wages in certain contingencies, where the employee may not work but still may be entitled for wages are governed by the said labour welfare legislations and there the employer is liable to act according thereto. In the matter of Government employees and others who are governed by the rules framed under Article 309 (proviso) of the Constitution the position is different. Fundamental Rule 17 (hereinafter referred to as “FR 17") provides as to when a Government servant shall begin to draw pay and allowance etc. In the matter of Government employees and others who are governed by the rules framed under Article 309 (proviso) of the Constitution the position is different. Fundamental Rule 17 (hereinafter referred to as “FR 17") provides as to when a Government servant shall begin to draw pay and allowance etc. and when he would cease to do so, and reads as under : 17.(1) Subject to any exception specifically made in these rules, and to the provisions of sub-rule (2) a Government servant shall begin to draw the pay and allowances attached to his tenure of a post with effect from the date when he assumes the duties of that post, and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties. (2) The date from which a person recruited overseas shall commence to draw pay on first appointment shall be determined by the general or special orders of the authority by whom he is appointed.” 17. The exceptions referred to in FR 17 are the eventualities like leave, joining time allowed to the Government servant on transfer, suspension etc. In case of dismissal or removal, FR 52 provides that pay and allowances of Government servant shall cease from the date of dismissal or removal, and in case of suspension FR 53 provides that though he would not be discharging any duty but subject to furnishing a certificate that he has not been engaged in any other business, profession or vocation, he would be entitled for subsistence allowance which may be 50% or 75% of the leave salary which he would have been drawing had he been on leave. The cases in which payment of salary is governed expressly by the rules, they do not create much difficulty but the litigation pertaining to service matters had brought a number of circumstances before the Court where the employees are denied benefit of salary or higher salary for one or the other reasons beyond their control or for which they are not responsible or nothing can be attributed to them and such situations are not answered by any rule or executive order having force of law necessitating judicial pronouncements time and again for such entitlement. Initially the Courts were of the view that once it is found that the employee was wrongly denied such salary, he is entitled for entire arrears irrespective of the fact whether he actually discharged duties of the post or not. There was a dichotomy of the judicial pronouncements in the matters dealing with labour cases and those dealing with Government service inasmuch as in the labour matters since the power of discretionary relief was conferred upon the adjudicatory forum under the labour laws, the issue was decided in the light of such provisions and the facts and circumstances of the concerned case but in the matter of Government servants, initially the Courts allowed arrears of salary virtually as a matter of course once it is found that such denial was inconsistent to law, but, subsequently it was noticed that failure on the part of the authorities in observance of or the strict compliance of the statute was more frequent then desired and the consequence of allowing arrears as a matter of course was so drastic that huge public money used to be siphoned off to such employees who have rendered no public duty or have not actually shouldered any responsibility of higher post and therefore a necessity arose to have a balance in two situations so as not to waste the public money for the follies of the authorities who were under the obligations to observe certain procedure, norms and failure whereof may not enrich certain employees being against the interest of the public exchequer but simultaneously the interest of the employees who were not at fault was also to be observed. This gave occasion to consider the question of arrears of salary not as a matter of right but in each case depending upon multifarious reasons and factors which we will be discussing later on. 18. Here at this stage we propose to refer some of the judgments throwing light on the discussion made herenabove. 19. In P.S. Mahal v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1291 while deciding the dispute pertaining to seniority, the Apex Court directed the employees to be treated as deemed promoted from retrospective date and also directed for payment of salary of the higher post for the past period. 19. In P.S. Mahal v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1291 while deciding the dispute pertaining to seniority, the Apex Court directed the employees to be treated as deemed promoted from retrospective date and also directed for payment of salary of the higher post for the past period. However in Paluru Ramkrishnaiah and others v. Union of India and another, 1989(2) SCC 541 despite allowing promotion with back date, the back wages were denied for the reason that earlier in other matters certain writ petitions were allowed by the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court on 4.4.1983 following the Apex Court judgment dated 2.2.1981 in Civil Appeal No. 441 of 1981 wherein back wages were denied despite retrospective promotion and a Special Leave Petition Civil No. 5987-92 of 1986 filed by the Government of India against the judgment of Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court was dismissed on 28.7.1986. Therefore the Court took the view that same relief should be granted to the appellant in Paluru Ramkrishnaiah (supra) also. 20. Subsequently relying on P.S. Mahal (supra), arrears of salary on account of back dated promotions was claimed but the aforesaid dictum was not followed in Virender Kumar v. Avinash Chandra Chadha and others, AIR 1991 SC 958 and for denying arrears of salary to the employees who were allowed promotion from an earlier date the Apex Court gave the following reasons : “ (1) Deemed appointments have to be given to the concerned employees even from the dates when they were not in service and probably when they were still in their schools and colleges. (2) Neither equity nor justice is in favour of the respondents to award them emoluments of higher posts with retrospective effect and the decision in P.S. Mahal (supra) was distinguishable. (3) The matter was agitated in 1972 but remained pending for more than one and half decade for no fault of the employer. (4) The higher posts were not vacant during the entire period and were manned by others. The employer had paid the incumbents who were working on the higher post emoluments of the said posts. (3) The matter was agitated in 1972 but remained pending for more than one and half decade for no fault of the employer. (4) The higher posts were not vacant during the entire period and were manned by others. The employer had paid the incumbents who were working on the higher post emoluments of the said posts. (5) The employees have not actually worked in the higher post and on the principle of “no work, no pay”, were not entitled for higher salary.” In the aforesaid case, therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the case as referred above, the employees were denied arrears of salary despite of allowing promotion from an earlier date. 21. In Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010 the validity of a Government order came up for consideration which provided that during the pendency of the disciplinary or criminal proceedings when an employee is to be considered for promotion, his matter shall be kept in sealed cover and he shall not be allowed actual promotion even if selected till the disciplinary/criminal proceeding is finalised and only after conclusion of such proceeding, the sealed cover shall be opened and if he is to be promoted, no arrears of salary shall be paid. The validity of this Government order to the extent it denied arrears of salary to employee against whom as a result of departmental inquiry or criminal proceedings nothing ultimately is proved and who is exonerated and found entitled for promotion from due date yet arrears denied came up for consideration and it was contended that this gives a leverage to the employer to take advantage of his own wrong and despite the fact that the employee is not at fault and has done everything possible and permissible, yet he cannot get arrears of salary for an act for which the employer is solely responsible and therefore such provision is arbitrary. A Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal declared the aforesaid part of the Government Order violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the matter came up in appeal before a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court which held that FR 17 would not be applicable to a case where the employee though is willing to work is kept away by the authorities for no fault of his. The Court held : “We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work, no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17 (1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” 22. The Apex Court, expressed its agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post alongwith other benefits from the date on which he would have been normally promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, the Apex Court further held that in such matters a discretion must be left to the employer to decide as to whether the entire salary is to be paid or not for the reason that there may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, were delayed at the instance of the employee or clearance in the disciplinary proceeding or acquittal in the criminal proceeding is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. The concerned authority therefore, must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. The Apex Court further hold that it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary but to ignore such circumstances when they exist, however, and lay down an inflexible rule of payment of arrears once an employee is exonerated would undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests. The Apex Court further hold that it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary but to ignore such circumstances when they exist, however, and lay down an inflexible rule of payment of arrears once an employee is exonerated would undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests. Thus the legal exposition as laid down in K.V. Jankiraman (supra) is where an employee is not guilty of being away from work but is prevented from doing so by the authorities, the normal rules of “no work, no pay” is not applicable but in such cases considering various complexities of life and the history of the proceedings etc., the departmental authority must decide entitlement of the Government servant about the arrears and the quantum thereof. 23. In Vasant Rao Roman v. Union of India and others,1993 Supple (2) SCC 324 arrears of salary was denied to the employee though it was held that denial of promotion on the higher post on account of wrong fixation of seniority was illegal. The Apex Court held that the principle of “no work, no pay” would have no application to the said case since the employee was neither under suspension nor any disciplinary proceeding was pending against him and on the contrary he was made to suffer on account of administrative reason for which he was not responsible. There was shortage of literate Shunters at Gwalior during 1960 and the employee being literate was deputed for table work and therefore for administrative reason he could not complete requisite number of firing kilometers. The juniors were promoted as Shunters and Drivers and his claim was ignored on account of lack of requisite number of firing kilometers. Thus on the one hand the employee was utilized by the department to benefit itself with the qualification of the employee since literate Shunters to discharge table work were not readily available and on the other hand for the same qualification he was denied promotion on the ground that he has not completed requisite number of firing kilometers. Hence the Apex Court held that there was no justification in denying him arrears of emoluments from the date he was allowed promotion to the post of Shunter Grade “B” and Driver Grade “C”. 24. Hence the Apex Court held that there was no justification in denying him arrears of emoluments from the date he was allowed promotion to the post of Shunter Grade “B” and Driver Grade “C”. 24. In Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others, AIR 1995 SC 1053 as a result of disciplinary proceedings the employee was punished but the said order of punishment was passed by an authority to whom an appeal otherwise would lay under the rules and thereby the employee was denied right of appeal though conferred under the rules. The Apex Court held such exercise of power by the higher authority illegal but while considering the question as to what consequential orders should be passed, in the facts of the case, noticed that the proceedings against the employee were pending since 1982 and almost for 13 years the employee was out of employment. He also at one stage was inclined to forego all the arrears of salary provided he is reinstated in service on the post to which he was entitled with the benefit of continuity in service to which the Bank did not agree. The Court thereafter noticed that his allegations that the charges were trumpeted against him cannot be said to be without any substance, the inquiry was also defective, he was an ex-army officer and therefore instead of remanding the matter a lump sum compensation would be just and reasonable. The arrears of salary and future salary would have come to about 20 lacs and noticing the fact that the Bank being nationalised, the money belongs to the public and such a huge amount should not be allowed to be paid to someone who has not worked for a long time at all just for the reason that the Bank feels that it has lost confidence in the employee. The Court directed for payment of a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- in lieu of arrears of salary and reinstatement in service with continuity of service without any loss of seniority. 25. In Smt. Sudha Srivastava v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India 1996 (1) SCC 63 following K.V. Jankiraman (supra) the Apex Court allowed arrears of salary to the legal heirs of the deceased employee on the ground that he was denied promotion on account of criminal proceedings wherein he was honourably acquitted. 26. 25. In Smt. Sudha Srivastava v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India 1996 (1) SCC 63 following K.V. Jankiraman (supra) the Apex Court allowed arrears of salary to the legal heirs of the deceased employee on the ground that he was denied promotion on account of criminal proceedings wherein he was honourably acquitted. 26. In State of Haryana and others v. O.P. Gupta and others, 1996 (7) SCC 533 : AIR 1996 SC 2936 , as a result of redetermination of seniority, pursuant to the direction of the Apex Court, promotions were allowed retrospectively but arrears denied. The Apex Court noted that the incumbents who approached the Court claiming arrears of salary though contended that they were ready but were not allowed to work on the higher post on account of wrong determination of seniority but their contention could not withstand judicial scrutiny for the reason that they were not the persons who agitated the issue of seniority earlier. Some other persons disputed the seniority list which was ultimately decided by the Apex Court directing for predetermination of seniority and therefore the contention of the employees that they were ready to work was contrary to record. It was also held where a seniority list has to be redrawn and the promotions have to be made and until that exercise is undertaken, it was not open to the employees concerned to claim that they were ready to work on the higher post and thus the question of entitlement of arrears on promotional post would not arise. The law laid down in K.V. Jankiraman (supra) was distinguished on the ground that it was a case of sealed cover procedure but would have no application to the case of promotion as a result of redetermination of seniority. 27. In J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and another, 1998 (9) SCC 559 the employee served a notice of voluntary retirement but before communication of its acceptance withdrew the same. However the employer forced voluntary retirement upon him whereagainst he approached the Tribunal which held that voluntary retirement having been given effect to and the employee also having handed over charge, no relief can be granted to him. The Apex Court reversed the judgment of the Tribunal and held that before communication of acceptance of the letter of voluntary retirement it was open to the employee to withdraw the same. The Apex Court reversed the judgment of the Tribunal and held that before communication of acceptance of the letter of voluntary retirement it was open to the employee to withdraw the same. Further observing that the employee was denied work though he was ready, it was held that he is also entitled for the benefit of the salary for the period he was denied work by the employer and the principle of “no work, no pay” would not apply. 28. A Constitution Bench considered application of “no work, no pay” in the matter of employees of the Bank going on strike in Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak, AIR 1995 SC 319 and observed that whoever voluntarily refrains from doing work when it is offered to him is not entitled for payment for the work not done. In other words that is the dictum of “no work, no pay”. However it was also held where the issue pertaining to strike is dealt with by the statute or the contract between the employer and employee recognising the right of employees to go on strike, in such case in order to get entitlement or wages for the period of strike it has to be both legal and justified. 29. In State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal, AIR 2001 SC 1748 an employee was transferred but he did not comply the same and made representations for its cancellation. He was relieved in absentia and reminded by the Bank to join at the place of transfer but he did not obey, whereafter another order was passed transferring him to another place but that too was not obeyed and instead the employee filed a writ petition wherein an interim order was passed directing the employee to obey the later order of transfer which was not complied by him again and instead he preferred an intra Court appeal wherein he was allowed some more time to join at the later place of transfer. The employee filed a special leave petition which was dismissed. However the employee did not join at the place of transfer. The writ petition was ultimately allowed by the Hon’ble Single Judge setting aside the order of transfer with all consequential benefits and salary for the period he was not in the office. The employee filed a special leave petition which was dismissed. However the employee did not join at the place of transfer. The writ petition was ultimately allowed by the Hon’ble Single Judge setting aside the order of transfer with all consequential benefits and salary for the period he was not in the office. The Apex Court in the appeal of the Bank observed that in such a case where an employee who has not discharged any duty by disobeying the order of transfer, if is allowed salary for the period he was absent, it would amount to granting a premium to an errant officer. Accordingly, setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the Apex Court left it open to the Bank to deal with the period of absence in accordance with rules of the Bank. 30. In Food Corporation of India v. S.N. Nagarkar, AIR 2002 SC 808 , notional promotion without arrears was allowed by the employer relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in O.P. Gupta (supra) and Paluru Ramkrishnaiah (supra). The Apex Court found that the notional promotion was allowed pursuant to the order dated 6.5.1994 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 4983 of 1993 wherein a direction was also issued for payment of arrears of pay. The said judgment having attained finality it was not open to deny arrears of salary while implementing the said judgment and to defend such denial in execution proceedings. Moreover, it was held that entitlement of employee for arrears of pay and allowances is within the domain of the Court and if it is satisfied that the employee was not considered for promotion to the promotional post for no fault of him but on account of the fault of the authorities concerned, it can always allow arrears of pay and allowances since it is settled law that in exercise of writ jurisdiction the Court can mould relief having reference to the facts of the case and interest of justice. 31. 31. In A.K. Soumini v. State Bank of Travancore and another, 2003 (7) SCC 238 : AIR 2003 SC 3137 the Court upheld denial of arrears on the ground that as a matter of fact the employee was disentitled for promotion under the promotion policy but taking into account the pendency of the appeal before the Court for a considerable time on account whereof the employee could not appear in subsequent tests, the benefit of promotion was allowed which was more in the nature of gesture of gratis and not by way of any right to which she was entitled. Therefore, the notional promotion allowed by the Bank with revision of pay scale was found to be more than what ought to have been allowed to her, be it either in law or equity, and her further claim for payment of arrears was found to be highly far-fetched, without any basis and unjust. This is apparent from para 9 of the judgment which is reproduced as under : “So far as the case on hand is concerned, the appellant was denied promotion in terms of the promotion policy under which it was necessary for a candidate to secure at least a minimum eligibility mark of 6-1/2 at the interview and the learned single Judge, allowed the claim only on the ground that such prescription of a minimum mark was not valid. Though the Division Bench also affirmed the same, this Court overruled the said decision, and upheld such prescription. But taking into account the pendency of the appeal in this Court for considerable time, and on account of which the appellant also did not appear in the subsequent tests, benefit to promote her was not denied. The fact that her non-promotion was legal and there has been no unlawful interference with her right to promotion or to serve in the promoted category was obvious and could not be minced over or completely ignored in the light of the judgment of this Court, allowing the appeal by the Bank. While that be the position, the grant of relief to her, keeping in view the delay merely due to pendency of proceedings before Court, was more in the nature of a gesture of gratis and not by way of any right, to which she was found to be entitled to. While that be the position, the grant of relief to her, keeping in view the delay merely due to pendency of proceedings before Court, was more in the nature of a gesture of gratis and not by way of any right, to which she was found to be entitled to. Consequently, the notional promotion given to her by the Bank with suitable revision of her pay scales itself is more than sufficient to meet the requirements, be it either in law or in equity. The further claim for payment of arrears as well, is farfetched and can have no basis, in law. The Division Bench, in our view properly approached the question in the light of the relevant guiding principles and the same could not be said to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or unsound in law to warrant of our interference.” 32. In Punjab National Bank v. Virender Kumar Goel, AIR 2004 SC 3988 the employees were denied work despite withdrawal of their options seeking voluntary retirement. It was held to be illegal on the ground that before acceptance it is always open to the employee to withdraw such option and therefore for the period the employees could not work, arrear was allowed. The Apex Court held that principle of “no work, no pay” would not apply in such a case since the employees were out of their job for no fault of their. It also held that a party who is in breach of contract can hardly seek for any equitable relief. Since the Bank did not permit the employees to work and breached contract, it did not lie in its mouth to deny arrears of salary to the employees. 33. In General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, AIR 2005 SC 3966 the employee was engaged for a short period i.e. 16.3.1988 to 28.2.1989 with some breaks and thereafter was not given any appointment. He raised an industrial dispute regarding validity of his termination wherein it was held that having completed 240 days of service in a calendar year, his termination was in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Declaring his termination illegal, he was held to be entitled for reinstatement, continuity of service and 50% of back wages. He raised an industrial dispute regarding validity of his termination wherein it was held that having completed 240 days of service in a calendar year, his termination was in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Declaring his termination illegal, he was held to be entitled for reinstatement, continuity of service and 50% of back wages. Upholding the award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court holding termination of the employee as illegal, the Court noticed that in the matter of award of back wages there is no rule of thumb that in every case whenever termination is found to be illegal, full or some back wages have to be allowed to the workman. Lot of factors have to be taken into consideration which include how quick the employee was in taking legal action regarding his grievance against the action of the employer, delay if any in litigation and whether the employee or any other person is responsible therefor. Moreover, the factors like manner and method of selection and appointment, namely proper advertisement inviting applications from the employment exchange; nature of appointment whether ad-hoc, short-term, daily wage, temporary or permanent in character; any special qualification required for the job etc. are of relevance to weigh the balance of the decision regarding wages. Moreover, the length of service rendered by the employee, the age and qualification showing that he may not be in a position to get any other employment, a regular service of permanent character if terminated illegally would attract different consideration then a short term or interrupted daily wage employment though has completed 240 days in a calendar year is also relevant. The Court also held that a person appointed on daily wage basis get wages for the days only he has performed work and when work not done, remuneration is not to be paid and this is also a relevant factor. Whether the employee was gainfully employed during the period of unemployment was also held to be a relevant factor. 34. The Court also held that a person appointed on daily wage basis get wages for the days only he has performed work and when work not done, remuneration is not to be paid and this is also a relevant factor. Whether the employee was gainfully employed during the period of unemployment was also held to be a relevant factor. 34. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. S.C. Sharma, 2005 (104) FLR 863 (SC) : 2005 (2) SCC 363 relied upon by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, the Apex Court noticed that while setting aside an order of dismissal or termination, full back wages is not the natural consequence and when the question of back wages is to be determined, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed and initial burden lie on him. However, since the employer was given a liberty to proceed afresh against the employee, the Apex Court did not express any final opinion on the entitlement of the service benefits to the employee concern and held that final decision would be taken by the competent authority in the departmental proceedings. 35. In Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd., 2005 (8) SCC 314 the Court allowed arrears of salary in the case where the employee was denied work by not permitting him to withdraw his resignation which was held to be illegal and following J.N. Srivastava (supra) and Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project and Development India Ltd., 2002 (3) SCC 437 , the Court held that the employee is entitled for full salary for the said period and observed as under : “We must frankly admit that we are unable to uphold the contention of the respondent Company. A similar situation had arises in J.N. Srivastava and a similar argument was advanced by the employer, the Court, however, negatived the argument observing that when the workman was willing to work but the employer did not allow him to work, it would not be open to the employer to deny monetary benefits to the workman who was not permitted to discharge his duties. Accordingly, the benefits were granted to him. In Shambhu Murari Sinha II also, this Court held that since the relationship of employer and employee continued till the employee attained the age of superannuation he would be entitled to “full salary and allowances” of the entire period he was kept out of service. Accordingly, the benefits were granted to him. In Shambhu Murari Sinha II also, this Court held that since the relationship of employer and employee continued till the employee attained the age of superannuation he would be entitled to “full salary and allowances” of the entire period he was kept out of service. In Balram Gupta in spite of specific provision precluding the Government servant from withdrawing notice of retirement, this Court granted all consequential benefits to him. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to salary and other benefits.” 36. In Baldev Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 2006 SC 531 the employee was convicted in a criminal case whereupon he was dismissed from service w.e.f. 18.7.1990. However, in appeal he was acquitted vide High Court judgment dated 26.3.1992 and was released from jail on 4.4.1992 whereupon he claimed that he reported for duty on 5.4.1992 but the said fact was denied by the Union of India and it was pointed out that after acquittal, order for his reinstatement was passed and he was repeatedly required to join his parent unit but he did not responded whereupon the High Court held that he was not entitled for salary for the period he was not in service. Upholding the judgment, the Apex Court held that the employee was not in actual service for the period he was in custody and since he was terminated on the ground of his conviction, the acquittal will not automatically give the benefit of continuous service and in any case since he has not rendered any service, is not entitled for arrears of salary. 37. 37. The question of arrears of salary has been dealt with in detail recently in U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. and another v. Udai Narain Pandey, AIR 2006 SC 586 and the Apex Court has observed that earlier direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result but now, with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the Court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it and/or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof the employer would be compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago when the employee was retrenched/terminated. It was held that no precise formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances payment of entire back wages should be allowed, but held that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot be automatic and should not be granted mechanically only because on technical ground or otherwise the order of termination has been found defective or illegal. It was also observed that payment of back wages involves a discretionary element in it and has to be dealt in the facts and circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula can be evolved, though, however, there is statutory sanction to direct payment of back wages in its entirety. Noticing the change in the approach of the Courts in dealing with such matters, in para 44, 45 and 46 of the judgment it was held : “44. Industrial Courts while adjudicating on disputes between the management and the workmen, therefore, must take such decisions which would be in consonance with the purpose the law seeks to achieve. When justice is the buzzword in the matter of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, it would be wholly improper on the part of the superior Courts to make them apply the cold letter of the statutes to act mechanically. Rendition of justice would bring within its purview giving a person what is due to him and not what can be given to him in law. 45. A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. Rendition of justice would bring within its purview giving a person what is due to him and not what can be given to him in law. 45. A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. If that principle is applied, the functions of an industrial Court shall lose much of its significance. 46. The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalization, privatization and outsourcing is evident.” 38. We may also add one more aspect. Many a times when the employee approaches the Court challenging an order of retirement, dismissal or removal etc. in writ jurisdiction and prays for an interim relief, while entertaining the writ petition the Court normally do not grant any interim relief for the reason that it is treated like granting a final relief to the employee at the stage of admission and also against the well established principle applicable for grant of interim injunction that not only a prima facie case must be shown but the petitioner has to show balance of convenience and irreparable loss lying in his favour. In the aforesaid kind of cases, since the employee can always be compensated while granting final relief by allowing wages for the period he is out of employment, interim relief is normally denied. Therefore, it is a relevant factor as to when the employee has approached the Court. Pendency of the writ petition and non grant of interim order in view of the aforesaid legal principle should not normally result in denial of the ultimate relief of salary to the employee when the impugned order is found to be illegal unless there are certain other factors, a few whereof have already been enumerated hereabove, justifying denial of full salary or arrears otherwise it would amount to denial of an effective relief to a litigant for which he is not at fault and also confer premium upon the other side for passing an illegal order and thereby depriving the employee from discharging any duty. We cannot forget that an employee has no right to work but only a right to get salary, and, it is always open to the employer to take work from the employee or not but he has to pay salary so long as the employment is not terminated in accordance with law or in accordance with the terms of his contract. 39. In Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 2003 SC 1115 the Court while justifying non grant of interim orders in the case of suspension, dismissal, removal etc. has observed that in such cases the employee can be suitably compensated when the said order is not found in order but in case the interim order is granted, it would amount to allowing wrong usurpation of the office by the employee during operation of the interim order and this act may be irreversible. The Court observed as under : “Dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement puts an end to the relationship of employer and employee. In case of suspension, reduction in rank or reversion the relationship of employer and employee continues. Interference at the interim stage with an order of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement would be giving the final relief to an employee at an interim stage which he would have giving the final relief to an employee at an interim stage which he would have got in case the order of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement is found not to be justified. If the order of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement is set aside then an employee can be compensated by moulding the relief appropriately in terms of arrears of salary, promotions which may have become due or otherwise compensating him in some other way. But in case the order of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement is found to be justified then holding of the office during the operation of the interim order would amount to usurpation of an office which employee was not entitled to hold. But in case the order of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement is found to be justified then holding of the office during the operation of the interim order would amount to usurpation of an office which employee was not entitled to hold. The action becomes irreversible as the salary paid to the employee cannot be taken away as he has worked during that period and the orders passed by him during the period he holds office (because of the interim order) cannot also be put at naught.” (Para 40) “Orders of suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, compulsory retirement or reversion of a public servant normally should not be interfered with at an interim stage as the employee can be suitably compensated in case the order of suspension, dismissal, removal, etc. is found not to be in order. The cases in which the operation of orders of dismissal, removal, termination etc. is stayed by way of interim order is later on upheld at the final stage then it results in wrong usurpation of the office by the employee during the operation of the interim order. This act becomes irreversible and the employer cannot be suitably compensated by moulding the relief at the final stage.” (Para-42) 40. In Ram Swarup Srivastava v. Allahabad District Cooperative Bank Allahabad and others, 2005 (2) ESC 1215 a Division Bench of this Court while considering the entitlement of arrears of salary to an employee who was wrongfully retired before attaining the age of superannuation, held that he is entitled for salary of the said period for which he was not allowed to work and was wrongly retired. It was noticed that the employee approached the Court before his retirement immediately after premature retirement was forced upon him by the employer but since no interim order was granted, he could not render any service and therefore he is entitled for salary of the said period. 41. It was noticed that the employee approached the Court before his retirement immediately after premature retirement was forced upon him by the employer but since no interim order was granted, he could not render any service and therefore he is entitled for salary of the said period. 41. Thus, it is important to notice at this stage that conduct of the employee in order to show his readiness by taking such steps as permissible in law to compel the employer to permit him to work is of utmost importance and this includes whether the employee took steps for preventing the employer from retiring him premature wrongfully well in time and where an employee has failed to approach the Court well in time, such relief has been denied on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence. Thus, while considering the question of arrears of salary where the employee could not work for an act of the employer which is found to be illegal or unauthorized, the direction for payment of full salary or arrears of salary is not automatic or mechanical but has to be considered in the light of the numerous attending circumstances and the facts of the case. 42. However with respect to entitlement of the petitioner for the aforesaid period, we, at this stage, do no express any final opinion since the matter is yet to be decided afresh by the authorities concerned and therefore we leave it open to the authorities to take a decision in the light of law as discussed above. 43. Before parting it may also be observed that during the pendency of this matter, petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation on 30.6.2001. 44. In the result, both the writ petitions are disposed of finally with the directions that the competent authorities shall take a final decision as required by the Tribunal vide judgment dated 1.3.1995 passed in claim petition No. 248 of 1991 and order dated 22.4.2002 passed in claim petition No. 2596 of 1997 within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. Consequently they will also take a decision in respect of entitlement of the petitioner for salary for the period he remained out of service i.e. 31.12.1978 to 6.4.1990. Consequently they will also take a decision in respect of entitlement of the petitioner for salary for the period he remained out of service i.e. 31.12.1978 to 6.4.1990. The said decision would also be taken within the aforesaid period in the light of the observations made above and law laid down in the cases as discussed above. The petitioner is not entitle for any arrears of salary for the period from 16.4.1974 to 30.12.1978 and the decision of the authorities and the Tribunal to this extant confirmed. Pensionary benefits of the petitioner shall also be calculated accordingly as consequence of the aforesaid final order passed in pursuance of this order within a further period of four months thereafter and the amount found payable to the petitioner shall be paid to him within further three months thereafter. 45. No order as to costs. ————