JUDGMENT 1. - In the writ petition preferred by the appellant before the Single Bench challenge was to the order of Government dated July 13, 1984 whereby the penalty of forfeiture of 50% pension of appellant for a period of ten years was imposed under Rule 170 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (for short `RSR'). Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated August 24, 1995. Hence this appeal. 2. Contextual facts depict that the appellant who had entered the service as Patwari retired on December 31, 1982 as Tehsildar (Conversion). Three days prior to his retirement, the appellant was served with a memorandum under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1958 (for short 'CCA Rules') proposing an inquiry against the appellant. The allegations incorporated in the memorandum were related to the period while the appellant was working as Assistant Settlement Officer (ASO). The appellant had remained posted as ASO from February, 1979 to September, 1982. The appellant submitted a detailed reply on December 31, 1982. On completion of inquiry, the Inquiry Officer placed his findings before the Chairman, Board of Revenue. The Chairman, Board of Revenue, forwarded the report to Governor seeking sanction under Rule 170 of RSR. The Government issued notice dated February 16, 1984 to the appellant proposing penalty of withholding of half of the pension for a period of ten years. The appellant submitted reply to the notice on April 19, 1984. The Government, thereafter, passed an order dated July 13, 1984 as indicated herein above. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the impugned order, placed reliance on various decisions of the Apex Court. In Union of India v. R.K. Desai, (1993) 2 SCC 49 , it was indicated that in case of a palpably erroneous decision, taken by virtue of his office, no disciplinary action would lie, but if the decision was taken pursuant to corrupt or improper motive, disciplinary action would lie. In Junjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409 it was held that failure to exercise quasi judicial power itself is not a misconduct because wrong decision is subject to judicial supervision in appeal. In Junjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409 it was held that failure to exercise quasi judicial power itself is not a misconduct because wrong decision is subject to judicial supervision in appeal. In Union of India v. A.N. Saxena, (1992) 3 SCC 124 , it was observed that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his action and only if the circumstances so warrent. The initiation of such proceedings is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. But it is not as if no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that as the respondent was performing judicial or quasi judicial functions in making assessment orders in questions even if his actions were wrong they could be corrected in an appeal or in revision and no disciplinary proceedings could be taken regarding such actions. 4. In Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC the question before the Supreme Court was whether the authority enjoys immunity from disciplinary proceedings with respect to the matter decided by him in exercise of quasi judicial functions. After scanning some of the earlier decisions it was observed in para 28, thus : "28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases : (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; (iv) If he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers. (v) If he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) If he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "tough the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great." 5. Considering of K.K. Dhawan (supra) the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680 , observed thus : "7. The decision in K.K. Dhawan case was considered by this Court and followed in Govt. of T.N. v. K.N. Ramamurthy, (1997) 7 SCC 101 . In that case the Tribunal had set aside the order imposing punishment on an officer who had been discharging judicial functions. The Court was of the view that the Tribunal's action was contrary to the several judgments of this Court and the settled law on the question. 8. In 1999 another Bench of Two Judges in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar, (1999) 7 SCC 409 , considered and referred to these earlier decisions. However, the Court appears to have reverted back to the earlier view of the matter where disciplinary action could be taken against an officer discharging judicial functions only where there was an element of culpability involved. Since in that particular case there was no evidence whatsoever that the employee had shown any favour of the assessee to whom refund had been made, it was held that the proceedings against him would not lie. In fact the Court set aside the disciplinary proceedings at the stage of the issuance of charge-sheet to the charged officer. Since in that particular case there was no evidence whatsoever that the employee had shown any favour of the assessee to whom refund had been made, it was held that the proceedings against him would not lie. In fact the Court set aside the disciplinary proceedings at the stage of the issuance of charge-sheet to the charged officer. 9. In our opinion, Nagarkar case was contrary to the view expressed in K.K. Dhawan case. The decision in K.K. Dhawan being that of a larger Bench would prevail. The decision in Nagarkar case, therefore, does not correctly represent the law. Inasmuch as the impugned orders of the Tribunal and the High Court were passed on the law enunciated in Nagarkar case this appeal must be allowed. The impugned decisions are accordingly set aside and the order of punishment upheld. There will be no order as to costs." 6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced before us. On surveying the material on record we notice that the appellant while serving as ASO had issued orders of transfer of Khatedari titles on the basis of mere possession and agreement between the parties. The orders were found without jurisdiction and against the provisions contained in the relevant statutory rules. The illegal act of appellant not only caused pecuniary loss of Stamp Duty and Registration Fee to the Government but was a gross misconduct on the part of the appellant as a as Government Servant. The transfer of immovable property of more than Rs. 100/- necessarily involved registration of transfer document under the Registration Act. Since there was prima facie material to show recklessness in the discharge of appellant's duty and he acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for devotion to duty, in our opinion inquiry under the CCA Rules was rightly initiated. The impugned decision of Government neither was illogical nor suffered from procedural impropriety. The role of court in determining the quantum of punishment is confined to see whether the Administrative Authority acted in deficiency of logic or moral standards. 7. In Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad, (2006) 10 SCC 388 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated that court's interference with the quantum of punishment cannot be a routine matter. The role of court in determining the quantum of punishment is confined to see whether the Administrative Authority acted in deficiency of logic or moral standards. 7. In Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad, (2006) 10 SCC 388 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated that court's interference with the quantum of punishment cannot be a routine matter. The court should not interfere with the Administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into correctness of the choice made by the Administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the Administrator. The scope of judicial review is to deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. 8. In State of Rajasthan v. Mohammad Ayub Naz, (2006) 1 SCC 589 the Apex Court observed that in determining the quantum, role of administrative authority is primary and that of court is secondary, confined to see if discretion exercised by the administrative authority caused excessive infringement of rights. 9. We thus find no substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. We are not supposed to go into correctness of the findings. arrived by the Disciplinary Authority and the Government. The scope of judicial review cannot be enlarged to the decision arrived under the RSR or CCA Rules. Judicial scrutiny of deficiency in decision making process can however be made but in the instant matter we do not see such deficiency. 10. For these reasons, we do not find any merit in the instant appeal and tiib-same accordingly stands dismissed.Appeal Dismissed. *******