JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard Sri B.P. Jauhari, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This is a writ petition on behalf of the tenant regarding a disputed premises House No. 68/17 Gandhi Nagar, Chhitwapur Pajawa, P.S. Husainganj, Lucknow. The contesting respondent is the landlady. A suit for eviction under Section 21(1)(a)(b) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred as the Act) was moved before the Prescribed Authority, which was numbered, as P.A. Case No. 2 of 2003. The ground for release was that the house in question is 100 years old and is in dilapidated condition. It can fall any moment, besides it requires reconstruction for personal use of the landlady. Previously one Smt. Jagpala was the owner and landlady who sold it to the present landlady vide sale deed dated 12.8.1983. The release application was contested by filing objection/written statement by the petitioner and after exchange of affidavits, the release application was allowed vide judgment dated 19.1.2007. The said judgment was challenged under Section 22 of the Act vide Rent Appeal No. 4 of 2007. The family of the landlady consists of herself, her husband, one son Praveen Kumar Shukla and his wife Poonam Shukla and also two daughters who are married but are residing with landlady. She has one room on ground floor along with kitchen. The disputed accommodation consisted of one room on the ground floor along with kitchen, one corridor and toilets. There are three small rooms, which have almost collapsed and is not livable. It was also contended that the tenant has acquired another house in vacant condition in Rajajipuram, Lucknow in the name of his son. In the circumstances, the trial court released the accommodation taking into consideration the fact that the tenant has acquired an accommodation within the municipal limits. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically challenged the two concurrent findings of the courts below. There are two submissions. The first submission is that the courts below have placed reliance on an affidavit in which the name of the deponent was not mentioned and even without ascertaining as to who had filed the affidavit, reliance was placed and the said affidavit is the basis for allowing the application. This affidavit has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 4. I have perused this document. This affidavit has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 4. I have perused this document. The very first paragraph of the affidavit shows that it is the applicant herself who is the deponent and in the concluding part of the affidavit, in verification clause it is specifically mentioned that it is the plaintiff who has filed the affidavit and in the column of the deponent, it is duly signed as ‘ Uma Shukla’ respondent No. 3. In the circumstances, the argument that reliance has been placed on a document without ascertaining the identity and the assertions made by a person whose name is not disclosed, is absolutely frivolous, baseless and without any substance. The next argument is that the release application was moved under Section 21(1)(a)(b) of the Act, therefore, the courts below should have ensured compliance of mandatory Rule 17 which has not been done in the instant case. This argument is also unsustainable in law. Certain conditions are required to be fulfilled which are enumerated in Rule 17 of the Rules. The four requirements are : (i) that the building requires demolition; (ii) that the proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared; (iii) that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law in that behalf for the time being in force, and (iv) that the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. 5. No doubt these requirements are to be fulfilled in case the building is released under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act simplicitor but this requirement has to be reasonably interpreted, specially where the release application is not only on the ground of it being in a dilapidated condition but also for personal need under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. This question was thoroughly gone into by this Court in the case of Binda Prasad v. lllrd Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 1984 (2) A.R.C. 306. In the instant case, the contention on behalf of the petitioner is farfetched and judgment can not be set aside merely because the landlady had not complied all the four conditions of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. In the instant case, the contention on behalf of the petitioner is farfetched and judgment can not be set aside merely because the landlady had not complied all the four conditions of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. In fact the tenant has no right to raise any objection for the reason that his son has already acquired another house in Rajajipuram which is a posh locality of Lucknow and Explanation to the 4th proviso of Section 21 of the Act comes into play in the instant case. For ready reference, Explanation to the 4th proviso is being quoted below : “Explanation.—In the case of a residential building— (i) where the tenant or any member of his family [who has been normally residing with him or is wholly dependent on him] has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained.” 6. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings of the courts below on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship do not meet the standard laid down by the Act or various decisions of the court is not sustainable. Admittedly the tenant’s son has shifted to another locality within the municipal limits therefore, he has no right whatsoever to raise any objection regarding the need or on the question that he will suffer greater hardship than that of the tenant. The appellate court had placed reliance on a decision in the case of Urmila Devi Telang v. IInd Additional District Judge, Etah (Allahabad), 1977 A.R.C. 456. 7. It is also noteworthy that the tenant-petitioner has failed to show whether he has made any effort to look for an alternative accommodation during pendency of the instant proceedings. In view of various decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Badri Narayan Chunni Lal Bhutade v. Govind Ram Ram Gopal Mundada, AIR 2003 SC 2713 and also this Court, Heera Lal v. 6th Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 2006(1) A.R.C. 142 and Hasmat Ali v. 6th Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 2005 ADJ 216, the tenant has no right to plead hardship. The balance of ‘comparative hardship’ tilts in favour of the landlord. 6. The balance of ‘comparative hardship’ tilts in favour of the landlord. 6. In the facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that there is no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. ————